









# MEMOIRS OF PRINCE CHLODWIG OF HOHENLOHE- SCHILLINGSFUE<sup>III</sup>RST

AUTHORISED BY PRINCE ALEXANDER  
OF HOHENLOHE-SCHILLINGSFUE<sup>III</sup>RST  
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## EDITORIAL PREFACE

ON March 31, 1901, Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, who had resigned the office of Imperial Chancellor in the previous autumn, kept his birthday at Colmar in the house of his son. After the birthday dinner he took the writer aside and surprised him with the question, "Will you help me to write my memoirs?" This led to a conversation in which the Prince expressed the desire to spend the rest of his life in arranging his papers and preparing them for publication. He proposed to send all his deeds and papers to Schillingsfürst, and invited me to visit him there for some weeks during the summer. We were then to look over the materials to hand and to arrange the plan of the book. In the event of his death the Prince told me that his son, Prince Alexander, would take possession of all his papers, and that his relations with myself had been already arranged. Decision upon matters of detail was postponed for those further discussions which were reserved for our summer meeting but were never held. At the beginning of July 1901, the Prince again visited Colmar, but he was a dying man and the end came a few days later in Ragatz. Thus he was denied the pleasure of personally beginning the last piece of work with which he proposed to conclude a long and laborious life. Prince Alexander and myself thus remained under the obligation of fulfilling the last desires of the Prince so far as possible. It must be said that after the Prince's death his project could never be more than imperfectly completed. He had intended to refresh his memory by a re-examination of his papers, and thus to become his own biographer. After his death all that can be done is to publish the papers which he has left behind in accordance with his desire so far as publication seems advisable.

From the year 1866 the Prince had been accustomed to keep a continuous record of his experiences and impressions, which he called his "Journal." The entries in this journal were completed by abstracts and copies of reports and letters which the Prince had preserved as possessing some autobiographical value. Had he been permitted personally to undertake the work of editing his memoirs, he would probably have amalgamated the journal and these documents into a uniform narrative. This he could not do, and it was impossible for the editor to make any attempt of the kind. A biography always gives that picture

of a character which the contemplation of its activities has evoked in the author's mind. Even had I considered myself competent to write such a biography of the Prince, the terms of my commission would have forbidden the attempt. The Prince asked me to help him to write *his* memoirs. For the accomplishment of this task it was an essential condition that the editor's personality should be as far as possible suppressed. Hence the form of the book in which the desires of the Prince are as nearly fulfilled as was possible after his death. The reader will see no figure before him but that of the Prince, and will hear the Prince's words or read the documentary evidence of his actions. No addition has been made beyond the insertion of such matters of fact as are indispensable to the full understanding of the material at my disposal.

For the period before the beginning of the journal the Prince left behind him nothing more than isolated descriptions of travel with political reflections. A diary begun in Coblenz in the year 1842 contains only a few entries intended to supplement his memory, and is also incomplete for the period. These deficiencies were partially filled by his letters to his mother and sister, the Princess Amalie. Thus it was possible to provide a first-hand account of the Prince's early development, the fragmentary character of which is compensated by the authenticity of the record.

Valuable additions to the Prince's personal papers were provided by communications from the widowed Princess Konstantin of Hohenlohe, *née* Princess of Sayn-Wittgenstein-Berleburg, and from the Prince's surviving sister, Princess Elise of Salm-Horstmar. To the kindly interest of these noble ladies is due the fact that during those later periods, when the papers of the Prince were chiefly restricted to political affairs, it was possible to give some account of his personal life and of his wider interests. This is especially true of the information concerning the last months of his life provided by the Princess of Salm-Horstmar.

I must avail myself of this opportunity to express my thanks to his Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Baden for his gracious permission to print certain of his letters to the Prince, especially those which throw most valuable light upon the struggles and difficulties of the transition period from 1866 to 1870 and also form a fine memorial of that unbounded confidence which united the Grand Duke and the Bavarian statesman.

My warmest thanks are due to my friend the Freiherr Julius v. Freyberg of Munich for information upon Bavarian affairs, and also to Professor Friedrich of Munich, whose kind information and provision of references greatly facilitated the editing of that part of the book which deals with the Vatican Council.

FRIEDRICH CURTIUS.

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YOUTH

1819-1847



## YOUTH

1819-1847

PRINCE CHLODWIG of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst was born at Rothenburg on the Fulda, on March 31, 1819. His father, Franz Joseph, was born at Kupferzell on November 26, 1787. At the age of seven Prince Franz was sent with his brother Albert to a Franciscan institute in Parma, and his recollections of this educational establishment were by no means agreeable. His education was completed at the Theresianum in Vienna, and he then entered a Hungarian hussar regiment. In 1804 he left the Hungarian for the Prussian service, and belonged for a year to a hussar regiment stationed at Ansbach. His commanding officer was Prince Solms, whose wife was the sister of Queen Louise, and afterwards became Queen Friederike of Hanover. When the Hohenlohe States were mediatised he left the service, and in the year 1807 his elder brother, Karl, the first of the Hohenlohe-Waldenburg line, gave him possession of the estate of Schillingsfürst with the consent of his collaterals. He became a hereditary legislator, and a "major" of Bavaria. He had abandoned the profession of arms much against his will, and solely out of affection for his mother; and as the estate of Schillingsfürst was not greatly productive, and was, moreover, burdened with heavy liabilities, the business of its administration proved an ungrateful task. From his early youth he had been in love with Princess Konstanze of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, but want of means delayed his marriage for seven years. His two brothers-in-law were the Landgrave Victor Amadeus of Hesse-Rothenburg, whose second wife was Princess Elise of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, sister of Princess Konstanze, and Count Moritz Fries, the husband of the Prince's sister, Princess Therese; they eventually removed the pecuniary obstacles to the Prince's marriage by the provision of an annual allowance. The marriage was celebrated on March 30, 1815, and the great happiness of his married life proved some compensation to the Prince for the abandonment of his military career. The young couple lived at first on the estate of Count Fries at Vöslau, near Vienna, and then alternately at Schillingsfürst and Rothenburg. The Landgrave, indeed, who had

no children, proposed to leave his allodial estates to the sons of his brother-in-law, and was anxious to share the responsibility of their education and the pleasure of watching their development. The journeys backwards and forwards between Schillingsfürst and Rothenburg took the most conspicuous place among Prince Chlodwig's early recollections.

The character of Prince Franz is thus described by his eldest daughter, the late Princess Theresa of Hohenlohe-Waldenburg: "His life was darkened by the abandonment of his military career. There was a strain of melancholy in his character, though he was a great wit and could be very merry on occasion. His kindness, courtesy, and amiability were infinite, and he was universally popular. History and politics interested him keenly, and he always said that he had a prophetic soul. He did, in fact, predict many events. It was with much reluctance that he left the peace of the home life in his beloved Schillingsfürst to take his large family to Hesse for the annual visit which was rarely missed; but his affection for his brothers obliged him to make this sacrifice to the pleasure of good Uncle Victor. He was not very fond of Corvey,\* and when staying there was always longing to get back to South Germany." This sketch may be supplemented by the words of a longstanding member of his family, Frau Schneemann (*née* Freiin von Etdorff), the governess of Princess Therese. She writes with regard to Prince Franz: "The light and lodestar of his existence was his love for his wife. Her loftiness of soul, her strength of character, and the fidelity of her love are above all praise. 'My wife fully justifies her name (Konstanze, Constance),' said the Prince, when praising the patient love and care with which she tended him in a long illness. He was not a profound student, but on many points his instinct proved more reliable than the judgment of many a scholar. History was his favourite study, and his criticisms were clear and impartial. Class prejudice he had none, and was ready to respect an honest and straightforward worker, whatever his rank in life. The spirit of Josephine which had purified the upper classes in Austria as elsewhere, for a time at least, had made a beneficial impression upon him. In his best moments the richness of his humour was delightful. Family life was everything to him. Unable at that time to serve his country, he took care that his children should grow up in an atmosphere of parental love. He constantly spent the evening with them, and their mutual confidence was absolutely unrestrained. The Princess was an aristocrat, but her inexorable common sense saved her from the errors committed by others of her class. Kindliness and enlightened religious opinions gave a special character to the every action of husband and wife. They were, in the true sense of the word, a

\* See p. 6.

noble prince and princess, and this because they were a noble man and woman."

The sons were brought up as Roman Catholics, while the daughters were trained in the faith of their Protestant mother. Religious toleration was thus for them the foundation and the indispensable condition of domestic happiness, and the dominant motives which guided the political career of Prince Chlodwig were the natural outcome of his tender affection for his Protestant sisters.

The boy received his first lessons with his brother Victor, afterwards Duke of Ratibor, who was born on February 10, 1818. The earliest account of their lives and lessons at this period is found in the following letter from their mother to a friend:

ROTHENBURG, *February 13, 1826.*

. . . Chlodwig is very amusing over his lessons, and the Chamberlain is always laughing at his drolleries. Both the boys are now having piano lessons. Father Ildephons gives them religious instruction, and is so extraordinarily kind and gentle that I am quite delighted with him. . . . In the afternoon they had a large children's party, and acted proverbs with great zest; this is almost a Sunday institution. Among other proverbs they recently performed "Throw a sprat to catch a salmon." Chlodwig was the salmon and Philipp Ernst \* the sprat; Otto Quessel threw the latter against Chlodwig with such violence that the unfortunate sprat tumbled down and roared loudly. A short time ago Chlodwig was asked in his geography lesson what the people were whose business it is to see that their subjects (*Untertanen*) obey the laws; he replied: "The objects (*Obertanen*)."  
Yesterday we had theatricals, that is to say, a kind of panorama, in which the battle of Leipzig was represented. The showman pointed to certain figures, and said that they represented the allied powers (*Mächte*), whereupon Chlodwig observed: "But I don't see any girls (*Mägde*)."  
A short time ago he was asked to give the half of 10, and replied: "o, because the two figures could be divided by a stroke, thus, 1/o."

The Coblenz diary † refers to the winter of 1830-1831 in Rothenburg in the following terms: "Broken health of body and mind; despondent imaginings."

From 1832 to 1833 the three Princes, Victor, Chlodwig, and Philipp Ernst, were sent to the Ansbach Gymnasium. Chlodwig was attacked by scarlet fever in the summer of 1833, and in the autumn of that year the diary again refers to "sick ness."

In October 1833 Victor and Chlodwig entered the Erfurt Gymnasium, and were placed in the *Tertia* (third form). "A

\* The third of the brothers, born on May 24, 1820.

† See Preface.

joyless and friendless life," is the diary reference to early days at Erfurt.

In 1834 the Prince was promoted to the *Secunda*. In the autumn of this year the diary observes: "Arrival of the whole family at the new inheritance; everybody ill." The fact was that the Landgrave Victor Amadeus had died on November 12, 1834, leaving to his nephews, the Princes Victor and Chlodwig, his allodial estates, the Duchy of Ratibor in Silesia, the Principality of Corvey in Westphalia, and the estate of Treffurt in the Government Department of Erfurt. Henceforward Corvey became the family home.

The first of the Prince's letters which has been preserved belongs to the summer of 1835. It was written during a walking tour through the Harz mountains, and is dated from the Brockenhaus, June 12, 1835. The letter describes the road through the "awful and romantic beauty of the Bodetal," and records with much satisfaction certain botanical discoveries. On the Brocken he found *trientalis Europæa* and the "Brocken myrtle."

The summer holidays were again spent by the family in Corvey, whence visits were exchanged with the Bückeburg Court. The Prince's social life during his school days is described in the following letter to his sister Amalie.\* She was eighteen months younger than himself, and their confidence became ever closer as he grew towards man's estate.

ERFURT, March 3, 1836.

. . . Yesterday evening we were at the house of the district doctor, where we spent a very pleasant evening, though the company was not numerous. First charades were played, and then there was dancing to the piano. Herr Golde played. This evening we are going for an hour or two to the Casino ball; we cannot get out of it, as this is the second time we have been invited, and we did not go before. . . .

Ketschau brought us a very fine song yesterday for bass voices, of his own composition; we are learning it now, and I am sure you will like it. Gustel's† new piano is splendid, and Ketschau says it has a better tone than the piano at Corvey; Gustel is always playing on it. I forgot to tell you that we had a very pleasant visit to Weimar a short time ago. A new opera by Auber was produced with immense splendour, the *Ballnacht*. I can say nothing about the music, for I sat next to the Grand Duke,‡ and he talked nearly all the time. The Weimar family are tremendously civil. They have asked us to a concert next Sunday, but of course we are not going. The Grand Duke also spoke of a State ball.

\* Born August 31, 1821.

† The Cardinal of later years; born February 26, 1823. He entered the Erfurt Gymnasium, as also did Prince Philipp Ernst.

‡ Karl Friedrich (1828-1853).



We have a great deal to tell one another, and I am eagerly looking forward to the Easter holidays. Give my love and kind remembrances to everybody,

Ever your loving

CHLODWIG.

In the autumn of 1836 the diary notes: "Fears of the approaching *abiturient* (leaving certificate) examination. Solitary rides."

At the request of Prince Franz Joseph the Minister Altenstein issued a decree on April 28, 1837, admitting the Princes Victor and Chlodwig under exceptional circumstances to the *abiturient* examination, though they had been in the *Prima* for little more than a year. Chlodwig announces his success in the examination to his sister in the following letter:

ERFURT, June 1, 1837.

To-day I write my last letter from Erfurt; perhaps we shall arrive before it. The examination took place this morning, and the business actually lasted from eight to one o'clock. Naturally we are glad to see the end of it, partly because one is always glad to have an examination over, partly because we are delighted at the prospect of coming home. We have not yet received our certificates. At the end of the affair, the Landrat Türk (presiding examiner) told us that we had passed without difficulty. So we are now free from anxiety, though we shall be even more so at Corvey with you than here. Packing is going on vigorously, and there is plenty of "row," as they call it. We have a heap of visits to pay to-morrow. After all, there is always something sad in leaving people with whom one has spent three years. But hope overcomes the unpleasantness of the moment, the hope of seeing you all again. . . .

The formal leave-taking of the Prince took place on June 3. In his farewell speech, the *Direktor* (headmaster) Strass said: "One of the triumphs of the age and of its learning is to be seen in the fact that young German Princes are not content to rely upon the achievements of their great ancestors, but are desirous of proving their own value by showing themselves worthy sons of those progenitors; thus they make it impossible for envy and malice to deny them that recognition which is now more than ever their due. By entering into that open field of competition where a man can secure respect only by his actions and his character, they have put to shame purse-proud indolence, complacent emptiness, and presumptuous ignorance, the forwardness of the boor and the underhand intrigues of the hypocrite, while they have also secured a higher place in the ranks of their equals."

Prince Chlodwig's certificate praises his high moral character,

his talents and his industry. "Ever distinguished by moral earnestness and good behaviour, honourably desirous to be blameless in every respect, and to succeed by his own efforts, the Prince invariably secured the sincere respect of his companions, and the warm affection of all his masters. His excellent abilities were stimulated and developed at an early date, and found congenial employment in the various branches of learning. His attention and eager interest in every subject of instruction was a marked feature, and was evidenced by his indefatigable industry both in school-work and private study." As regards the attainments of the Prince in the various subjects of the curriculum, special emphasis was laid upon his German, and his "power of grasping the essential points of a subject, and of arranging them in logical order." "He writes," the document continues, "correctly and fluently, and his poetical essays show much life and imagination."

On June 23 the Prince matriculated at Göttingen, and attended Mühlenbruch's lectures on the Institutes during that summer. In September he made a tour from Corvey through Driburg to Paderborn, Iserlohn, Barmen and Elberfeld, Cologne, Bonn and Neuwied. The diary of this tour has been preserved, and contains lively and vivid descriptions which show that the young traveller was possessed of a keenly inquiring mind. During the winter of 1837-38 the Prince attended Mühlenbruch's lectures on the Pandects, "without understanding them," as the diary observes. He also attended Herbart's lectures on logic and on elementary philosophy.

The only record in the diary of the Easter vacation at Corvey runs: "Sentimental. Beautiful April. Read Werther."

During the summer semester of 1838 the Prince studied at Bonn. The diary refers to his social companions among his contemporaries; these were the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, the Princes of Schaumburg-Lippe and Löwenstein, the future Duke Ernst II. of Saxony, and his brother, Prince Albert, afterwards consort of Queen Victoria.

Information about social life in Bonn is provided by a letter to Princess Amalie:

BONN, *July 20, 1838.*

. . . Our mode of life here is almost equally divided by study and amusement. I had begun a letter to you, but my visit to Bückeburg prevented its completion. We were invited to Godesberg, where a splendid dinner awaited us. The Prince was very kind and the Princess also, though the latter seemed to keep a sharper eye upon us than before: perhaps she did not quite trust us, or she was looking to see which of the eight Princes would be most suitable for her daughters. I was not so fortunate as to have much of her conversation, as I was not often placed next to her. In the evening we went up to the Godesberg ruins, and an old Count Beust, to the general amusement, talked

Count Erbach over a vineyard wall. Both were so absorbed in their conversation that they did not notice the proximity of the precipice until Erbach found himself at the bottom of it. Of course, he was not hurt. The next day there was a professors' dinner at the Prince's house, at which we were not present. In the afternoon we made an excursion with the Prince's family to the Rosenburg and Kreuzberg, and took tea in Godesberg. Then there was a general leave-taking. The Princess Mathilde\* looks very well.

On Monday the Duke of Coburg† is returning here from England. . . . You will see that life here is by no means monotonous. We are sowing seed for the future, which should bring forth valuable fruit.

Our swimming lessons from one to three o'clock every day are extremely pleasant. We are a cheerful and noisy company — the Hereditary Prince, the Prince of Coburg, the Prince of Löwenstein, Erbach, and myself. We have had a boat built to suit us, which bears our several flags and in which we row ourselves.

At the beginning of the vacation of 1838 the Prince made a tour in Switzerland with his brothers Victor and Philipp Ernst. The tourists travelled up the Rhine to Mannheim and Leopoldshofen. There they left the steamer and passed through Karlsruhe, Baden, Freiburg, and the Höllental to Schaffhausen, Zürich, and Zug, over the Rigi to Lucerne, Langnau, and Bern, and finally through Lausanne to Geneva, where they stayed at the Hotel des Bergues. After an excursion to Chamonix, they settled in Plongeon, near Geneva, to pursue the study of French. Their stay does not seem to have been devoted exclusively to educational purposes, for the diary reports: "Follies, fine evenings, recollections! Philipp Ernst and myself thoughtful under the chestnut-trees. Miss Jones."

In November the Princes moved to Lausanne; the diary refers to their stay as "sad days," perhaps with reference to the greater cheerfulness of life at Plongeon. A letter from the Prince to his sister, under date December 18, is written in French and gives proof of the industry and zeal with which the writer pursued his studies. Vaudois society received the German Princes with much kindness, and in this connection we hear of M. de Blonay, Mesdemoiselles de Seigneur, and Madame de Gingins; also of the Baron de Chavette, whose wife was a daughter of the Duc de Berry. The Prince attended lectures in the Academy, and was constantly present at the sessions of the Vaudois Assembly. About noon he usually "walked alone and gave audience to his own thoughts, which turned chiefly upon recollections of the past, plans for the future, and *soi-disant* philosophical, or possibly misanthropical and philanthropical, speculations." A

\* Afterwards Duchess of Württemberg (1818-1891).

† Ernst I. (1784-1844).

society was formed by seven young men in the *pension*, and included the three Princes, two Kantakuzeni, a Dutchman, and a Swiss; the society possessed a president, vice-president, and secretary, and discussed political questions in French. "We generally discuss politics," he writes to Princess Amalie on January 15, 1839. "Discussion sometimes grows so fierce that the members turn white, green, and red. We defend our position and they theirs, from their liberal standpoint. Afterwards our former relations are resumed, and every one adheres to his own opinion. We have constantly attended the sessions of the Grand Conseil du Canton de Vaud the Legislative Assembly. The arguments are often terrible stuff — bad logic as well as bad politics. The local peasantry have a certain veneer of education, which is really worse than none. Their culture is only on the surface. But the fellows plume themselves upon their wisdom, boast of their fine republic, and so forth. I never felt so strong an aristocrat and monarchist as in this republic. I hate the Radicals more than ever, now that I have been behind the scenes and learned the nature of their egotistical projects. However, one must give many of the members their due — for instance, Professor Monnard, whose name you may have seen in the newspapers. People cry out against him as a radical, but he is nothing more than a simple republican, and in a republic he could hardly be anything else. He is a very noble and high-minded character, and the best speaker in the Grand Conseil. It is very interesting to see the working of this constitution, which is quite new to us.

You cannot imagine the pleasure of talking French in society. Now that I have attained some fluency, I become more and more convinced that French is the one language for conversation. One can talk the whole evening without saying anything. Several Frenchmen are here just now whose conversation is full of interest at times — for instance, the well-known Carlist, Chavette, a very nice fellow."

The Princes made a tour in Italy from March 5 to April 29, and went as far as Naples. In Rome they met Prince Albert of Coburg.

In May 1839 a move was made to the University of Heidelberg. Among his fellow students the Prince's diary names the Prince Karl Egon of Fürstenberg (born March 4, 1820), Count Erbach-Erbach (born November 27, 1818), and the Marshals of Baden, Dusch and Sternberg. The Prince's letters to his sister testify to his great industry. Every morning he worked from five to ten o'clock; lectures\* then began, and only the evenings were reserved for recreation.

\* In the summer of 1839 the Prince attended lectures upon feudal law, general European International law, general and German constitutional law by Zachariä, upon criminal law by Zöpfl, upon psychology and Goethe's *Faust* by Reichlin-Meldegg; in the winter of 1839-40 he followed courses on German constitutional law by Morstadt, on Catholic and

HEIDELBERG, *June 30, 1839.*

. . . Lectures are a magnificent spectacle during the hot weather, as it is the custom here for students to take off their coats. A very disgusting custom, too, as the original whiteness of their shirt-sleeves is a matter of conjecture, from which fact other inferences may be made.

I am working hard now, and go out very little; I sometimes get a ride in the evening with Fürstenberg and Erbach, or a walk with Sternberg and a certain Herr Uhde of Dresden. The last named, a friend of Sternberg's, is very pleasant and intelligent. I prefer these walks to any other form of excursion, and certainly to the long rides with a large number of friends, on which Erbach is very keen; on these occasions he generally insists on riding through the streets five abreast.

*To his MOTHER.*

HEIDELBERG, *August 5, 1839.*

. . . Prince Wilhelm of Prussia (the King's son) was expected in Heidelberg in the afternoon, but did not arrive until eleven o'clock at night. We could not possibly call upon him then. To-day we learned that he was staying until half-past eleven, so we (Victor and I) paid our call to-day. He received us very kindly, asked how long our studies were to continue, &c. . . . He seemed to be pleased by our inquiries after his health, which is said to have been very indifferent. As we went away he shook hands, and hoped we would work hard that we might be better fitted for the duties of life. This wish has reassured me considerably with regard to my plans for the future, as he must have assumed that I should enter the Civil Service, because he wished me success in my legal studies (I had previously mentioned that I was thus occupied). Moreover, we may also infer that he is not surprised at our long absence from Berlin. It is assumed that we are to learn something, before we present ourselves at Court. All this is mere conjecture, but so much and more may be inferred from the tone and course of the conversation.

The vacation\* was spent amid the pleasures of family life at Corvey.

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Protestant ecclesiastical law by Zachariä, on the history of the German States and constitutions by Zöpfl, and on the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel by Reichlin-Meldegg.

\*"It was very pleasant," writes the Prince's surviving sister, the Princess of Salm-Horstmar, "when the brothers came home for the vacations from the University and brought some life into the great Castle of Corvey. My sister Amalie would sit at the piano in the splendid large room and accompany my brother Chlodwig, who had a fine baritone voice, or would sing duets with him. I was then a small child, and looked with admiration upon my brother and sister. My sister would also accompany herself upon the harp. My other brothers were fond of drawing, especially Philipp Ernst, whose life was to be so short."

The studies at Heidelberg were then resumed and continued over Christmas without interruption. "A quiet Christmas," says the diary. On Christmas Day the Prince writes to his sister:

"I am now reading Müller's letters to Bonstetten. Nothing so inspires the ordinary man as to see how great men, the glorious phenomena of the intellectual world, rose by their own efforts, though also with the help of 'genius,' to a height which we poor sublunary mortals can only admire. I have bought a Latin copy of Thomas à Kempis. It is a revelation in the original: a fine strong language the spirit of which does not lend itself to a German translation. And the meaning can only be grasped in its entirety in the original."

HEIDELBERG, *January 25, 1840.*

Our life is at present diversified by many distractions in the form of evening entertainments, which contribute little to the study of jurisprudence, little to the study of people not worth studying, and nothing at all to our personal pleasure. However, I must not do any one an injustice. A few days ago Philipp Ernst and myself had a very pleasant time at Count Rantzau's house. He has a small reading circle where parts are distributed and tragedies read. *The Merchant of Venice* was read when we were there. We both took parts, and on the whole amusement is not lacking.

We are delighted with the kind letter which Prince Albert sent in reply to our congratulations.\* It was a really kind and sympathetic letter. I am looking forward to a ball which the Grand Duke† is soon to give at Mannheim. One of my fancies is a growing preference for the society of large towns as against that of small, though the results in either case are the same. The evening parties sometimes given by Count Rantzau are, in the first place, entertaining; and further, instead of the odious gossip and the *médisances* of scandal-mongers male and female, one can indulge in sensible conversation and avoid that *horreur des horreurs*, the affectations of a provincial tea-party. I know that *il faut savoir s'ennuyer avec grâce! Bien! mais je n'ai pas le temps de m'ennuyer.* On the other hand, I must admit that one ought not to despise tiresome parties so absolutely. In every company of people there is an element of interest which ought to be discovered and stimulated. The man who is bored usually has only himself to blame, and he ought to determine not to be bored. For instance, a short time ago I took a young Polish countess in to supper. She was said to be a poor conversationalist, and generally has nothing to say. My lucky star led me to begin upon a topic which proved surprisingly successful and attracted the general attention to the liveliness and the

\* On his betrothal to Queen Victoria.

† The Grand Duke Leopold of Baden.

excellent French of this usually silent lady. So I say that a man who is bored has only himself to blame. In the case of unintellectual people who cannot express themselves one must be content to study their character and to compare their stupidity with one's own — a process which in my case has often led to pleasant and often to sad results; in other words, one must be contented to remain a psychologist, an investigator of mental powers. Only thus can one retain one's own character in the presence of a scoundrel, one's small intellectual powers before a fool, and one's cheerfulness before a grave-digger.

In a letter of February 13, 1840, the Prince speaks of the pleasures of music, and concludes with the words, "without music man is but half complete."

Speaking of foolish and uninteresting society, he says: "It has happened to me to stand by a lady with such a lack of interest in her that I was able to run over the whole of my revision-lecture for the next day." The Prince also felt strongly about the "anti-pietist" movement which arose in Heidelberg. "The greatest philosophers," he writes, "have been led back to the fundamental truths of Christianity in the course of their investigations, and have been astounded by the magnificence of these truths; yet insignificant creatures, unworthy to loose their philosophical shoe-strings, would cast off the faith and the principles of true piety."

At the beginning of March 1840, the Prince was present at the carnival of Mannheim. Thence he writes on March 2: "Yesterday there was a really magnificent pageant here; a hunting procession in costume from the earliest times of German history to the present day. Splendid dresses, beautiful horses, a hundred chief figures and many attendants. The local gentlemen, officers and others, organised the undertaking at much expense and with great historical accuracy."

The Easter holidays were spent at Corvey, and University work was resumed in the spring of 1840.\* The Prince's letters to his sister are full of his delight with the situation of the new house on the Neckar.

"The University has not as yet entirely assembled," he writes on May 9, 1840. "Mittermaier and Rau, two of our best professors, are still at the Landtag, which I have so often and so comprehensively anathematised. I am at some pains to avoid the use of even stronger language in description of this idiotic assembly. These chattering institutions have never made me so angry as now, when we are suffering under them ourselves. If I ever get an opportunity of venting my indignation upon them and their like, I shall seize it."

\* During the summer semester of 1840 the Prince attended lectures on Roman civil law and procedure and on the Roman testamentary law by Deurer, on civil procedure by Mittermaier, on natural law by Röder, on political economy by Rau, and, finally, special lectures by Zöpfl on German constitutional law and civil procedure.

In September of the same year the Prince was invited to Windsor by Prince Albert, whose marriage with Queen Victoria had been celebrated on February 10. The Prince was in England from September 20 to 24, but, unfortunately, the only records of this visit are the names of persons and places of interest. The rest of the autumn vacation was spent at Corvey, but was interrupted by a journey to Berlin for the act of homage on October 15 and to Silesia. Then followed "cheerful wedding-days," when his eldest sister, Therese (born April 19, 1816), was married to Prince Friedrich Karl of Hohenlohe-Waldenburg; the ceremony took place at Langenburg on November 26, 1840. Shortly afterwards Prince Franz Joseph fell seriously ill, though this did not prevent the Prince from concluding his studies. Bonn was chosen for his preparation for the examination. "The winter months here are very quiet and sad," says the diary.

On January 14, 1841, the Prince Franz Joseph died. "A sad journey to Corvey. Return to Bonn," says the diary. The preparation for the examination admitting to the legal profession (*Auskultator*) was now completed, and the Prince sat for his examination on April 3 in Coblenz. According to the certificate dated April 10 he displayed "unusual knowledge and capacity." When the examination was over the Prince employed his leisure in visiting his relations. The diary observes: "Pleasant journey to Castell by way of Meiningen, Langenburg, Kupferzell, and Wickersheim. Wonderful May weather. Cheerful recollections of a joyous union." A page of the diary informs us of his state of mind.

KUPFERZELL, May 6, 1841.

Why, among the many hearts that can feel, should it not be possible to find one capable of understanding us because it tenderly loves us? How true it is that the differences between people largely consist in their varying possession of that most individual characteristic, the power of feeling. Education, environment, difference of inclination and talent necessarily imply a different point of view in any two individuals. But is the power of "understanding" a person — I use the term in its consolatory sense — merely the product of these influences? Surely the true consolatory "understanding" consists rather in the appreciation of another person's ideas, of new points of view, in receptivity to another's sorrows, and in all other impressions of the kind, in an ever-intensified harmony of two kindred souls. Is any other theory desirable or possible, and is this one impossible? At any rate I do not abandon hope!

After their father's death the brothers had agreed that the third of them should be Prince in Schillingsfürst as the two elder were provided with the Rothenburg inheritance, Victor in Ratibor and Chlodwig in Corvey. In June 1841 the Prince travelled to



Silesia to visit his elder brother, who had gone into residence at the Castle of Rauden, near Ratibor, on November 3, 1840. A further object of this journey was to enter into relations with the leading personalities of the Prussian Ministry with the intention of securing admission to the Prussian Diplomatic Service. The Prince resolved to prefer a request to the King that he might be excused the necessity of performing the prescribed preliminary service under the judicial and administrative authorities — a regulation which the high nobility regarded as somewhat derogatory. On September 21, 1841, he wrote to his mother from Rauden: “. . . Our journey to Breslau went off very well. I had an interview with Count Stolberg, who was very kind and encouraging. We have been received in the kindest manner by the high society of Breslau, especially by the Prince of Prussia, and on this Count Styrum observed: ‘*On voit que le roi vous veut du bien. a votre place j’en profiterais*’; and turning to Victor he said: ‘*Il n’y a pas d’autre moyen d’en profiter, Monseigneur, que d’entrer au service militaire.*’ But this Victor cannot do. . . .”

In pursuit of his intentions Prince Chlodwig spent the autumn in Berlin. “Fine promises,” observes the diary. At the end of the autumn he went to Corvey to await the decision. It was, however, long delayed. In his impatience he began to consider the advisability of renouncing his hopes of a Government post and of living in Corvey as an independent nobleman. But the passion for politics was rooted in him, and was far too strong to permit the permanent abandonment of his original intention. Thus he writes to his mother from Corvey on November 23, 1841: “My stay here has shown me more clearly the impossibility of settling here definitely, which in its way is no bad thing. I am now setting forth homeless through the world, and must zealously pursue some prospect of entering a profession, and in this quest homelessness is the best condition to be in. . . . If I could only be certain of my future and settle my plans for the winter! If I cannot enter the Diplomatic Service I shall try to enter the English military service and then join the Chinese expedition. But this plan is as yet quite vague.”

CORVEY, December 19, 1841.

. . . I have just received a letter from Löwenstein which has decided me to start for Berlin at once. I think Stolberg cannot have given my letter to the King. However, that does not matter now; I shall stay the winter in Berlin and settle down there. If I meet with a refusal I shall wait till spring and see what else there is to do.

From Berlin he wrote to his mother on January 3, 1842: “I have your dear letter of the 21st, and thank you most heartily for your wishes and hopes. I will gather my forces for an advance

upon the object which I have set before me. Nobody can advise an individual upon his future life; I have had far too much advice already, both about the end and the means, and for this reason I have often been led astray, but I think I pretty well understand my position at present. I am beginning to work and to see and hear a lot. I go about a great deal, and I have very pleasant society in the Fürstenbergs, Löwenstein, and other very nice people."

*January 17, 1842.*

Unfortunately, I have no very good news for you to-day. I have an answer from the King in the negative. It runs as follows:

YOUR HIGHNESS, — I have requested a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs upon your Highness's wish, communicated to me on October 19, respecting your admission to the examination for the Diplomatic Service without undergoing the preliminary training in judicial and administrative practice hitherto obligatory. In view of the report I hesitate to comply with your request, and my decision is determined not only by the general considerations upon the present conditions of the service examination which the report brings to my notice, but chiefly by personal regard for the interests of your Highness. You cannot fail to see, as I see, that to grant the preference which your Highness desires would be to place you in a position of some inferiority to those with whom the Diplomatic Service would bring you into association. In consequence, it will be a pleasure to me if your Highness will pursue your desire of beginning a diplomatic career in our service, by first complying with the general regulations existing upon this head.

Your Highness's affectionate friend,

FRIEDRICH WILHELM.

BERLIN, *January 14, 1842.*

Thus the matter now stands. You may well imagine that my state of mind is by no means cheerful.

The Prince, however, overcame the prejudice of the media-tised against the obligatory training in the Prussian Civil Service, and agreed to follow the course which the King had indicated. On April 6, 1842, he went to Coblenz to work as *Auskultator* in the law courts.

The diary complains of the "monotony of the first days," gives the names of the people he met at dinner, chiefly officers and functionaries, and the visits which he paid. Among others, the Chief President von Bodelschwingh is mentioned as "a very agreeable man whose face betokens the uprightness of his character and the nobility of his mind, as well as his high intelligence."

The Prince soon found complete satisfaction in the serious work of legal practice, and his spare time was employed in hard study. "The meaning and delight of real hard work," says the diary, "I experienced to-day and yesterday to the full, in the careful study, pen in hand, of the work of Bülow-Cummerow.\* When the intellectual life revives, all minor external cares disappear, life loses its monotony and I begin once again to live. It was fortunate that the King's decision sent me back to the realities of life. The form of judicial procedure customary here gives me no insight into the Prussian system, but the training which I am gaining from it, and the power of clear and definite judicial thought, is even more valuable. Circumstances have shown me that my stay here was necessary, and that there was no other course open to me. I must make the best I can of it.

"One advantage I am obliged to do without, and yet I need it so greatly: a friend or any soul in whom I can thoroughly confide and to whom I can tell my sorrows and my joys. Except Philipp Ernst and Victor, I have never had any one of the kind. Sternberg,† a noble sympathetic character with high ideals, has been the only friend of the kind with the exception of those two (and mother and Amalie). Alas! why is man so distant with his unfortunate fellow men? Why should an unhappy soul torment itself throughout the paltry span of human life? And to what end? Merely to die; and yet they all pass to and fro unheeding, make their plans, torture and deceive themselves."

April 11, 1842.

The homely manners of the Coblenz high society do not altogether please one. One misses the aplomb and the lack of restraint which characterise the great world. An evening party is an extraordinary event in a small town and seems to throw every guest into a state of surprise which speedily tends to vulgarity, unless natural good-breeding holds the balance.

On April 12, the diary complains of "intellectual indolence, the result of idleness in Berlin." "What a wholly different character I might have become had I remained free from strict domestic supervision from my sixteenth year onwards. I should have committed many follies and perhaps have gone to the devil. But it seems to me, though I do not complain of the past, that I might have become a better man. A passive and dreamy character weak in action requires the stimulus of being left to act for itself,

\* Von Bülow-Cummerow, *Preussen: seine Verfassung und Verwaltung, sein Verhältnis zu Deutschland*. Berlin, 1842. Cf. Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. v. p. 198.

† Freiherr August von Ungern-Sternberg was a fellow student of the Prince at Bonn and Heidelberg. He was born at Mannheim on August 16, 1817, and died March 20, 1895. He was then Privy Councillor to the Grand Duke of Baden and President of the Privy Council of Karlsruhe.

and must not be allowed to let things slide if it is really to develop. I am by nature passive, and this continuous state of tutelage has given me a great capacity for introspection, I can hardly say for philosophy, but has contributed in no way to the strengthening of my character. Upon this latter object my efforts must now be concentrated.

To PRINCESS AMALIE.

COBLENZ, May 3, 1842.

. . . You are right when you think that I can never be unhappy, I mean really unhappy. The power to appreciate unhappiness and to think about it will save me from ever being entirely crushed by it. "The only man who is really unhappy is the man who is unable to weep over his troubles;" I shall put this into a novel some day. This brings a poem to my mind which I have recently composed and which fits very well here. It is in the so-called *gazel* metre:

Clouds o'ercast with gloom the sky;  
Wilted blossoms droop the head;  
Waters cease their lullaby.  
Comes a boding hush of dread  
O'er the parching face of earth.  
Ah, the signs of thunder-shower  
In the sultry summer days  
Oft recall each weary hour  
When the worn, long hardened heart  
Yearns for tear-drops' softening power.

You are right when you envy me my pleasant stay here. For almost three weeks the weather has been so warm that everything is calling for rain. The fruit blossom is almost over, and the woods are beginning to grow green. It is a beautiful sight to behold the silvery moonlight reflected in the Rhine and the dark mountains and the noble Ehrenbreitstein opposite me. Were it not for the beauties of nature I should be unhappy in spite of all my philosophy, for the natives are anything but oreads or hamadryads. I have made the acquaintance of many excellent people, and many of them I like very well. But they like distinction and the power of taking things for granted; you will understand what I mean. It is a faculty only found in well-bred or cosmopolitan people. My social amenities are more or less confined to those of the "how-do" type, even in the case of the most superior ladies, Excellencies, &c. (with honourable exceptions). A fair widow . . . twenty-one years of age, with a very beautiful contralto voice, pleases at the first glance. But an attentive listener speedily discovers a lack of proper training in her singing, and similarly her manners soon displayed, to my thinking, a kind of rustic vulgarity, tempered by an acquaintance with sentimental literature and with the English language, a

mixture even more disagreeable to my mind than the unadulterated country bumpkin who is neither able nor wishes to be other than he is. The old ladies are great bores, and I miss my talks with my Berlin lady friends, Frau von Luck and others. Among the men, and indeed throughout the country, notwithstanding their Rhenish good-nature, a certain pot-house tone prevails which galls me exceedingly. The sole consolation here is music. Everybody is musical, and the charming Frau . . . and her sister . . . sing and play at every party from the beginning to the end; a chorus or a trio or a quartette or something of the kind is then sung and *Maitrank* is handed round; so the evening passes and one quite enjoys oneself. My singing powers have not yet been discovered. I now take singing lessons regularly, and after some practice shall suddenly appear the only decent baritone in the town and enchant everybody. My teacher is not so bad, he makes me sing the *soljeggi* of Cherubini, drums the notes into me, and is anxious that I should be able to sing at sight in two months. Think what a pleasure that will be! I am also learning to understand the scales, B flat minor, C major, the minor keys, accidentals, &c. I shall soon have got far enough to compose songs, and my teacher will then have to accompany me.

Yesterday I went to Neuwied and cannot say enough in praise of the good people there. I had feared they would look at me askance on account of my position as *Auskultator*, but, on the contrary, I was received with astonishment as an extraordinary phenomenon. This calmed my fears entirely. For such is human nature; man looks for outward approval though he should be satisfied with the consciousness that his motives are pure. The Prince\* has something very interesting in his suffering face; his fine eyes contrast in an extraordinary manner with the deathly pallor of his complexion; he is said to be very talented, draws beautifully, &c. I liked him at first sight and much regret his shattered health. Schönlein† was here a short time ago, and gave great hopes of improvement; he is in fact somewhat better. Prince Max is a capable and talkative man. Prince Karl often used to see papa and mamma in Vienna, and looked back upon that time with much pleasure. Prince Philipp Löwenstein came in during dinner, *jeune homme fort élégant* as usual and *rajeuni* if possible. He seemed never tired of saying to me, "Why, you are looking very well."

Last summer you observed that the air of the pine woods has a bad influence, and here the contrary observation seems indicated that spring air on the Rhine exerts a good influence. When I take my evening walk along the most frequented of the paths by the Rhine, I find even the most prosaic Philistines inspired by a kind of poetical illumination which is quite touching. And yet

\* Prince Hermann of Wied (1814-1846).

† The famous Berlin pathologist.

no other result is conceivable; when the cool Rhine breeze comes down laden with the scent of flowers, no matter how sad my thoughts, straightway my whole being is cheered, and I look with keener pleasure upon the golden hills and the peaceful church towers of the opposite villages. Then the evening bells begin to ring, and I am borne perforce into that heavenly frame of mind which excludes all earthly wishes, except that you might be here with me.

This letter has been at a standstill for several days; an excursion to Frankfurt, and the sense of isolation which follows the conclusion of these steamer trips prevented me from writing. In Frankfurt I sat opposite to Paul, Duke of Württemberg during lunch; he talked incessantly, the more so as his neighbour Rüppell,\* one of the most famous travellers of the day, was good enough to act as gutter-spout for the trickle of his stories. It was all I could do to avoid laughing at the fellow, nice as he is.

The steamer was as utterly wearisome as ever. Moreover, I made the acquaintance of a young Saxon officer whose behaviour was entirely governed by those "manuals of polite society," as they are called, and who consequently proved a terrible bore. Now I am sitting again at my desk studying my statutes and rejoicing over a Havana cigar (50 thalers a thousand, tell this to Victor) and a cup of coffee.

I advise you to keep my letters, as I keep yours and, in fact, all that I receive. Even if we do not hereafter publish the Bettina correspondence it will be interesting to read it again in after years. When we afterwards secure some measure of personal success it is pleasant to look back upon the path by which we have travelled.

Tell Victor that if the Arnims† come to Winkel-am-Rhein, I shall go there and hope to spend some pleasant hours (in the society of Bettina).

### *From the Journal.*

*June 3, 1842.*

From May 3 to June 3 my activity has been interrupted by an attack of measles. Unpleasant as such an illness is, it has this benefit, that it entirely absorbs any superfluous energy, and I must admit that this illness and my solitary studies and self-questionings have done much to clear my mind. I have even come to love this solitude; the monotony of a sick-bed, provided one is in no special pain, gives many pleasant hours to any one capable of thought, and some sad moments also, for "it brings one back to the question that torments the sick, but never the healthy man." The noise of the children was abominable, and if I had any thought

\* Eduard Rüppell (1794-1884), naturalist and traveller in Egypt, Nubia, and Arabia.

† The Prince had made the acquaintance of Bettina von Arnim in Berlin in the winter of 1841-42.

of marriage it would be postponed for ten years by the outcries of my housemates. There is nothing more unpleasant in the world than a crying child.

As soon as I can get to work again, I shall have to begin a thorough study of constitutional law. Nothing is more dangerous than a state of mental indolence when engaged in the study of constitutional questions. Without thorough training, we become, especially in the Public Service, either mere tools or fickle weather-cocks, or one-sided characters, easily absorbed by party considerations. Thoroughness is the only means by which to preserve integrity of character.

August 16, 1842.

. . . There is something sad about the lives of our modern youth in their constant praise of "freedom." Any one who finds satisfaction in immorality is certainly welcome to such freedom. But in this freedom of the old bachelor lie terrible possibilities of selfishness and heartlessness.

September 11, 1842.

I have been studying the report of Marheineke upon the Bruno Bauer affair\* in which his arguments are by no means logical, as the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* show. It must, however, be said that want of logic may easily result if passages torn from their context are fitted together, as they are in the *Jahrbücher*.

In the course of the summer the Prince was invited to an evening party at the Castle of Bruhl, where he was very kindly received by the King and Queen. Among the guests the diary mentions the Duke of Cambridge, the Prince of Orange, the Archduke Johann of Austria, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and the Hereditary Prince of Baden; "the latter extremely agreeable." At the concert the sisters Milanollo played.

In September the Prince and his brother Gustav made a journey to Lausanne, by way of Strassburg, Basle, Solothurn, and Bern. Here the diary observes on September 27:

"Notwithstanding all this pleasure I cannot say that I am so attracted by it as before, or that I could give up everything to remain here for the rest of my life. Perhaps I am now becoming too thoroughly German. Perhaps also my troubled state of mind and my rising ambition are also responsible for this change. A man must make trial of life in his youth; must see what it brings him and what spiritual help he can thence gain for himself and others. The sentimental appreciation of the beauties of nature weakens a mind which ought to advance more and more

\* The Minister Eichhorn had demanded a report from the theological faculties upon the question whether Bruno Bauer was competent or should be allowed to teach theology in view of his radical publications.

in determination and clarity of view. Such development can be gained only by extraordinary energy and a definite object in life. Onward, therefore!"

On his return from Switzerland the Prince spent the autumn with his relatives at Kupferzell. Thence he visited Bettina von Arnim in Frankfurt. The diary speaks of an evening spent with her: "Bettina's daughters are no less amiable and clever than before. If only they would give up their efforts at eccentricity, which are quite unnecessary! They are so amiable, so well educated and sensible that they might easily avoid foolish paradoxical views. I heard many sharp criticisms upon affairs in Berlin, for instance, upon the extraordinary conference of poets, &c. After a somewhat unfavourable criticism of the character of Tieck they went on to Rückert, who came in for their special censure as being a man with whom the King could not work, an eccentric unpolished creature who always used to wear an overcoat and now thinks it his duty to appear in evening dress, which suits him very ill. They compared Rückert's face with a shoe down at the heel, if I am not mistaken. Their somewhat severe judgment of the King is inspired by their great love for him and their wish that his fame should be immortal; this in their opinion can only be possible if he boldly advances upon the path of progress which he formerly entered, and declines to be checked by the action of his Ministers, who wish to assume too much power. The most characteristic and pleasant feature about Bettina is that she is not merely a learned, pompous woman, but a true child of nature, notwithstanding her wide intellectual interests. There is no restraint in her circle; every one acts as he pleases, characters are taken for what they are, and she attaches herself to any one who seems for the moment to be novel and interesting."

In the year 1843 the Prince was occupied by preparation for his second examination and by projects for his future career. He resolved after the second examination to leave the legal profession and to prepare for the Administrative and Diplomatic Services: "I will be a *Landrat*\* or a diplomatist, or both!" says the diary. On February 18, 1843, he writes to his mother:

"... At the same time my liking increases for my legal work, partly because I can see that I am getting on, and also because such training is of the highest value to an ill-balanced mind. I wish I had become convinced at an earlier date, as I am now, that a civil career is in no way derogatory, but on the contrary highly valuable. The unusual nature of my action has brought me some prestige, and after all the nobility can only maintain a position which is everywhere disputed, by showing intellectual or moral pre-eminence, or at least by trying to show it. Had I realised this before I should have saved many a year which has been expended in mere projects. Now that I have embarked

\* President of an administrative district.



upon my profession all former objectors have been silenced, and hitherto I have experienced no obstacles except such as were raised by my own distraction and negligence. Only recently my choice has been again approved by the Duke of Nassau and the general in command here, both of whom agreed with me upon the hopeless nature of a Prussian military career. In any case I trouble very little at present about other people's opinions and rejoice in my own independence, having now entirely shaken off the last traces of my former tutelage. I cannot say whether I shall remain in this profession when my time of training is passed and the actual work begins. I should derive more benefit if I could then retire peacefully into private life, live somewhere or other with you and continue my studies. I am of the opinion of Wilhelm von Humboldt, that man's chief object must be his individual development and if possible his perfection, in order that we may then influence others by our own power and thus become centres of beneficial force; but this is better done alone and in peace than in the college of some great town."

The following observations in the diary probably reflect some unpleasant experiences in Coblenz society:

July 30, 1843.

. . . It is advisable and in fact necessary for me to be constantly upon my guard. These characters that in many respects happen to harmonise with my own are, after all, nothing to me. I must be careful lest I fall into some base surrender. Watchfulness and prudence upon every occasion, combined with the utmost outward friendliness and affability, is an object that every prince should place before himself if he does not wish to be led into follies from which other young men are protected by their lower position. Caution, therefore!

Great indeed is the artificiality of the age, great the corruption of the present generation, and miserable the state of our society when a strong man can only attain his object by spending his strength and blunting his feelings in order to reduce himself to the level of his environment, when he must become bad that he may not hurt the feelings of the bad.

After the Prince had passed his examination on August 17, he was appointed *Referendarius*\* on September 9, 1843. During this month he made a long tour through Switzerland to Southern France and Upper Italy, starting from Lausanne with his brother Gustav, who had there been continuing his studies in French. In Lyons the brothers were present when the Duc de Nemours arrived to hold a review, and witnessed his arrival on board the steamer. "Among a hundred thousand spectators," says the diary, "not a single cheer was heard." From October 10 to 25 the Prince travelled alone to Sardinia and returned from Genoa over the Splügen. He spent November in Kupferzell and then went to Rauden by

\* A barrister practising without emolument.

way of Corvey and Berlin, remaining there until the end of the year. Here he also spent the first weeks of the year 1844, and came back after a stay in Berlin extending from February 8 to March 25. April was spent on a tour to Vienna.

Meanwhile he had been appointed to a post under the Potsdam Government on April 4, and at the instance of the Minister of Justice he was retired from the legal service on April 17, "in consequence of being transferred to the Administration," with a certificate "of good qualifications and praiseworthy behaviour." On May 13 the Prince arrived in Berlin to begin work under the Potsdam Government.

*From the Journal.*

April 19, 1844.

This book has been unopened for weeks and months. Meanwhile many changes have taken place both about me and in myself. However, throughout the movements of my life I have been but confirmed in my former opinion that intellectual occupation can alone make a man happy. All else is but a subordinate matter, though beneficial as a relaxation. But when relaxation becomes the business of life it is a toil and of course ceases to be a relaxation.

*To his MOTHER.*

BERLIN, May 16, 1844.

I am to be introduced to the Department at Potsdam to-morrow. I have an infinite objection to Potsdam and its inhabitants which I do not expect to lose, as I shall employ every spare moment in making excursions to Berlin. My calls have all been paid. I met the Princes in the train and was received with their usual cheerfulness, which was increased when I told them of my plans; this information induced Prince Friedrich to observe that I should probably become a *Landrat*; he did not know how near he was to the truth. Apart from this, the Prince of Prussia approved my intention of working under the Government and said that he was especially delighted, "as we can ask you now and then to come and have a bit of dinner."

*From the Journal.*

May 29, 1844.

I have recently felt no inclination to attempt a description of my feelings. The gentle stimulus of my life in the law does once more arouse the capacity for writing down one's thoughts; indeed it becomes a necessity to see in writing what cannot be expressed in words. This was indeed my object in resuming my career; I wished once more to recover my knowledge of myself. That my

powers of introspection have not disappeared but were merely dormant is a conviction which fills me with joy and atones for the many disadvantages of my profession.

*June 25, 1844.*

The legislation of the period between 1807 and 1811 had aroused a certain spirit of Liberalism in Prussia which was to culminate in a universal and remarkable display of national enthusiasm during 1813 and 1814.

After the Congress of Vienna, the Governments were inclined to consider the widespread spirit of Nationalism in Germany a somewhat dangerous tendency. Even though the legislation of 1820 and 1821 pointed to the speedy institution of a State Constitution in Prussia, the nation was soon deprived of these prospects by the establishment of a constitution based upon the provincial orders. Meanwhile people were contented with the possession of an orderly administration, and were ready to trust to the King's sense of justice, seeing that he had passed through many joys and sorrows with his people, like a father with his children, and that his intentions were as sound a guarantee for the maintenance of what was good and the suppression of what was not, as any constitution upon a monarchical basis could provide. This was the situation when King Friedrich Wilhelm III. died.

The speeches delivered upon the occasion of the homage aroused general hopes of a free constitution, though the public was inclined to see some sign of the King's ecclesiastical leanings in the appointment of such Ministers as Eichhorn, Stolberg, Thiele, and other officials. This tendency soon became more obvious. It also speedily appeared that these speeches, far from promising any representative constitution, implied the contrary. General dissatisfaction was aroused, which began to find expression at the outset of 1842. The censorship legislation, which seemed to promise greater freedom of discussion, was opposed by the Arnim Ministry, which aimed rather at restriction, while the High Court of Appeal on questions of censorship acted upon wider principles and allowed many articles to pass. To these disturbing elements were added many economic evils, such as still persist, want of employment in Silesia, railway company legislation which had recently become a necessity, &c. Finally there is a general want of principle and all-pervading lack of vigour, or rather of system, among the supreme administrative authorities; business is delayed, money is wanting, and the finances are in confusion, so that the general dissatisfaction increases, though varying in particular provinces. They have just been sending some excellent gentlemen to sound popular feeling in the Rhine provinces, as if the local authorities were not likely to be far better informed. This action is discussed and criticised on the Rhine. The nobility is brought into contempt by the misdeeds of individuals. Much else might also be mentioned, not to speak

of the divorce law and the criminal law. If the popular feeling be taken into consideration along with the *personnel* of the present Ministry, it becomes obvious that no alleviation is to be expected unless a complete change is made in the supreme authority. We dare not shut our eyes to the fact that on the slightest provocation he may have a rebellion. One movement leads to another; the military are untrustworthy, and there is nothing to check the stream if it bursts its banks and rushes over meadow and field. All who do not now work their hardest to secure a capable education are lost. A time will come when birth will no longer be of importance, when high and low will be forced to contend in open discussion. It is the duty of the aristocracy to arm themselves, not with sword and shield, but with the word of power drawn from science, that they may thus become a firm, loyal, and immovable support for the throne and for themselves. We are the trees upon which drowning men may climb to safety from the flood. Let us see to it that our roots be not rotten but firmly planted in the soil.

*To his MOTHER.*

BERLIN, *July 15, 1844.*

I have been almost every Sunday to dine at Court, and to my astonishment have secured the favour of exalted personages. Yesterday the King actually offered me his snuff-box, from which I took a pinch with delight.

"In the middle of July," says the diary, "I travelled to Corvey and felt a difference in the air immediately. Here body and mind are oppressed, there they revive. Then there was the pleasant meeting with Victor, Gustav, and Konstantin.\* Then, until October, was a peaceful and undisturbed time at Potsdam. Stag-hunting, ending with a fright. In December to Rauden. Joyful, tender, and ever memorable days spent with mamma, Philipp Ernst, Konstantin, and Gustav. On January 8, 1845, to Berlin. Interesting carnival, romanticism of Kroll, railway, Court festival. Arrival of Victor. Delight at his happiness."†

*To his MOTHER.*

BERLIN, *January 17, 1845.*

Yesterday I received a letter from Victor with the news that he would not arrive here until the 20th. At the same time he confirmed the news of my election to the *Landtag*.‡ I am then going with Victor to Breslau. I do not know what use this *Landtag* will be to me; I have had the most interesting con-

\* The youngest of the brothers, born September 8, 1828.

† On his engagement to Princess Amalie of Fürstenberg.

‡ The Silesian Provincial Diet.

versations with Ministers and others, and also with the Prince of Prussia about it, and I am by no means dissatisfied. My few conversations with the authorities have shown me the confusion and want of intelligence prevailing in the highest circles, where every popular desire, if it does not correspond with the wishes of the Government, is regarded as treason. The assembly might become a turning-point for me if it were not my business as a novice to speak but little and to keep my principles as dark as possible.

The Prince's visit to Breslau lasted from the beginning of February to April 10. On April 19 was celebrated the marriage of the Duke of Ratibor with Princess Amalie of Fürstenberg in Donaueschingen. The serious illness of Prince Philipp Ernst had already begun. "Cheerful and yet sad wedding days," says the diary. Shortly after the marriage festivities at Donaueschingen the Prince grew worse and died on May 3, 1845. "This event," says the diary, on May 14, "marks the beginning of a new epoch for me. My natural cheerfulness and my native optimism have been shattered for ever by this death, which has taken from me the one closest to my heart, with whom I thought and felt in such perfect harmony, and with whom I was in such entire intimacy last winter. I told him what I have never entrusted to any one, as he understood everything, was in every case indulgent to the feelings of others, was gentle and lovable. . . ."

The outward consequence of this bereavement was a decision which made the Prince master of Schillingsfürst. In the course of the summer the negotiations took place which ended in a convention with the Duke of Ratibor. By the terms of this agreement, Prince Chlodwig renounced his claim to Corvey, while the Duke of Ratibor resigned the Schillingsfürst succession in his favour. The domain of Treffurt remained in the possession of Prince Chlodwig; he afterwards sold this estate and acquired instead a larger property in the Province of Posen. Retirement from the Prussian State Service was the next consequence. "On June 11," says the diary, "I was with Arnim. My reception was very formal and unusually cold. Upon my explanation he merely asked whether I wished to continue work in Potsdam. When I told him that this was, perhaps, the case but that I had no definite object, he went so far as to admit that it was a matter of total indifference to him, or even a matter of preference if I abandoned my career. As I do not meet with the least encouragement, I think better to give it up. For the moment I intend to leave the question of my return to Potsdam open, to take leave for an indefinite period and then to see what is to be done at Schillingsfürst.

The Prince spent the whole winter between 1845 and 1846 in Schillingsfürst. "A terrible winter," says the diary, "which, however, has had its good side. Man can bear everything if he only

will. *Voluntas est potestas.*" The following poem belongs to the lonely winter spent at Schillingsfürst :

From the castle's rocky height,  
Clear beneath the winter moon,  
See the valley decked in light,  
See the church and see the tomb!

There they laid thee in the grave;  
Warm and loving friends we were:  
Thou wert loyal, strong, and brave;  
None with thee shall e'er compare.

Many a bitter tear they shed  
Standing round that holy spot;  
But their sorrows now are fled,  
For, alas, they knew thee not.

But my tears shall ever flow  
As upon that gloomy morn,  
When I made thy grave below,  
Broken-hearted and forlorn.

*From letters to the PRINCESS AMALIE.*

SCHILLINGSFÜRST, *March 4, 1846.*

O'er the valleys and the hills  
I would be a wanderer bold;  
Through the cruel winter storms  
Thunder round our castle hold.

I would be a mariner  
Boldly sail the waters dark,  
Though the fury of the wave  
Bode destruction to my bark.

With the children of the South  
Through the palm-groves I would haste,  
And upon an Arab steed  
Scour the desert's burning waste.

With the sword for freedom's cause  
I would smite the enemy,  
And the triumph of my land  
With my dying gaze descry.

Anything were better than  
Thus o'er musty deeds to frown,  
Yawning, sharpening a pen,  
Slipped, in a dressing-gown.

I have just interrupted my restless nervous letter and looked out of the window. Ah, how that calms the mind. It is a wonderfully beautiful moonlight night, beneath which wide valleys and mountains lie outspread. It is all quiet and peaceful and warm, and the spring breezes are blowing up here upon the mountain. The remembrance of the past fills my heart with silent sorrow,

and from the past there rise the good thoughts and actions of our life, together with the remembrance of those who have passed away; nay, they rise in person. None the less, it is a consolation to think that this old home does not look out dead and desolate upon the lovely night, but belongs to a kind of third-rate poet who now and then looks out upon the moonlight himself. And it almost seems to me that the old stone barrack itself rejoices at the fact.

*March 14, 1840.*

. . . I have now got a very good parson at Frankenheim, a zealous capable man named Bischof who was here lately. Of all the applicants his testimonials showed him the most capable and his conversation was a pleasure to me in my loneliness. I felt at home with him immediately in a philosophical discussion, and that is always something in his favour. At the same time, he is no rationalist, but a real Christian, and not a hypocrite either; and though my knowledge of human nature sometimes plays me false, I have a good eye for parsons, governesses, and stewards.

I am now getting the garden into some kind of order, and making plans and proposals for the building of a summer-house. Beyond that I shall never bother much about laying out and building. I get terribly bored with it, especially the building.

*April 7, 1846.*

I have read the book by Gervinus.\* With much of it I am in complete accord, especially the horror of dogmatism, which has been greatly intensified by Gustel's treatises. His remarks also upon Schleiermacher are very true. But I cannot agree with the whole of his optimism, least of all with the hopes which he expresses of such windbags as Ronge and Scersky. I should, indeed, be delighted to see a great universal Christian Church embracing all that is pure and lofty in Christianity. I think also that this idea is possible, though I dissent from the opinion that ecclesiastical or religious unity of this kind must precede political unity. This I neither hope nor believe. Political unity must precede religious unity, unless struggle for religious unity produces a condition of affairs leading to an opposite result. This is a somewhat confused sentence and requires development, but I hope you will be able to understand it.

It is impossible for me, much as I have recently attempted to deceive myself, to accommodate myself to all the dogmas, and for that reason I have recognised certain passages in Gervinus as the expression of my inmost thoughts. During the solitude of this winter, I have been entirely honest with myself, and am now striving to be equally honest with others. Lying is entirely foreign to my nature, and any traces of it in me are due to the

\* *Die Mission der Deutschkatholiken*, 1846.

education of Herr Boltes,\* an excellent method of its kind. "To thine own self be true," is a phrase that should be written everywhere in letters of gold. . . . Hence I must also say that I have as yet absolutely no thoughts of marriage. I am becoming more and more convinced that marriage for a man is not an end but a means, a means to the enobling of his character. His wife should be "a shady footpath skirting the high road of life." But to enjoy such happiness, a man must walk boldly upon the high road of life, must have reached one goal and have another before him. In our class, marriage is too often made the chief end of life. One sees a prince of the empire settled in his castle, getting married, hunting, signing decrees, and thinking what a hero he is; yet however happy he may be in his married life, he feels a certain inward dissatisfaction which he cannot explain and which embitters his days; this is the want of some definite object, the incapacity for taking an active share in the higher interests of humanity, in short, the voice of conscience which he does not, cannot, or will not understand. An estate in a province like Silesia, the more vigorous life of the North Germans and Prussians, provides other compensations and means of stimulus to such an existence, but South Germany does not. The happy ones in this country, and in our class, are not the men but the women, provided that they appreciate their situation. Nothing more easily depresses a clever thoughtful man than the consciousness that he has no object for his efforts and activities. Do not tell me that I ought to be content with my present sphere. It does not give me nearly enough to do, and the occupation which it provides is not of the kind to raise the mind. It may be all very well for later years, but it is no school for life, and I must insist upon going to school. I will and I must recognise the truth of Chamisso's words: "Let us work and create by means of our knowledge lest we should conceive the idea of blowing our brains out."

On April 18, 1846, the Prince entered the Bavarian Upper House, and took part in its proceedings in Munich. His impressions of his first experiences in the arena of Bavarian politics are given in the following description from the diary:

MUNICH, *May 9, 1846.*

Nothing in political life is better or worse than the transition from doubt to firm conviction. It is a bad thing, because it wastes the inward life; a good thing, because it puts an end to the state of doubt. I have now reached this point. Previously I held to the so-called Ultramontane party, because I regarded it as safe; but this idea, which had previously made me doubtful of my actions, has now disappeared. Since my

\* For many years tutor to the Princes.



conversation with H. J., my views have become decided. The abyss towards which I was being carried by the policy of the Jesuits has suddenly been revealed to me. Their intolerance, their hatred of Protestantism, which is one of their leading features, their idea that the Reformation and all its consequences was a mistake, that the great philosophical, literary, and other splendid moments of our history were only aberrations of the human intellect, is an absurdity. It is treachery, utterly opposed to my inmost being, and is a sign of internal corruption and decay, which makes it absolutely impossible for me to give the smallest help to that party, so long as I place any value upon the whole of my past life and my dearest convictions. I pray God for strength to deliver me from the temptations of this devilish society, which works only for the subjugation of human freedom, and especially of intellectual freedom; I pray that I may never be led astray from the path of truth, either by promises or threats. For this purpose there must be an open breach with the whole clique, which it will be my business to bring to pass as soon as possible.

*To PRINCESS AMALIE.*

MUNICH, *June 2, 1846.*

I am getting more and more acclimatised to Munich, as Herr Bolte says. I am already able to talk to the people in a dialect composed of Hohenlohe and old Bavarian tongues, and in society to produce a dainty mixture of French and German phrases. Apart from this, now that the world at large is scattered, I am living quietly for my own plans and for art, and am only sorry that I cannot take you to see the beauties of this place.

*To his MOTHER.*

SCHILLINGSFÜRST, *June 20, 1846.*

My plans are still undecided; I am waiting to see whether the King will appoint me President of the Central Agricultural Union, and am then going to Munich to take my bearings. Here I am occupied, apart from other business, with the reading of agricultural works, in the hope of being able to speak upon agricultural improvement with proper unction. It cannot be said that the past is in any way a continuation of my Prussian career, but it brings me into close association with the Crown Prince, and makes me a kind of intermediary between the Crown Prince and the King; in short, it would be a difficult position, but a valuable experience, and perhaps would be of use to my future prospects in the higher service of the State. The position was offered to me without my seeking it, after I had only been known a few weeks in Munich, and the honour was thus too great for me to decline.

On June 26, 1846, the Prince was retired from the Prussian Civil Service through the Potsdam Administration, with the hope "that the memories of your work here as *Referendarius*, during which you devoted your energies with all zeal to the business of administration, may have none but pleasing recollections for your Highness."

TO PRINCESS AMALIE.

SCHILLINGSFÜRST, July 1, 1846.

The fact that one can live in a lonely castle, round which the wind howls, with no human society, occupied only with books and hunting, and yet retain one's cheerfulness, must surely be due to the quality of the air. It must be the air also which makes me look forward with pleasure to the new activities with which I am confronted. In any case, the system of agriculture in vogue here is absolutely wrong, and for that reason I am eagerly studying the books which bear upon the subject. A new field of knowledge has opened before me, a new world of discovery; I look upon men and cattle with different eyes, respect people and efforts which I formerly despised, and find the old phrase more and more true that all philosophy and abstraction is only valuable when founded upon a concrete basis of the widest and deepest positive knowledge. From this point of view, and considering that man, who is idle by nature, must have some outward impulse to occupation if he is not to perish, and that a man is only half a man unless he can really do something (in contrast to the woman, who must *be* something) — from this point of view, I say, and from many others, the occupation to which I look forward seems highly pleasing and desirable. If the decision should turn out in my favour, and it is not yet certain, I shall regard it as a happy piece of fortune.\* How I should like to sit with you for an evening in mamma's room! You will rejoice at the courage and energy with which I mean to carve out my career. I also wanted to relieve dear mamma's anxiety a little, by telling her there is nothing dangerous in Gustav's plan of going to Italy for the winter. There are, and always must be, two kinds of men: those who serve themselves and the world by independent thought in science and politics, and those who hold to what is given and work for the positive beliefs, of which the Catholic Church is the culminating point. Every one can choose the one or the other, but, having chosen, one must abide by it. Gustav's stay in Rome will not, therefore, turn him into a Jesuit, but will make him a clear-headed, resolute Catholic priest, like Diepenbrock and Schwarzenberg, who were also in Rome. Whatever one does must be done thoroughly; our age of contradiction and warfare demands

\* The Prince did not obtain the post which he had in view.

that every one shall express his convictions and take a side. Not that every one is called to action, but each must help to build up his party, so that all may be ready when in the good providence of God the hour of reckoning or of union strikes.

With the sense of inward purity and manly resolution expressed in this letter, the conviction arose in the Prince's mind that the time, which seemed so remote on April 7, had now come for the consummation of his life by marriage. The following letters show that he no longer rejected the friendly offices of various people who sought to help him to this happiness.

TO PRINCESS AMALIE.

FRANKFURT, August 8, 1846.

Herr von Verno told me in Cologne that the Wittgensteins were coming to Schwalbach. Uncle Constantine's friend, Herr Mühlens, from Frankfurt, knows the family very well. From his account they are all very distinguished people, and Herr Mühlens himself is a most honourable, fascinating, and accomplished man of the world. *La personne principale* is said to be a marvel of charm and simplicity, pious, good, &c. &c. Should I not be a fool to let this opportunity of seeing her escape? Notwithstanding her seventeen years the lady is very independent, and will not be an easy prize. There is no difficulty about an introduction to the family. Frau von Lazareff and Princess Fanny Biron, who are on very friendly terms with the Wittgensteins, were in Ostend. I won both their hearts by my flattering attentions, moonlight walks, boating expeditions, and songs, so that they invited me warmly to call on them in Schwalbach, where they are to stay for a week with the Wittgensteins. Without exactly speaking of the plan I had had in view, I observed that they cherished the same wish, and as they are extremely tactful and nice, as well as somewhat fond of matchmaking, I can calmly approach the situation others have prepared for me. The web of intrigue which I have spun for this object only, with the people who have been drawn in without knowing anything about it, is truly Jesuitical, and I plume myself greatly upon it. As regards the main point, however, you may be sure I shall act in all honour, and shall not forget Gelzer's Tenth Address.\* I am fully persuaded of the serious nature of the step that may ensue on this journey, and will allow no external circumstances to persuade me to adopt a lie for the partner of my life. I have enough courage, and am calm and sure enough of myself, to manage the affair with prudence.

BINGEN, October 5, 1846.

. . . Each day makes me feel more and more what indescribable happiness has quite undeservedly fallen to my lot.

\* Gelzer, *Die Religion im Leben. Reden an Gebildete*. Tenth Address: "Marriage, Moral and Religious."

Each day brings greater intimacy, not in the ordinary way, but in the subtle sympathetic communion in which the eyes express mutual satisfaction, that even here, even in this, each soul is in unison with the other. And this is the more remarkable, since, as you know, I am not fond of serious conversations in French . . . amazing too, seeing that she is barely seventeen and a half. You can imagine that time passes under these conditions as if I were in Paradise. The fact of there having been no definite explanation as yet, lends a peculiar charm to the whole affair.

BINGEN, *October 30, 1846.*

As soon as external matters had been settled, the internal aspects and considerations presented themselves during my journey. The sacred nature of marriage became clear, the necessity for mutual and unbounded love, unlimited confidence, and other similar reflections welled up, and disturbed me greatly. For I had to recognise two things. In the first place, whatever my own inclination, I was by no means clear about her feeling; then again, the journey to Bingen was tantamount to a proposal, and it would be very difficult to draw back after that. These scruples and reflections sent the blood to my heart, and produced the unpleasant sensations that are experienced by the most frivolous as well as the serious-minded, on the verge of taking a step that will affect the whole future life. It was therefore "a rather pale-looking young man" (*sic*) who stepped ashore, and made his way to the Hotel Victoria. No one would be at home till 4.30. So I had time to get calm. At the appointed hour I betook myself to the *salon*. The Princess came in first, with another beautiful, tall lady behind her. All the bogies I had conjured up disappeared, I only saw a cordial, expressive countenance beaming on me like a ray of gentle sunshine, before which all my doubts and scruples melted away like ice. From that moment all embarrassment vanished. We conversed at table with the exclusive absorption that springs from satisfaction in meeting again after a not too long separation, the satisfaction and joy in which so much hope and promise are involved.

MUNICH, *November 16, 1846.*

. . . I am staying here a little longer, till about December 3, and shall then return to Schillingsfürst. I have had other dear, beautiful letters, and see more and more what a world of trust and confidence has opened for me, giving me an escape into a sure haven from all the problems and fatalities of life. . . .

MUNICH, *November 21, 1846.*

. . . Once married I shall devote myself with fresh courage and energy to my daily task, which may be dangerous, but will always be honourable. It is a splendid cause to work wholeheartedly for the entire country. And what a help and comfort

to be supported in all one's labours by a kind and sympathetic wife! . . . I cannot thank God enough for that. I have such confidence in her character as I have rarely felt in any human being. In regard to Marie, a sense of stability and constancy in ideas and feelings comes over me such as I have never before conceived possible.

The Royalties were very gracious to me. I have also made acquaintance with the Duke of Leuchtenberg and the Crown Prince of Sweden. *Deux jeunes gens fort aimables.*

FRANKFURT, December 30, 1846.

I have been here three days, and even if it were possible to tell you all that I am feeling, I should want time and peace, and colossal talents. From the instant when, waiting by the fire of the *salon* in the evening, I saw Marie hastening towards me, glad and radiant, while our joy prevented either of us from saying a word (fortunately we were alone together) — ever since I have been seeing her and talking to her every day, while our intercourse never palls — since I have found her once more lovely, noble, candid, all it is possible to be, I love her no more with a quiet admiration of her good qualities, no longer, one might say, as her intended, but I am . . . *c'est une expression un peu triviale* . . . enamoured, restless, feverish. And yet we have to act a comedy a little longer, as the announcement cannot be made for a few days.

On February 16, 1847, at Frankfurt-on-the-Main, the Prince was married to the Princess Marie zu Sayn-Wittgenstein-Berleburg. The young couple went first to Corvey, whence the Prince writes to Princess Amalie:

"I have no feeling other than a joyous sense of spring, when one lies under a leafy tree on a gently sloping hillside, watching the clouds course over the blue Heavens. Beyond, above the Ziegenberg, one grey snow-cloud may chase another, I reckon little of them, for I am happy and entirely content. My heart is filled with gratitude to God, who in His goodness guides the steps of men to blessings and happiness.

"Our life here is the most limpid, beautiful, and rational that could fall to the lot of any mortal. On rising between eight and nine I usually go for a ride, and return when Marie is ready. Then we breakfast together in the yellow room, rejoicing every day at the good coffee, or some new sort of cake the cook bakes to surprise us. We sit and talk till eleven, when I go to my room for business, while Marie reads, plays the piano, or occupies herself in some other way. About two, when I have finished, we go out a little in the Avenue if it is fine enough, to meet the post, and read our letters on the spot. After two we dine, again in the yellow room, and then drive in the pony-carriage to Godelheim, Brenkhausen, or to the Chaussée-Haus on the Weser. Sometimes we

both ride, Marie in a fine brown habit and black hat, on Fuchs, who ambles along like any Spa donkey. On returning I usually find Dedié\* in my room, to give me his reports and any other news. In the evening we read all kinds of books or make music till tea-time. . . . And all this happiness is increased by the knowledge that we are not living simply in this idyllic life, but can push on the great Wheel of Time, after as well as before — better, indeed, than before, since there is no burden of care to drag us down into the squalor and boredom of the mediatised. . . .”

Their stay in Corvey lasted till April 29. The Prince and his bride then went *via* Berlin to Silesia. On June 29, 1847, they made their entry into Schillingsfürst.

\* Kammerrat Dedié, one of the Prince's functionaries at Corvey.

THE REVOLUTION AND THE  
EMBASSY

1848-1850





## THE REVOLUTION AND THE EMBASSY

1848-1850

THE Prince was busy during November and December 1847 with a memoir "On the Political Condition of Germany, its Danger and Means of Defence," of which we have the rough draft and some amplifications. He explains the discontent that was generally diffused among all circles in Germany, by a consideration of the situation in Austria, Prussia, and the smaller States. The following extract treats of Prussia:

"Since the House of Hohenzollern first stepped forward as Electoral Princes and Sovereigns, they have been marked out as the defenders of Protestantism in Germany. So long as Prussia protected Protestantism in its widest sense as the free development of the human mind within lawful bounds, and held fast as the watchword of her policy the truth that a Government should anticipate and meet the Spirit of the Age, so long was Prussia at the head of the German nation, respected and feared by her enemies. But when the Prussian Government renounced her calling, she sank into that labyrinth of inconsequence which brings a State to the verge of ruin. Prussia lay in that abyss in 1806. Nothing but the political genius of Stein and his friends, who were like-minded and inspired with himself, could have saved the country from the mire of unexampled squalor. The laws passed at that time gave the people back their faith in, and love for, their Fatherland, and therewith the strength to free themselves from a foreign domination. This, however, was only the prelude to the further development of the nation. The reactionary tendencies of the Government from 1817 to 1840 could not prevent those laws from bearing an abundant harvest. The municipal regulations of 1808, the agrarian laws, the increasingly democratic tendencies of the Government (despite all suppression of local activity), religious toleration, which afforded free spiritual development under the philosophic ministry of Altenstein, and, lastly, the ineffaceable impression which is stamped by an epoch of inspiration upon the old and new generations alike — all these combined to produce a free-thinking, if not yet free-speaking,

nation — a nation that deliberately set before it the aim of participating in the management of the State. At the outset of the reign of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. this nation believed itself justified, out of the mouth of its Sovereign, in hoping for the fulfilment of its desires, which had been silent, though not asleep, since 1817. But the Government pursued another path from that expected by the people. . . .

"The ecclesiastical policy of Friedrich Wilhelm III. is well known. That it was not based upon unrestricted ecclesiastical and religious liberty appears more particularly from his measures in regard to the Catholic Church, and the in part compulsory introduction of the Union, the suppression and persecution of the so-called Old Lutherans. But when we ask why these measures excited rather a partial than a general agitation, why these events passed by without further consequences, we can only explain it by saying that Friedrich Wilhelm's system of Government was after all, despite its despotism and its aggressiveness, a Protestant system, that these very despotic measures and encroachments originated in the Liberalism of the Government, and hence were less disquieting to the conscience. This policy might be branded with the old sign-manual of Prussian supremacy, education by means of the cudgel, but it was none the less, and more than is commonly admitted, too much in harmony with the spirit of the nation to arouse more than merely momentary discontent. Free investigation, the inborn, rational philosophy of the Prussians, remained unattained.

"The Eichhorn Ministry . . . who can deny it? . . . rests upon an anti-Prussian soil and foundations. His system of orthodox Protestantism is known, and cannot be demonstrated."

On the danger of the universal discontent the Prince writes:

"The real peril lies, not in the parties of the Communists, Socialists, and Radicals, who have existed in every State and in all ages; not in the secret machinations of the Jesuit Fathers and their friends, who represent the stunting of the minds of the people as the only salvation, the sole anchor of safety — but in the fact that the discontent, of which each party makes such skilful use, is so universal and so well founded. Just as a man, reaching full self-consciousness after years of careful training and youthful adventures, reaches the heights of free self-determination and forceful action, and enters next upon a phase in which he rejects any hand that seeks to guide him and will tread only in the path which seems right in his own eyes, so in the history of every nation there is an epoch in which it comes to full self-consciousness, and claims liberty to determine its own destiny. At such an epoch the intentions of the wisest Governments are misinterpreted, the most zealous fulfilment of duty by a fostering administration is held inadequate, wherever these Governments and administrations fail to recognise that the nation has attained its majority,

and continue along the old path, from habit, or from a misapprehension of the interests involved.

"We in Germany have reached this stage. The nation demands a share in public administration, now as never before. The Governments, however, reject this movement. In it they see, or wish to see, only the propaganda of a radical clique, and are filled with misgivings. One reason for discontent is universally diffused in Germany; every thinking German is deeply and painfully aware of it. This is the impotence of Germany among other States. Let no one say that Austria and Prussia as great Powers represent the might of Germany in her foreign relations. On the one hand Austria asserts herself far too little because she is lacking in internal strength; on the other, Prussia, to speak plainly, is only admitted on sufferance among the great Powers, and will not even hold this position much longer if the movement in internal politics continues as it has begun. In last resort, however, there are only Austria and Prussia, while the rest of Germany for ever plays a minor part as a mere camp-follower. No one will deny that it is hard on a thinking, energetic man to be unable to say abroad: 'I am a German' — not to be able to pride himself that the German flag is flying from his vessel, to have no German Consul in cases of emergency, but to have to explain, 'I am a Hessian, a Darmstädter, a Buckeburger; my Fatherland was once a great and powerful country, now it is shattered into eight-and-thirty splinters.' And when we study the map and see how the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean break upon our shores, and how no German flag commands the customary salute from the haughty French and English, surely the hue of shame alone will survive from the red, black, and yellow ribbon, and mount into our cheeks? And must not all the whining talk about German unity and the German nation remain woefully ludicrous, until the words cease to be an empty sound, a phantasmagoria of our complacent optimism, until we have the reality of a great, united Germany? The industry so largely fostered by the Zollverein no longer suffices for our commerce in its present extended conditions, our rich trade seeks extraneous markets and connections over sea. The outcry at the deficiencies of the German fleet, and the question of the unity of Germany — a real, politically efficacious unity — will be handled with fresh vigour by the now emancipated Press.

"It is a mistake to try to dam the Revolution by liberal reforms in individual States without reforming Germany as a whole. The Free Press is a necessity; progress is a condition of the existence of States. But if we are to emancipate the Press, it behoves us to know, and to make clear to ourselves, what, as said and reiterated by its means, is penetrating to the mind of the citizen, and bearing fruit. We have to ask ourselves, is this the fruit we desire? If we advance, let us do so with our eyes open, and let us open our eyes wide. Before we let an entire

people move in a given path, we must see where this path leads. It is a lamentable illusion with many well-meaning statesmen to regard progress under the existing conditions of Germany as something quite innocuous. Progress leads to Revolution. A hard saying, but a true one! . . ."

The following note shows the trend of the whole memoir: "An argument can be formulated from the essay in question, to show that the whole of the present cry for Progress will lead to Revolution if the matter is not handled by the right end. So long as this, which is a reversal of the conditions of the German Bund, is not apprehended by the Governments in a serious and self-sacrificing spirit, the whole system of progress and concessions tends to revolution. So long, accordingly, as I fail to discover this attitude of mind, I am an ultra-Conservative, since I therein find more assurance for the safety of the Fatherland. I will not co-operate in a revolution, and if the revolution is to break over Germany after the pattern of 1789, and the aristocracy perish, at least I shall not have to say, I have landed myself in this plight by my own want of common sense."

On March 3, 1848, the Prince writes to Princess Amalie from Schillingsfürst: "And so we are no longer on the verge of great events, but plunged in the midst of them.\* We must now be prepared for everything. Once the first moment of agitation has passed, I shall calmly await the future, and shall not remain passive."

On March 31 he says in a letter from Munich: "If I have not written before, it was from no lack of will, but from sheer impossibility. I am launched full sail on the sea of political activity, and have to divide my whole time between conferences and writing. I am busy now preparing for our Sitzings, which are suspended for eight days. I am a member of three Commissions all at once, thanks to the determination of my colleagues to put me forward."

On April 3: "The political outlook is gloomy to our very gates, but all is serene within. Once the first unpleasant moment of awakening from the sleep of civilisation is passed, once we have rubbed our eyes, and discovered that all the things we have read about — death, murder, plague, hunger, poverty, and the like — may in sooth be coming very near us, when once we have overcome this first panic, without swooning like the worthy Grand Duke of Weimar, further developments will be easy to endure. The inward light of the mind burns clear and bright, and none can extinguish it. It is only of late years that I have become attentive to the external things of life, and it will be easy to forego them again. For the nimbus of our princely station will be first to go, nor have I any great hope for the dignity of

\* After the revolutionary Popular Assemblies convened in several of the South-German States, and permitted by the Governments.

the Peers. Whether things will move quietly, whether we shall attain the goal of the political unification of Germany without an interregnum of anarchy and horrible bloodshed, seems to me very dubious."

The apprehension of stirring events expressed in these words betrays itself also in the following note of April 7, upon the proceedings of the Preliminary Parliament at Frankfurt:

"The Assembly in Frankfurt has passed a resolution that a Constituent National Assembly must be convened in Frankfurt within the next four weeks.

"If the German Governments set their hand to this they are lost. The Constituent National Assembly will deliberate on the reorganisation of Germany. It will decide whether Germany is to be a Republic or a Constitutional Monarchy, whether the individual Governments shall continue to exist or not.

"In the most favourable conditions, the Monarchs will thus receive their crowns and their authorisation to continue reigning from the hands of the people, with graceful thanks. In less favourable cases they will be invited by the Constituent Parliament to make way for the Agents of the Provisional Government. The existence of the German Governments is therefore respited till May 1. But who, in the next place, guarantees the result of the elections? Who will control these elections so that the results are Conservative? And supposing they are Conservative, if the German Governments do receive permission to remain in office, would their future existence be anything more than vegetating, than a further respite, until the moment when it shall seem advisable to some new Assembly to deprive them of this precarious existence?

"This is the point to which the wisdom of our rulers has brought us! To this — that every right is questioned that has been established for centuries. What little the German Governments have so far preserved of power and authority will under the most favourable conditions become an absurdity on May 1. But the downfall of the power and authority of the Governments, of the legitimate existence on a constitutional basis of the States, must involve the irrevocable abolition of the rights of the individual, of personal freedom and property!

"Now, is this state of dissolution, which we regard as inevitable, the outcome of the will of the German people; is it not rather the revolutionary minority that is plunging us consciously or unconsciously into this abyss? In truth, and I say it with a shudder, the slumber in which the German Nation has been cradled for thirty years by its rulers is hardly yet out of its eyes. The German Nation will wake up indeed when the destroying waves of anarchy roll over its head. Then it will marvel that a small but active handful of Republicans and Communists have succeeded in ruining Germany. Then it will itself pronounce the terrible words, 'Too late!'

"But is it yet too late? A German, who still has faith in the energy and goodwill of the Governments, must answer 'No!'

"There is still time for the Governments to summon, not a Constituent Assembly, but a Parliament. They still have time to convene a Chamber of Princes and to appoint a Head of the League. The freely elected Deputies will form a People's Parliament on the widest basis in conjunction with the Diet. An Assembly thus constituted would establish legislation, instead of subverting it. It is only thus, and along these lines, and not by looking on in silent terror that the Governments can save themselves, that Germany can become free and united, that anarchy can be averted."

On April 12, 1848, the Prince writes to his sister: "They give me an appalling amount to do. To-night at six, I have to report on a thing of which I have only just heard — the Electoral Law of the Frankfurt Assembly."

On April 13 the plenary sitting of the Upper House opened. At the beginning of his address the Prince remarked: "With regard to the law in general, I may say that we hail it gladly. It is the first significant, one might say the first tangible, step that the German people has taken towards the fulfilment of its dearest wish. Deep in the heart of every German lives an inspiring belief in a unified, free and powerful German Fatherland. This belief has issued in action, the wish of the people has become a pressing demand. A constitutional path has been prepared and smoothed for it by the draft of this Bill. The popular Assembly of the Representatives of the People will save us from the anarchy which still hovers ominously over the Fatherland. Popular representation in the Confederation will be the bed in which the waves of general political excitement may flow like a torrent. Great will be the contrast with the old Bundestag, which certainly also was a bed, but one in which the German nation has slumbered for thirty years . . . in a sleep from which only the furious storms of recent times could awaken us."

*To PRINCESS AMALIE.*

MUNICH, May 24, 1848.

I wrote to you on May 3, but only the beginning of a letter. To-day I will attempt it again, because I always feel sad at heart on these two days, and you above all others can sympathise with me.\* It does one good in the wild tumult of political life to plunge back now and again into better days, and into their sorrows. It gives one the same feeling to go from time to time into a church, as I love more especially to do now that the beautiful Offices for

\* May 24 was the birthday of Prince Philipp Ernst, May 3 the day of his death.

May are being sung in the twilight. For in political work, which is a thing of great utility and most congenial to me, the soul consumes itself, and man turns into an egoistic calculating creature. I celebrated this day by an oratorical triumph of which I am very proud, and of which I will tell you more when we meet. Our Landtag drags on from one day to another, partly because the Court wants to gain time and begins to gird itself for action or reaction.

One such reactionary attempt on the part of the Court party gave me the opportunity this morning of fulminating against that same party, which incidentally helped on our own business.\*

After the Landtag adjourned on June 5, the practical political activity of the Prince came to an end, and he became a spectator for the rest of the summer. On August 31 he writes of the proceedings of the Frankfurt Parliament: "Of political affairs I can only tell you that it seems rather a bad look-out for German Unity. The time when the iron was hot and unity could have been hammered out, was wasted in idiotic, futile prattle, and the separate nationalities, Prussia in particular, are now so reinforced that we are farther from unification than ever! The whole National Assembly is ridiculous now. Alas for Germany!"

WIESBADEN, *September 23, 1848.*

The rate at which political conditions alter is shown by the outbreak at Frankfurt, where little was wanting to make them proclaim the Red Republic. The whole fabric of our social and political conditions, especially in the South-West of Germany, and wherever Christianity has been non-existent for years, is hopelessly disorganised. Witness the murders of Lichnowsky and Auerswald, of which I have not the heart to write further. It is the most shocking deed in history. And yet the blindness of the Germans is so great that even the most appalling crimes pass without notice, and the entire nation, from sheer wanton stupidity, flings itself more surely every day into the arms of barbarism and the overthrow of civilisation. To me the political outlook becomes more hopeless every day. It needs a sane, vigorous and *pious* people for the resuscitation of a great free Germany, such as I believed in two months ago. It is impossible to build up any political system where scepticism and doubt have permeated even to the lowest classes of society. Social and civil order must necessarily perish. In this particular no era presents such marked analogies with our own as that of the decline of the Roman Empire. Christianity

\* The Prince's speech referred to the Law of Ministerial Responsibility. The *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* reports that "Princes Wallerstein, Leiningen, and Hohenlohe greeted the law as a welcome step forward, but regarded it only as the transition to the realisation of really constitutional principles." The Sittings of the Upper House had been public since April 19.

and Civilisation will need to seek another and a sounder people than any European Nation. It seems as though God never permitted civilisation to reach its climax, lest the poor earthworms become too arrogant.

Notwithstanding these pessimistic conclusions, the Prince did not withdraw from political activity. By the law of June 28, 1848, a "Provisory Central Executive for all general affairs of the German nation" was instituted, "until such time as a Paramount Executive should be definitely established." Among other functions, it had "to provide for the international and commercial representation of Germany, and to nominate Ambassadors and Consuls with that object."

A circular from the Provisory Central Administration of September 20 desired the separate States to recall their foreign representatives, or at any rate to make known through them that the political representation of Germany for all international affairs lay exclusively in the hands of the *Imperial*\* Envoys. "One day," we learn from an undated pencil note of the Prince,† "a University friend of Heidelberg days came to see me, and informed me that the Imperial Ministry proposed to entrust me with a mission. The Bavarian Deputies at the Imperial Diet had spoken of my activity in the Bavarian Chamber, praising the keen interest I had shown in politics. I was warned at the same time, by the older and more experienced diplomats, that the new Empire was not likely to last long, and they advised me not to embark on a sinking ship. I did not believe them. I hoped that the Prusso-German idea would prevail. The Ambassadors previously despatched by the Empire had played but a sorry rôle, and I imagined in my juvenile self-esteem that I should do better and represent the Imperial interests more effectively. I was young, and had a high-spirited wife, who was eager to travel." A letter from the Minister von Schmerling, dated November 1, 1848, informed the Prince officially that the Imperial Administrator had appointed him "to notify his accession as Imperial Administrator at the Courts of Athens, Rome, and Florence." A portfolio from Minister von Schmerling of November 13 brought the Prince the Letters of Notification addressed to the Pope, the King of Greece, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The Prince was referred for his instructions to the documents now forwarded to him‡ and to verbal

\* Early in 1848 the discredited German Diet convoked from all Germany the Constituent Assembly known as the Frankfurt Parliament, which appointed Archduke John of Austria as "Imperial Administrator" for all Germany. The Archduke appointed an Imperial Ministry. The Frankfurt Parliament continued to sit as a German Legislature; but the whole system broke down within a few months.

† The note apparently dates from the last months of the Prince's life, and seems to be the only trace of commencement of the work he still intended to carry out.

‡ These were copies of instructions to the Imperial Ambassador von Raumer in Paris, the Envoy Dr. Heckscher at the Sardinian and Sicilian



communications from the Under-Secretary of State von Biegeleben. Among the instructions there is also a circular letter from the Central Executive of November 14, regulating the status and procedure of the Imperial Ambassadors so long as the separate States still had their accredited representatives.

The Prince, accompanied by his wife, left Schillingsfürst in November 1848, and went by Belfort, Lyons, and Avignon to Marseilles, with the intention of embarking there for Civita Vecchia, in order to discharge his mission to the Pope in the first place. Herr von Schack was assigned to him as his secretary. The news of the outbreak of the revolution in Rome, and of the Pope's flight, communicated to the Prince at Marseilles by Roman Prelates, obliged him to go in the first instance to Athens. Of these events he writes on November 29, 1848, to the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"You will already have been informed by the papers of the events that have occurred in Rome. I will therefore refrain from giving you the details imparted to me by eye-witnesses, but I am constrained to send you a brief report of the last important intelligence.

"There is no possible doubt as to the flight of the Pope from Rome as announced in the journals? It is confirmed by the verbal accounts of two fugitive prelates of his suite. The Pope took refuge with the French Ambassador, on board the *Ténare*, and has left Italy. The direction the vessel has taken is at present unknown. The Pope's return to Rome during the next few weeks is out of the question. My mission to Rome is accordingly an impossibility for the moment, and I have decided to go direct to Athens on December 1, by steam-packet, so as to carry out this portion of my charge at all events in the meantime. Possibly there may be a turn for the better during this interval, and the Pope may be recalled by the wishes of the Faithful, or perhaps order will be restored by the French troops that start from here to-morrow. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the proclamation of a Republic will be the result of this revolution. It is obvious that such an event would materially affect policy as regards the question of the Italian war, and the new Republican Government might under such conditions manifest tendencies that would be subversive of the principles of the Central Administration. For while the Central Administration of Germany must wish well to the independence and national vigour of Italy, and would in no way desire to interfere in the internal affairs of the Italian States, still the formation of new and Radical Governments in Italy would introduce principles into Italian politics which would hardly tend to a peaceful solution of the

Courts, and the Imperial Commissioners Welcker and Colonel Mosle in Vienna and Olmutz, in respect of the position of the Central Administration with regard to commercial relations between Austria and Sardinia, and with regard to Italian affairs.

Trans-Italian problem on the lines so far firmly insisted on by Germany.

It is, therefore, essential that I should know whether, in the event of the proclamation of a Republic, my mission to Rome comes to an end, whether I am to expect a special mission to the Holy Father, in the event of his definite removal from Rome and the Papal States for a protracted period, and lastly, what further instructions will be given me from the Imperial Ministry in respect of my attitude towards the Radical Governments in Italy.

I, therefore, beg your Excellency to forward me the necessary instructions to Athens, addressed to the Prussian Embassy.

On December 1 the travellers went by the *Télémaque* to Naples, where they lay one day, and then proceeded by the *Scamandre* through the Straits of Messina to Malta, where they waited another day. They had a stormy passage round Cape Matapan, and only reached the Piræus on December 11, and took up their abode in the Hotel d'Angleterre at Athens.

*To the IMPERIAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.*

ATHENS, *December 17, 1848.*

Unexpected hindrances detained us on the way from Marseilles to the Piræus, so I only arrived here on the 11th. Next morning I presented my credentials in due form to the Minister Kolokotroni, was invited to an interview, and after explaining my views received his promise to help me as much as possible.

The formal audience took place on the following day, the 13th of this month. His Majesty the King received me in the Throne Room, standing not far from the throne, in the presence of the Minister Kolokotroni, the Marshal of the Court and two Aides-de-camp. The King listened attentively to my address, which corresponded with the text of the document which I was to deliver, and replied to it in another speech, in which he professed his sympathy with the Central Administration, touched on the international relations between Greece and Germany, and expressed his friendly feelings for his Imperial Highness the Archducal Administrator. After that the conversation proceeded on informal lines, and the King's interested questions about German affairs gave me the opportunity of making pretty general representations.

I was invited to dinner on the next day, which was an extraordinary compliment, according to the etiquette of this Court. On this occasion the King, who treated me with marked distinction, repeatedly betrayed his keen interest in the new organisation of Germany.

The Minister promises that the audience with his Majesty shall appear in the newspaper that is the official organ. I am now awaiting the news of the Pope's return to Rome, and the

directions from the Imperial Ministry which I requested in my first report of November 29, in order then to re-embark for Italy.

The Germans who reside here presented themselves *in corpore*, and expressed their delight in the unificatory movement in Germany, as well as in the arrival of an Imperial Ambassador, to which I replied with words of recognition and encouragement.

The reception of the Germans at Athens here alluded to took place on December 14. The Prince said in his reply to their welcome:

"You have reason to rejoice over the new development of Germany. For the glorious result of this acquired unity of Germany is that we are no longer a forgotten people, a geographical expression; but that they all know—Americans, Russians, Turks, and Greeks—that they know us for a mighty German nation, that has one will and the power to impose it. Gentlemen, I can tell you this about German Unity. It has many enemies who grudge us our achievement, but it is so firmly implanted in the breast of every honest citizen, that no man on earth will succeed in wrenching it from us. To me this is a profoundly affecting moment, in which for the first time I confront my German fellow countrymen as the Ambassador of the German nation. I owe this emotion to your kindly visit, and offer you my cordial thanks."

On the evening of the 17th there was a Court dinner, and on the 18th the Prince and Princess rode with the King and Queen. On the 19th, both attended a diplomatic dinner at the house of the Austrian Ambassador von Prokesch. On December 20 they were fêted by the Germans. The Princess writes of this in her diary:

"At 8.30 a deputation came with a carriage to fetch us. The hall was decorated with German flags. There was a concert, and at the end of the first part they gave us Rhine wine, and made a speech to Chlodwig, to which he replied. A music-master presented me with a polka which he had dedicated to me. We were back by 10.30."

The Prince's speech was about the German nation. "To the German people," he said, "in this glass of German wine! To the German people with its youthful dreams and manly acts! With its warm inspirations and profound thoughts! To the German people in all quarters of the world! And to you above all, Germans of Athens! May each day make you prouder of speaking German, and of being Germans. Hurrah for the German nation!"

*To the IMPERIAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.\**

ATHENS, December 23, 1848.

The great affability with which the King received me gave me repeated opportunities last week of discussing political matters

\*Schmerling had resigned his office on December 17. His successor was Heinrich von Gagern.

## MEMOIRS OF PRINCE HOHENLOHE

Mein Herz, bewegt von innerlichem Streite,  
Erfuhr so bald in diesem kurzen Leben,  
Wie leicht es ist, die Heimat zu aufgeben,  
Und doch wie schwer, zu finden eine zweite.\*

*December 29.*

The wind fell a little. But the weather was still too bad for us to leave the harbour. The bay in which we are lying must be very beautiful in summer. Before us, is a deserted village on a hill, spreading to right and left. Behind us, there are fairly high mountains which enclose the bay like a lake. But the sea is rough for all that. Gulls hover round the ship with their melancholy cry. The whole scene reminds one more of Achenbach's sea-pictures of Norway than of the islands of the Archipelago. With reading, writing, and whist the time passes pleasantly enough.

On December 30 the journey was resumed in spite of the sea still being very rough. Towards morning on the 31st, they were in sight of Rhodes. "Unfortunately we did not stop, but passed between Rhodes and Scarpanto; the sea is not disagreeable." The spot at which the Prince entered on the New Year is indicated by a still extant entry of the captain: "The position of her Majesty's steam vessel *Volcano* at the commencement of the year 1849: latitude 35° 4' north, longitude 29° 21' east of Greenwich, distant 324 miles from Jaffa." On January 2, 1849, the snow-covered Lebanon lay before the travellers, Mount Carmel just opposite them. It was impossible, owing to the rough sea, to land in Jaffa; the ship had to run for Haifa in the Bay of St. Jean d'Acre. From that point, the Prince and Princess made a riding tour in the Holy Land. On the 3rd they climbed Carmel, on the evening of the 4th they were in Nazareth, on the 8th in Jerusalem, on the 9th in Bethlehem, on the 12th in Ramleh, on the 13th in Jaffa, on the 15th back at Carmel, where a storm prevented their departure.

*Journal.*

MOUNT CARMEL, *January 16, 1849.*

I am more and more convinced of the need for a speedy central organisation of Germany. England and Russia are extending themselves here as much as possible. The East knows nothing of Germany. We must have a German Catholic Consul in Jerusalem. Influence in the East would give (1) more power to Germany, (2) increase of German commerce and perhaps of colonisation. In order to establish this influence, we

\* "My heart, torn with inward conflict, too soon discovered in this brief existence how easily one may give up one's home; how hard, alas! it is to find another."

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must make use of the religious element of the Catholic clergy. More attention must be paid to this.

January 18.

The matter of colonisation by German emigrants has often been discussed with great vigour in recent years. Projects of all kinds crop up and collapse again. None of them will lead to any profitable result if not supported by the Central Administration itself, and by a Perpetual Commission controlled by the Foreign Ministry. Above all, German diplomacy must take it up. All emigration, all colonisation, all deporting of men to foreign lands even with abundant subsidies is in last resort nothing but a convenient kind of traffic in souls, unless comprehensive treaties are concluded between the several Governments. If this is effected, if the Central Executive enters into diplomatic relations with foreign Governments, there is no reason that we should not turn from the distant, already thickly populated and not particularly fertile North of America, and come back to the East. There are three islands in the Mediterranean that have already belonged to European States, and were conquered by the Ottoman Power at the time of its predominance. I mean Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete. Why should we not, in view of the immeasurable weakness of the Turkish Government, endeavour to win these islands back again, and populate them with German immigrants? Cyprus seems to me especially well adapted. The shifty, evil, Turkish Government is hastening the depopulation of this island year by year. The immigrants would find very few inhabitants. The island is one of the most fertile of the Mediterranean; all kinds of fruits ripen there naturally. The mines of copper and other minerals would give a rich yield. Germany could have no more valuable possession than this island. All this must of course be taken in hand in as friendly a spirit as possible, as, for instance, by purchase from the Turkish Government. In the first place, however, a secret agent should be sent immediately to investigate the geological, topographical, and all other features of the island. If the result of these investigations is satisfactory, and shows it to be worth while to annex the island, Constantinople must then be approached as quickly and tactfully as possible. The task of the Central Administration in Germany appears to me, in regard to the Eastern question, to be, not *de se joindre aux intrigues absurdes dont s'amuse les diplomates à Constantinople*, but to bring about some sort of solution of the problem. From the present state of the question Germany gains nothing and is only losing time. But if the whole affair comes to a crisis, and if Germany is unified, strong and armed, she will be able to secure Cyprus, and more besides, in the universal partition. Above all, however, may God send reason and a single mind to the patriotic babblers, and to the Governments of Germany; above all, we must rid ourselves of the pitiful jealousies of parliamentary life, if we hope to impose ourselves upon the

world with the old German vigour and robustness. But when will this come about? If, however, by peaceful negotiations with the Turkish Government, or the explosion of the Eastern question, we acquire Rhodes or Cyprus, or whatever else, we shall thereby obtain a splendid outlet for thousands of the proletariat, we shall gain a sea-board and a mercantile navy, marines and sailors. Nor must Syria and Asia Minor be forgotten. We must do all we can to check the Russians and English there, to which end it is essential to send out no Protestant bishops and missionaries, but to make it a station for the Catholic world in the East. German Consulates, filled by efficient men, are among the most pressing tasks of the Imperial Executive. At the same time, better no Consul than a bad one! A Consul in the East must be a Catholic, good at Oriental languages, and experienced in commercial affairs, while the Consul-General for our purposes must be a competent diplomatist. Up to now, nothing good is known in the East of Austria; of Prussia, only that it patronises the Protestant bishop and promotes the conversion of the Jews at Jerusalem; of Germany, absolutely nothing! It is a most humiliating experience to travel in the East as a German. More than ever do I deplore the weakness with which the first days of the revolution were frittered away, without producing anything thorough-going and complete at the moment when all the separate Governments were helpless. Yet why murmur! Let us endeavour to save what may yet be saved!

On the 19th the ship was able to leave Haifa, and lay off Alexandria on January 21, 1849. They were in quarantine till the 29th. On the 30th the Prince and Princess were allowed to land. They reached Cairo on the 31st, and made a journey to Upper Egypt between then and February 15. From the 16th to the 19th the travellers made a further stay in Cairo, left on February 20 for Alexandria, and occupied the next five days in going to Malta. After a quarantine of several days they landed at Naples on March 6, and reached Molo di Gaeta on the 9th. The Prince found the following letter from the Imperial Minister, Heinrich von Gagern, in Naples:

FRANKFURT, *January 3, 1849.*

Your valuable report of the 17th has reached me, and the Administrator has heard from me with much pleasure and satisfaction of the very cordial reception your Highness met with in Athens. . . . Since, for the moment, the Imperial Ministry sees no justification for the prolongation of your stay in Athens, I am to request you will present yourself to his Holiness the Pope, as soon as possible, either at Gaeta or wherever he is to be found, to present the Administrator's notification. The indefinite, and perhaps ephemeral character of the Provisional Government is the reason for this order from the Ministry, and

to judge from the manner in which the residence of his Holiness in Gaeta appears to be organised, I have little doubt that the Pope will receive Ambassadors there. From the Papal Court, your Highness will next proceed to Florence. I look forward with much interest to your despatches.

January 23, 1849.

Your Highness will have duly received the despatch of January 6, in which I requested you to deliver the Letters of Notification of November 12 to his Holiness, at his present headquarters. In the meantime I have also had your welcome report of December 3 from Athens, and quite approve of your journey. As the time of your proposed absence from Athens has now elapsed, and I doubt whether the present despatch would have reached you there, you will find it at Gaeta, forwarded from the Royal Prussian Embassy in Naples, to which it is going to-day. Enclosed are:

(1) Copy of a letter addressed by the Holy Father from Gaeta on the 4th inst. to the Administrator.

(2) The answer of the Administrator, along with

(3) An open copy, and

(4) The translation of the same;

these two last as a preliminary communication to the Papal Chancellory of Foreign Affairs. I beg you to hand the answer of the Administrator to his Holiness, which can be done directly you have presented the Letters of Notification.

Of these despatches the Prince reports on March 10, 1849: " . . . I arrived here yesterday, and betook myself this morning to Cardinal Antonelli, who, as *Prosegretario di Stato*, undertakes the business of Minister of Foreign Affairs. I handed him the letter from the Ministry to the Cardinal State Secretary, along with the copy and translation of the Letter of Notification of November 12, and the answer of H.I.H. the Imperial Administrator to the letter from the Holy Father of December 4, and begged the Cardinal to procure me an audience with his Holiness. Cardinal Antonelli expressed his willingness to introduce me forthwith, and, after announcing my visit, conducted me to the Holy Father, who resides in the same house. All etiquette and ceremonial have been very much cut down in Gaeta, under the circumstances, so that this audience will be held fully adequate, the more so as the other newly accredited Envoys, and even the Belgian Ambassador, have been presented in the same way to the Holy Father.

"As soon as I entered, his Holiness welcomed me cordially, and after the necessary ceremonial, bade me be seated opposite to him and declare my mission. I handed him the Letter of Notification, and then the letter from the Administrator of January 23, coupling with the latter an assurance of the pro-



found distress which H.I.H. felt at the recent events in Rome. This feeling I expressed, for my own part, in the name of the whole of Germany. His Holiness received these words very kindly, adding that the firm coherence of the European Governments was all the more necessary inasmuch as this was a war of barbarism against religion and social order. I then told him of the struggle for unification in Germany, which had for its object the establishment of civil and moral order, when the Holy Father warmly expressed his sympathy with the unification of Germany, described the relation between Austria and Prussia as the *nodo gordiano che vuol essere sciolto*, and added that he would pray for the happy consummation of German affairs. The Holy Father then spoke of matters more personal to myself with his own peculiar charm, and the audience came to an end. All this, as is now customary in the Papal Court in the absence of a proper organ, will be published in the Neapolitan *Official Gazette*. As the Imperial Ministry will already be aware, the Grand Duke of Tuscany is here too, but has so far received no Envoys. If, however, a French Ambassador intends to wait on the Grand Duke here, as is rumoured, I shall regard this as a precedent, and deliver my letters. I will enter on the political situation in my next report, only stating now that I shall associate myself with the efforts of the other diplomatists here, to restore the Pope to his independent position in his own States.

*Report of March 24, 1849.*

The *Prosegretario di Stato* of his Holiness the Pope has, at my request, communicated to me the documents referring, on the one hand, to the position of the Holy Father in regard to the usurping Government in Rome; on the other, to the relations of his Holiness with the European Governments, and the intervention which he desires. The present state of the question of intervention is this: on the Pope's request for intervention, the four Powers appealed to\* declared themselves ready to intervene; the Governments of Spain and Naples had previously agreed; the replies from Austria and France arrived a few days ago. France, as Cardinal Antonelli to-day informs me, has already massed troops ready to embark for the coast of Italy. In order to discuss the mode of intervention, and the fitting time for it, there is shortly to be a conference between the Plenipotentiaries of France, Austria, Naples, and Spain, in Gaeta. Even granting a decision to be imminent, there is no disguising that the peculiar attitude of the French Government towards the National Assembly and its relation to Austria might give rise to difficulties of

\* Austria, France, Spain, and Naples.

all kinds within the conference. The Cardinal State Secretary is by no means unaware of this, but believes that he will be able to interpose in a conciliatory manner, trusting chiefly to the fact that he has treated the whole question as much as possible from the religious standpoint, reserving the political side of the question till intervention is over.

No communication has been made to myself, or to the rest of the diplomatic body. I shall, therefore, only attempt to follow the course of the negotiations, and shall have the honour to report further to you at a later date.

*Report from Naples, April 11, 1849.*

Since there appeared to be no justification for prolonging my stay in Gaeta, I took leave of the Holy Father two days ago, and was dismissed with the utmost cordiality. I was unable to give the Imperial Administrator's letter to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. For although it seems probable that the Grand Duke will in the immediate future appoint a Foreign Minister and receive Ambassadors, I could not await this event, in view of the probably brief duration of the Provisional Government in Germany. I communicated this to the Grand Duke, and was privately received by him. As I am sailing for Germany in one of the next packets, I shall shortly have the honour of communicating my reports to you by word of mouth.

In a letter dated Naples, April 4, 1849, the Prince writes to Princess Amalie: "My residence at Gaeta in the near neighbourhood of the noble and excellent Pope was a beautiful experience, to be reckoned among the most impressive days of my life."

While still in Gaeta the Prince had received the news that King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. had declined the Imperial Crown. "Therewith," he remarks in his note, "the fate of the Frankfurt Empire was sealed. I took leave of the Pope, and of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to whom I was unable to deliver my papers, as he had no Foreign Minister. He said: 'Greetings to my cousin in Frankfurt!' We went to Naples, remained there during the month of May, and returned *via* Paris to Frankfurt."

After the Prince had been received in audience by the Archducal Administrator, and had conversed for an hour, he was offered a place in the Gravel Ministry, which had taken command in the National Assembly on May 17. He declined, on the ground that "he had no desire to take part in a Ministry whose only duty was to give the Empire a decent burial." The Prince looked hard at the Archduke, and nothing more was said about it.

The close of his Imperial mission marked the close of the Prince's active share in politics for the time being. He was again for all practical purposes reduced to the rôle of spectator. The impression which the gradual collapse of the national hopes and the disgraceful termination of the movement made on him appears in the letters to his sister and his speeches in the Upper House.

TO PRINCESS AMALIE.

MUNICH, November 18, 1849.

. . . My brothers and sisters and I are bound together by a rare bond of spiritual affinity, which is practically unknown to other folk. I have met with it in few families. Such a spirit is rare in the society of the great world. Generally speaking, and here in particular, the great world in its heart of hearts is very small. Good if you like, kindly, less evil than is commonly made out by country parsons — but there is little enough behind. It is a rare thing to meet with the noble minds which this city must contain as well as any other. In such surroundings I am becoming all unconsciously a democrat; exactly as in the Chamber, where I am driven to the Left by the party of narrow-minded aristocrats, who are so without any justification. For instance, at the last sitting I had to protect the German National Assembly against the stupid attacks of a certain elderly gentleman. We had an interesting sitting on the German question, and I spoke tolerably well before a crowded audience. I was gratified at my own coolness and self-possession. It is a fortunate thing in these days to have attained the art of speaking clearly and without embarrassment before a large audience. My very tame discourse was, however, considered too anti-Ministerial, and I shall get into disgrace with the Court. *Kein Vernünftiger kann zergliedern, was den Menschen wohl gefällt.*

The sitting alluded to in this letter took place on November 12, and was concerned with the attitude of the Bavarian Government to the German question, for which the Chamber gave "grateful thanks" to the Ministry. This "grateful thanks" referred, as the proceedings show, to the disavowal both of the Frankfurt Assembly and of the League of the Three Kings. Prince Hohenlohe did not abstain from voting, but spoke as follows with regard to the League: "Had the question been brought before this House while still undecided, had this House been asked whether it consented to the establishment of this league, I admit that I should have advised that consent should be given. I start from the principle that a strong Central Executive is a necessity, and from this standpoint I should have taken leave to doubt whether the impulse towards National Unity could have been fulfilled in any other way than in

that laid down on broad lines by the League of the Three Kings.

"The German States are collectively constitutional and monarchical; no autocratic form of Central Administration is therefore conceivable. A Parliament in co-ordination with this Central Executive is a generally acknowledged necessity. But in my opinion this collaboration of an Executive with a Parliament is a very dangerous matter. A Directory of Plenipotentiaries — for Directors must always be fully empowered — a Collective Body, in fact, any one of these many-headed organisations of the Central Authority will always act according to instructions. But when you are dealing with a Parliament it is indispensable to act quickly, decidedly, and vigorously. It appears to me that such vigour, speed, and decision in execution would not be compatible with acting upon instructions. This was our experience before, when the Confederation still existed in its earlier form, and I do not believe that, hitherto at least, the problem has been solved. But to-day I say no more on all these points. The question of the League of the Three Kings is for the moment closed. It has at any rate passed into a stage in which further advocacy is futile. The Bavarian people, through its Representatives, has declared against the League of the Three Kings. His Majesty's Government has rejected the League of the Three Kings, supported by the majority of the Bavarian nation. My personal and opposite views (which I felt it right to bring forward briefly) must therefore be set aside. It is not my duty to blame the Government for doing what the majority of the people wills. In a question which affects the rights of a whole nation, and the independence of a State, the personal, subjective convictions of the individual must be subordinated. Yet I know of no other expedient by which the Government could have brought the wishes of the people into harmony with the principle of the unification of all Germany. It is difficult, almost impossible, to fulfil the wish for national unity, and at the same time preserve the entire independence of each several State. If unification has gone by the board in the year 1848, it is not so much on account of the separate dynastic interests as of the enmities of the various German races. That is a sad truth, nevertheless it is necessary to avow the truth as often as may be. Under such conditions I acknowledge that the Government could not have acted otherwise than it did."

To PRINCESS AMALIE.

MUNICH, December 22, 1849.

. . . We are just now reading bits of Humboldt's *Letters to a Friend*. In these I find my own thoughts at every turn. Latterly, however, I have had very little time for reading

aloud. My days have been entirely absorbed in the proceedings of the Chamber. I was much praised for a successful impromptu speech a few days ago. This *événement* was the topic of conversation that day. Since the subject is not of universal interest, you will not find it in the *Augsburger Zeitung*. I myself am indifferent to these successes. I am glad that I am making some progress in this way, because it is very annoying in stirring times to be embarrassed intreating a subject by a bad style. But I take no pleasure in these things.

The proceedings of the Chamber, to which these observations refer, related to the prosecution of the revolutionaries in the Palatinate. During the sitting of December 18, Count Arco-Valley termed himself a "drag on the chariot wheels of the Republic," in contrast with "some young hereditary legislators." It was his reply to this attack that the Prince calls an "impromptu." On the question of the amnesty he says, in a note made at the time: "I believe that all who took part in the criminal attempts of last spring fall into two categories:

"(1) Demagogues proper, or professional Radicals.

"(2) Revolutionaries from transitory motives.

"We know that a party, a widespread sect, exists which has fallen out with the present moral and civil order and is struggling after another. The study of philosophy, of Hegelianism in particular, has brought the leaders of this party to the conclusion that Christianity is a lie, the Christian State accordingly founded on error. They seek to express this truth, as they perceive it, in Religion and the State. What positive contributions they bring us, I have failed after the most strenuous endeavours to make out. Wherever they have been constrained to practical action the theory that floated before them has in the event collapsed, owing to its purely negative character. Mazzini in Italy, Pierre Leroux in France, Karl Vogt — I mention only the most prominent names in the party — all have so far shown themselves potent in negation only. Granting, however, that this party could introduce a new religious and social structure, they could do so only after the total destruction of the existing order. And here they encounter the resistance of all reasonable men. It is clear that only barbarism can result from such a destruction of our present civilisation. It is our duty, therefore, to oppose the efforts of the Radical party with great firmness. The Radical party is too clever to put out its hand in a reconciliation that can do it no good. It wants war. It follows that a policy of pardon, or clemency, would be weakness.

"This party, however, has few supporters in the Palatinate. Its leaders have nearly all made good their escape. We have principally to deal with the second class, those who are revolutionaries, from transitory causes, the politically disaffected,

whose movements will calm down like the waves of the sea once the storm is over. When in years gone by the country was filled with enthusiasm for the unity of Germany, men of noble character set themselves at the head of the movement, and said to the people: 'Have patience, we will create a United Germany by constitutional means.' The National Assembly was convened, the people calmed down — and waited. It waited patiently for a whole year. In that year the revolution waned, the Governments waxed stronger. Nay, the enthusiasm for German unity cooled in many breasts. Many even of those who sat at Frankfurt did not wish to carry through their task. When the Constitution was passed with toil and travail, inspiration and excitement stirred again, as in 1848, in many breasts. But times had changed. What had been tolerated the year before, because no one could prevent it, was now a crime. This, however, was incomprehensible to the agitating section of the people. They could not know that what had brought many an agitator to high honour in March 1848 was treason now. They did not know their age. It is hard, indeed, to read the political stars aright, to forecast correctly what will succeed or fail. This section of the people could not know that the Government was now directed by strong men, able to stem the tide of revolution, strong enough to enforce respect for the laws. These excited spirits could not tell that the time had gone by in which men heard the voice of the populace in every cat-call — and trembled. That the people did not know all this, that they acted on faith in a revolution which no longer existed, was the cardinal error committed by most of those who are indicted and compromised."

The Prince's attitude on the disappearance of the last hopes of patriotism, as connected with the League of the Three Kings, found expression in a scathing article in the *Frankfurter Journal* (No. 71) criticising the King of Württemberg's Speech from the Throne. "Through the whole speech," he says, "runs an unwholesome strain, telling of the dangers that threaten us from without, if the people of Württemberg and of Germany at large do not follow the paternal admonition of their Sovereigns, and cease to pursue the phantom idea of German unity. We are told expressly that the realisation of the Federal State is impossible 'without infringement of the solemn treaty on which our position and independence in Europe, as well as the political equilibrium of Europe itself, depend.' We hear of the dangers to which the League of May 26 must lead, within, as well as without. It is clear, then, to the august speaker that foreign Powers might menace our independence, that an interference of foreign Powers in our internal affairs is impending. We have come to this point, that in a German kingdom political shame is utterly laid aside, and the eyes of all Europe may see that

we no longer venture to propose a Constitution corresponding to *our* needs, but that the casting-vote is to lie with the Powers who have guaranteed the contract! Things have come to such a pass that this confession is, and can be, fearlessly made to a Democratic Assembly! Truly, it had been better to be silent about 'ancient privilege' in the speech from the Throne, if an ancient honour is to be so utterly disowned."

Shortly before the catastrophe of Olmütz the Prince writes to Princess Amalie:

SAYN, *November 16, 1850.*

"... Yesterday I had tea with the Princess of Prussia. She was very depressed by the latest political events;\* she is so distressed and pained by the deplorable proceedings in Berlin that it is grievous to see her. I might compare her to Niobe. The comparison is the more justified in that, in the wreck of Prussia, she mourns the wrecked future of her excellent and promising son."

\* Resignation of Radowitz on November 2 after the "Preliminary Meeting" in Warsaw of October 28, in which the Constitution of the Union was given up.





1850-1866



1850-1866

BETWEEN 1850 and 1866 we have no material in his own words for a coherent account of the Prince's life and work. He did not keep a continuous diary during that time, while his letters to Princess Amalie, in which his inner life had expressed itself before his happy marriage, naturally assumed another character after that event, and were confined to the facts and affairs of everyday life. This period again is wanting in the unity given to his years of development by the growth of his personality. His character was now practically formed, and he was only awaiting his opportunity for political action. The times, however, were not favourable. The national idealism of 1848 had expired in the wastes of reaction, and the former head of an Imperial Mission had no prospect of advancement or office from the Bavarian Government. Bavaria in the fifties gave no scope for the activities of a politician, Conservative by training and social standing, yet filled with strong patriotism. It is psychologically interesting to see how his craving for political activity gradually induced the Prince to that compromise with circumstances in which lay his only chance of a political career; how he endeavoured to make his peace with the Bavarian Government, and how, by the influence of all these external conditions, his own political views gradually became modified, and brought him nearer to Bavarian Particularism. He was a supporter of the Triad idea not from conviction, but from a feeling that, in view of the apparent hopelessness of the Little German programme, and the obvious impossibility of a Great German policy, the concentration of the national forces of the South German and Middle German States into a Third Germany was preferable to total disintegration and the impotence of powerful German Peoples. This Bavarian and Particularist tendency is the more remarkable, since it reappears in the subsequent policy of the Prince when he was at the head of the Bavarian Government, and because this very concession to Particularism was the underlying principle of the national policy which the Premier of Bavaria was to carry out. Only a statesman the correctness of whose Bavarian was beyond question could

have won the confidence of King Ludwig II., and could have inspired that Prince's attitude to the German nation in the great and critical questions of its political destiny.

## I

## PARIS AND RUSSIA, 1850-1866

IN December 1850 the Prince went with his wife to Paris for several months. From there he wrote to the Princess Amalie on December 15:

"We are spending the first week in settling down and visiting the different theatres, as this will be impossible later when we have evening engagements. The theatres are interesting and instructive as regards the language. Madame Rachel and Madeleine Brohan at the Comédie-Française are both remarkable, the latter particularly for her beauty, while the former is beyond all criticism, and one entirely forgets her Jewish appearance. A melodrama called *Palliasse*, an excellent thing by Lemaître, is to be given at the Gaîté. The new opera, *L'Enfant Prodigue*, by Auber, is the universal topic of conversation. The story is taken from the Bible, and the scene laid in Egypt and Palestine. A more offensive production than this opera one cannot imagine. It concludes with a scene in Heaven itself, with angels playing on harps! The scenery is magnificent, the music miserable, and one has to listen for five mortal hours to this hysterical outburst. Once! but never again. I saw Madame Sontag in the *Barber of Seville*; a curious experience, after seeing her the last time in her own drawing-room in Berlin.\* Our *entrée* into society took place at Madame Narischkine's. She made it her special business to introduce us as soon as possible, and did it with the greatest kindness and tact. We met many old acquaintances from Athens and Naples in her *salon*, so her task was considerably lightened. Next day I was presented to the President by the Bavarian Ambassador. The rank and file remain in the large drawing-rooms, and persons of quality are received in the President's small apartments, where I was taken by Wendland. We met the Household in the first room, and at the door of the second a little man in the Bavarian Light Horse uniform, and wearing the grand cordon of the Legion of Honour. This was "*le Prince*." I was introduced to him, and he talked with me of Bavaria. "*J'y ai passé ma jeunesse à Augsbourg, et j'en conservé toujours un très bon souvenir*."† He spoke of a certain Prince Hohenlohe, whom he

\* Henriette Sontag (1803-1854) had lived in Berlin as the Countess Rossi from 1843-1849.

† Napoleon, from 1816, had lived for many years at Augsburg, with his mother Queen Hortense, and attended the St. Anna Gymnasium there.

had known at Munich. I was next introduced to Princess Mathilde, a stout handsome lady in diamonds. Presently the whole company made a move and defiled into the ballroom, the crowd forming a lane through which we had to walk. In the room I was presented to Lord and Lady Normanby. Lord Normanby is a tall, curly-headed specimen of an Englishman, with a perpetual smile and quantities of Orders; Lady Normanby stout and phlegmatic, wearing diamonds. Count Hatzfeldt, the Prussian Ambassador, whose acquaintance I also made, is a Rhenish landed proprietor, *dans toute la force du terme*; his wife, a lively, intelligent Frenchwoman. The Austrian Ambassador Hübner is a combination of Liszt and Karl von Koschentin,\* adroit and clever like all Austrian diplomats. There were a great many Russians, who are very charming to us; for the rest, extremely polished and uninteresting.

Yesterday evening we were at the Duchess of Maillé's, an amiable lady with a grey moustache. We had a pleasant reception in the small exclusive *salon*, where we knew nobody; but the guests only stay for about half an hour at these small *soirées*, and we went on to Princess Lieven's. This was a most interesting experience for me, as we met so many remarkable and celebrated people. Guizot, as you can see at once, has a striking personality. He is the only man I have seen so far in this Parisian society who does not appear to be thinking of something else all the time one talks to him. It is really a difficult thing, and denotes great strength of mind, to keep one's head in the chatter and bewilderment of a Paris drawing-room. Molé† is a capable man, but very absent-minded. Berreyer,‡ who also was present, but whom I did not speak to, looks like a country clergyman. Amongst the ladies I saw, I should single out Madame Kalergi for her beauty, Princess Grassalkowitch for vigorous old age, Madame Gudin for her stout figure and ingenuous conversation. I saw no young girls, except a few at the President's ball. Everything here is very pre-revolutionary (*vormärzlich*). My coachman invariably answers, "*Oui, Monseigneur.*" Orders are continually worn, over everything, and all day long. Life is pleasant and easy, and the *soirées*, of which there are several every evening, are short and informal.

February 4, 1851.

I am going to a very interesting lecture by Michel Chevalier on Political Economy, with Marie, Princess Menchikoff, and Frau von Seebach. The Collège de France is, unfortunately, so far off that I can only attend the remainder of the course

\* Prince Karl zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1820-1890) of Koschentin.

† Count Louis Mathieu Molé, Conservative Minister under Louis Philippe.

‡ The celebrated orator, Ney's and Napoleon's advocate after the Boulogne enterprise.

(as well as a mad *cours de philosophie* by Michelet) now and again. On Thursday and Friday at half-past seven, at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers, Blanqui \* speaks on Industrial Economy. They are most interesting and remarkable lectures, but, owing to dinner engagements, I am scarcely ever able to attend. It is extraordinary, however, to notice the various elements which make up the audience: ladies and gentlemen in the reserved seats, and crowds of working men in their blue blouses in the amphitheatre. It all has a calming and quieting effect on me: I am the poorer of some illusions, but richer in thought. Marie feels more and more every day the real worth of our quiet life at Schillingsfürst, and has taken a step nearer to real peace of mind; and all these experiences make the quiet of our home dearer to us, thus bringing before us our duties in the future and opening up the glimpse of a quiet but useful life.

The last observation refers to an arrangement of the Prince with his father-in-law, the Prince of Sayn-Wittgenstein, whereby the Prince was to take over the management of a large estate in Russia, the property which the Princess and her brother had inherited from their mother, born Princess Stephanie Radziwill, who died July 26, 1832. The removal to Russia was fixed for the autumn of 1851.

To PRINCESS AMALIE.

SCHILLINGSFURST, July 24, 1851.

I have a great desire to go to London, though I do not know how I can fit it in with all other my other plans of travel. It may not be possible, and I must renounce, with great regret, the idea of seeing the Crystal Palace and the great Exhibition. I am highly pleased that this enterprise has thrown such a striking light on the merits of Prince Albert which have so long been unacknowledged. It is another proof how wrong one is to accept so-called public opinion and the judgment of the populace on persons of exalted rank.

To the same.

RAUDEN, October 4, 1851.

. . . The longer I am away from Schillingsfürst, the firmer grows my conviction that I shall not get back there, and the thought of Russia, and all it means, weighs so heavily with me that the little affairs of Schillingsfürst do not count. I hardly know why I am able to leave Schillingsfürst so easily and how I can give up that beautiful, pleasant life without grieving. The older I grow, the further recedes the ideal life. Man must create, and work, and reasonable beings feel that in their work

\* Political Economist, the elder brother of the Communist.

lies the source of happiness, and therefore I am thirsting for work, because, whatever we do, we are always striving to be happy. On that account the life of a South German squire has grown distasteful to me, because it is saturated with idleness. And the possession of Schillingsfürst has not been in harmony with my nature or temperament, and in fine I thank God that He has forcibly taken me from it and has placed me in a new way of life, unknown, perhaps difficult and tedious, but suited to my character. Forgive me for talking so much of my own thoughts and affairs, but it is such a comfort to me, and I hope to you, to show you that I hope to do my duty, and not to go through life frivolously.

*To PRINCESS ELISE.\**

*WERKI, October 25/13, 1851.*

We have been here for two days, and I cannot say that either country or people have made an unpleasant impression on me. If I were ten years younger, and full of hope in life and the realisation of one's ideals, it would be most melancholy work to travel through this depopulated gloomy country, of which one knows not whether its greatness is in the past or in the future. I can see in it neither the one nor the other. The country can never have been any different in the past, and it will never have any future. One must just take it as it is. The majestic solitude of the Lithuanian woods, and the cornfields stretching out of sight into the distance, have, however, a peace and charm of their own. Werki itself recalls Lubowitz or Fürstenberg. It is like the Oderthal, or the Weserthal, only without the villages and with more woods and open country. The situation of the castle is beautiful, and the castle itself and the park quite English. We can make ourselves quite happy here. I went to-day to see the Governor-General at Wilna; a very agreeable man. We shall stay here for a couple of days and then go further north, and hope to be in Petersburg at the end of the month. We are to stay there at the Bariatinsky house — in which a wing has been rented for us.

The Prince and his family spent the winter of 1851-52 in Petersburg, and in the spring of 1852 went back to Werki. Their residence in Russia lasted till the summer of 1853. Unfortunately, there are no written records extant of the Prince's life at this time. Letters from the Princess Elise, who lived during the summer of 1852 with her brother, give a picture of the home life at Werki. A few extracts from these letters, which the Princess has kindly allowed to be published, may be inserted here.

\* The Prince's youngest sister, born January 6, 1831, married in 1868 to Prince zu Salm-Horstmar.

WERKI, June 26, 1852.

The castle stands high, and there is a pretty view of the River Wilia, as it winds through the valley below. I can only see a tiny bit of it from my room, as it is on the ground floor, and the maples which grow all over the mountain hide the view from me. Bushes grow thickly in front of my window, and between these and the trees, which grow on the slopes of the mountain, is a lawn, surrounded by a gravel path. From the drawing-room window above, one can see over the trees to a little lake, lying at the foot of the mountain, entirely surrounded by foliage. To the left of the river are houses covered with creepers, which belong to Werki. The finest thing here is the *terrasse*. In the garden, at the foot of the mountain, a room has been built, with an iron balcony. Under a large lime-tree are chairs and benches, and one has a beautiful view of the river. A white Greek church can be seen on its bank, and on the hills behind the wood Wilna lies very prettily. It looks very near—in fact it is only half-an-hour's drive. The road leads straight from the river between fir-trees to the mountain. The whole horizon is bounded by the dark wood. Morning is the most beautiful time on the *terrasse*. The sky and air are as clear as in September. I have not seen any peasants, as none live here. The houses are all inhabited by artisans who are all well-to-do. Beggars with petitions sometimes come into the garden; they are generally from distant places, and bow themselves almost to the ground.

June 28.

I am sitting in a summer-house near the *terrasse*: it is a circular room with glass doors all round. On the side where I sit I can see only pine-trees, and hear the wind rustling in the wood and the ravens croaking. There are so many here. Except at Schillingsfürst, I have never seen any place where there are so many beautiful walks as here; every day after lunch Marie shows me a new one. To-day we drove some way over a wooded hill. Then we alighted and followed a green, sunny path between the immense pine-trees. Every moment you came on a white chapel, thickly surrounded by trees. Not far off is the Calvary Hill, where the Catholic church is built. We climbed up to it before we came away. From there we could see the white castle with its tower peeping out from the thick, dark wood like a fairy palace; round it, nothing but wood. Wildness and loveliness are united here. If the dark woods make one sad, the blue clear water of the river refreshes, and the pure air braces one. The air to-day felt like the sea, but the house is gloomy, close, the passages dark and close, the rooms high, but most of them narrow. The whole house is cramped, with no side wings. A tower stands at one end, and at the other a winter garden, full of beautiful palms and all kinds of plants. Both



Chlodwig's room and Marie's bedroom open on to turret staircases. In the former we always drink tea in the evening. At two o'clock I read to Marie — just now Say's *Political Economy* — and at four o'clock we dine in the high, bright-lit Rittersaal.

July 22.

At night, when I have put out the light after I have been with Chlodwig, I often feel very happy that I can be his companion and proud that he shares his thoughts with me — and my heart is full of love for him.

July 24.

This evening we have been reading Liebig's *Letters on Chemistry*, at least the doctor reads to us and explains to us the properties of oxygen, carbon, &c. Chlodwig sketches meanwhile, and Marie and I work. I stayed with Chlodwig for a quarter of an hour after the reading. This hour and my solitary morning hours in the garden are the happiest in the day.

September 5.

Chlodwig has been away since the 2nd on a visit to another property, where he will get some shooting. He will return in a fortnight.

October 8.

Chlodwig came back again on the 4th, but, unfortunately, he only shot one elk. He looks very well, however, after his time in the woods. Since his return, life in the house is quite different. The days are much fuller. I always admire Chlodwig when he takes Elizabeth\* on his knee, and draws for her. It is a beautiful picture to see their faces, his full of tenderness bending over her curly head, while she strokes his cheek with her little hand. After she had gone to bed Chlodwig began to read aloud to us *Ihr nahtenchrweider, Schmanheude Gestalten*. A whole world burst upon me in that book. After tea, the doctor came again to read to us. He has been explaining the structure of the eye to us, illustrated from a bull's-eye. The end of the day brought a talk with Chlodwig, which would have been comforting if I had not noticed that he was troubled about something. That always makes me unhappy. One morning I was teaching Elizabeth her alphabet; she is always so inattentive, but I try not to be impatient, and go over the same letter thirty times, as if I were singing a melody. It was successful, for she suddenly began to take it in. Chlodwig looked at us a moment kindly before going to his business, and said, "That is a good system." It was quite enough to make me happy and contented for the day.

\* His eldest daughter, born November 30, 1847.

*Memorandum to the PRINCE.*

July 3, 1853.

The present activity in physical science, brought about by an advance in knowledge undreamed of by former generations, has revealed to the student the entire impossibility of a union between faith and knowledge. So, the school of natural science declares war on transcendentalism, and banishes the transcendental to the sphere of belief.

Thus, we find ourselves in a dangerous position.

It is well known already that educated men are either devoid of faith or accept the church and follow her ordinances without real conviction, as a matter of form. But are not the two things identical? Is not that form of belief which follows the rules of the Church without inner conviction of their truth merely pharasaical? I know, of course, that many thoughtful men, and men of real feeling, subscribe to this form of religion. But will such conventional homage to the Church endure? Will not the effects of this knowledge without faith spread to those classes of society which can have no interest in subordinating themselves to the Church and her dogmas, to the discipline and mortification which she imposes? Will not a total collapse be the end, or rather has it not even now begun to spread among the lower classes? Most people are still living in the pleasant illusions of transcendentalism, and the discoveries of natural science, made by the modern school, at present only affect scientific circles. But will this last? And if this result comes about, we must face the bankruptcy of faith, a catastrophe which must infallibly lead to the collapse of the whole structure of modern civilisation. For all that it would be childish to regret the discoveries of natural science. They are for a wise and useful end, because they have their place in the development of mankind. One thing is needful. We must not close our eyes to facts. We must not weep over humanity, nor laugh; we must strive to understand.

The following undated note appears to belong to about the same period: "At the present time we see the conviction growing more and more that knowledge and faith must be completely separated. In consequence of the spread of this conviction, Protestantism, so far as it has attempted a reconciliation between Science and Dogma, has lost ground. The educated man, who feels the necessity of church and religion, drifts without conviction to the Catholic Church because it meets the demands his reason makes for a coherent dogma. So the doubting part of mankind will get nearer and nearer to Catholicism. But will the establishment of something that will endure follow this? Will men be satisfied with a form of dogma which they accept from necessity, but without inward conviction, simply because

they yearn for a definite form of faith? I do not believe it; but I believe that mankind will create for itself a form of faith adapted to it, and become religious again."

In the year 1853, owing to a difference of opinion with his father-in-law, the Prince resigned the management of the Lithuanian estates. The family returned to Schillingsfürst and took up their residence there for the next few years. The life at Schillingsfürst was interrupted by wintering in Munich for parliamentary business, and frequent long journeys. The Prince's work in the Upper House, and the observations which his travels enabled him to make on European politics are recorded in the following notes.

## II

### ROME, 1856-57

The Prince's family, during the winter of 1856-57, lived in Rome, where his brother, Prince Gustav of Hohenlohe, was at that time Papal Chamberlain. A few extracts here follow from the Prince's diary during his residence in Rome, which give interesting information on the conditions and personalities of Roman society.

ROME, *December 2, 1856.*

I am growing to understand better the separation that exists between the Jesuits and their followers, and their opponents among the clergy. In the severance of the clergy from lay society, in their renunciation of all that makes life pleasant for ordinary men, in their independence of the existing institutions on which our present social hierarchy is framed, the former see the salvation and future welfare of the Church, while the other party claim to take man as they find him, make allowance for the existing class differences, and count, not on the destruction of existing social conditions, but on their continuance. The Jesuits, on the one hand, are preparing for the collapse of society. On the other their opponents don't believe in it, but intend to uphold social order and to identify themselves with it.

*December 12.*

This afternoon we took various walks through the town; in the evening several priests came to see us — first the good Abbé de Geslin; then clever and energetic Père Etienne Djunkowsky, Prefect of the North, who talked to us of his experiences in Lapland. He too is at war with the Jesuits. I hear more every day of fresh intrigues amongst this Order, and am beginning to lose the good opinion I had of their efficiency.

December 17.

I went later to see Theiner,\* who talked to me of his work at the archives, which he found in the greatest disorder. He had arranged everything with German exactitude, and intends to make himself very useful to the Holy See. Up till now, all the archive keepers had only made use of their office as a stepping-stone for their own advancement, to nunciatures, &c., and had left the archives to take care of themselves. . . .

December 18.

At eleven o'clock a Te Deum was sung for the King of Naples to return thanks for his happy escape. We were invited by the Neapolitan Chargé d'Affaires. We arrived rather late and went to the diplomatic gallery, which was erected near the high altar. The whole *Corps diplomatique* was there, including several ladies. Close by was a tribune for the Roman princes, in the centre a small, high one for Queen Christina of Spain. The high altar was splendidly lighted with immensely long candles, and the whole ceremony, with the assisting Dominicans in white, was most impressive. The music left much to be desired.

ROME, January 27, 1857.

This afternoon I went to see Gustav in the Vatican. I found a Franciscan with him, Father Petrus, a Dane. In the middle of our talk the Pope was announced; I fled to the inner room, the monk into the chapel, and Gustav went to meet the Holy Father, who came in with Stella and Merode and established himself in the *salon*. I soon heard my name mentioned, and the Pope asked that I should come in, so I appeared, stood near him, and assisted at a lively conversation on different subjects. We talked of the ceremony at San Pasquale, then of chapter-houses and canonesses, of Neufchâtel, China, Persia, &c. The Pope inspected the whole of Gustav's apartments with much interest, and spoke also to the Franciscan, who made his appearance, and was very bright and sympathetic.

February 1, 1851.

This morning at half-past seven Mass was said in the Chapel of the Blessed Sacrament at St. Peter's, at which the Pope administered communion. We made haste, to be there in time. It was a clear, bright morning, and the rising sun shone magnificently on the pillared church. The Pope said Mass in a remarkably strong voice. Then he administered communion to some ladies, and a few men came also. I did not present myself, because I hope to make my communion in the Pope's private chapel, which will be far better than in this crowd.

\* Augustin Theiner (1804-1874) was appointed as Prefect of the Vatican archives in 1855 through Prince Hohenlohe's influence. (See) *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. xxxvii. p. 674.

† Ferdinand II., on whose life an attempt was made on December 11.

February 8.

To-day at eleven o'clock I went to the Gesu Church to hear an Italian sermon. The preacher was a Jesuit, very clear and choice in expression. He had set himself the task of refuting the opinion that it lowers the dignity of a man to submit his reason to the Church.

March 7.

We did not come here merely as sightseers, but principally to make a position for ourselves and Gustav in society, and so to be of some use to him and, in general, to those who have been mediatised; so the first few days, which were spent in apparently frivolous amusement, had for us a deeper significance. To-day we have been busy with preparations for a *soirée* we are giving. It was only an experiment on our part, and for that reason we invited none of the really important Roman people, but rather the more fashionable part of society, who know each other well, in order to have an amusing evening to serve as a kind of bait for future occasions. It was a great success, and, as we had the Duchessa Zagarolo, the Marchesa Calabrinì, some Russian ladies, and a good many men, there was much brilliant conversation which has given our salon a *cachet* and has established our position in society. They did not leave till one o'clock, which is a proof of the success of the evening.

March 8.

At half-past four we went to the Church of St. Ignatius, where a so-called Jesuit mission is established. On a raised dais sat two Jesuits, carrying on an argument. One of them represented Ignorance, and the other Learning, and they were disputing on ethical topics. Their subject for dispute to-day was the habit of swearing. While the *dotto* explained the sin of *imprecazioni*, the *ignorante* on his part saw nothing very terrible in it. The public cheered the latter, who played his part most naturally. No doubt this kind of discourse makes an impression on people in this part of the world.

March 16.

A dinner-party. King Max was detained, and only came as the other guests were leaving. After he had gone I hastily got into my uniform, and went with Marie to two *ricevimenti*. Cardinal Geissel of Cologne and Cardinal Haulik of Agram, who have come to be invested with their hats, held their receptions or *ricevimenti*. Geissel received in Cardinal Reifach's apartments in the Palazzo Santa Croce, Haulik in the Palazzo di Venezia. The most brilliant *ricevimento* was Cardinal Haulik's. The whole palace was ablaze with light. Two bands played waltzes, &c., before it in turn, a crowd of foreigners and natives in uniform filled the staircase, and the *salons* were filled to overflowing.

Countess Colloredo did the honours for the Austrian Cardinal, and all the Roman ladies came in their most gorgeous diamonds. After a long wait we found our carriage and left to go to Salviali, where we found all our friends sat assembled.

*Sunday, March 22.*

At half-past four I went to San Agostino, where I expected to hear a sermon. As I entered I was surprised to hear the murmur of voices talking. But as I approached the mystery was explained. The church was full of groups of children; boys with priests who sat and catechised them, little girls being instructed by well-dressed girls of the *bourgeois* class, and older girls in charge of an aged priest. They were all very earnest and serious, rapt attention on the part of the pupils, while the fervour of the teachers was most edifying. Elder people sat near and listened. This instruction, which is given in many churches on Sundays, is a delightful sign of the religious life of the people, which should not be judged by certain scenes which may be witnessed in St. Peters, and is more practised here than in many other countries. When I left the church and walked further, chance took me to the Church of San Luigi de' Francesi, where I heard a sermon by Père Chevreux, very able and full of feeling, on the difference between religion and philosophy. The sermon was so interesting that I stayed to the end. It was still raining, so I strayed into another church, San Apollinare, which was empty; then to the Piazza Capranica, to the Church of the Orfanelli. Here were many people waiting for the sermon. On a little platform was a red silk arm-chair and a table, and after some time a priest came, sat down in the chair, and began a sermon — or rather, a lesson on confession, which is heard all the week at five o'clock. The priest spoke clearly and simply, in a remarkably pleasant manner. I would willingly have stayed to the end, but as it was nearly half-past five I had to come away.

*March 24.*

After dinner I went to the Vatican, to keep Gustav company in the *Anticamera*. It gives me fresh pleasure every time I go up the old Vatican staircase in the growing darkness, past the Swiss Guards in the great court of the Loggia. It is all so quiet and solemn, in the warm spring air, with the starry sky above and the high columns and galleries. The anteroom was as usual hushed and empty. Here we talked while the Pope gave an audience in the neighbouring room.

*March 29.*

As I had heard that there was to be a good preacher at the Church of Santa Lucia del Gonfalone, I went there at ten o'clock. After the Gospel (during Mass) a priest sat down in an arm-chair,

before the altar, and began in a simple, clear, and logical way to speak on confession. He was so impressive that I was only sorry there were so few people to hear him. There were barely twenty or thirty in the congregation. I have seldom heard anything so perfect. It was one of those discourses which makes an irresistibly pleasant appeal to the heart of every hearer. Not one learned word, no rhetoric, no fine phrases. It was a fresh proof of the Roman Church's tender care for souls.

I had arranged with Gustav that I should go to see him at Frascati, where he went yesterday. As the carriage was closed, and the day beautifully fine, I sat on the box by the coachman and drove to Frascati through the Campagna which looked lovely in the morning light. At the Hotel de Londres I heard that Gustav had gone the night before to the Camaldolites. I breakfasted at once and ordered a horse, to follow him there. It is barely three-quarters of an hour from here, by scattered farmhouses and gardens. At every step the landscape seems to widen out. Rome soon appears in the distance, beyond is the sea, to the right the mountains in all their morning freshness, below is the green hill of Tivoli. I soon reached the heights, and before me was the convent of the Camaldolites. A porter in a white habit came to meet me, and conducted me to the Prior, where I found Gustav and another of the monks. Only the Prior and this monk speak and show themselves; the other monks live like hermits in their little houses, and assemble only at midnight in the choir to sing. We sat by a fire in the large room, as it was pretty cold. The warmth of the fire attracted a scorpion, which glided to my feet, but the Prior seized it with a pair of tongs and threw it into the flames. After a little conversation they offered to show me the church and the convent, which offer I accepted with pleasure. The church is not particularly interesting. The monastery consists of rows of tiny houses, where each monk lives alone. He has a room containing a bed and other furniture, and a tiny study and chapel adjoining. They also showed me where Gustav stays when he comes for any length of time: a pretty little house, with a charming garden and a view of Rome, the sea, and the Campagna.

After I had seen everything, and had been loaded with roses by Father Lorenzo, Gustav and I rode back to Frascati, stopping on the way to see the Villa Falconieri, which belongs to the Cardinal, last of the Falconieri, and where one sees an interesting collection of family portraits painted *al fresco*. At Frascati we got into Gustav's carriage and drove round by Marino, where we saw the cathedral to Castel Gondolfo. Here we climbed up to the garden, and walked through the shady paths to the Papal villa. The interior is exceedingly comfortable for a Papal palace. I was much interested in a picture by a Neapolitan painter of the fall the Holy Father had at Sant' Agnese, where all the misfortunes of the Popes are painted. I also

saw Gustav's room, with its beautiful view of the sea. From here we went down to Albano, lunched at the "Post," and rode afterwards through Ariccia to Genzano, where we strolled in the beautiful Cesarini Park. Then we rode back to Albano. It was then half-past five, and we had to make haste to get home. The Vatican coachman took us back in less than two hours. As we passed the Coliseum the moon was so bright that we were obliged to stop and go in. It was wonderfully calm and restful, and the ruin solemn and impressive.

*Palm Sunday, April 5, 1857.*

At nine o'clock we went to St. Peter's, to attend the solemn High Mass. There was an immense crowd of people, but the church is so vast that the twenty or thirty thousand persons who were there did not nearly fill it. For the first time we took possession of our tribune, the one which has been erected for mediatised princes near that reserved for reigning Sovereigns. We were quite close to the Pope and could see the ceremonies, especially the distribution of palms, very comfortably. In the Royal tribune were the King of Bavaria, Queen Christina of Spain, the Crown Prince and Princess of Würtemberg, and Prince Karl of Prussia. They were all attended by brilliant suites. As the question of precedence was not decided, I had to forego the right of receiving a palm from the Holy Father's hands. The Mass lasted till half-past one.

I was summoned at half-past eleven to an audience of the Holy Father, and made my appearance punctually. The ante-rooms were full of people waiting for the Pope, in view of his impending departure. Some deputations were received first, then Cardinal Roberti, and I came next in order. The Pope was as before exceedingly friendly and kind. As I saw that he waited for me to speak, I began at once saying that I had come to ask him for his blessing before he went away, to thank him for his goodness, and to recommend Gustav specially to him. He answered very kindly, spoke of Gustav's illness, and remarked that "he hadn't my constitution." Then he spoke of the audience which he had given Marie and Princess Léoville\*; of other things also, and then dismissed me. I kissed his hand, and he remained standing until I got to the door. He was particularly cheerful and kind in his manner.

*May 4.*

As the Pope had decided to leave to-day for Loretto, I went at six o'clock in the morning to see Gustav, whom I found on the point of going to the Holy Father. We had, therefore, only a moment together, and then separated. I went home, and called for Marie to go to St. Peter's. There we found the Pope already saying Mass at the High Altar. We stayed to hear it,

\* The second wife of the Princess's father, *née* Bariatinsky.



and also the other Mass which the Pope stays to hear after saying his own, and then saw Gustav for a moment in the church, while the Pope breakfasted in a room close by, which has an entrance to the church under the monument of the Pope Alexander VIII. We then hurried to the church door, to see him as he went out. Many soldiers were drawn up in the Piazza. Among them we saw the Pope's travelling-carriage and the post-horses standing ready. Shortly after 8.30 the Pope left the Basilica with his suite. As he passed near, and Paur told him that we were there, he kindly came up to us and gave us his blessing. We went down the steps with the suite and saw him into his carriage. Cardinal Antonelli kissed his hand to him. He gave his blessing to the crowd from his carriage and then drove away through the Porta Angelica. Gustav rode in the second carriage.

The diary has the following notes on the Roman society of that period:

"In speaking of Roman society, one has to divide it into three distinct groups: Roman society proper — *i.e.*, the Roman aristocracy — the Diplomatic Corps, and the foreigners. Roman aristocratic society is one of the best in the world. The good breeding which is a peculiar and inborn characteristic of the Roman people, this fine feeling for good form natural to all the higher classes, is specially developed in the aristocracy and gives to society a polish of manners and behaviour which makes a most agreeable impression on all persons of taste. There is a certain stiffness which strikes one at first, but disappears on further acquaintance, and there remains in intimate relations an impression of exquisite reserve and courtesy. There is not much education among the higher classes. The men, with few exceptions, are very ignorant. The women are more cultivated though their education is very imperfect. The men do not go to public schools, or try in any way to acquire knowledge. When a young man has got beyond the elementary stages and knows a little French his education is at an end, and he is turned out into the world very carefully dressed. A few go on to study at the Universities. They have no prospect of making a career for themselves, so they have no incentive to complete their education. They drive about the streets and the Pincio, and flutter from one party to another; they serve their time in the *Guardia nobile* if their rank entitles them; they marry as early as possible if they have any prospect of an independent position, and enjoy life. For the most part they are harmless creatures, the more accomplished in all the ways of their world as that world is the end and aim of their existence, careful as all Romans are to avoid the difficulties and dangers of life, and much astonished if they hear that there are people who have ample means and yet give themselves up 'to drudge and slave and die in their travail.'

"The women have mostly a French education, but a few of the younger ones an original Italian cultivation, with some acquaintance with their own authors, and an interest in their own country and its history. Their knowledge comes little to the surface, however, as they fear above all things to be called Blue-stockings.

"Their morals are, on the whole, good. At least one doesn't see much wrong in society. Flirtation, so called, is tabooed. One may guess that certain relations exist between men and women one meets in society, but there is very little to be seen. I am only speaking now of the highest classes, *i.e.*, the Roman princes; of what goes on in the *mezzo ceto* (middle-class society) I cannot say. The nobles of the second rank, who are admitted into this patrician society and are on sufferance there are not of much account, and all kinds of scandalous gossip is current about them.

"Family life amongst the Roman aristocracy is still quite patriarchal. They all meet together for prayers, morning and evening, in the best families. Marriages are not made from inclination, but are arranged by agreement between the heads of the two families, *et les jeunes gens ne s'en trouvent pas plus mal*. Extravagance in a young girl in the best families is impossible. When a marriage is arranged all the details of daily life are set down in the contract, so that the young couple have their existence mapped out for them, and not only the amount of the dowry is known, but also the amount of their expenditure, how often they may go to the theatre, how much travelling they can afford, how many servants, horses, and carriages they can keep, &c. &c. This is necessary as marriages are contracted very early, and husbands and wives are mostly of the same age, and equally inexperienced.

"Nor are these peculiarities confined to the aristocracy. With some modifications the same customs are found among the lower classes also, and these last think it perfectly correct that the same habits should prevail amongst the aristocracy, only on a different scale. The Roman aristocracy, with all their faults, have a greater regard and respect for the lower classes than we have in Germany, and are more in touch with them. The envy of the higher classes and the democratic revolutionary spirit which with us extends through all society exists here only amongst the heads of the revolutionary societies, and not in the hearts of the people."

## III

## THE YEAR 1859

Early in the year 1859 the Prince went to Berlin to make himself personally acquainted with the trend of the new Prussian policy and with its leading spirits. The following notes give some of his impressions:

*Political Notes made in Berlin, 1859.*

Formation of a Ministry. Prince von Hohenzollern is considered to be able to supply just what the Prince of Prussia fails in, *i.e.*, a capacity for business and strength of character. This will counterbalance the influence of Herr von Auerswald, whom people regard as untrustworthy, deceitful, and too liberal in his views. He is in debt, is lazy, and not respected in private life. Herr von Patow is a good man of business, who understands his work, and has gained the confidence of the Conservative party. Bethmann-Hollweg is in opposition to the Extreme Orthodox party, without being a Nationalist. Herr von Bonin has not the confidence of the Army, which regards him as too Liberal. Herr von Voigts-Reetz has been appointed to the Ministry of War, to pacify the Army. The indolence of the Ministers is a great hindrance to the necessary reorganisation of the Army. Flottwell is too old, and must soon resign. Arnim Boitzenburg will only come in on the understanding that Auerswald resigns. The Prince Regent is opposed to this, as Auerswald is his friend. Schlenitz has gained the confidence of the Diplomatic Corps.

BERLIN, *February 17, 1859.*

The Prussian Cabinet wishes to keep the peace, as it has no desire to begin a national war, which would end (and end indeed happily) in arranging terms for a national peace — that is, that through a war the nation in co-operating would have a right to a hope whose realisation they regard as very inconvenient. They are taking the greatest possible trouble to weld together the concert of Europe, which has gone to pieces, but they have the following obstacles to overcome:

- (1) The untrustworthiness of Napoleon III.
- (2) The political incapacity, incivility, and falsity of the Austrian Cabinet.
- (3) The displeasure of John Bull, who sees his trade is being injured by the chicanery at Paris, and is not disinclined, even if it costs money, to make a clean sweep of the whole uncomfortable business.

(4) The hatred between Austria and Russia, who might avenge herself for the attitude of Austria at the time of the war in the East with a little blood-letting in Italy.

Thus it appears that for the moment war can be avoided, that most probably it will be postponed for a time, but that it will, in all probability, come sooner or later. The Duke of Coburg is here and is working for reconciliation; he is an active man, and in any case will be useful.

*February 26, 1859.*

Prussia is now in a particularly favourable position. Her home policy has won over public opinion in Prussia and all Germany. Austria is in a dangerous position, as the middle-sized and the small German States look to Prussia as their natural leader in the hour of need. This fact is very well known here. Prince Hohenzollern troubles himself very little about the small States, but takes his own way quietly. The warlike tone of speakers in the South German Chambers is disapproved of here.

*March 8.*

Meanwhile Austria has succeeded in disposing public opinion in the South German countries towards war. Prussia, on the other hand, has somewhat isolated herself by presuming on her strength. A *rapprochement* with France and Russia had been making itself felt. This was made the most of by the Prussian party, which is hostile to Austria, and it forced the Government into the dangerous position of a possible alliance with France. The news of peace has saved Prussia from this danger. The Austrian circular of February 22 is regarded as a threat, and there is ill-feeling about it. Owing to the peace, Prussia is in a position to climb down again, and public opinion, which began to turn against her in these last days, will calm down. For the rest it appears that people still see traces everywhere of "a longing for the hegemony of Germany." An inclination to a "Gothic" policy does in fact exist, and may not impossibly manifest itself more clearly in the near future. The position of the middle-sized and small States will be very difficult.

*March 14.*

A really Little German policy, such as was attempted in the year 1849, does not appear at the present moment to be aimed at here at least. All things are narrowed down to mistrust of Austria and small jealous quarrels. No positive policy would be carried out. The Ministry contains no statesmen. This was obvious during the debates in the Upper House. The expression of a large section of public opinion in Prussia may be found in a pamphlet called *Prussia and the Italian Question*.\* Thoughtful

\* By Constantine Rössler.

men grieve over the irritability of this Prussian vanity, and that on the Austrian side they do not go to work more cautiously, when it is a question of drawing up despatches relating to German affairs, and it is much to be wished that in this connection some good advice might be given from Bavaria.

March 22.

The rumour of a European war is spreading. The Ministry is not stable. It wants a strong Minister of the Interior, and an orator, also another Minister of Commerce is very necessary.

March 27.

I was surprised to see myself mentioned in an article in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, as a Bavarian Minister of the new era, the chief of the Ministry of the future. Whether the King of Bavaria will take this view I do not know. . . .

March 3.

. . . Further news from Munich gives me some hope that the Ministerial cup will pass me by.

*Notes on a visit to England in June, 1859.*

The occasion of this visit was a request from my aunt, Princess Feodora von Hohenlohe-Langenburg, that I should accompany her. She was sent for on account of the illness of her mother, the widowed Duchess of Kent.\* As the Prince von Langenburg was ill, and her sons were engaged with their military duties, the Princess was naturally anxious to find another relative to act as travelling companion, and her request gave me an opportunity of seeing England at this period. I hastened, therefore, to comply with my aunt's request, arranged by letter to meet her at Mayence, on June 21, and set off. Marie accompanied me, as she wished to visit her parents at Sayn. I met my aunt at Mayence. From Coblenz I travelled alone with her down the Rhine, arrived at Cologne at six o'clock, visited the Cathedral, and went the same evening to Aachen, where we stayed the night; the next morning being Corpus Christi, I went first to church, and then we started for Ostend, where we arrived at six in the evening. At the railway station we were received by Captain Smithead, who commanded the boat which had been sent over for us; an elderly, striking-looking sailor with white whiskers, and a majestic bearing. He proposed to my aunt not to sail until early the next morning, to which she consented very willingly as she was glad to have a

\* The Duke of Kent, a younger brother of William IV., had married the Princess Victoria of Saxe-Saalfeld-Coburg. She had been first married to the Prince von Leiningen. Her daughter by her first marriage was Princess Feodora, who had married on February 18, 1828, Prince Ernst of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, the brother of Prince Chlodwig's mother. She was thus Queen Victoria's half-sister.

chance of getting a rest. I spent the evening in a walk to the harbour and the various promenades of Ostend, which were well known to me, but now still and deserted, met a few acquaintances and went to bed.

On June 23 we went on board at seven o'clock in the morning. The boat was a new and very fast steamboat, the *Frederick William*. It was a clear cool day, the sea almost calm, and after four hours and twenty minutes we found ourselves close to the white cliffs of the English coast, passed a large three-masted American ship which was slowly beating down the Channel, and soon steamed into Dover Harbour.

Here a large crowd had assembled on the quay, attracted by the military detachment, who were there in honour of my aunt. As soon as the boat touched the quay, the harbour-master, an officer of marines, and the general with his aide-de-camp in full-dress, came on board to pay their respects to my aunt. After a short preparation and change of dress we left the boat, my aunt on the general's arm, I behind with the others, and walked to the station through the crowd and the lane formed by the troops of the Line and the Militia which were drawn up on the quay. Another detachment of soldiers was here; close to the train stood a company of the famous 32nd Infantry Regiment, celebrated for its deeds at Lucknow. The men bore few traces of their Indian campaign. But the officers, on the other hand, were much bronzed by the Indian sun. As the train left the company presented arms, and the band played "God save the Queen." The train bore us rapidly away towards London, through the green country, past cosy villages and country houses. As we drew near, we caught a glimpse of the imposing Crystal Palace at Sydenham, and soon we entered the smoky atmosphere of the town. A Royal carriage was waiting at the station to take us to Buckingham Palace, where we were met at the great doorway by Colonel Biddulph, the Queen's Master of the Household. The hall we now entered is, like the whole Palace, in modern style, ornamented with Corinthian columns, and the floor covered with thick carpets. The staff who received us consisted of the so-called Pages, Gentlemen-in-waiting in blue coats and black silk stockings. As we mounted the steps, the Queen came to meet my aunt, and greeted her in the most friendly way. We went with her into a small room adjoining, where a few words were exchanged, I received my share of the friendly greetings, and then my aunt followed the Queen to her rooms. I took my leave, to go to the hotel in which it had been arranged that I was to stay, as there was no room for me in the Palace. The Royal carriage took me to the Brunswick Hotel, Jermyn Street, rather a dingy place, but on account of its proximity fairly convenient. I found a suite of several rooms ready for me, took possession of them, and then went out for a walk. I had not time to see anything seriously, and besides was rather tired after my journey, so

I turned my steps towards Hyde Park, where, as it happened, the fashionable parade was at its height. No people is so much the slave of its manners and customs as the English, and this sheep-like imitation of each other is seen at its best in Hyde Park. Every one who has the means to do so drives, rides, or walks there, and moves mechanically up and down in the comparatively small space for a couple of hours. Here is seen what is called *fashion* in carriages, horses, and dress. What is worn and displayed here is the fashion, and spreads rapidly all over England. This summer, for instance, violet is the correct colour for men and women in neckties, gloves, &c. &c. It has an extraordinary vogue — and all the shops are full of violet and lilac silk.

There was no lack of beautiful horses, although the hour (five o'clock in the afternoon) is not the time for the fashionable world to ride. This takes place at twelve in the morning, and in the afternoon people drive or walk. I could not stay very long as the crowd, the heat, and the endless coming and going made me quite giddy.

When I returned it was time to put on my Court dress — black coat, knee-breeches, and silk stockings — and go to dinner at eight o'clock at Buckingham Palace. Although I did not get there till eight, I found I was much too early, and had time to look round the apartments where the Royal Family assemble. It was the same room in which the Queen had received us in the morning; there was a crimson and gold carpet, and Empire furniture upholstered with the same colours; a marble mantelpiece, and a large table in the centre of the room. Two windows looked on to the garden; a well-kept little park with wonderful trees and green lawns, and looking most fresh and peaceful in the setting sun. While I was enjoying the prospect, Prince Ernst Leiningen came in, whom I had not seen for ten years. He is in the British Navy, and wore a great many medals, which he had from the Crimean War. After him sidled in King Leopold of Belgium, with his foxy old face, and with him his second son, the Count of Flanders, a tall, fair, dull youth. Prince Albert came in soon afterwards, and greeted me in his usual friendly way. He had been that morning to the Handel Festival at the Crystal Palace, and talked enthusiastically of the performance by four thousand musicians before an audience of twenty-five thousand. As we were talking the Queen entered, accompanied by her daughter, Princess Alice, and my aunt, and we all, the Queen leading with King Leopold, moved into the large reception-room. On the way we were joined by the Queen's ladies; among them the Duchess of Sutherland, Mistress of the Robes (if I am not mistaken), and the Duchess of Atholl, Lady-in-waiting. In the large room were the invited guests, and we went in to dinner. The Duchess of Atholl, who sat next Prince Albert, fell to me. On my other side was a lady of the Court, I think her name was Miss Bulteel. Both of them were quite talkative, though I

remember nothing very distinctly of the conversation, which, being in English, was, on my part, carried on with some difficulty, except that through the opportunity of a remark on the condition of things in Russia, the Duchess of Atholl spoke with much interest of a black and brown beetle, which was found in Russian houses, but whether it was interest in ethnographical or in entomological knowledge that led her to choose this topic, I could not judge. During dinner I noticed Prince Paul Esterhazy,\* who had just arrived from Vienna. He sat near the Queen, and talked to her in a loud voice. He was telling of his stay in Russia, and I observed that the Queen was much amused with his recital. After the Queen had left the table with her ladies, I saw him talking eagerly to King Leopold, and I could hear that they were speaking of the latest phase of the policy of the Austrian Government. The King listened to him for the most part very attentively. I then went to sit near Prince Albert, and the conversation turned, as was natural, on the Austro-French War. He spoke of the Emperor of Austria and his policy unfavourably, and maintained that the Archduke Ferdinand Max had arrived at no better results in Italy, because he had been always hindered and distracted from Vienna, whatever he tried to do. I then said that all this was new to me. "Generally," he said to me, "one cannot augur favourably of a man who has been educated by the Jesuits, as they recognise only the evil side of their fellow men, think that human nature is incapable of noble thoughts and feelings, and always presume the most sinister motives. These men, and the policy inspired by them, are the cause of the present troubles." I answered that although I had no particular leanings towards the Jesuits, I must yet observe that the present disturbances were for the most part the fault of the revolutionary secret societies and that it was unfortunately a sign of the decadence of human society that its ablest members were under the influence of these organisations. Prince Albert disputed this. Secret societies, he said, only existed when misgovernment called them into being. They made reform impossible, and would do away altogether with popular freedom. I maintained that that seemed very unlikely to me. In the South American Republics there were as many secret societies as in Italy. Amongst the people of the Latin races the party which had no share in the Government would always form in the Government a secret society. As to the theory then advanced by the Prince that the welfare of mankind was founded on Christianity in the philosophical sense (Bunsen), I replied that it might be conceded as a possibility in the German nation, but the Latin races were emerging from dogma only to plunge into atheism, and this would end in the dissolution of social order. We talked on these subjects until the

\* Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy (1786-1866), who from 1815 to 1842 was Austrian Ambassador in London. In 1856 he had been sent on a special Embassy to Moscow for the coronation.



Gentleman-in-waiting came to say that the Queen was waiting for us. The Prince rose, making a quotation from one of St. Paul's Epistles. In his whole attitude of mind there is something distinctly doctrinaire, and I thought how unfortunate it was for the Prince that he should come straight from a German University to his present position, after a course of superficial study, without having had the corners rubbed off by contact with the practical world.\* After dinner the Court assembled in the large saloon, a long, splendidly decorated hall, adorned with columns. The Queen talked to the company. She spoke in a very sympathetic, unaffected, and natural way to me (quite unlike the apathetic chatter of Continental Sovereigns) and inquired after all my family, showing her kindness of heart, of which I had heard so much. After she had held her circle, the Queen went into the neighbouring drawing-room, where she sat on a sofa, surrounded by her ladies and a few men. Some music was given in an adjoining room. At about eleven o'clock she rose, which was the signal for a general departure.

On Saturday, June 25, I called on the Austrian Minister, Count Apponyi, who told me the news of the Austrian defeat at the Mincio,† which he had just heard by telegram from Paris. He seemed much disheartened, and spoke with great bitterness of the Prussian policy, which Austria had to thank for this disaster. If Austria were now compelled to sign a dishonourable peace, Napoleon would turn against Prussia and Germany, and then Austria would be no longer in a position to help.

On this day there was a *levee*, i.e., a great Court presentation. I went to the neighbourhood of St. James's Palace to see the equipages as they passed, amongst them, those of the Lord Mayor of London and his suite were distinguished by their peculiar magnificence. I spent the rest of the day in shopping. As the Queen was not giving a dinner-party, I was not invited to the Palace, and dined with Apponyi, where I also spent the evening, going back to my hotel at twelve o'clock. As it was Saturday evening, all the provision shops in the smaller streets were open, so that people could buy their food for the Sunday. I saw many drunken people in the streets.

On Sunday, June 26, I went at half-past nine to the church at Farm Street, where I had been before — a remarkably neat and homely church. At one o'clock I went to Waterloo Station, on my way to Windsor. At the station were countless holiday people going out of town for the day. I reached Windsor at half-past two, went to Frogmore to visit Aunt Feodora and the Duchess of Kent, whom I found convalescent, and then walked back to the station by the terrace of the Castle, catching the six o'clock train to London, where I arrived at seven.

\* Cf. the corresponding opinions of Prince Albert in Duke Ernst's work, *Aus meinem Leben*, vol. i. p. 129.

† The Battle of Solferino, June 24.

At eight o'clock I again dined at Court, where I met the Prince of Wales, who had just returned from his Continental travels. He talked to me a great deal about Rome, and his sea-trip to Gibraltar on Victor's ship. He is a very well-bred young man, rather in awe of his father. It is a pity he is not taller for his age.

I took Lady Herbert in to dinner. She is the wife of the present Secretary for War, but I could only exchange a few words with her, as Princess Alice, the Queen's second daughter, sat on my other hand and had much to tell me. She is very well informed for her age, is quick and lively, and her face, in spite of her long nose (which she herself regards as a calamity), is very pretty. After dinner there was again a circle and the Queen talked to me for a long time on the latest political affairs, and spoke of her fear that only half measures would be taken in Berlin — a fear that I entirely shared with her.

Amongst the invited guests was Lord Aberdeen, now old and very frail; also a man with a thick beard, who I was told was the Duke of Newcastle; Lord Carlisle, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, an affected creature, with the manners of an old ballet-master; and last, Lord Herbert of Lea, a very vivacious man who gesticulated a great deal. As we separated, I took leave of the Queen, as I intended to take my departure the next evening. Prince Albert asked me to come and see him again the next day.

On Monday, the 27th, I had some business to do, and took the opportunity of visiting the Tower and Lincoln's Inn, the large building where the court of Chancery and other civil courts are held. I went into one of the courts, and thought the procedure before the judges, in their quaint wigs, was conducted in a most pleasant and agreeable way. It was a pity I had no one with me who could point out the different persons and their functions to me.

At half-past three I went to the Palace to take leave of Prince Albert. He was, as usual, in ordinary morning dress, without uniform or Orders. I was taken into his library, where I saw a Vienna-made glass bookcase filled with German books, copperwork, &c. He showed me a map of the seat of war, expressed disapproval of the Austrian plan of invasion, and maintained that if they had made up their minds to an invasion they should have adopted a triangular formation, advancing the apex, and gradually opening out the sides. He then began to speak of the whole Austrian policy, and said that the ultimatum to Sardinia had been sent at the instigation of Grünne and Windischgratz, without the knowledge of Count Buol. This seemed to me very doubtful. Then he inveighed against the democratic disorganisation of the Minister Bach, in which I readily agreed. Finally, he said that Austria believed when the war began that Germany would be forced to strike in as well — a revolution had been fomented by Austria in Munich. Then he mentioned the rumour

that Napoleon wanted to make peace proposals direct to the Emperor of Austria, and concluded by bidding me farewell and wishing all success to the struggle in Germany. He did not seem to believe, however, that it would come to that. The Prince of Wales then came to say that the Queen was waiting in her carriage, and they both hurried away. I strolled through Regent's Park and back to Piccadilly, did some business, saw Apponyi, with whom I dined, and went with him and Count Chotek to the Olympic Theatre, where some amusing pieces were very well played. When we left the theatre it was raining very heavily, which obliged us to take a cab home. On Thursday morning, the 18th, I went to see an old acquaintance whom I had not met for nineteen years — Mr. Cauvin. He was pleased to refresh his youthful memories of Göttingen and Corvey. As he is a literary man, and understands public opinion in England, I asked him about the English Government, the state of feeling, &c. I asked him particularly whether people feared Napoleon would turn against England if he beat Austria and Germany. He replied that the previous winter England was against Napoleon, but that the feeling towards him had now changed, for two reasons: first, on account of the enthusiasm of Englishmen for the Emperor's so-called liberation of Italy, which enraptured the British Philistine; and secondly, because of the approbation which always follows success. Besides, English people believed they were strong enough and rich enough to meet Napoleon if he should take it into his head to invade them. "We have," he said, "no system in our politics; we live from hand to mouth." Cauvin went with me for a stroll, and left me at five o'clock, when I dined. Afterwards I went straight to the station, and arrived at Dover at eleven, when the steamboat left immediately for Ostend.

### *A Royal Dialogue.\**

*The King.* My dear Prince, I think you wished to speak with me alone?

*I.* I must thank your Majesty most humbly for having consented to receive me alone. The more so as I have no special petition to present. I only wished to have an opportunity of offering my humble services to your Majesty. I have long wished for the opportunity of giving your Majesty practical assurance of my sincere attachment. After the death of Count Lerchenfeld† the thought occurred to me whether it would be possible to enter your Majesty's service. If your Majesty were graciously pleased to employ me, I am conscious that so far

\* The transcript of this conversation with King Maximilian II. was made for the Princess. Hence the notes here and there in French.

† Count Max Joseph of Lerchenfeld, Bavarian Minister at Vienna, who died November 3, 1859. The conversation also took place in November 1859.

as means and position are concerned, I should be in a position worthily to represent the Bavarian name, and uphold the Bavarian flag with energy and determination.

*The King.* These sentiments give me much pleasure. I am all the more pleased, as at one time I had doubts about it. (*Ce n'était pas tout à fait cela, c'était plus poli, mais le fond était le même.*) However, we have all been young once upon a time, and experience changes us a great deal. Forgive me for speaking so frankly.

*I.* Your Majesty is no doubt speaking of my Imperial Mission. As regards that, may I be allowed to say that the Archduke Johann made choice of me on that occasion with the special object that a Bavarian should take part in the diplomacy of the Central Government. This was the chief reason for my nomination, and the Archduke also wished me to visit Munich in order to intimate this personally to your Majesty. I was prevented by circumstances from doing so. I also believed, when I accepted this Mission, the Central Authority would be acknowledged by all the Governments. When it was dissolved I at once retired from public life.

*The King.* Yes, yes (*very graciously*). Those times were different. Now the case is altered, though Bavaria is still the third German Power. And I do not wish to be taken in tow by either Austria or Prussia.

*I.* That prospect has gone by; it is an exploded idea. A Central Government in that sense is now impracticable. Your Majesty may rely on the unanimous feeling of the Bavarian people which has once for all declared itself against a Prussian hegemony.

*The King.* Very true. So much so that early this year I gave offence, as it was believed I had shown the merest shadow of an inclination towards Prussia. It was not the case. I am interested in science, and may perhaps appoint a few Prussian professors. But for all that, I know how to preserve the independence of my country. As I said, I am much pleased with the sentiments you have expressed.

(*Ici je craignais qu'il ne se contentât de ces phrases, et je repris:*)

*I.* When I ventured to come here with this request to your Majesty, I had also a personal reason. If your Majesty will allow me, I will speak frankly. (*The King nodded kindly.*) The immediate impulse and personal suggestion came from a letter from my mother-in-law, which alludes to the desire of the Prince and Princess of Prussia that I should return to the Prussian service. (*Ici je lui raconte la conversation de maman avec la Princesse de Prusse. Je parle de Hatzfeldt et de Louis.*) I am expecting a proposal from Berlin which will place me in a difficulty. If I could give as a reason for refusal a wish from your Majesty that I should enter your Royal service, my difficulty

would be at an end. And it would carry out my mother-in-law's wishes equally well.

*The King.* Then you think that this arrangement would be agreeable to the Princess also?

*I.* Yes. For, even if her son were in the Prussian Diplomatic Service he could be employed at the place where I had the honour to represent your Majesty, and, in that way, the desired object would be attained, for I could keep an eye on him there.

*The King.* Ah, I see. Well, I will think the matter over, and I am very glad that you have spoken to me of your views. (Here followed inquiries after mamma, *toi*, &c. &c.)

(*As I went out.*) I will give what you have said mature consideration. (*Révérance et départ.*)

*The PRINCE to PRINCESS ELISE on the same subject.*

SCHILLINGSFÜRST, January 14, 1860.

Our plans are uncertain still. The King is perplexed. He may send for me, but I do not know how he can arrange it, as such a crowd of applicants of established reputation are forthcoming for diplomatic appointments. I should regret if another chance of permanent employment and position in life were to pass me by. The older one grows, the more necessary becomes a calling in life. What the years take from us must be made up by the discharge of our duties. I am not made to spend my life in merely fulfilling the duties of my social position, though I recognise in these duties something more serious and important than men generally see in them. I even think that I am not equal to the task, and that personal obstacles stand in the way which I am unable to overcome. The aristocratic life is either a good one to lead, one which is worthy of respect and will find acknowledgement, or it ends in frittering away one's energies in trivialities like the distribution of gold snuff-boxes and Christmas presents. Any number of people are better at that sort of thing than I.

#### IV

#### RUSSIA AND VIENNA, 1860-1861

In September 1860 the Prince started on a journey to the Wittgenstein estates in Russia, and arrived at Werki on September 20. The following is from the diary of the journey.

"On the 22nd we were invited by the Governor-General Racimoff to dinner, at his pretty little house at Swievinic on the Wilia. We were invited for four o'clock, but came so late that dinner was not till half-past five. The Governor-General

is a little man, with bushy eyebrows and stiff moustache. He gives himself military airs, and is an insignificant, well-meaning person. His wife was once a beauty, and still shows some traces of it. She has very charming, expressive eyes, and is the life and soul of the house. The dinner was bad, and the service inefficient. According to Russian ideas, a Prince who has no official post has no rank, so when dinner was announced the two Civil Governors pounced upon the ladies of the house before me, and I followed with our host and Peter.<sup>1</sup> I sat near the Governor-General, who talked the most absurd nonsense about high politics all through dinner. I had on my left hand a young girl who talked to her neighbour (another girl) in several languages. I didn't see why I should interrupt them. After dinner we went into the park which surrounds the house, and saw two fine bison which were kept there. While the rest of the company stayed timidly under the trees, Peter and I went close up to the animals with the keeper, and had a fine sight of these curious creatures three paces off. They were quietly eating the meat which was scattered on the ground and which is their chief food, and took very little notice of us. Now and then they have been known to make small attacks on people. The park looked very beautiful under the rising moon and the twilight. The quiet river flowed in front of us, beyond were the dark pine woods, and quite a little waterfall trickled into the river. We soon took our leave, as it was seven o'clock, got into our carriage, and drove back to Werki, where we amused ourselves by making astronomical observations through a telescope till Pastor Lipinsky came, with whom I had a long talk on the latest movement in the German Protestant Church. He knew considerably less about the subject than I did, and I felt quite brilliant. Even my encyclopædic knowledge, however, was soon exhausted. After that everybody grew sleepy.

*September 25, 1860.*

I am writing in a tent, which gives a pleasant shade, while the sun is very hot outside. The door is open; I can see the wood in front of me and hear the oaks and the pines rustling.

On the 23rd we drove from Werki in a half-open carriage, changed horses at Wilna and several other stations, and came through a hideously dreary country to Lubez at half-past eight in the evening. Only towards the end of the journey did the aspect of the country become less repellent; the first part of the way lay through sand and pines. Lubez is part of the Wittgenstein property, and lies near the Niemen. The castle was once of grand proportions and fortified, but it has all been destroyed by fire except two towers.

On the 24th a shooting-party was arranged. We saw some

\* Prince Peter of Sayn-Wittgenstein (1831-1887), the Princess's brother.

partridges, moor-hens, and snipe, but not till almost nightfall. The day was clear and warm, and the wide, open country and green banks of the Niemen looked enchanting under the setting sun. We set out in the carriage at half-past eight for the hunting camp. It was a beautiful moonlight night, and the wide desolate country, with its low undergrowth from which wreaths of mist were slowly rising, was most charming. After half an hour's drive we came to the Niemen, crossed a bridge of boats, and arrived at a village. Here we found that the large carriage could go no further, and a one-horse peasant's cart was waiting for us. We climbed in and drove into the woods. Soon, however, even the cart could go no further, and we proceeded on foot and soon reached Koslowabor, a lonely farmstead near which they had pitched the tent and where the flickering firelight was most welcome. We made our preparations for the next day, loaded our guns, prepared our cartridges, and went to sleep. It was the first time I had slept in a tent. Outside the huntsmen talked over the fire, and the wind rustled among the trees. The murmur of talking gradually ceased, and we soon fell into a pleasant sleep, which was disturbed at half-past three by the cry, "Time to get up!" We were soon ready. With guns on our shoulders and long sticks in our hands, we went through the wood. Two huntsmen accompanied us. They wore grey coats, white linen breeches, and sandals. They are the best men for this kind of work that I know. We first tried to entice an elk into the swamp. One of the *strajniks* blew on a horn of birch-bark a cry exactly resembling the stag's. A stag answered, not far from us, but kept out of sight. We tried the same thing in other places, but without result. We were rewarded, however, by the walk through the wood; the swamp, which is more than two miles square, is full of alders, birches, and other deciduous trees. The undergrowth was so thick and so beset with reeds and all kinds of matted growths that it was almost impossible to get through. It is a perfect example of a virgin forest. In the deepest places bushes and trees lay in the water, and we had to climb painfully over them. Sometimes a convenient tree served as a bridge, but in most places nothing of the sort was to be found, and there was nothing for it but to wade through the mud and brackish water. It was one continual splashing and jumping from one piece of firm ground to another, a constant winding about through thick-set bushes. We proceeded like this for five hours — blowing constantly on the horn. At last we gave it up, and at half-past nine returned to the tent, where the men who had stayed behind had a good breakfast waiting for us. We dressed either in the tents or outside, and now all has sunk to rest.

In the evening, after a meal in the open air, we retired to our drawing-room, in other words, we lay down on a great heap of straw beside a huge fire and gazed up at the stars.

## MEMOIRS OF PRINCE HOHENLOHE

each riding past at the gallop, shooting pistols and waving lances, and then came manœuvres. It was extremely funny when a battery advanced towards the spectators, unlimbered and fired, whereupon the public, consisting of Jews, fell in a heap with screams of "Murder!" A great change of front of all the regiments was carried out with great precision. The military men present considered that this cavalry corps manœuvred admirably. I afterwards drove with Peter to the town, where we entered our names in the visitors' books of the foreign princes.

At two o'clock was the ceremonious opening of a tunnel by the Emperor. The persons invited, among whom were many ladies, assembled at the railway station, where a temporary wooden structure in the Moorish style had been erected to receive the guests. The Emperor, his suite, and a number of ladies seated themselves in an open, richly decorated railway-car. I went with Peter, Leon Radziwill, and two generals in another. Arrived at our destination we got out and followed the Emperor on foot through the tunnel, which was brightly illuminated with cressets. The clergy accompanied the Emperor to the middle of the tunnel, where he placed a stone in position, on which the Grand Duke of Weimar very gracefully struck a blow or two. After that we went at the double to the other end of the tunnel and back again. It was not exactly comfortable in there, as we were bare-headed and water dropped frequently from above. The return journey was made by rail. The workmen posted everywhere along the route greeted the Emperor with acclamations. At Wilna the hurrahs of the Jews were most peculiar, sounding exactly like the bleating of sheep. It is not surprising that despite their demonstrations of loyalty they should be considerably cuffed and knocked about by the police, for a more impudent lot than these Polish Jews I have never seen, thrusting themselves in everywhere like wild beasts, even where they have no business whatever.

### *Political Notes in Vienna, January 1861.\**

The present situation in Austria is one of watchful expectancy. That the Diploma of October 20 † satisfied nobody is patent. It deals out rights without imposing obligations, and weakens the Government without winning over public opinion. Hence the prevailing dissatisfaction and suspicion.

The split in Ministry between Rechberg and Schmerling is typical of the whole situation. While the party to which Rechberg belongs goes only *de très mauvaise grâce* with the stream of

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† A statute promising special regulations for the separate Crown Lands.



each riding past at the gallop, shooting pistols and waving lances, and then came manœuvres. It was extremely funny when a battery advanced towards the spectators, unlimbered and fired, whereupon the public, consisting of Jews, fell in a heap with screams of "Murder!" A great change of front of all the regiments was carried out with great precision. The military men present considered that this cavalry corps manœuvred admirably. I afterwards drove with Peter to the town, where we entered our names in the visitors' books of the foreign princes.

At two o'clock was the ceremonious opening of a tunnel by the Emperor. The persons invited, among whom were many ladies, assembled at the railway station, where a temporary wooden structure in the Moorish style had been erected to receive the guests. The Emperor, his suite, and a number of ladies seated themselves in an open, richly decorated railway-car. I went with Peter, Leon Radziwill, and two generals in another. Arrived at our destination we got out and followed the Emperor on foot through the tunnel, which was brightly illuminated with cressets. The clergy accompanied the Emperor to the middle of the tunnel, where he placed a stone in position, on which the Grand Duke of Weimar very gracefully struck a blow or two. After that we went at the double to the other end of the tunnel and back again. It was not exactly comfortable in there, as we were bare-headed and water dropped frequently from above. The return journey was made by rail. The workmen posted everywhere along the route greeted the Emperor with acclamations. At Wilna the hurrahs of the Jews were most peculiar, sounding exactly like the bleating of sheep. It is not surprising that despite their demonstrations of loyalty they should be considerably cuffed and knocked about by the police, for a more impudent lot than these Polish Jews I have never seen, thrusting themselves in everywhere like wild beasts, even where they have no business whatever.

*Political Notes in Vienna, January 1861.\**

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liberal opinion, Schmerling's party hopes, now that these liberal measures are once granted, to force on a constitutional development of the whole State system. When I visited Schmerling he began at once by saying it would, no doubt, have been easier to take one of the existing constitutions, say, the Belgian or Bavarian, and model an Austrian one on that, but, having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the Austrian Empire, more radical measures would have to be adopted. The Hungarian question was not the only obstacle. As to this, he expressed himself to the effect that a revolution would occur, but that they would be able to deal with it; that the Old-Hungarian party had never found favour in Hungary; that the constitutional party of Deak was, and would be still more swamped by anarchy. He spoke with the utmost scorn of the attitude of the Germans in Hungary. To my question how the Cabinet proposed to deal with the many different nationalities to be represented, and whether it would not entail very great difficulties, he answered hurriedly that his entrance into the Cabinet had materially changed all that. Besides, by degrees they would arrive at being one undivided representative State. The affairs of the various Protestant communities would be set in order in the next few days. The Concordat itself he would not meddle with, as this was best left to the Reichsrath. By bettering the position of the Protestants he hoped to improve relations with England. It appears to me that Schmerling reckons upon the representative system to rid him of such colleagues as are inconvenient to him. Of the danger and impolicy underlying these manipulations, which always open the door to extortion, he is probably well aware; yet his position towards the Court, the reactionary members of the nobility and the Concordat party make any other way impossible to him. Through fear of the word "Constitution" both Emperor and Government have gradually let more be extorted from them than the more liberal constitution could ever grant, and the people do not even say thank you. They hope to gain time, and then, when things are smoothed down, to reintroduce absolutism with a firmer hand than ever. In this underhand dealing lies the real danger. Preachers of religious absolutism, stiff-necked aristocratic club-men, courtiers devoid of all political understanding—these are the Emperor's real counsellors. At the moment they are all lying low, but the time is not far hence when either they will be crushed under the revolution or rise triumphant on the wave of general reaction.

*January 21, 1861.*

To-day, at Fries's, I found Prince Jablonowski. After dinner the Imperial manifesto to the Hungarians.\* In connection with this I remarked that it seemed to me strange to speak of

\* Of January 16, directed against the revolutionary agitation in Hungary.

Hungarian nationality as opposed to German, seeing that the Hungarians are mainly Germans. Not one of all those who wear the Hungarian national costume speak anything but Austrian-German. Moreover, I took that opportunity of pointing out to the company the danger of their "historico-political Individualism." Jablonowski said he did not recognise any Austrian Empire, merely an Austrian Emperor. Had he been in a position to do so he would have advised the Emperor to give the Reichsrath only an advisory function and the provincial assemblies the decisive voice in the Government. Fries declared that the Austrian Monarchy was so peculiarly constituted as to demand quite particular institutions. To which I observed that with their methods of construction the Monarchy would fall to pieces; I was before all things a German, and I would advise the energetic maintenance of the unity of the Empire even with the aid of the democratic element. Democracy would soon settle the question of the various nationalities. Whereupon violent protest and indignation.

It was interesting to hear the opinions of the Austrian aristocratic party. They cling to the Diploma of October 20, and imagine that that will save the Monarchy. A hopeless mistake which the Government itself is aware of, as the manifesto of to-day clearly proves. Nevertheless, as the luckless Diploma *has* been issued, and every national passion thereby let loose, it will be hard work to set things straight again.

The nationalities who have benefited by the Diploma will not hear of an Imperial parliament by general election. I fancy, however, that the Czechs might be easily won over. For the moment the Hungarians would have to be left out of the reckoning, and the Poles would probably give in too. It seems to me that it is not the people of the various non-German countries, but rather the aristocracy (some from ambition, some from narrow-mindedness) and the *doctrinaires* among the professors who hold fast to their autonomy and the Diploma.

I believe that Schmerling is of my opinion and will calmly go his own way.

January 22, 1861.

To-day I was present at the State banquet given in honour of General Werder, who had brought the notification of the accession of King Wilhelm I. to the throne. The Empress being absent, there were no ladies there. All the notabilities of the Court were present — Prince Liechtenstein, the High Steward, with his white moustache just like an old tom-cat; then the High Marshal of the Court, Count Kuefstein, an ex-diplomat, who had much to tell me of the Vienna Congress as I sat next to him; Count Lanckoronski, High Chamberlain; Adjutant-General Count Crenneville, a most estimable, pleasant man with Napoleonic features. Besides these there were Count Grünne, the War

Minister Count Degenfeld, Count Rechberg, Lieutenant-Field-marshal Count Henrikstein, the staff of the Prussian Embassy and Prussian officers attached to General Werder's suite.

After dinner the Emperor held a circle. He conversed with me for some time on affairs in Naples, praised the courage of the Queen,\* to whom it was chiefly due that the King had been able to hold out so long,† and expressed his deep indignation at the behaviour of the Neapolitan officers by whom the Queen had been betrayed last summer. Considering how naturally and pleasantly the Emperor speaks, I could not help regretting that he makes so little use of this gift for the benefit of his subjects. He finds it impossible to court popularity by adopting a more condescending manner, which would mean so much to an unsophisticated people like the Austrians.

This evening, the 30th, the Town ball took place. The Court made its appearance just as we came in. It was received in dead silence. One noticed an intentional indifference on the part of the public and a kind of annoyance. The Emperor stayed a long time, but remained in the gallery talking to the Burgomaster, instead of moving about the room and speaking to the townspeople as King Ludwig and King Max do to their great advantage.

*February 4.*

To-day Count Rechberg resigned the Presidency of the Cabinet and Archduke Rainer undertook the post. Rechberg remains Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nobody knows exactly what to say to it. For an Archduke to be Cabinet President is rather peculiar. It seems to me that it is their way of trying to make Rechberg's resignation look more decent — *d'avoir cédé le pas à un archiduc*. Schmerling will be the soul of the administration, the Archduke will lend his name to it.

Old Count Hartig, with whom I had a long conversation at Bray's, told me much that was interesting. He declares they have let themselves be taken in by the Hungarians in giving them the Diploma of October 20. He agrees with me in thinking the Diploma absurd, and considers that only by giving more security and stability to the laws can a better state of things be brought about. This, he thinks, will be the case now, and sets great hopes on the expected alterations in administrative affairs.

\* Sister of the Empress of Austria.

† Till the capitulation of Gaeta, January 14.

## V

PROCEEDINGS IN THE CHAMBER OF THE  
REICHSRATH, 1861*Emancipation of the Jews.*

In April 1861 the Prince laid before the Reichsrath a report on a Bill sent up by the Lower Chamber for the removal of certain restrictions on the liberty of the Jews as regards change of domicile and trading. In recommending the adoption of this measure the Prince had to encounter the objection raised in the Upper House that with the increasing equality of rights granted to the Jews, Bavaria would cease to be a specifically Christian State and would become a State "based nakedly on law." "In order to judge this contention fairly," says the report of April 25, 1861, "we must be quite clear as to what we mean when we speak of 'a Christian State' and 'a State based on mere law.'"

"According to the conception which was current all over Europe in the Middle Ages, the State was subordinate to the Church, a subordination which men sought to explain and justify by declaring the Church to be the founder of the State. Religion and politics, Church and State, were thus continually intermingled. The State was the servant of the Church. Not to be a member of the Catholic Church was to have no existence as a recognised member of the State, and who so stood in opposition to the teaching or constitution of the Church was regarded, *eo ipso*, as an enemy of the State. This was pre-eminently the case with the Jews, who, less because they were aliens in Europe than because they were enemies of Christendom and of the Christian State, were regarded as creatures absolutely outside the law.

"They might count themselves fortunate if, in the Roman Empire of the German Nation, they secured forbearance and protection in return for a heavy tax, first from the Emperor as 'Imperial chattels,' and later from various petty Sovereigns to whom the right to protect the Jews (*Judenschutzrecht*) was delegated as a privilege. Even the Reformation did little to alter this conception of the Christian State. It no doubt dissolved the old relations between the Catholic Church and the State, but the State remained none the less 'Christian,' if by that we understand the maintenance of an exclusive creed, even in matters of jurisdiction against the unrecognised sects of religion.

"Not till the middle of the eighteenth century did a fresh conception of the relations between Church and State, and consequently of the whole nature of the latter, begin to gain ground. Church and State gradually came to be recognised as two different, separate and independent organisms, each with its own peculiar

mission to perform. Thus the ideas of religious liberty and of the State based on law went hand in hand. With the triumph of the former the conception of the 'Christian state,' which had hitherto been workable enough, became untenable. The State could no longer remain doctrinally exclusive and intolerant. It must of necessity become Christian in another sense, that is to say, just and tolerant towards every class of its subjects. It must, in fact, become the State based on law, or, as is much better, the State based on justice.

"True, an opinion and an apprehension has been expressed that the modern State has ceased or would soon cease to be Christian; and reference has been made to the observation which is frequently heard that 'the State is of its nature atheistic, and cannot be otherwise.' I fail to share either the opinion or the apprehension. A sounder theory has long since recognised and rectified this misleading idea, and it is understood that it was founded on a hasty fallacious judgment which has overlooked the fact that it is founded on an impossible presupposition. The modern State can only be Christian if it has ceased to be the doctrinal and Feudal State of the Middle Ages. "It can only claim to be Christian because all the relations of citizen and family life are permeated with the spirit of Christianity; because our social, political, and judicial institutions are built upon a Christian foundation; because our whole modern system of morals is Christian; and, finally, because the moral code, to give full effect to which is the constant endeavour of the State founded on law, is identical with the Christian code. There can be no question, therefore, as to whether the Christian State will or will not continue to exist; it does exist and will exist so long as Christianity is the creed of the great majority of its members.

"The modern State, however, has long since repudiated the idea, so irreconcilable with a truly Christian point of view, that *any* person or persons can be outside the law, and has extended the conception of citizenship on which our present-day political life is chiefly founded so as to embrace all classes of its subjects. It must be admitted by every one that the State has done this without any compromise of its Christian character. If there was no impediment in the Christian character of the State of our days to the grant of the rights of citizenship to non-Christians, still less can the grant of these privileges to the Jews be met with any reasonable opposition. No modern State, without being false to the whole trend of its historical evolution, can refuse to give legal and political equality to Jew and Christian alike."

*The Question of the Hessian Constitution, May 1861.*

The Hessian Minister Hassenpflug had in the autumn of 1851 obtained of the then newly restored Federal Diet for the overthrow of the Hessian Constitution of January 5,

1831. After the inchoate resistance of Prussia at Olmütz had broken down, the Diet resolved, on March 27, 1852, to suppress the Hessian Constitution of '31 as being inconsistent with the provisions of the final Act of the Congress of Vienna. A draft of a new Constitution drawn up by the Hessian Government in concert with the Federal Commissioners was to be immediately promulgated as a law, together with the electoral regulations thereto appertaining. It was then to be presented "for ratification" to the State, which was to be created on the basis of these regulations. The promulgation of the new Constitution took place on April 13, 1852. But in spite of the reckless use of all the powers of coercion which these laws gave the Government, they were unsuccessful in persuading the Chambers elected on the prescribed franchise to agree to ratify it, and this anarchic situation in Hesse lasted for another decade. On July 15, 1858, the Hessian Government proposed in the Diet that it should overlook the necessity for ratification by the State of Hesse, and should guarantee the prescribed Constitution of 1852. On July 26, 1859, a Committee of the Diet reported in favour of the Hessian suggestion, and proposed that the Diet should require Hesse to accept and ratify the draft Constitution of 1852. Thus there came to be discussed the question (almost unheeded amid the general depression of 1852), how far the right which the confederation claimed by its resolution of March 27 of that year was a danger to all German Constitutions. From this point of view the Hessian question acquired a new meaning, which its lively discussion in the Press soon brought within the sphere of action of Governments and Parliaments. In November 1859 the Prussian Government entered the lists on behalf of the violated rights of Hesse, and demanded the restoration of the Constitution of 1831, with the exception of those of its provisions which were contrary to Federal law; but the majority of the Diet, following the lead of Austria, remained faithful to the reactionary principles of 1852. In his Speech from the Throne of January 12, 1860, the Prince Regent reiterated with great decision his conviction that a return to the Constitution of 1831 was the only way to restore law and order in Hesse. On March 17, 1860, the Prussian Government expressed the same conviction in an exposition of their previously recorded dissent from the decision of the Diet. Meanwhile the Diet decided to follow the recommendation of their committee. Von der Pfordten, the Bavarian representative in the Diet, took part in this decision. Prussia protested against it, and washed her hands of the consequences. The Prussian Chamber of Deputies, on April 20, expressed its approval of the protest by a large majority.

In Bavaria the Hessian question was dealt with in the Chamber of Deputies in March 1861. On the motion of Dr. Völk

the House resolved "to enter a solemn protest against the Federal resolution of March 27, 1852, and the principles which underlie it, and which are contrary to the law of the Bavarian Constitution"; and it was decided to petition the King to direct his Ministers "to assist as far as in them lay in restoration of a properly ordered Constitutional Government in Hesse."

The first of these resolutions was referred to the Upper House for information, the second for discussion. The Reporter, Reichsrath von Bayer, contested the competence of the Bavarian Legislature to concern itself with the matter, because such competence could only be established "if documentary warrant for it could be found in the Constitution," and because, according to the general principles of German constitutional law, the decision of questions of external politics belonged only to the supreme head of the State. Against this Prince Hohenlohe moved:

"(1) That a solemn protest be entered against the Federal resolution of March 27, 1852, and its underlying principles and motives.

"(2) That the Government be requested to use its influence in a suitable manner, as far as possible, for the restoration of a properly ordered Constitutional Government in Hesse."

At the sitting of the House of May 4, 1861, he supported this motion in the following speech:

"The reasons which have led the representatives of the people to pass their resolution on the Hessian question in the Lower House are known to you. I will not fatigue you with a recital of details of the constitutional imbroglio in Hesse. . . . The fact we have now to deal with is the intervention which took place in Hesse in 1850. I am far from reproaching his Majesty's Government with that. Intervention in Hesse was a link in the chain of the policy to which the Bavarian Government was forced owing to the events of the years 1848 and 1849—a policy which was justified by the refusal of the German peoples to sacrifice their particularism, their independence as individuals, in the struggle for unity in 1848.

"The consequence of their refusal was the collapse of that struggle, and the Bavarian Government was forced to fall back on the Diet. Intervention was the keystone of the policy to which it was forced, partly at least, by the decision of the people. The result of intervention was the celebrated report of the Federal Commissioners, and the resolution of March 27, 1852, which was founded on it. This resolution suppressed the Hessian Constitution of 1831, and required the Elector to grant a new Constitution, and lay it before his State.

"This Constitution was promulgated, but has not yet met with the State's acceptance. It is quite natural that on the one hand the Hessian people hold fast to their Constitution,



and refuse to recognise the law as laid down in the Federal resolution of 1852, and that on the other hand, the Elector founds himself on the warranty which was given to him by the authority of that resolution. That is the essence of the so-called Hessian question.

"I do not need to weary you with an exposition of the legal question. On that point you are already sufficiently well informed. I shall therefore only refer to Article 56 of the Act of the Vienna Convention, which is particularly relevant to the matter in hand. It is there stated that:

"‘A Parliamentary Constitution duly fulfilling its functions can only be altered by constitutional means.’

"This Article was circumvented by the resolution of 1852. The Diet thought itself warranted in this course by the interpretation of the word ‘constitutional,’ which makes it apply not to the Federal, but to the local legislature. I need not controvert this interpretation at length. It is unwarrantable, and may well be abandoned in the near future by the Diet itself. But, as we are confronted with a Federal resolution which takes no heed of Article 56 of the Vienna Convention, it is inferred that doubt is thereby thrown on the position of the Collective Constitutions of the several States of Germany. I share this view, and, moreover, I think there is reason for speaking out against this danger. That is the motive which led me to propose my motion, which consists of two parts, the protest and the petition to his Majesty the King. The Government has, indeed, in the Lower House, questioned the right of the Chambers to make a resolution of the Diet the subject of discussion and decision. It is objected, on the other hand, that the matter is quite outside the competence of the Chambers, and my honourable friend the Reporter has just renewed the argument that they are incompetent to deal with it. This would be all very well if the resolution had no reference whatever to the Bavarian Constitution. But that is not the case. On the contrary, his Majesty’s Government collaborated in the composition of this resolution. Furthermore, they have accepted the principles which underlie it, and could not escape the consequences even if they would. For the Federal resolution is a binding law, I do not say for the several States, but for their Governments, who by the Federal Constitution are obliged as far as in them lies to give effect to such a resolution.

"Now suppose a majority of the Federal Assembly went back on this resolution, or passed another based on similar principles, no German Government would be in a position to evade the finding of this majority, and in view of this precedent which you seek to establish, the Bavarian Government would be unable to oppose such a resolution, even if it referred to the Bavarian Constitution. No doubt you say that is an impossible situation, for our circumstances here are very different from

the circumstances in Hesse which provoked the resolution of 1852. I fully share the hope which has been expressed that we may never find ourselves in a similar situation; but here we have not to do with hopes or beliefs, but with legal questions and legal principles, and in such a matter we cannot be too positive. If there is any risk or danger to the Bavarian Constitution arising from the resolution, it must follow that the Chambers are competent to make the resolution the subject of discussion, and the question arises what means must be used to meet such danger. Like the honourable Reporter, I refer to sec. 25, c. vii., of the Constitution. In this paragraph is given the form of oath in which the States swear to maintain the Constitution. In this oath it is not merely provided that nothing shall be done contrary to the Constitution, but also there is laid down the duty and the right to see to it that the Constitution is universally respected. In the case of a positive breach of the Constitution the course of the States is clear. They are to have recourse to complaint and impeachment.

"There is no question of so serious a breach of the Constitution in this case. We have to deal only with a slight infraction of it, for as such must be regarded the risk to which the Constitution is exposed, and, therefore, in any case a protest and a petition to the Crown are warranted.

"It has been asserted that this motion is untimely, and that there is no need to record a protest. . . . I fully share the confidence which is felt in the sincerity of the Government's intentions, and those of Ministers opposite never to do anything unconstitutional. I have, however, tried to show that in this case everything does not turn on the will of the Government. I go further. I believe that the will of the Government is not sufficient, and that it must be supported by a protest from both sides of the House. Besides, reliance on the good intentions of the Government will only be confirmed if positive documents are available to prove that they dissociate themselves from the resolution, and the principles on which it rests.

"But what sort of explanation has his Majesty's Minister given us?

"I have read his speech in the Chamber of Representatives, and I have found that in principle he fully admits the right of the Federation to pass the resolution of 1852 in the form and manner in which it actually was passed. His Excellency observes:

"I believe, gentlemen, you will have been convinced from this account that nothing arbitrary has been done, but that the Diet, taking its stand on the Federal Constitution, found itself warranted in doing what it did.'

"You will hear the same explanation again in a little while from the Ministerial table. You will hear that the Ministry adopts the standpoint of the Federal Government in this

question, and is committed to uphold their action as fully warranted.

"I therefore consider that a protest is necessary. But I go further and propose a petition to the Crown.

"The honourable Reporter has directed the whole weight of his argument against this petition, has attacked it as inadmissible, and has specially endeavoured to found his view on the contention that this petition has no connection with the Bavarian Constitution, and is therefore quite outside the proper sphere of action of this House. . . .

"As to this, I have already shown that the maintenance of the Constitution belongs to the functions of the Chambers. If, then, it has been proved that there is a connection between the Federal resolution and its motives and the interests of our Constitution; if fears for our Constitution arise therefrom, then, by sec. 19, c. vii., of that Constitution, the Chambers have the privilege of bringing the wishes they may form and the proposals they may adopt to the notice of the Crown. . . .

"It has been said that this is no time to bring forward such a motion, as the Federation is no longer in a position to pass a resolution on this subject. I will only now refer to the resolution of 1860, which contains a requisition to the Hessian Government to proceed immediately with the establishment of their Constitution, and to forward a report to the Diet. In any case, then, the matter will again come under Federal discussion, and his Majesty's Government will have another opportunity of expressing their views to the Confederation. They will then be able to reinforce these views by the expressed opinion of the Chambers.

"I must now hasten to conclude, and will only beg leave to make an observation on the political aspect of the question.

"It is true that the Hessian question will be used as a means to political agitation and commotion. It will be used to awake distrust of the Government by the people. This is the ugly side of the Hessian question, but this cannot be placed in the scale against the importance of deciding the legal issue before us. . . .

"At a time when, as a speaker in the Chamber of Representatives says, revolution has inscribed the words *fait accompli* on her banner, it is necessary that the Conservative forces in political life should inscribe the word Law on their banner, and should hold that banner high. I urge upon you, my lords, to show that you are a truly Conservative assembly, by maintaining the law's independence of all political considerations, and I therefore ask you to vote for my motion."

On a division the Prince's motion was thrown out by 29 against 8 votes. With him voted Count von Giech, Count Fugger-Hoheneck, Count zu Pappenheim, President von Harless, Freiherr von Franckenstein, Count von Holstein, and Herr von Heintz.

As is well known, the Constitutional question in Hesse was settled in 1862, in accordance with the claim of right advocated by Prince Hohenlohe. On March 8, 1862, Austria and Prussia brought forward a joint motion in the Diet to require the Hessian Government to take the necessary steps to put in force again the Constitution of 1831, which had been suppressed in 1852, subject to changes being constitutionally carried which were required to bring it into harmony with Federal law. On May 24 the Diet adopted the Austro-Prussian proposal. On the 26th came the fall of the reactionary Ministry at Cassel, and on June 22, 1862, the Hessian Constitution of 1831 was re-established.

In the beginning of 1861 the Prince, in a correspondence with his brother, had raised the question whether he was entitled to a seat in the Prussian Upper House as owner of the domain of Treffurt, and so invested with a fief of the younger branch of the Ratibor-Corvey family by an entail confirmed by Friedrich Wilhelm IV. It appears from a letter from the Duke of Ratibor, dated April 14, 1861, that the King had expressed his readiness to receive an immediate application from the Prince as to his entry into the Upper House, as "he would regard him as a valuable acquisition for Crown and country in these difficult times."

After the Hessian debate in the Chamber the Prince replied to this communication in the following terms:

MUNICH, *May 14, 1861.*

With reference to the subject above mentioned, I will tell you frankly that I find myself in a curious difficulty. Of course I want to be admitted to the Upper House. But I know the circumstances and the opinions that prevail here too well not to foresee that any step directly taken by me in that direction will be taken very ill. I have made deadly enemies of the Bavarian Particularists, of the Court, even of the King, by my speech on the Hessian question. Now, if these gentlemen hear that I have been named a member of the Upper House "at my special desire," they will draw the conclusion that I intend to give up my position here entirely, that, therefore, I wish to give up being a Bavarian, and that I don't want to have anything more to do with them. This, however, is not so. I think, on the contrary, that the two positions are perfectly compatible. The following reproach will also be cast in my teeth. They will say, "Oh, yes, now we understand why Prince Hohenlohe took such a strong line on the Hessian question. We always said that it was and they alone the National League party who brought the Hessian question on the *tapis* in Bavaria. Clearly Prince Hohenlohe belongs to this party, as he has solicited a seat in the Prussian Upper House, and he will sell Bavaria to Prussia," and so on, in the same silly style.

If, then, the King were graciously pleased, without my applying, to name me a member of the House on the ground that I am the beneficiary of the entail confirmed by his Majesty, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV., I should be most grateful, and I could represent it here as being a perfectly natural consequence of my owning land in Prussia. To make an application would be very difficult for me at this moment.

## VI

JOURNEYS TO BADEN, SILESIA AND BERLIN,  
PARIS AND KARLSRUHE, AND TO THE  
FRANKFURT CONGRESS OF PRINCES

1861-1863

BADEN-BADEN, *July 17, 1861.*

"The news of the attempt \* on the life of the King of Prussia brought me to Baden to pay my respects to his Majesty. I met several high personages on the way bound on the same errand, some as emissaries of their Sovereigns, others on their own account, as, for instance, Count Adlerberg.

"All Baden was full of indignation at the deed and of joy at the King's marvellous escape. They say the pistol was fired point-blank at him. There is a pretty severe contusion, but the King goes out although his neck is still somewhat stiff, as I noticed when he spoke to me to-day on the promenade.

"On my arrival yesterday I called on the equerries on duty and heard from them the details of the attempt, which are of course in all the papers. A remarkable congratulatory address was sent to the King's Aide-de-camp from Tharandt. It ran somewhat as follows: 'The Prussian students in Tharandt \* drink with rejoicing patriotism to the happy escape of the King, and perdition to the assassin.'

"I called to-day on von Roggenbach, the Minister for Baden. We soon got on to the subject of German politics. He expressed himself to the following effect: There were no grounds whatever for identifying him with the National Union or reproaching him with trying to force Prussia into a Unionist policy. He considered the National Union not only useless, but positively harmful; it represented the irregular troops in the campaign. The really important thing was that Prussia should know definitely what she wanted. If they felt they had not the courage to put themselves at the head of Germany they had better "leave the cart in the stable." As, however, even the timid people must

\* By the student Becker on July 14, 1861.

† *Reiben einen patriotischen Salamander.*

admit that something would have to be done to meet the demand for greater unity — as it was in the interests of various ruling houses to abandon the defence of positions which had become untenable — it was necessary to have a clear view of one's aim. In his opinion Prussia should pursue neither a policy of annexation nor of union. The former was self-evident. By the latter he meant a policy which sought to apply concentration to spheres where it was unnecessary, impracticable, and, as regards the maintenance of the separate States, dangerous, as, for instance, the adoption of a universal legislature or the like. Above all, he considered it imperative that the separate German States should relinquish what, as a matter of fact, they do not possess, namely, the defence of Germany and the representation of Germany in other countries. Austria must go her own way, and would do so as soon as she dropped her present policy of propaganda and turned to the policy of securing her legitimate interests. She would then see that she must lighten herself of her ballast of German policy; and Austrian influence once removed from the Middle German States, they would be much more likely to conform to Prussian political ideas.

In the course of conversation we touched upon the position of the German upper classes. Roggenbach said he rejoiced to see how many of the landed nobility had abandoned the pitiable rôle of being dragged at the chariot wheels of the particularist Junker policy. This they must do in self-preservation. Their order spread all over Germany; their politics therefore should be German too. They were the class on which a German Constitution might found itself and so forth. In much of all this Roggenbach was of course "suited to his company," but there is a kernel of truth in what he said. He advised a general union of German landed proprietors. I told him of the experiments on these lines of the attendant difficulties.

The King received me with his wonted kindness, thanked me for my sympathy and for having come so soon. I apologised for having added even one more to the number of audiences. He was still unwell and fatigued and sat in an arm-chair, I opposite at the writing-table. He spoke first of Berlin, of the Upper House, of the Reichsrath in Munich, &c. Presently he said: "You remember when I saw you here last year how all the German States were on good terms with Prussia;\* they had confidence in me. That is all changed now, there is much distrust and dissension of every kind. We then touched on the Hessian question, which he handled with thorough knowledge. Here Austria and Bavaria were the most difficult to deal with. He did not deny that the change of government in Prussia since the overthrow of the Hessian Constitution had made it easier for him to turn back than for Austria, where there had been no change either of Sovereign or Ministers. However, there was now no other way

\* The Congress at Baden in June 1860.

but to turn back. Finally he thanked me once more and I took my leave.

*Memorandum of the year 1862.*

Among German statesmen and politicians there are many who declare the dissatisfaction which has recently seized upon the people to be wholly groundless. In their opinion the political condition of Germany, though it no doubt leaves much to be desired, is, on the whole, satisfactory, and only deliberate ill-will could blind any one to the advantages offered by the existing federal constitution. These gentlemen compare the Germany of to-day with Germany as rearranged by the Imperial Commission of 1803,\* and consider the federative organisation of the German Confederation as it emerged from the laborious negotiations of the Congress of Vienna infinitely preferable to the disorganisation of the old Empire. In this they are no doubt right, for the worst defects of our present military organisation are perfection compared with the old system of district contingents, &c., in the days of the German Empire. The most regrettable resolutions of the Diet of the Confederation are miracles of wisdom compared to the deliberations of the Diet of Regensburg and our present division of States looks imposing when placed side by side with the patchwork map of the German Empire at the time of the Peace of Lunéville.

If, nevertheless, the commendable points of our Federal Constitution are not appreciated, and the desire for its reform finds determined expression on all sides, the reason will be found to lie mainly in one cause — among many — which has perhaps not received sufficient attention. It is a well-known fact that in no part of Germany does the idea of German unity enjoy greater popularity than in the South-Western States.

While Austria and Prussia treat the question of an improvement in the Federal Constitution either as an unimportant detail or use it as means of increasing their influence in Germany, or for their own aggrandisement, in South-Western Germany it is regarded as a matter of life and death and is the unceasing object of anxious thought to politicians and eager excitement to the masses.

No one in his senses will attribute this movement to revolutionary agitators. Movements of this kind cannot be artificially produced, their roots lie deep. We believe that the true cause lies in the fact — more or less consciously recognised — that the greater portion of the German nation has no voice in deter-

\* The *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of February 25, 1803, embodied the decisions arrived at by a commission appointed by the Reichstag of the old Empire. It provided (*inter alia*) for the secularisation of all the ecclesiastical principalities, &c., mediatised most of the Imperial free cities, and effected a considerable rearrangement of the territories of the smaller states.

mining its destinies, these destinies in relation to the outside world being settled by Austria and Prussia alone, to the exclusion of the other sixteen millions of Germans. This sense of exclusion weighs more heavily and is more bitter because South-West Germany is the true source of the race, where the strain is purest, whereas in Austria and Prussia the Teutonic element is largely mingled with the Slav. Here, too, in the South West, lies the cradle of our greatest ruling Houses; from this part of Germany more particularly came the men who have exercised the greatest influence over the intellectual development of the nation; even to the present day the most prominent statesmen in Austria and Prussia were of South German origin. This bitterness is naturally intensified the more the people of these parts become conscious of their intellectual and material superiority, and yet find their political activity restricted to more or less local interests.

It is incontestable that, for the political education and invigoration of a people, they must have a share in these human interests which are called high politics. It is certain that in petty and narrow circumstances the individual citizen's horizon is restricted, and his energy, soundness of judgment and strength of character collapse and give place to a bourgeois sentimentality and an unwholesome spirit of cosmopolitanism. It cannot therefore be denied that the cry for German unity which now goes up from the German States of the middle and lesser ranks, is even as the struggle of a sick man to obtain the longed-for remedy which he knows will cure his disease, and which alone can save his life.

There are social philosophers who will say in reply, the Germans are a *Kulturvolk*, whose mission is rather to guide the intellectual development and solve the great questions of humanity than to descend into the arena of political strife. We can only hope that those who find comfort in this thought are endowed with the resignation of the Jews, for the Jews, too, were a *Kulturvolk*. But we refuse to believe that the German nation has sunk so low as to find consolation for its political impotence in an empty name.

### *Journey to Silesia and Berlin in the Winter of 1862.*

In undertaking this journey I had two objects in view: to discuss the question of the sale of Treffurt in Rauden; further to consult with Victor about entering the Upper House, after which I meant to go to Berlin and settle the matter. In connection with which plan others were to be fitted in.

I arrived at Rauden on December 31; started off at once in bitter weather on a boar hunt, but shot nothing.

The next day we had a great New Year's dinner, at which



Justizrat Engelmann and Wiese were present, with whom I discussed the Treffurt business.

After I had had a few days shooting in Rauden, Karl\* came over from Koschentin, and I had some interesting conversations with him on the present political situation in Prussia.

He admits, like all other sensible people in Prussia, that there is nothing for the Government but either to put itself boldly at the head of the movement or to adopt a more conservative attitude. Mere impartial good-nature all round will simply set both the Upper House and the Democrats against the Government, as the event of the elections has demonstrated. The democratic result of these was due to three causes:

(1) Both country and townspeople are afraid of the burdens attendant on the new military organisation, and believe that the Democrats alone have the necessary pluck to stand up against the King's wishes in that matter.

(2) The Ministry forbade the provincial officials to exercise any influence on the elections, which consequently fell into the hands of the Democratic District Councillors.

(3) The *Kreuzzeitung* party would sooner see red Democrats than Liberal-Conservatives in office, so that their part in the elections was a doubtful one.

In Oppeln I met the State Councillor Rudloff† and went on with him to Breslau. His opinions agreed pretty much with what I have just set down. I spent the day with him in Breslau, learnt much from him on the present situation, spoke of my plan regarding the Herrenhaus, and was advised to consult Privy Councillor von Obstfelder in Berlin. Victor and Prince Karl Lichnowsky joined me in the evening at the station, and I arrived in Berlin on the morning of the 14th. Here the necessary calls were made, I dined at the "Maison dorée" and finished the evening at the Casino. On two evenings I drank tea with the Queen. On the first occasion I sat at the Queen's table between Frau von Lazareff and Hugo,‡ on the second between the Queen and Frau von Lazareff. There was an *Ordensfest* on Sunday the 19th. We assembled at 11.30 in the new chapel of the Palace, which is almost too sumptuous for a Protestant church. There was a seething mass of Orders of every description. To the right of the altar were *fauteuils* for the Royal Family, opposite, on the left, the seats of the Knights of the Black Eagle. The rest of the Knights took their places according to the precedence of their Order. The Royal Family appeared at 12.30, the ladies wearing trains. Then began the service according to the Protestant Liturgy; the choir was excellent. The sermon, which was in good taste, purposeful and very well delivered, was preached by a Würtemberger named Hofmann. He described candour,

\* Prince Karl zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen (1820-1890).

† Whom the Prince knew as a barrister in Coblenz.

‡ Prince Hugo of Hohenlohe-Oehringen, Duke of Ujest (1816-1897).

steadfastness and devotion to Christ as the three qualities which should adorn the true Knight. After the service came a grand dinner of five hundred covers. I sat between two Court ladies, Countess Brandenburg and Countess Schwerin. On the other side of the latter sat Field-Marshal Wrangel, who grew extremely merry and noisy towards the end, as did the somewhat mixed company in the other rooms. It was all over by half-past four.

BERLIN, *January 18, 1862.*

At half-past two to-day I had audience with the Crown Prince. After a little conversation on general subjects he began about our family affairs, the entailed estates of Ratibor and Corvey, and about Treffurt too. At his request I explained it all to him and laid stress upon the fact that I thought of acquiring more property in Prussia. To this he replied that he was the more pleased to hear it as he had learnt with regret that I had renounced my intention of entering the Prussian Upper House. I then told him that I had consulted my brother last year as to the advisability of my doing so, and had received a favourable answer, but that at that time and during the session of the Bavarian Parliament I had not ventured to make an application in the matter. In consequence of this delay the report had got about that I had abandoned my previous intention. This was not the case at all. On the contrary, I was now in a position to take the necessary steps at any moment, as I considered the work in the Prussian Upper House entirely compatible with my duties in Bavaria, where we sat only once every three years. As to the political side of the question, that presented no difficulties to me — I was already decried in Munich as a Prussian, and should, therefore, be neither better nor worse off in Bavaria than before. I then proceeded to give him a detailed account of my political history, beginning with a complete description of the Imperial Mission, going on to my political position in Bavaria, laid stress on my vote in 1849 and wound up by characterising my position at that time as a "Little German." The Prince listened with great attention, and then openly admitted his own "Little German" leanings; expressed his satisfaction at Herr von Roggenbach's work, and agreed with me entirely when I observed that considering the prevailing state of feeling in South Germany, and the extremely subtle and secret plans of the Emperor Napoleon, we could not proceed too carefully. Finally, I begged the Crown Prince to tell the King that I had by no means given up my intentions with regard to entering the Upper House, and was ready at any moment, if it pleased his Majesty, to take the necessary steps.\*

\* The Prince gave up all idea of entering the Prussian Herrenhaus, however, in consequence of the struggle over the Constitution. On December 12, 1862, he wrote to the Duke of Ratibor: "It would seem

BERLIN, *January 21, 1862.*

This evening again I took tea with the Queen and had a long conversation with her on literature and literary people. She holds very sensible views on the intercourse with *savants* and the dangers attendant thereon. The King, as usual, came in rather later, was very cheerful and conversational, but sat so far away that I did not get a word with him till just before the end of the *soirée*.

*January 24.*

This morning the Queen sent me word I was to come to her at half-past three, "in morning-dress." As I knew that, for all their Anglomania, the frock-coat is not yet recognised at Court as morning-dress, I put on a dress-coat, but permitted myself a black tie. The Queen was out driving, but had deputed Countess Haacke to keep me company till her return.

At four o'clock the Queen arrived, dismissed the Countess, and seating herself just as she was in bonnet and cloak at a table in the window, motioned me to a seat at the other end of the table.

She said she was anxious to ask me a few questions which I was to answer quite frankly, regardless of who or what she was, simply as an old friend. Formerly the Prince of Hohenzollern had kept her in touch with politics, but his health had made his retirement absolutely necessary. She did not interfere at all in political matters, she only saw the Ministers when they came to tea, and therefore could not gain any information from them. She confessed to me frankly that she was greatly depressed. She had never imagined that ruling was so difficult, or that the circumstances of her new position would present themselves to her in so wretched a light after so short a time. The King was irritable and dispirited, the outlook was very gloomy, the people with whom one came in contact, the party leaders, seemed to her so unpleasant, so far from being gentlemen in the English sense of the word. They all seemed up in arms against one another, so that she was thoroughly anxious, especially as she heard from all sides that the situation was critical.

"The King and I," she continued, "are old people; we can hardly hope to do more than work for the future. But I wish I could look forward to a happier state of things for our son."

She then turned to foreign politics. Here the question of German unity played the chief part. They bore a grudge against her personally on that account and cast aspersions on her. She advocated neither a policy of immobility nor of conquest; she stood fair between the two parties; she would have every German ruler retain his rights, without, on the other hand, closing her ears to the urgent desires and needs of the times.

to me nothing less than indelicate to apply to his Majesty for a seat in the Herrenhaus when I was almost sure, sooner or later, that my opinions would clash with those held by the Sovereign.

When she had finished I rapidly debated in my own mind what her real aim might be. I could not quite see what she wanted, but I thought it best to give her my views quite openly. I began, therefore, by saying that I had always agreed with the old saying \* which Dahlmann took for the motto of his policy: "We should neither weep nor laugh at human things, but endeavour to comprehend them." Therefore I could not regard the present situation in Prussia so seriously. I begged her not to forget that by the legislation of the last forty years Prussia had become democratic through and through, and that this democratisation dated from a period which the Prussian people regarded with pride and glory. I pointed to the *Ordensfest* as being a typically Prussian but nevertheless a democratic ceremony. Though this spirit had been repressed during the reign of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV., that was, after all, only repression, not destruction; with the new reign and the hopes engendered by it the old democratic spirit had revived in full force. This was one reason for the Democratic elections; another was that the peasants and the rest of the tax-payers had thought that the Democrats, being less timid, would be more likely to cut down the Budget than the Ministerialists. To dissolve the Chamber, however, because of these elections, I should consider a great mistake. Circumstances might occur during the course of the session to make such a step necessary, but upon that I could not hazard an opinion.

I also pointed out to the Queen that Constitutional Government in Prussia was barely ten years old; that many a movement which was looked upon as a political catastrophe was merely a symptom of that process of development which we in the South German States had passed through much earlier. The conflict between modern constitutionalism and the feudalism of the mediæval State was naturally much fiercer in Prussia than elsewhere. This was a struggle which England had still before her, and which the majority of the Continental States had already fought out.

It was, of course, to be regretted that in our political life we had not "gentlemen" to deal with, but it was a term for which, in this connection, we had no equivalent.

As to foreign policy, I quite approved of her views. It was more necessary than ever to play a waiting game. The German question would be near its solution if revolutionary principles gained the upper hand in Europe, but further from it if the principle of "historic tradition" were given another trial. Just recently the latter event seemed to have come to pass. At such a moment, if the situation shows the faintest sign of becoming more stable, no German Prince dreams of renouncing a single right which is profitable to his officials. The number of Legations, for instance, will not be reduced. The whole question, I continued, presented infinite difficulties, and at the moment I saw

\* Of Spinoza.

no possibility of coming to any satisfactory conclusion. We conversed some time on this subject, on the indignation aroused by Bernstorff's note,\* deplored the hostile attitude of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, and so forth.

Finally her Majesty said she was anxious to speak to me about my own position. "Leonille † has often told me she wished you would take some post in Prussia. That is my wish, too. We need you." Here followed some flattering remarks. "I think the only way is for you to enter the Upper House. Would it not be possible? Could you combine it with your duties in Bavaria? For those you must not give up. We have so few links with South Germany that this one would be of the utmost value." So that was her real object in this interview, to play the mediator between Prussian schemes and South Germany!

I explained that I had already made inquiries as to the feasibility of my entering the Upper House, that I had only deferred, and not abandoned, the idea last year, and that I had every intention of taking it up again, although there were sure to be difficulties.

After a few more remarks on personal matters she rose, still talking fast as she went towards the door, turned at the door, gave me her hand, which I touched respectfully with my lips, and disappeared.

## PARIS — THE WINTER OF 1862

*Extract from a letter to PRINCESS ELISE.*

PARIS, February 22, 1862.

. . . I must confess that I am not enjoying myself particularly here. Amusement has no meaning for me except as a rest from work. But when a man of my age has no work he is bored. My interests are not here, but at home. What I see here only fills me with vexation. For here is a great nation with a national centre, vast, world-wide interests, plans and thoughts, while at home there is nothing but dissension, the splitting up of national energy, projects, and thought, and Germany fails to occupy the position which ought to be hers in times such as these. They class us here with the Poles — a nation that has had its day,

\* Prussia had replied to von Beust, the Saxon Minister's scheme of reform, in which he proposed that Austria and Prussia should alternate in the Presidency of the Confederation, by a note of December 20, 1861, declaring that the formation of a Federal State within the Confederation was not only feasible, but that it was the only feasible plan. Against this Austria and the Middle German States protested in identical notes, February 2, 1862.

† Princess Hohenlohe's step-mother, Princess Leonille of Sayn-Wittgenstein, an intimate friend of the Empress Augusta.

by whose dissensions they can profit and whose remains they are already preparing to devour. All this detracts from the pleasure of my stay. I am too much of a politician to be able to help seeing everything from that point of view.

PARIS, *February 23.*

The sermon I heard to-day in the Church of St. Clothilde interested me in many respects.

I went with Princess Wittgenstein, and we arrived at two o'clock, although the sermon was not to begin till a quarter-past three.

The church is in beautiful Gothic style, and was only completed in 1857. The stained glass is middling. The organ has a very beautiful tone, but the music during vespers is too pastoral in style, a sort of Swiss air with variations. The preacher, Father Felix, a Jesuit, a little man, perhaps thirty, perhaps forty years of age. He spoke very distinctly, now and then a trifle theatrically, but on the whole extremely well.

The object of the sermon was to solicit contributions to a Carmelite monastery to be founded at Meaux. He answered the question as to the need of monasteries in general and of the Carmelites in particular by pointing to the egoism of the times which was apparent everywhere, and was the ruining of the home as well as of the State. "*L'égoïsme dans l'Etat*," he said, "*c'est la tyrannie en haut, le servilisme en bas, la dépravation partout.*" This egoism, the radical evil of our day, manifested itself in three ways, as avarice, sensuality, and arrogance, and these the Carmelites sought to combat by taking the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience. It was a well-thought-out and well-delivered sermon.

*February 24.*

This evening we were at Galiera's, where we found most of the Faubourg St. Germain assembled. Thiers was there and Montalembert, and the former Minister, Count Duchâtel. The Duc de Valençay, who had just returned from Berlin, talked of the prevailing tone there. An aged M. de Pontois regretted the disunion in Germany. Canofari, ex-Ambassador of the King of Naples, goes about with a face of gloom. He is a shrewd diplomatist, but will wait in vain, I fear, for the restoration of the kingdom of Naples. There is much talk of the scenes which have taken place in the Senate, and of Prince Napoleon's speech.\* I am convinced that this speech was not made without the Emperor's approval, although yesterday both the Duc de Tacher and the Duc de Bassano assured everybody that the Emperor had no such views. On the contrary, the Emperor, feeling that

\* At the debate on the Address in the Senate on February 22, Prince Napoleon had made a very violent speech against the legitimist Count Laroche Jacquelin.

the occupation of Rome has damaged him with the democratic party, has seized this opportunity to throw dust in their eyes by making them a concession through his cousin.

PARIS, *March 9.*

The German question is at present occupying all statesmen, not only of Germany but of all Europe. And very naturally. Every question of the present day which is seized upon and exploited by the party of revolution must absorb the attention of all thinking men, to a greater or less extent in proportion as the grievances and discontent underlying such "questions" are well founded. What we call "questions" nowadays are widespread movements, oscillations of the whole human race, enigmas which have to be solved. The German question did not spring fully armed from the heads of the demagogues; it arose out of the nature of things, and its spirit permeates every party in Germany. For a whole people whose separate component States are united by the tie of a common language and literature, who are moved by common interests, and who in consequence of increasing travelling facilities come daily into closer connection with one another, will not endure indefinitely a state of disintegration which degrades them to the position of being the plaything of foreign intrigues and the scorn of foreign nations.

Hercin lies the great danger, and this is the reason why even the most peaceable and conservative people in Germany have been driven to declare: "We must have union, and since we cannot achieve it by lawful methods, then it must be by revolution."

Thus demagoguery enlists decent people on its side and swells to a power which no Government can control. The question is: Can the revolution, which, though not immediate, is unavoidable, be obviated by prompt measures of reform?

The proposals hitherto made by the various Governments for reforming the Confederation are utterly impracticable. Herr von Beust's \* scheme was merely a move to checkmate Prussia. Perfectly aware that Prussia would not accept it, the Middle German States made this cheap offer which they will never have an opportunity of carrying out.

The word Pan-German has two meanings. Either it means "one great German Republic," in which the German-Austrian States would be included, or it is an empty phrase coined to work against Prussia and lull the good citizen to sleep. The Pan-German Federative State may be all very well in theory; in practice it is out of the question. It premises the renunciation by the rulers of certain sovereign rights which only the revolution will force them to give up. But if it came to that, if the revolution were such a power as to be able to force the German rulers to obey her behests, she would certainly not be satisfied with a Federative State.

\* See note, p. 115.

A practical Pan-German programme has never existed and never will exist.

The antagonism between Prussia and Austria may be deplored, but cannot be argued away. It is just as impossible that Prussia should be under Austria as Austria under Prussia. The monarchs and diplomatists can do nothing either for or against it. The people themselves will not have it so. All this talk of the revival of a German Empire under the House of Hapsburg is mere visionary nonsense.

But if we do not want a Pan-German Republic, if we see that a continuance of the present state of affairs must lead to revolution, we must think of some plan which is not outside the bounds of possibility. The logical result is that we come back to Herr von Radowitz's idea: a Federal State under Prussia and an alliance with Austria.

This plan miscarried because in 1849 people were not yet convinced that any other plan was impossible. Thirteen years have passed since then, and the idea has gained ground every day. But the idea of a Federal State also came to grief through the opposition of the Catholic party in Germany, to whom the prospect of putting themselves under a Protestant Emperor was most distasteful. There, I think, the Catholic party is wrong. By clinging to the Pan-German programme it only hinders reform without getting any nearer to the realisation of its desires. It works for stagnation and therefore revolution, whereas under a Prussian sovereign it would lose nothing, but would gain greater freedom for the Church. The position of the Catholics in Prussia as compared to their position elsewhere in Germany is a proof of this.

It lies with this party now to decide whether the reform of the German Confederation shall be accomplished by peaceful methods or by revolution. If it takes up the idea of a National Assembly the various Governments will be obliged to yield. A conservative element will thereby be introduced into the movement which will be a guarantee for its remaining purely a movement of reform.

A word from Montalembert to this effect would be of incalculable importance and find instantaneous response.

March 10.

I laboured away at Montalembert to-day on the foregoing subject. He brought forward two arguments against it:

(1) He complains of Prussian intolerance towards the Catholics, particularly in the matter of the Universities. He says that Friedrich Wilhelm III.'s hostile policy had set the Catholics against Prussia. Besides that, *par suite d'un préjugé et de traditions*, the Catholics in Germany were attached to the House of Austria, and were consequently against Prussia.

(2) He considers Herr von Radowitz's idea impracticable,



because Austria was made for a Federal State, and would be unable to force her conflicting racial dependencies into any continued unity.

I vindicated Herr von Schmerling's ideas, and did my best to disprove his first contention. In the middle of it we were interrupted.

KARLSRUHE, September 26, 1862.

While in Karlsruhe I managed to have several conversations with Roggenbach, partly about my private affairs, partly on questions of general political interest. At a supper at his house the Prussian question came up and was discussed by him and me and the two Holsteins. The present state of affairs, said Prince W. Holstein, was owing to the power and the influence still exercised by the *Kruezeitung* party, not only in the Upper House, but towards the Crown and society in general. Everything was suffering under the pressure. There was a good deal of talk about details, the arrangements of administrative districts, &c., which Prince Fr. Holstein considered important. But Roggenbach urged that the one thing needful was that the aristocracy, or a part of it, should put itself at the head of the movement so far as its claims were legitimate, and that they should leaven the Liberal party with a Conservative element, instead of seeking to import Liberalism into the various Conservative groups. The rest would follow.

With regard to the German question, Roggenbach observed that it could not be fully discussed till some great European question, such as the Eastern, should give a handle for forcing the Powers into making concessions to Germany. She could not constitute herself *de but en blanc* into a united State without taking the European balance of power into consideration and instantly calling a coalition against her into being. This would, however, be avoided if the Powers were divided on some other European question, and an opportunity was thus afforded to throw the concession regarding the German and Holstein questions into the balance as a makeweight to the alliance.

At the Court ball Prince W. Holstein and Roggenbach returned to the Prussian question, and Roggenbach emphasised the fact that, above all things, it was necessary to form a party in the Upper House, who were capable of administration and who could take the initiative and gain the respect of the country, so that, should a crisis occur, they would stand out as men of whom a Government might be formed.

In my last conference with Roggenbach, when we were alone, we first discussed Austria's position in Germany. Austria's business, he said, was to reduce her sphere of influence within definite limits and to settle her attitude to Germany, thus fixing her position in accordance with what was possible. Her present aim was to destroy Prussia and make herself sovereign of Mid-Europe. This was a task, however, quite beyond her power to

carry out. Europe would never suffer the destruction of Protestant Prussia, and Austria's supremacy in Germany was absolutely conditional on that destruction. If, therefore, the object of these enthusiasts in Austria was unattainable, the whole matter became a fruitless agitation, with possibly dire consequences to Austria. The moment the Pan-German programme ceased to be negative it became a radical one. He quite agreed with me that to have a Parliament without a strong central government was to play into the hands of the revolution.

As regards my own position, he said at the close of the interview: "When the present Crown Prince came to the throne, they would have to look about for a man whose position, education, and views fitted him for the post of Premier. He knew no one so suitable as myself, and the way was being prepared. As Minister for Foreign Affairs in such a case he should propose Usedom. (I fancy, however, he was really thinking of himself, for Usedom is quite unsuited to the post.)

His programme seems to smack somewhat of Cavour. He wants to put Prussia at the head of Germany, at Austria's expense. If Austria goes under, the Austro-German provinces will fall naturally to Germany. That is the *fin mot* of the Little German programme. Once "Little Germany" is constituted, Austria is to be the German Venetia. That is why Herr Metz of Darmstadt let the cat out of the bag when he spoke of the Austrians as our "whipping boys." This was premature, but we shall hear of it again.

Roggenbach thinks that all these assemblies in Frankfurt, Weimar, and so on will come to nothing. To my objection that they knew nothing of me, supposing I ever came to be Prussian Premier, he answered very naively: "If you serve a dish, you supply the sauce to it. The Press will see to that."

### *Journey to Frankfurt to the Congress of German Princes.*

Friday, August 14, left Munich at six in the morning for Frankfurt *via* Ulm and Stuttgart.

At one of the numerous changes I was joined by Count Waldstein, a member of the Austrian Upper House, who was also on his way to the Congress at Frankfurt. He told me much that was interesting about affairs in Bohemia, and appeared to belong to the Unionist party. His opinions on the German-Czech aristocratic party were most sensible. The decorations were in progress at the stations all along the route. The heat was beyond words. We arrived at Frankfurt in a boiling condition. I secured a modest room at the Hotel de Russie, and hastened to change my clothes and go down to dinner. There, to my very agreeable surprise, I found Mülhens, and we spent the evening

together, going after dinner, first to Madame Metzler, then for a moment to the theatre, where we saw the last act of *The Merchant of Venice*.

I have heard nothing as yet about the Congress; everybody is too busy decorating their houses, arranging the procession and suitable quarters for the exalted personages who are expected.

August 15.

At ten o'clock to the Duke of Coburg. I found him delighted that the idea suggested by the Emperor had been carried out. He thinks the Emperor should at once lay a fresh Constitution for the Confederation before the German Princes. Prussia would then withdraw from the Confederation, but in a fortnight's time would be only too glad to enter it again. The King of Bavaria, he said, was furious, the other monarchs quite nonplussed; indeed it was altogether a very comical situation that these gentlemen, who had just forbidden the German flag in their dominions, should find themselves compelled to sit fuming under the magnificent black, red, and gold flag flying over their several residences here in Frankfurt.

I next called on Pfordten.\* He was very friendly, but seemed to take a gloomy view of the whole situation. He thought it peculiar that no communication had been made beforehand. That his friendship for Austria and antipathy against Prussia should have brought this upon him caused him a very disagreeable impression. He was evidently disconcerted and out of humour with Austria. I was not at all sorry to see him in this dilemma, which I had long ago predicted for these Bavarian gentlemen. I am curious about the King; they say he has suddenly developed extraordinary sympathy for Prussia.

At five o'clock in the afternoon I went with the Mülhens and Prince Bernhard Solms, with whom I had dined, to the Beifuss house, from the balcony of which we were to watch the Emperor's entry into the town.

At six came the Emperor in an open *calèche* seated for two people. As they had expected he would arrive with eight horses and a great suite, of course nobody recognised him, and there was not one hurrah as he drove past. Only Frau von Bethmann, on our balcony, threw down a bouquet or two, but, fortunately for the Emperor, they missed the carriage.

In the evening we strolled about the streets, and at nine o'clock I drove to Madame Metzler's, where I stayed till eleven. The King of Hanover arrived just as I got home.

To-day, the 16th, great crowds in the streets, the Sovereigns visiting one another, the public staring and criticising.

\* Freiherr von der Pfordten represented Bavaria in the Diet of the Confederation from 1859 to 1864.

The situation would seem to be as follows: Austria will bring forward a delegation scheme, the details of which are not known. The Duke of Coburg and Herr von Herstorff are supposed to have originated the idea.

The King of Bavaria and the Grand Duke of Baden are against it, Würtemberg will accept it, of Hanover I know nothing. The Austrians have the best of it in any case. If nothing comes of it they can always say we were ready to do anything, but the German Sovereigns would not agree. If discontent and revolution follow they will retire into the security of their united kingdom and fish in troubled waters. Should the Sovereigns agree, however, then Austria will gain what she has long hankered after: the supremacy over a dominion of seventy million souls. Regarded thus the *coup* is extremely adroit, but whether in the interests of Germany is another question.

*Afternoon.*

It appears that the scheme for the new Constitution is not so bad after all — a Directorate, a Council of Princes in which the Free Cities will have a vote, and a House of Delegates with pretty extensive powers. A deputation of the Princes will be sent to request the concurrence of Prussia. The first debate is to take place to-morrow. God grant that the opposition which is bound to arise may not wreck the whole business.

My day was spent mostly in the streets. At every turn one met ministers and diplomatists, Apponyi from London, Larisch, Schrenck, and so on. I paid my respects to the Duke of Augustenburg at the Englischer Hof.

In the evening fatigue and a stroll through the Zoological Gardens.

At eleven o'clock of the same day Hermann\* came to me to say that he was to have an interview to-morrow with State Councillor Samwer, attached to the Duke of Coburg, on the subject of the position of the Free Cities in the Council of Princes. He wished me to be present.

*August 18.*

In consequence, I went this morning to the Duke of Coburg's, where I found the Duke at breakfast with Hermann, Erbach, and a few gentlemen.

The new Constitution was discussed and I now heard the details of the project.

A Directorate will be formed of five members, Austria to have one vote, Prussia one, Bavaria one. The Assembly of Princes will consist of the former Diet.

The nobles are to have a share in the Legislative vote in the Council of Princes. This has already met with opposition. The

\*Prince Hermann of Hohenlohe-Langenberg, the present Governor of Alsace-Lorraine.

question to be decided in Hermann's consultation with Samwer is, therefore, whether we are to use our efforts to get into the Federal Council. We thought, however, it would be more to the purpose to enter the Council of Princes. There is not much to be done either way, only by the latter means you maintain the principle of equality of birth. This is Samwer's opinion too. However, to his thinking this Constitution by no means settles the question of the Federal State. The Constitution would not last very long, and then the question of the Federal State would come up just as before.

At eleven o'clock the meeting is to take place at which the Emperor will lay the project before the Sovereigns. The King of Bavaria will reply, they say. The Sovereigns will then enter into debate upon the question, which will last for several days. There is talk of a deputation of Princes, with the King of Saxony at its head, to be sent to Baden to the King of Prussia. It is not thought that Prussia will retire from the Confederation, especially if Hanover joins it.

On Monday, August 17, I determined to go to Munich, returning on Thursday, as there must necessarily be a pause in the proceedings during those days. The Assembly of Princes had decided to address a letter to the King of Prussia.

After one day in Munich I returned to Frankfurt on Thursday the 20th. The King of Saxony\* had not yet returned. In the evening I went to the Duke of Coburg's, where I found Hermann. Here I noticed at once that the situation was completely changed. The Duke lamented that nothing would be achieved; that his brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Baden, was agitating vigorously against the scheme; that behind the Grand Duke stood the Gotha party, with Häusser and Bluntschli at its head, determined to oppose Austria; that the Grand Duke obstructed everything, stirred up the Princes against Austria, and was personally discourteous to the Emperor.

I went home with Hermann, who was going back to Langenburg the next morning.

*Friday, August 21.*

This morning to the sitting of the Diet of Deputies, which is held in a fine room in the so-called *Saalbau* with roomy galleries. The Standing Committee of the Diet proposed without further ceremony to elect the officers and to that end proposed Bennigsen, Unruh, and Barth, who were accordingly at once nominated Presidents. Bennigsen made a kind of inaugural address in a well-modulated voice, and admirably expressed. He looks young and has the assured manner of a man who has moved much in public life. Unruh is the typical Prussian Government official. Barth was no stranger to me. The most important of the speeches

\* Who had gone to Baden on August 19 as the bearer of the letter from the Assembly to the King of Prussia.

was that of Häusser, wherein he very clearly expounded the attitude of his party as regards the Emperor's projects of reform. I saw at once from this that Austria has nothing to hope for from the Liberal party in Germany, who hold fast to the supremacy of Prussia and the programme of the National Union. Welcker, who has grown very old, spoke with his wonted energy for a National Constitution. Schulze-Delitzsch's speech was fine, but more suited to a popular meeting. Some of the other speakers were absolutely below criticism, for instance, a mouthing Jew called Fischer from Breslau, a Herr Becker, and one or two others unknown to fame.

I was there again in the afternoon, but as I could not stay after four I missed Völk's speech, which was good, I hear. At five o'clock I dined at the Russicher Hof with Larisch, who is here as Minister for Altenburg. He, in his good old familiar way, is frankly against the Austrian Reform scheme. He holds the Reform to be impossible without the absolute equality of the two Great Powers, and that such equality is impossible within the Confederation. To have a Confederation containing Austria would simply be to perpetuate the present state of things. To set Austria at the head of a Federal State would mean the humiliation of Prussia in which the smaller Sovereigns had no wish to lend a hand, and to which the Prussian people and the Prussian Army would never submit. This is the opinion of Oldenburg, Baden, Meiningen, Altenburg, and others. Darmstadt and Nassau side with Austria, as does Saxony most probably, because the shrewd Herr von Beust thinks nothing will come of it anyhow. Bavaria withholds her opinion as yet; Würtemberg too is undecided. As the Liberal masses are not satisfied with the Reform projects, the Sovereigns say to themselves, Why should we surrender our independence if even our own Liberals are not going to thank us? For Austria, of course, they will not stir a step for all their ostentatious display of sympathy. Prussia's absence from the Congress is a splendid excuse for their doing nothing. And now the German Diet of Deputies is supporting them! If these professors understood their own interests they would have got their Parliament even if it were made up only of delegates; they would at least have had something to take hold of and could have rearranged things later as circumstances permitted. Instead of which they foolishly cling to the idea of a National Constitution, which no human being will ever give them, and so finally will get nothing at all. Once more I have thoroughly convinced myself that the German people are not ripe for a United Germany. If they ever will be God alone knows.

At Roggenbach's I found a number of diplomats of the Prussian persuasion putting their heads together. This is the headquarters of those who oppose the scheme because they do not want Austria in Germany. They want to remain pure unadulterated German — no concessions to Austria. Here Liberalism

is mixed with a due care for the maintenance of the individual sovereignties and for their personal ambitions; and great stress will be laid on the principle that Prussia must not be out-voted. All these gentlemen are favourable to Prussia, but they are joined in secret by many who were hitherto on the side of Austria, and still are so openly. They are ostensibly displeased at the conduct of Austria's enemies, but in their hearts are thankful to be able to draw their heads out of the halter of the Austrian Confederation Reform.

To-day, the 22nd, at one o'clock in the morning, Austria sent round a proposal in which the Princes are asked definitely to accept in the conference to-day the chief points in their favour, and leave the details to be discussed by the Ministers. Great consternation among the smaller opponents. Even the Duke of Coburg thinks this is going too far and that the petty Sovereigns should not submit to it. Great driving about of the Ministers in the early morning. The conference takes place at eleven o'clock. It appears, however, that Austria has lost the game. In my opinion they quite deceived themselves in Vienna as to the feeling among the petty Sovereigns. They imagined they had them safely bagged and that Prussia was to be annihilated by a *coup d'état*. This has missed fire because the German sovereigns at once formed front against Austria when they saw she meant to crush one or other of them. Had Austria known her ground better she would not have carried out this manœuvre, or else she should have adopted a more revolutionary programme and won over democracy by a Democratic Constitution.

*August 22.*

Austria withdrew the proposal she sent round in the night, at the instance, it appears, of the King of Saxony. The conference then took place with much stormy discussion, I am told. Down to Article 6 they were agreed, except as to Article 3 — the Directorate — which was set aside for further debate this afternoon. The petty Princes are unwilling to put themselves unconditionally under this Directorate of Five; they wish that it should represent the united sovereignty of the German Confederated State, but not the supremacy of one ruler over another. They therefore wish to provide that the Directory must lay a sort of account of its stewardship before the Council of Princes. The Kings are not satisfied with a Directory of Five — Saxony proposes six, of whom Austria and Prussia are to choose two, Bavaria one, Saxony, Würtemberg, and Hanover two, and the rest of the Princes one.

This is to be put to the vote to-morrow in the Emperor's presence. This one point settled, the rest will not take very long, so that Wednesday will probably see the end of it all.

In the evening there was a ball at Baron Bethmann's. I met a number of people I knew — Herr von Vincke (Gisbert), who now

lives here, Sternberg, Dumreicher, Zachariä from Göttingen, and others. The Grand Duke of Baden drew me aside to give me his views. The Grand Duke of Weimar invited me to Weimar in the autumn. I spoke besides to the Duke and the Hereditary Prince of Meiningen, to Rechberg, Crenneville, Schrenck, and many others. The news that the Bavarian Chamber has declared for the draft Constitution made a great sensation.

Herr von Kerstorft remarked that it was high time the Sovereigns cleared out of Frankfurt, "they were beginning to bore people."

Prince and Princess Metternich were also present at the ball, the latter in a somewhat conspicuous toilette and very much rouged.

I drove to the races this afternoon with Lerchenfeld and Hompesch. On the Royal stand were the Emperor, the Elector of Hesse, the Duke of Meiningen, and a few more.

After the races to the Grand Duke of Baden. He gave me details of the conference, and said that those Sovereigns who raised any objections to the Reform Act were terrorised by Austria and the majority. He had ventured to point out that the discussion could not be carried on without some show of business order, but no one took any notice. They went on talking, and at last the Emperor said: "We will try putting the separate paragraphs to the vote," and this "trial" proceeding was forthwith employed for good. Immediately after the reading of the first Article on the purpose of the Confederation, the Emperor had asked if any one had anything to say against it. No one spoke, so he, the Grand Duke, observed that this Article covered the most important constitutional questions, but as none of those present expressed any opinion on the subject, he concluded that they had no wish to discuss it. At this, general murmuring; he was asked if he had anything better to suggest, and so forth. Altogether any opinion differing in the least from the Austrian was put down by terrorism and intrigue. The Grand Duke seems persuaded that they are trying to crush Prussia, and that it is his special mission to prevent this. In the evening at Madame Metzler's I found Prince Metternich, Rechberg, the Hereditary Prince of Meiningen, a few diplomats, and a great many of the elegant ladies of Frankfurt. I soon took myself off again.

*August 24.*

In the afternoon, before my departure, I looked in for a moment on the Duke, who had just come from the conference and was very pleased at the result (six members in the Directorate). He has hopes of the matter being accomplished.

At four I left for Sayn, convinced that nothing could be done in the interests of the nobles, and worn out by the irritation of only hearing half of what was going on and yet being pestered



for my opinion by people who were thoroughly acquainted with all that happened, and more convinced than ever of the wisdom of minding one's own business.

## VII

## SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

MUNICH, *February 18, 1864.*

Yesterday I called on Bodenstedt. I had learned that he wanted me to join the Schleswig-Holstein League, and that this was a means of my becoming a Minister which he and the Liberal party in Bavaria consider necessary. Bodenstedt regretted that I had not come sooner; I could have been of use then in the league; now it was almost too late. He complained of Schrenck and his inaction, believes that the King would act quite differently if he had another Minister, and told me that Schrenck had already broached the Schleswig-Holstein subject to the King, and had said that Germany looked to the King in the matter, &c.

To-day, then, I went to Schrenck.\* He began by saying he had heard I was going to join their league. On my denying this, he lectured me, saying that on so sacred a matter one had no right to conceal one's true opinions, and so forth and so on. I replied that I had never concealed my political opinions when there was call to express them; besides, everybody in Bavaria knew what my opinions were. The following consideration, however, rendered my entry into the league impossible. It was my belief that the Schleswig-Holstein associations would shortly find themselves compelled to choose between two paths: either to abandon lawful tactics or, yielding to superior force, retire into private life, and neither of these alternatives were to my taste. If I once joined an association, I would accept all the logical consequences arising out of that step. It was not my way to look back when I had once set my hand to the plough. But as, given certain circumstances, I saw revolution ahead as the inevitable consequence of these associations, I preferred not to have any part in them.

To Schrenck's plea that the league was composed of most responsible men — he instanced Ringeis — I returned that I must maintain, with all due modesty, that if I entered the league it would give it a political colouring. In the course of the conversation I explained my programme, showed him that for Bavaria it was a matter of life and death, and that for the maintenance of her independence a Parliament of Mid-German States must be called together and a definite policy set up.

\* Minister for Foreign Affairs and for Commerce, 1859-1864.

MUNICH, *March 12, 1864.*

Meanwhile various events have occurred. The death of the King\* will make no difference for the present in the policy of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Schrenck will remain in office.

The matter stands thus: Hanover proposed, or tried to propose, that Denmark should be called upon by the Confederation to put a stop to the seizing of German vessels. (Austria is against it, consequently the proposal will never be made.) In the event of refusal, the Confederation is to declare war on Denmark. The paramount Powers, however, will not recognize the Confederation.

In the same way, Darmstadt is said to have required that the troops of the Confederation should be employed against Denmark. This, too, is refused by Austria and Prussia. The assistance of separate German States will be accepted, but not that of the Confederation. The paramount Powers want to keep the affair in their own hands.

The proposal of a debate on the question of the succession is to be delayed as long as possible. The German paramount Powers will not hear of convening the Holstein Deputies. They insist on a free hand. Herr von Bismarck, it appears, has taken Austria in tow.

Archduke Albrecht's mission is partly of general interest, partly for the opening up of friendlier relations. But special propositions were made, too; in particular as regards the treatment of proposals made by the Confederation, on which subject the Austrian Government is at variance with the Confederation. The Bavarian Government, especially the late King Max, held their ground, however.

Prince Hohenlohe was among the most decided followers of Duke Frederick. With twelve other members of the Bavarian Upper House, he addressed the following letter, dated May 12, 1864, to Herr von Beust, the representative of the German Confederation at the London Conference:

"Your Excellency already possesses many written evidences of the prevailing feeling in Germany as regards the German-Danish conflict. In addressing to your Excellency yet another letter on the subject, the undersigned members of the Upper Chamber of the Legislature of the Kingdom of Bavaria are acting not only in full agreement with the standpoint always maintained by their own Government, but in the consoling assurance that your Excellency shares their convictions, and that you have ever laid your decisive word in the balance for right and justice. By ancient chartered right the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein can claim indivisible union under a Duke of their own. At the death of Friedrich VII.,

\* King Maximilian II. of Bavaria, died March 10, 1864.

King of Denmark, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, the indubitable right to the ducal throne of Schleswig and Holstein devolved upon Duke Friedrich VIII. of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. By the undisputed and indisputable principles of private and general law, no one — therefore not even the Great Powers of Europe — is warranted in adopting measures inimical to the clearly proved rights of third parties — in this case Duke Friedrich VIII., the Representatives of the Duchies, and, in so far as Holstein is concerned, the German Confederation. As such unwarrantable proceedings would react disastrously and irremediably on the interests, and deeply violate the sense of justice of the German nation, we confidently hope that your Excellency, as the authorised representative of the German Confederation at the London Conference, will use your utmost endeavours to bring about a solution to this difficulty which shall satisfy the just claims of the legitimate successor, of the people of Schleswig-Holstein, and of the German Confederation.

“As the Landtag is not sitting at present, and the people are without representation in the Confederation, it rests with individual members to voice the general anxiety of the nation and openly express their conscientious convictions in this question, which so profoundly affects the honour of Germany. At the same time, may we beg your Excellency to accept this expression of the firm confidence with which we are inspired by the knowledge that the honour and interests of Germany are in your Excellency’s hands?”

To which Herr von Beust replied :

LONDON, *May 20, 1864.*

Your Highness did me the honour to send me a communication, signed by several members of the Upper House of the Legislature of the Kingdom of Bavaria, containing a renewed and weighty expression of the prevailing sentiment in Germany touching the justice of the German-Danish conflict. I beg to offer my respectful thanks to your Highness for this communication, which I value all the more highly in that it affords me another and most encouraging proof of the fact that the political significance for the future of Germany of the mission which brings me here is recognised and appreciated to the full by the Conservative sections of the nation.

I can say with a clear conscience that, in so far as my efforts are concerned, the flattering confidence expressed in the letter is not misplaced, and I look forward to justifying it by the success of my endeavours.\* I have every hope that a

\* At the sitting of the London Conference, May 17, the Prussian Representative read the German declaration claiming for the Duchies complete political independence. Although this by no means excluded the Danish King from the succession, it was ~~immediately rejected~~ by

solution of the question will be reached which will satisfy respectively the sense of justice and the political interests of the German nation and the wishes of the people of the Duchies.

*Notes of a journey from Aussee by way of Wildalpen to Munich.*

October 2-10, 1864.

. . . In Linz I bought a *Presse*, and saw from it that Schrenck had resigned.

Arrived at Munich at ten o'clock.

The next morning I attended to some commissions and then went to the Ludwigstrasse, where I met Venninger, who congratulated me on my nomination to the Premiership. He said I had been alluded to as President at the sitting of the Bank Committee. Soon afterwards I met Handelsgerichtsrat Völdern-dorff, with whom I went for a walk. He, too, spoke of the change of Ministry, and said that in Franconia they all counted on me and put their faith in my party. We discussed what course the Foreign Minister in Bavaria should adopt just now, and both agreed that the most important thing at present was to acquire influence over the young King, and for the rest to be discreet in the endeavour to put Bavaria at the head of the Mid-German States, to keep a firmer hand on Home government, no reaction, and in foreign affairs caution and independence.

Oettingen complains of the difficulties a member of the Upper House has to encounter. Harless told me the King had declared he would make no member of the Upper House a Minister.

The latest news names Hompesch as Minister of Foreign Affairs. When I found him at dinner at the Vier Jahreszeiten, he was not agreeably surprised to see me. This confirms my opinion that he has hopes. I saw the King at the theatre. He looks well. I could not help thinking, however, that he is beginning to take on his father's distrustful expression.

My opponents are the Court, the lower nobility, the Ultramontanes, and the Austrians. The intelligent middle classes are for me, and so are the Democrats. It looks, however, as if Prussian and Austrian influences were at work to bring about a reaction in Bavaria. They do not want me, at any rate, and with this conviction I calmly took my departure.

Denmark, thereby putting the personal union with Denmark out of the question for good and all, and ensuring the continuance of the war with the object of completely detaching the Duchies from Denmark. Beust had declared at the sitting of the conference, in the name of the German Confederation, "*que la majorité de la Diète ne consentirait pas à une solution qui, même sous la forme d'un arrangement conditionnel ou éventuel, rétablirait l'union entre les Duchés et le Danemarck.*" — Count Beust, *Aus drei Vierteljahr-hundertern*, vol. i. p. 383.

*From a letter to PRINCESS ELISE.*

AUSSEE, *October 29, 1864.*

. . . The *Presse* has a savage article against me from Munich. It accuses me of always appearing in Munich just before a change of Ministry, and speaks contemptuously of this unjustifiable pretension. It also throws my youth in my teeth! I confess that the article rather annoyed me. But it is quite wholesome to be abused sometimes.

*From a letter to HERR VON MÜHLENS in Baden.*

SCHILLINGSFÜRST, *November 23, 1864.*

I have not been made Minister, in spite of the general report. The Bavarian Dynasty will not have a mediatised noble as Minister.

This must be a family policy. Well, I cannot say I am sorry. Better never see the Cabinet than pass through it only to be shelved. . . .

*To KING LUDWIG.*

MUNICH, *April 3, 1865.*

Your Majesty has graciously commanded me to acquaint you with the matter which led me to request an audience. I hasten to comply, and herewith lay at your Majesty's feet the petition which it was my intention to prefer verbally.

From the beginning of your Majesty's reign I have had continuous proof of your Majesty's gracious approval, which fills me with pride and the deepest gratitude. The sincere and heartfelt loyalty which I bear towards your Majesty inspires me with the earnest desire never to forfeit this gracious consideration, nor, above all things, your Majesty's respect.

With the opening of Parliament, however, I am seized with the apprehension that your Majesty may receive reports of my activity in the Chamber, and of the motives inspiring me which might present me in a false light.

Accustomed, in the debates in Parliament, to act strictly in accordance with my conscience and the obligations of my Oath, I cannot blind myself to the possibility of circumstances arising in which I shall be at variance with the Government. Your Majesty is too high-minded not to appreciate independence of opinion in the country's representatives, among whom the members of the Upper House may be reckoned. On that score I know I have nothing to fear. But I do fear misrepresentation as regards my motives.

Consequently, should your Majesty ever happen to consider my words or action in the State Council of sufficient importance to claim your Majesty's attention, and to require explanation,

I should be profoundly grateful if your Majesty would be graciously pleased to demand such explanation direct from me, or through your Majesty's Cabinet.

This was the request which I was anxious to prefer in all submission verbally, but which I herewith venture to lay before your Majesty in writing.

*Two letters to QUEEN VICTORIA of England on social and political conditions in Germany, 1864, 1865.*

In the April of 1864 the Prince received a letter from his aunt, Princess Feodora of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, in which she mentioned a wish expressed by her sister, Queen Victoria.

The Queen complained that since the death of the Prince Consort, her connection with Germany had been, to a certain extent, severed; and that there was no one to whom she could speak her mind openly, or from whom she could receive an unbiassed account of things. She had confidence in Prince Hohenlohe as an old friend of Prince Albert, and wished him to keep her *au courant* with the social and political conditions in Germany. Owing to the suspicion with which all German influence in England was watched, these communications were to be sent to the Queen through the medium of Princess Feodora. In particular, the Prince was to explain the Schleswig-Holstein affair, and its significance for Germany, as this was not understood in England. In accordance with Queen Victoria's wish, therefore, the Prince sent in the two following communications under date May 4, 1864, and April 15, 1865, a political confession of faith immediately preceding the outbreak of the great movement in which the Prince himself was called to play a leading part.

MUNICH, *May 4, 1864.*

Your Most Gracious Majesty did me the honour to charge me to report from time to time on the social and political conditions in Germany. I venture herewith to satisfy your Majesty's wishes.

As regards the social conditions, these have at all times in Germany been so intimately connected with religion that it is as well to examine the religious movement in Germany first.

It is a remarkable phenomenon that the opposition between Orthodoxy and Unorthodoxy is becoming rapidly more accentuated. The religious tendency in Western Germany, the representatives of which in some countries hold the reins of Church government, starts from the idea that the Reformation stopped half way, that it adopted too many elements of

the Roman Church, and thereby barred the door to progress; that the time has now come to remodel Christianity in accordance with the spirit of modern thought, and the really existing faith and religious needs of a community no longer orthodox in the old sense of the word. In contrast to this broad "Protestant" movement the orthodox Lutheran party closes its ranks more firmly than ever. This party disputes the necessity for progress or the development of the Protestant creed in accordance with the spirit of the times. It stands fast by the Bible and Luther, and one section would even be willing to return to the bosom of the Roman Church if she only would, or could, make them a few concessions — notably in the matter of justification by Faith. This being out of the question, they content themselves with increased strictness in their own doctrinal sphere, modify their Liturgy to resemble that of the Roman Church, and adopt as much of the ritual and organisation of that Church as is in any degree possible. The institutions of the Deaconesses, the Brothers (*Brüderschaft*) in Berlin and Hamburg, the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, &c., are so many proofs of these tendencies.

Beyond these Christian parties stands the great School of Materialism and Nihilism represented by the leaders of Materialistic Philosophy and Natural Science. The teachers of this party are often men of wide knowledge and honest intentions, but who have come in the course of their studies to deny the existence of anything they cannot put under the microscope. Were these theories confined to their originators the danger would not be so great; but education is so widespread in Germany, the people take so lively an interest in all the professors bring forward, Science has become, if I may so express it, so democratic, that such theories cannot fail to have a serious influence on our social life. True, we have no proletariat comparable in extent to that in England, Belgium, or France; the industrial population is mostly gathered together in a few districts, and the greater portion of Germany, especially Bavaria, has chiefly a population of quiet agriculturists. But with the advance of industry the industrial population will increase, and the deeper it has been imbued with this superficial, false, and subversive education the more pernicious will be its influence on the social and political conditions of the country.

As regards the political situation, all other considerations are swallowed up in the Schleswig-Holstein question. That this question should have acquired importance is to be explained, first, from the fact that the German is by nature a lawyer, and that legal questions always arouse the keenest interest — so much so that in some parts of Germany litigation is the farmer's one amusement in his spare time. Apart from this, however, every one in Germany is conscious of the profound significance the Schleswig-Holstein question must

have for our internal policy. Every one knows that with that question the German question too will be decided. At the beginning it looked as though the Mid-German States, the real root of the nation, were to rise to greater political prominence by means of the Schleswig-Holstein affair. And therein lies the reason why this question has aroused greater excitement in the German territories outside Prussia and Austria.

Examining attentively the movements which have agitated Germany during the last fifty years, we find that their true origin lies in the discontent of the population of the middle and petty States, a population of nearly nineteen million souls, at seeing themselves excluded from participation in the affairs of Europe — in the position of grown men who are not permitted to have a voice in their own business. In time this becomes insupportable. You may say that the material condition of these States is very satisfactory, and that it would be folly to bring about a state of affairs which would certainly entail greater material sacrifices than the existing one. But this ambition, or rather, this craving for due honour and repute, is a sign of the vitality of the German people, who put honour and repute above mere material comfort. It was to throw off this oppression that they fought in 1848 for German unity. This movement began in South-West Germany. It proved abortive, because neither Austria nor Prussia would bow to an ideal overlordship.

One party then attempted to bring about the Prussian hegemony, but that, too, was frustrated by the refusal of the King of Prussia.

The aspiration remained, however, because it was firmly rooted in fact. Then came the Schleswig-Holstein affair, which, had they been able to combine, would have afforded the middle and petty States an opportunity of winning for themselves a recognised political position in Europe. The people thought that the hour was come, and importuned their Governments. The Governments, disunited and incapable, let the happy moment go by. The German Paramount Powers took the matter in hand, and so vanished the political hopes which the people of South Germany had built upon the Schleswig-Holstein affair. Not so, however, their interest in the matter. Public opinion turned once more to Prussia, for men cherished the hope that, after her military successes, she would not let the rights of the Duchies be trampled under foot.

Since 1848 the German people have made progress in their political education; in particular, they have learnt to wait. They have learned that in political matters it is inexpedient to run your head against a wall. It is, however, inevitable in the prevailing state of public sentiment that a solution to the Schleswig-Holstein question offensive to the people's sense of justice would have the gravest consequences for Germany, and



more especially for the very existence of the middle and petty States. Not that an immediate revolutionary movement would break out — the mass of the people is too peaceable, too phlegmatic for that — but contempt would arise for the Governments, who would be severely blamed because they did not seize the right moment, and a deep, growing irritation which must in the end undermine the existence of the dynasties of those States.

This the statesmen of the respective countries recognise to the full, which explains how conservative men like Beust and Pfordten are on the side of the Progressive party in this question.

If I am not much mistaken they have come to the same conclusion in Prussia. For the same movement that would crush the middle and petty States must sooner or later have fatal consequences for Prussia. For Prussia is essentially a German kingdom, and her Government must — whether they like it or not — go with the stream of public opinion, whereas Austria, predominantly a Slav nation, takes little account of the opinion of her German subjects, nor has she any need to. The Schleswig-Holstein affair is, therefore, to the people, a question of rights, a question of power to the Governments, and a question of existence to the Confederation, that is, to the middle and petty States.

I must apologise to your Majesty for dwelling at such length on a subject on which doubtless your Majesty is better informed than I. My reports can contain no really recent political news, seeing that I am not in touch with the central points of European politics. They are only meant to serve as an expression of the political opinion of the educated classes in Germany, and as such I beg your Majesty's indulgent criticism of it.

MUNICH, *April* 15, 1865.

Your Majesty will graciously pardon me for having delayed thus long in following up my communication of last May with a second. My sojourn in the Austrian Alps, and consequent remoteness from the political arena last summer, made it difficult for me to offer an opinion on the state of political affairs in Germany. Since my return I have made several attempts to repair this neglect, but found myself each time slipping into the odious style of our journalists, and could not make up my mind to lay it before your Majesty.

I must, however, pluck up courage now — though at the risk of creating an unfavourable impression — to send your Majesty another instalment of my political observations. They are, after all, chiefly the outcome of what I have read in the newspapers and reviews, and, therefore, I must beg your Majesty's kind indulgence for them.

The question which was agitating the whole of Germany last spring has now been relegated to the background. Schleswig-

Holstein is still much written about and discussed, but the interest of the general public has waned. This is a proof of the justice of my former assertion that the ardent interest in the fate of the Duchies last year was less for the Schleswig-Holstein than the German question, which promised to find a solution in this conflict. Now that the affair has simply become a question of power and influence between Prussia and Austria, the agitation of the masses has subsided, or turned in another direction. Certainly not a little of this pacification is owing to the general satisfaction that the Duchies have ceased to belong to Denmark, but nevertheless, a feeling of bitterness and disappointment is slowly spreading through the South German States at the passive rôle to which these States are condemned in any question involving German interests.

This feeling is shared by Government and people alike; it seems necessary, therefore, that the Governments should look about for some means of extricating themselves from so trying a situation. Bavarian statesmen see salvation in the "Triad," *i.e.*, a closer union between the middle States, and their organisation into a Federal State under the overlordship of Bavaria, a State which, with the addition of Austria and Prussia, would form the great German Confederation.

There are, however, many insurmountable obstacles to the realisation of this idea. First, the disinclination of the separate rulers to renounce any part of their sovereign rights in favour of the dynasty which would stand at the head of the more restricted Confederation. I hardly think that either the King of Saxony or the King of Würtemberg would care to hand over any of their rights to our youthful Monarch. Nor would the King of Hanover feel the slightest inclination that way.

Another stumbling-block is the opposition of the democratic party to the Triad idea. The South and Mid-German Democracy belongs in part to the National Union, whose aim is the organisation of a Federal State under the overlordship of Prussia. They look upon Herr von Bismarck's Government as a passing evil, after whose removal the project will certainly be carried out. The rest of the Democrats are, consciously or unconsciously, Republicans, and look forward to the time when a Democratic storm shall empty the thrones of the Continent and bring back to Germany the glorious days of a Constituent Assembly. Owing to the opposition of this section of public opinion which knows how to make itself decisively felt, a reform of the Federal Constitution, on the lines I have indicated, is very difficult.

Another obstacle to the realisation of Bavaria's idea is the objection of Austria and Prussia to the Triad. In Austria they want to keep the Confederation as it is, and are opposed to the formation of a third group of States, because in it Protestant and Catholic States would be associated, an idea most distasteful to

the Ultramontane party. It is possible that Vienna looks forward to the complete break up of the Confederation in order to round off the Austrian dominions on the German frontier with some of the remnants. But I am not sufficiently initiated into the secrets of Vienna Court or Government circles to be justified in offering an opinion.

Prussia sees in the Triad not only a menace to the prospect of a Prussian hegemony, but also a hindrance to her territorial expansion in the north of Germany. So from this side too Bavaria will meet with determined opposition.

I fear, therefore, that the Middle States are bound to remain as they are till in some great European conflict they are swallowed up in the resulting territorial changes.

To me this state of things seems grievous, not only for the Principalities thus menaced, but in the interests of the German paramount Powers themselves. Austria needs no additional territory. A well-ordered internal Government and settled finances are always more important to her and suffice to establish her dominion on a permanent basis, especially if in addition she has the support of her natural allies. Prussia could only carry out her federal scheme under a quite exceptionally favourable juncture of the European situation, and then only if Austria were wiped off the map. In 1848 the political situation on the Continent was favourable to the formation of the Federal State, but Prussia missed her opportunity. Such an opportunity is not likely to recur in a hurry. In spite of Italy, in spite of bad finances, and in spite of the concordat, Austria will not disappear from the map of Europe. The conditions therefore are not yet within sight which are essential to the formation of a Prusso-German Federal State. Meanwhile, however, the present state of affairs in the German Confederation may well lead to such a disastrous commotion as will shake even Vienna and Berlin.

For this reason I think it would be in the best interests of both Austria and Prussia if they would not only withdraw their opposition to the formation of a third group of States but use their influence towards its formal recognition. The antipathy of the several German rulers would then retreat into the background and the support or opposition of the Democratic party lose its importance. I believe that by thus removing the chief cause of disquiet and complaint the paramount German Powers could secure peace to Germany and the rest of Europe for long years to come.

I see no other solution of the problem. Nothing will be achieved so long as they fail to pay due attention to certain undeniable things. Chief among these is the individual character of the various German races and the tenacity with which each clings to its peculiar characteristics. Social and political uniformity is not so difficult in France or Italy, where the national

character shows greater uniformity and fewer idiosyncrasies in its component parts. But in Germany the races are as distinct to-day as they were in the time of Charlemagne; the Würtemberger is as much an Alemann or a Suabian, the Bavarian as unmistakably a Bojar as ever; you recognise the vivacious Frank in Central Germany, the reserved and hard-working Saxon in the population of Westphalia and Hanover. Thus, what is generally known as particularism has its root deep in the national character and is not to be torn up and thrown aside by theories.

Where, as in Prussia and Austria, the influence of the Slav element has asserted itself, and even, in a way, predominates, legislative union, and uniformity has been easily attained. In the South and West of Germany, the parts untouched by the Slav element, the separation has continued as the unavoidable result of race characteristics. It will be hard enough to induce these Principalities to enter into anything approaching a practical federation, but certainly easier than trying to fuse them into one State like Prussia or Austria. In political matters it is best to set one's mind only on what is possible, painful as it may be to renounce one's cherished theories.

I sum up, in conclusion, the subjects that are at present occupying the attention of all classes in Germany. The principal points are as follows:

(1) The Papal Encyclical,\* which, on the whole, has not created a good impression among the German Catholics.

(2) The question as to which will gain the victory in the struggle between Government and people in Prussia.

(3) The solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question — so closely connected with the foregoing — whether the Duchies will come under Duke Friedrich's independent rule or become a province of Prussia.

(4) The American Civil War which profoundly affects the material interests of South Germany. It is not only our cotton-spinners that are suffering. It is a question of life and death with them. The capitalists who have put their money in American stock are anxiously watching the progress of the war, and long for the conclusion of peace and the triumph of the Northern States. Besides, the sympathies of the Democratic population of South Germany are naturally with the North American States.

Finally, as regards Bavaria, I must not omit to observe that we have the most amiable and engaging Sovereign I have ever beheld. His is a noble and poetic nature, and his manner is so particularly attractive because one feels that his courtesy is the natural expression of a truly kind heart. He has plenty of brains and character to boot. I trust that the tasks he has before him may not be beyond his strength.

\* The Encyclical *Quanta Cura* of December 8, 1864, with the "Syllabus."

The foregoing notes by the Prince on his journeys and his political impressions give no idea of the busy and happy family life at Schillingsfürst which was unfolding itself in the quiet years between 1853 and 1866. On November 30, 1847, the first daughter, Elizabeth, was born to the princely pair, and on July 6, 1851, the Princess Stephanie. On June 5, 1853, came the son and heir, the present head of the family Prince Philipp Ernst. A son, Albert, born October 14, 1857, fell a victim to diphtheria in the spring of 1866. Finally, on August 6, 1862, the twin Princes, Moritz and Alexander, were born.

In 1858 the Prince acquired the house in the Brienner Strasse in Munich, which he occupied with his family during the parliamentary sessions. In 1865 he bought a farmhouse at Alt-Aussee in Styria, which he remodelled as a villa. Here the family invariably spent part of the summer. The parents were assisted in the education of the children by Princess Elise, the youngest sister of Prince Hohenlohe, who made her home with her brother till her marriage in 1868 with the Prince of Salm-Horstmar. From her letters which the editor has been kindly permitted to see, a few short extracts are reproduced in this book which illustrate the life and spirit of the household. The Princess Amalie, the Prince's favourite sister, married in 1857 the Court painter, Richard Lauchert, against the will of the family. The resulting estrangement lasted but a few years. Princess Salm writes on the subject: "Later on my sister was reconciled to all my brothers and passed many a happy hour again with my brother Chlodwig. My brothers came to see that the man for whom she had given up all was entirely worthy of her. He was not only a talented artist but an admirable and wholly trustworthy character. Unfortunately he died in 1868, when they had only been married eleven and a half years."

On the relations of the Prince to his brothers and sisters the Princess writes: "We all turned to him when in the slightest doubt or difficulty. His keen judgment and reassuring calm, and the brotherly love which was evident in all his counsels, gave them great weight. Our mother's tender goodness came out again in Amalie and Chlodwig. He had drawn up documents about each of us, so that he could take up the thread of our affairs at any moment. At Schillingsfürst one used to go to his little study and sit down in a small arm-chair beside him at the writing-table, and he would look up from his work and instantly give his whole attention to whatever you had to say. Words cannot describe it; I can still feel his penetrating gaze."

Again, in 1852, the Princess writes: "I can never cease to admire Chlodwig, and how calm, unselfish, and patient he is in all his actions. Let them say what they will about masculine energy, firmness, and proper self-assertion—that is all very well in its way; but a delicate noble mind is an infinitely higher thing. Better to have that alone, without those

qualities, than the other way round. To-day he was speaking again of sacred things. I cannot describe the extraordinary impression it makes on me, how it moves me to hear him pronounce the name of Christ; it seems to come from the depths of his heart."

The Princess thus describes the position of Schillingsfürst: "It was charming in the summer with the wide views, the solemn silence up on the heights, the sunshine streaming through the spacious rooms and the glorious sunsets. We much appreciated the near neighbourhood of Langenburg, where Prince Ernst (my mother's brother, and father of the present *Statthalter*), a man of the old courtly school, was then living with his beautiful and cultivated wife. For other neighbours of our standing there were none, so that Schillingsfürst might really be called a lonely spot. For my dear sister-in-law, who was not accustomed to that kind of life, it was in some respects hard, especially as the dryness of the air, the absence of a river, and the keen wind which nearly always blew at Schillingsfürst, seemed not to agree with her. This necessitated frequent changes to Schwalbach and Schlangenbad or to the sea. They also went frequently to Rauden, near Ratibor, to England, and, in later years, also to Vienna. This constant moving about was not really to my brother's taste, but it was his way to make the best of everything. He made copious and interesting notes of all he saw, had many instructive conversations with people he met, and ever put his own desires in the background.

"Afterwards, in the winter evenings at Schillingsfürst, my brother would illustrate his travels by drawings in a great scrap-book. The youngest child would be seated on his knee, the others standing round looking on with awe and delight as they watched their own portraits in every possible situation, and the portraits of their parents, relations, and servants growing under their father's hand. In this way many books were filled containing a whole family history.

"My brother was very fond of sport and was an excellent shot, but all with due moderation. Once in his later years in the Chancellor's Palace he said to me: 'I cannot bear to look at antlers now; sport has become a perfect idolatry.'"

The following observations from the pen of the Prince's sister-in-law, Princess Konstantine of Hohenlohe, touching the social rather than the domestic life of the Prince, may serve to amplify what we have learned from Princess Elise:

"The character of my brother-in-law, Chlodwig," she writes, "always seemed to me to bridge the gulf between two periods. His mind, though deep rooted in the feudal traditions of his caste, had yet a lively and intuitive sympathy for all the liberal views which have only come to the fore in our modern days. To his benignant philosophy it was given to smooth rough edges, to

mediate between conflicting forces. Whether the conflicting elements in his own breast did not bring him frequent suffering none can say; he veiled it in impenetrable silence. His imperturbable calm seemed to me simply the peace after a hard-won victory over self.

"He devoted himself with fatherly care to his youngest brother, Konstantine, who was hardly more than a boy at the death of their beloved mother. He and his wife arranged our marriage and Marie was delighted to have a cousin in the intimate family circle. She always treated me with special kindness, and they both came every year to visit us newly married young people. The social life of Vienna, at that time so exclusive, courtly, and brilliant, had an irresistible attraction for my sister-in-law. It did not appeal so much to her husband, but, as he was always loath to spoil any one's pleasure, he took part with cheerful resignation in all the pomp and the festivities where the beauty and the splendid jewels of his adored Princess created a great sensation. He would often accompany me to a lecture which interested me while our respective frivolous better halves went off to an Offenbach operette. A change came over these pleasant and innocent associations in the years between 1866 and 1870 for Chlodwig's well-known political views and his proclamation against the Vatican Council gave great offence in Vienna. This very much upset my husband, who highly disapproved of his brother's action in the matter. Yet the Chlodwigs came to see us as before. They had no thought of missing their innocent share in the accustomed festivities and he pretended not to notice the coolness of his reception or, at most, merely smiled if some one rudely failed to return his greeting. His dignified and reserved attitude made any direct attack impossible, so that it never came to painful scenes. Our Emperor was always well inclined towards him, a feeling which in later years, when he was Governor of Alsace and Imperial Chancellor, increased to warm attachment. The Emperor expressed his regret at being unable to invest the three Hohenlohe brothers simultaneously with the Golden Fleece. Besides my husband, the eldest brother, Ratibor, had received the Fleece for his constant and active services to the interests of Austria at Berlin. Immediately on the death of the Duke of Ratibor, Chlodwig was honoured by receiving the Golden Fleece, the most exclusive of Orders.

"We had many a delightful time together in the Austrian Alps where my husband had rented one of the finest chamois shootings in the country. My sister-in-law threw herself passionately into this noble sport. Her husband fulfilled his duties as a hunter most correctly, but with far less enthusiasm. He took Latin classics with him when out stalking, filling my boys, who were still at the Gymnasium in those days, with amazement. I remember being out with him once in his last years. We had a long wait, and to pass the time he recited from memory and without

one stumble whole poems of great beauty. In our fine enthusiasm of course he missed the chamois which were being driven to him. At the last moment, as we were on the point of going home, his whole attention was taken up by a field-mouse which, terrified by all the racket and shooting, had sought refuge and protection with him. This delayed us considerably, especially as even then he walked very slowly, and my husband, alarmed for our safety, had sent some of the huntsmen back to look for us. The inextinguishable laughter of the company when we explained that we had been delayed by a mouse while out chamois driving made not the smallest impression on Chlodwig's imperturbable calm."

## VIII

## THE YEAR 1866

*Memorandum by the PRINCE.*

MUNICH, March 21, 1866.

As to the approaching or contemplated demonstration,\* it is in the highest degree necessary to be clear as to ends and means, to ask oneself whether the object is attainable and whether the means at hand promise a successful result.

The end must be: by organising a union to urge the Government to take up a more decisive attitude, to intervene actively in the present crisis, and at the same time secure for itself the alliance of the nation, or at least of the South-Western portion of it, by publishing the scheme for convening a German Parliament.

The active intervention of the Government must be assisted so as to bring about the union of the secondary States.

Here it may be asked: Is this portion of the programme yet within reach? With regard to the dynasties and the Governments representing them, we can only count on the assent of Saxony; Würtemberg is doubtful, Baden hostile, the small duchies and all North Germany on Prussia's side. All these States would only follow the lead of Bavaria if they were forced into it by a popular agitation.

Even in its own country the idea of a German Parliament would at present be regarded with distrust. The situation is at present this, that a simple, artless suggestion to convene a German Parliament would be received with jeers. It must consequently be chiefly and emphatically the Parliament of the middle States, the so-called Triad Parliament.

\* Nothing more precise about the projected "demonstration" can be ascertained. The reason is given in the following letter of Prince Karl of Bavaria.



But even here, is acquiescence to be counted on? The Ultramontane party will have nothing to do with it, the Progressive party, in so far as they are National Unionists, do not swerve from the Prussian headship, and is content to wait. The Democratic-Progressive or people's party is with us so weak that it may be disregarded. There thus remains only the Liberal Greater Germany group. This is at the present moment without influence; at least its influence is too trifling for it to carry the Bavarian people along with it by drawing up a programme.

In Würtemberg the parties are grouped in a similar manner. Baden is partly Ultramontane, partly National Unionist. The North is altogether for the National Union. Thus, outside Bavaria, no enthusiasm for the Triad Parliament is to be awakened.

The active interference of the Government must further consist in quitting its neutral position and entering upon a definite alliance with Austria.

This object will also be reached without our co-operation. Either Austria approaches the Confederation, transfers the occupation of Holstein to the troops or commissioners of the Confederation, which Prussia will not suffer, and then there would be war with Prussia and the alliance with Austria follows of itself:

Or Austria goes off on her own path alone without reference to the Confederation, which is improbable. Then comes the immediate question, Yes or No? brooking not a moment's delay, which the two paramount German Powers will put to the secondary States. Bavaria's only course, whether she likes it or not, will then be to join Austria.

The setting up of the parliamentary idea for the German secondary States might lead to unexpected results, which, in Bavaria's interests, are little to be desired. Who is to guarantee that if the parliamentary idea were to be suddenly mentioned and gained support, Prussia would not thereupon proceed to propose, directly and officially, reform of the German Confederation, of which she has already given semi-official intimation? Then we should all at once be relegated to the Union of 1849.

Should I, however, be deceived on all these points, should it indeed be judicious and useful to proceed to the formation of a union in the proposed manner, yet there is an important point to take into consideration. Political demonstrations should not emanate from *novi homines*, nor from those who do not possess, or who have ceased to possess the entire confidence of the people. At any rate, those who belong to these two categories should not attempt a demonstration single-handed. Demonstrations can only prove successful when led by men whom the people (whether rightly or wrongly) look upon as the men worthy of their trust. If these be the leaders, we can join ourselves to them; if, however, we act alone, we shall be scoffed at as prying aristocrats, and render ourselves impossible for ever. I

reckon amongst the trustworthy men who might originate the demonstration, amongst others the following persons: Pötzl, Schlör, Hegnenberg, Lerchenfeld, Stenglein, and, above all, Marquard Barth.

The demonstration will be useless from the beginning if it does not have the effect of kindling enthusiasm. These volunteer political acts are only justifiable when they are the manifestation of the inspired thought of all hearts, when, the moment they take place, every one must exclaim: "That is the very thing!" Only let there be no blow struck at empty air, especially when the air is storm-laden.

Therefore, I will conclude in the words of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. ix. v. 26: "I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air."

PRINCE KARL of *Bavaria to the* PRINCE.

MUNICH, *March 23, 1866.*

YOUR HIGHNESS, — I send your remarks of the 21st inst., which I intended to bring back to-day myself, with best thanks.

Bavaria's programme, which proposes to support Austria if she returns to the point of view of the German Confederation, will be approved by all parties. An association formed to act in this sense is superfluous. An assembly which demands the immediate convocation of a Parliament for Germany collectively, or for the secondary States, is impracticable and therefore absurd. I had no such thought.

The Parliament should temporarily make its appearance only under the condition of meeting the demand for reforms in the German Confederation. Bavaria would have to establish a connection between these and her adhesion to Austria.

It seems to me that a more favourable opportunity than the present for arriving, *without a revolution*, at a reform of the German Confederation will not soon return, and I should even to-day (at all events in the event of increasing complications) consider as practicable the convocation of the Landtag to take active measures in this direction and to aim at the unification of all Liberals of the Greater Germany group. It is possible, however, that you may be right, and that for this the time has not yet come.

Besides, I suspect Pfordten of carrying on at the same time in deep secrecy a policy of a Rhine Confederation. How then?

These are the observations to which I intended to call the attention of your Highness. In the meantime I will not forget the counsel of prudence, for which I reiterate my most sincere thanks, and remain,

Your Highness's devoted servant,

KARL.

*Journal.\**

MUNICH, April 11, 1866.

Dined to-day with the King. In the Winter Garden after dinner the King began discussing politics with me, and expressed his apprehension regarding Prussia's proposal to set up a Parliament. I said the Parliamentary scheme would always turn up from time to time; now was the moment of all others for Bavaria to come forward. The Democratic party would not follow Bismarck unconditionally, as they would a Liberal Prussian Ministry. Prussia's only aim just now was supremacy in North Germany. Here the King broke in: "*Just now*, yes, but presently she will want more." I questioned this, and added that I believed Bavaria could come to terms now with Prussia, and that Prussia would offer no objection if we tried to make a better position for ourselves in South Germany. He then spoke of Bismarck's influence over the King, which he declared to be unlimited. The Queen and the Crown Prince were against Bismarck. Leaving me, the King had a talk with Maurer,† who corroborated my opinions and told me afterwards he had particularly urged the King not to be afraid and to seize this favourable opportunity.

MUNICH, May 31, 1866.

Arrived last night. The debate on the address took place yesterday morning. Arco-Valley, whom I met at the station, told me that Zu Rhein moved, and in a long speech urged, the adoption, in the address, of a more rigorous tone against Prussia, whereas Wilhelm Löwenstein advocated a moderation in her favour. However, the Chamber accepted Harless's address as sufficiently firm and dignified. I suspect that Stauffenberg fixed the meeting immediately *before* my arrival, if not purposely, at least not without inward satisfaction. He wanted to deprive me of the opportunity of making a political confession of faith. On the other hand it may only have been to enable him to get away to-day on another week's holiday.

Feeling here is against Prussia; even the sympathy which prevailed in the Army has vanished, I am told. I walked up and down the Dultplatz yesterday for a long time with Bodenstedt, who is keen on the general arming of the people — outside the Standing Army of course. This was the special rallying-cry of the democracy, and if the people did not mind the attendant expense and discomfort, why not let them do it and be happy. Revolution would certainly not come of it.

The King's journey to Switzerland ‡ has done him much

\* Here begins the regular continuous record which the Prince calls his diary.

† State Councillor von Maurer (1790-1872), a member of the Upper House.

‡ The purpose of the journey to Switzerland, where the King visited the scene of Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell*, was misconstrued by the public, who believed that the King went there in order to meet Richard Wagner.

harm with Munich people. They are said to have shouted abuse at him in the open street, and when he drove to church on the opening day of the Diet there was no hurrahing, they scarcely even saluted him. *This*, they say, is his reason for transferring the Chief of Police, Pfeufer,\* to Augsburg (as if the police could cause the bad feeling!) and nominating Fritz Luxburg† Chief of Police, in his place. The latter is wretched about it and cannot make up his mind to accept.

Pfordten declares constantly that he is sick of the whole business, but stays on nevertheless and will probably go to the conferences as Plenipotentiary to the Confederation. I do not see how this will work with the Landtag, as there will then be no Minister to bring forward the Government business.

They tell me the King has refused to open the session personally, so old King Ludwig and Prince Karl drove over to Berg and lessoned him. The closing sentence of the address of the Council is also a lesson :

“When the devotion of a Monarch to the duties of government — doubly heavy at the present time — is supported by the confidence of his people, and the confidence of the people in its turn increased and strengthened by that devotion, both ruler and people may look without dismay even into a dark future. United by this bond of mutual trust, we may hope, with your Majesty, that should we be called upon, in spite of all our efforts for peace, to defend the right by force of arms, the valour of our troops and the fervent patriotism of the people will, with God’s help, gain the victory.”

MUNICH, *June 1, 1866.*

Prince Reuss‡ fears that the anti-Prussian demonstrations in the Bavarian Chamber will finally result in setting the Prussian people against the South German States and so hasten the war. He declares that Prussia is being more and more driven to take the defensive, and that Austria, by an artificial working up of the war enthusiasm, is being forced into war. The scheme of reform of the Confederation which he imparted to me touches but few points, ignores the question of a central authority, and will satisfy no one. I told him so to-day, and pointed out to him that by calling in a Parliament without at the same time organising a central authority Bismarck was simply encouraging the revolution. That is, perhaps, his intention. In my opinion the only practical plan would be a Council of Ministers associated with a certain number of picked men from the Chambers, who should then deliberate together and decide upon a draft of a Federal Constitution and draw up an electoral law at the same time. This is the only practical way of going about it.

\* Afterwards Minister of the Interior.

† Count Luxburg, Prefect of Strassburg in 1871, and afterwards President of the Government in Würzburg.

‡ Prussian Minister in Munich.

MUNICH, *June 3, 1866.*

There was another brush with the police last night in the Sterngarten. The Landwehr fired on the brawlers and one man was killed and two wounded. I heard the shots, but thought it was fireworks in one of the beer-gardens. There can be no doubt that these disorderly scenes are got up by paid agents. This afternoon it began again at the Löwenbräu. Who is at the bottom of it all is not quite clear. The Liberals say it is the Ultramontanes who are trying to get up a revolution and drive the young King out; others say it is done by Bismarck's agents so that Bavaria may be obliged to withdraw some of her troops from the frontier to quell the disturbances.

The conferences seem to be meeting with difficulties. Degenfeld,\* whom I met to-day, says that Austria was making conditions that must inevitably wreck the whole conference. It is evident that the more one hears of there being little or no desire for war in Prussia, the more is Austria set upon having it. I no longer doubt that there will be war. Napoleon will then join with Italy and Prussia, and if the South-Western States make too much fuss they will be occupied by France and Prussia together. We are not sufficiently organised to be able to offer much resistance.

Pfeufer's dismissal was the outcome of a very outspoken report he sent to the King on the notoriously bad feeling in the capital. Without further explanation he was deprived of his office and made Director of Administration at Augsburg. Instead of entering a protest against this Sultanic encroachment on the part of the Cabinet, the Minister of the Interior, like the thorough old bureaucratic sleepy-head he is, let it pass without a word. So long as the King is encouraged in his caprices by the sycophancy of the Court and the Government officials, so long will he continue to regard himself as a demi-god who can do what he pleases and for whose pleasure the rest of the world — at any rate Bavaria — was created.

*June 4.*

Somebody told me yesterday that Blome† was the head of the war party in Austria, and was all the more anxious to bring it on because he considered this the most favourable moment for re-establishing the temporal power of the Pope on its old scale. If the Jesuits, who have even Bismarck under their thumb, consider war necessary to their interests, no power on earth can save us from it. Since I heard that I have not the slightest doubt that in a fortnight's time it will have broken out.

MUNICH, *June 5.*

Austria refuses to send a representative to the Congress or the conferences. From this everybody concludes that the war will

\* Minister for Würtemberg.

† The Austrian Minister in Munich.

break out at once, particularly if it is true that Prussia declared in Vienna she would regard the calling together of the Estates in Holstein as a *casus belli*. Consequently there is general consternation in Munich. On the other hand, Könnertitz \* says Bismarck is in a horrible position. He sees now that he has gone too far, that his unpopularity is increasing, the military organisation inadequate, and the Landwehr wanting in the proper warlike spirit. The Household troops could not be spared from Berlin, as the feeling there was too uncertain, and as a result of all this there were rumours of the King's abdication. Whether this is only a highly coloured Saxon version I cannot say.

As regards the Schleswig-Holstein affair, they say a scheme is being discussed according to which Duke Friedrich is to renounce the ducal crown in favour of his son, and a Regency to be appointed. Prussia would then be more likely to give way.

If a change of throne and government were really to occur in Prussia, the party of the National Union and their Prussian views would grow stronger in Bavaria and the position of the Bavarian Government much more difficult.

MUNICH, June 7, 1866.

The longer I stay here, the clearer does the situation in Bavaria become to me. Things must unfold themselves slowly before me if I am to gain a right view, and that entails many wearisome visits and evenings at the Club.

Yesterday Berchtold † was with me for a long time and told me of the conversations between the Deputies at the committee on the address. Pfordten stated his policy frankly and received the approval of all parties. They all said they had nothing whatever against him, but much against his incompetent colleagues. Bavaria stands firmly by the Confederation, and in this Pfordten is supported by all parties. The Left votes grudgingly with them, but can bring forward no other programme. The Triad is not excluded; the way is being prepared for that too. Berchtold said there was a rumour that I had come to an understanding with the Advanced Liberals, Barth and Völk, that they were going to draw the King over to their side, have Wagner recalled and put me up for the Premiership. I am quite innocent of any claims to this honour, for with the exception of Herr Umscheiden ‡ whom I often meet in the street as he lives near me, I have never even spoken to a member of the Left. As Pfordten is now more firmly established than ever there can be no question of any such combination, which would be very distasteful to me.

\* Saxon Ambassador in Munich.

† A parliamentarian of advanced views.

‡ A judicial officer, formerly Member of the Frankfurt Parliament.

*June 9.*

To-day brought the debate on the address in the Chamber of Deputies to a close after lasting two days. Pfordten's Ministry met with little opposition on the whole. As far as I could hear no voice was raised in favour of direct alliance with Austria. The instability and vagueness of the whole situation made the Deputies very guarded in their speech. Altogether there was much talk with very little in it, as nobody would show his hand.

The chairman, Professor Edel of Würzburg, said pretty much what one reads in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. He was appallingly dull. A Deputy of the Palatinate said they ought to side neither with Austria nor with Prussia, nor yet remain neutral, but should place the Army at the disposal of the German Parliament; to which Pfordten replied, would he be good enough to tell them first where the German Parliament might be.

Pfordten spoke with his customary lucidity, and entirely from the standpoint of the rights of the Confederation. That will not do him much good if the Confederation is broken up by the war between the two paramount Powers. There seems at present to be a decided feeling in favour of a closer union between smaller States, the formation of the so-called Triad. Whether this plan could ever be actually carried through still seems to me very doubtful.

The debates on the question of supply will begin at the end of the week in the Lower House, and then come on to us in the week of June 17 to 28. I shall probably have an opportunity then of speaking against the State paper currency.

War now seems inevitable. I have every reason to suppose that Napoleon has an understanding with Prussia and that events will take the course I have already pointed out.

MUNICH, *June 16, 1866.*

One startling piece of news comes on the heels of another in these days. First Prussia's secession from the Confederation because of the mobilisation of the Federal forces, and now the news of the entry of the Prussians into Saxony, of King Johann's departure for Prague, and the retreat of the Saxon troops across the Bohemian frontier. Prussia has sent an ultimatum to Hanover and also to the Electorate of Hesse — to disarm or she will send an army of occupation. And so the scheme for the partition of Germany is well-nigh complete. We, for our part, allow ourselves to be hustled, now by Prussia, now by Austria, and have no definite plans of any kind.

The Bavarian Army is in a most unsatisfactory state. Prince Karl is too old to be Commander-in-Chief. The officers have not sufficient confidence in their own powers. I hardly think we shall win many laurels for all the hearty good will of the men and the Bavarian's inborn love of a fight.

On Monday the debate on the thirty-one millions which

are needed for military purposes will take place in the Chamber of Deputies. I am curious to hear the speeches on paper money. Brater and Kolb are of my opinion, and *against*.

The King sees no one now. He is staying with Taxis\* and the groom Volk on the Roseninsel, and lets off fireworks. Even the Members of the Upper House, who were to deliver the address to him, were not received — a case unprecedented in the constitutional life of Bavaria. Not to receive addresses of loyalty, and from the faithful Senate, that is a bitter pill for the august Chamber! The Munich people themselves are again making quite justifiable comments. Other people do not trouble their heads about the King's childish tricks, since he lets the Ministers and the Chambers govern without interfering. His behaviour is, however, imprudent, since it tends to make him unpopular. At one o'clock I was with Reuss, who is expecting his recall. Louis† will take his place. He must, in fact, unless he is anxious to ruin his position in Prussia altogether.

The public at large are watching the whole crisis with a kind indifference, an objective interest. That present conditions cannot continue, every one can see. Why go to war to maintain them? Könneritz thinks that in spite of all Bavaria will take no active part. To-night, so Stauffenberg tells me, an uproar among the Jews is announced. I don't believe it though.

MUNICH, *June 19, 1866.*

On account of the proposal to mobilise the Army Corps of the Confederation, Prussia has announced her withdrawal, and has attacked Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse. The Bavarian Government, which up to now has taken up an indecisive attitude of ostensible impartiality, and flattered itself it could keep it up, has suddenly, to its astonishment, been waked out of its dream and compelled to range itself on the Austrian side. The Prussian Minister has been informed that diplomatic relations are broken off, and Reuss left with Louis at six o'clock this evening. I bade him farewell at the station; the French, the Russian, and the Italian Legations were there, besides Quadt, Deroy, and I.

Reuss left with a heavy heart, as undoubtedly he will not return here. Alvensleben is staying some time longer, to put everything straight.

The most various rumours are afloat. One day they say that the Prussians are at Hof, and the other day the Austrians had taken Görlitz by storm, an Archduke killed, &c. Then some one declares that he has read a telegram from some one in the neighbourhood of Frankfurt, who has heard heavy firing in that neighbourhood.

\* Orderly Officer Prince Paul Taxis.

† Prince Ludwig zu Sayn-Wittgenstein, brother of the Princess, then in the Prussian Legation at Munich.



Our Army is not in particularly good condition, and the Austrians do well to send further reinforcements to Southern Germany. Austrians are expected there shortly.

I am afraid that now the war will be very long and very sanguinary. People will only grow accustomed to war by degrees, but the habit of it will come, and when once Germans get to logger-heads, they can't stop.

The Rhine Palatinate has sent a deputation here to complain that they are being delivered over to the mercy of the French. The Emperor Napoleon is already setting inquiries about as to whether the population would care to become French. The characterless people there, who have never clung to any Sovereign, any more than to Germany, will readily allow themselves to be made French. This makes the patriots furious, and they are sending deputations to implore protection. But where are we to get an army from to keep the French troops off? Our troops have enough to do to keep off the Prussians; there are none left for the Palatinate.

To-day there was a long sitting of the Upper House, before which I had brought a motion on the disadvantages of paper money. The House and the Ministry, however, were not agreed on the point, so I withdrew it, my intention being only to bring the question under discussion.

I met Pfordten at the Club to-night. He was lamenting over the war, which will result in the dismemberment of Germany; he said over and over again: "This is the end of Germany." I almost believe it myself now. Prussia will become a great and compact State in North Germany; we, in the South, will go on vegetating under French or Austrian protection, until our hour strikes, and half of us falls to France, and the other half to Austria.

Baron Guttenberg came late into the Club, and related that the Prussians have shown themselves in the neighbourhood of Hof. Taxis\* thereupon is said to have rapidly collected his troops against them, whereupon they withdrew across the frontier again without fighting. This is said to be authentic. Leidenhayn says they are arguing in his club about the war. "What quarrel have we with the Prussians, then, that we should go to war for Augustenburg?" the *habitués* there say. "If Max were alive now," he added, "things would not have come to this."

MUNICH, June 21, 1866.

To-day we had our last sitting on a law touching the extension of the Bank's right to issue notes. At the end of the sitting Pfordten gave a valedictory address, in which he emphasised that the Bavarian Government had done their best to avoid a war, &c. At one o'clock I had a meal with a

\* General Prince Taxis was father-in-law to Freiherr von Guttenberg.

number of Senators and Gustav Castell \* at the Bayrischer Hof. Gustav Castell had been at Bamberg to make arrangements for the reception of the General Staff in the palace there, and got back here again yesterday evening. Prince Karl left here at noon yesterday for Bamberg with the whole of his Headquarters Staff. Von der Tann is Quarter-master General. A huge number of officers, &c., travelled in the suite; likewise an Austrian General, Huyn. Prince Luitpold is going with the General Staff too. The King goes there to-morrow, so they say, but will only remain a short time. There is talk here to-day again of battles. They say that in Saxony or Bohemia there has been a cavalry engagement, and that a big battle has taken place near Oppeln. However, nothing is known for certain. The prevailing temper here is not enthusiastic. People are convinced of the necessity of the war, but regret it, and are loath to go to the front. Munich is deserted; the people stand at the booksellers' windows, stare at the maps, and repeat the rumours they have heard to each other.

Dusemann has just been here, and told me that the *Neue Bayrische Kurier* is enlarging upon the fact that I accompanied Reuss to the station. As if they could find any sympathy for Prussia in that. I could not let Louis leave without going to see him off. At eleven o'clock last night I was at the station to see the Austrian troops go through. But they were only coaches with a convoy of Italian-speaking soldiers. A crowd of onlookers were sauntering about. As a matter of fact, every one is on the go all the time to be ready to be off to the station and watch the troop trains. I own that the sight makes me sad, since it is a case of war in Germany, and between Germans.

They are considering here whether they ought not to send their valuables to Switzerland. Still, I have heard sensible people again, who regard such attempts at flight as absurd.

MUNICH, June 26, 1866.

On my arrival back from Baden last night, I learnt that the Duke of Augustenburg was here. I went to see him this afternoon. He invited me to dine with him, and I met Samwer, a Dr. Lorenzen, and a Major Schmidt. After dinner we both drove to Schack, and then in the English Garden. He told me the whole history of his political life since 1863. He is extraordinarily calm and confident, and has no doubts as to the success of his cause. It was news to me that the King of Prussia and Bismarck were entirely in agreement with him until Bismarck's journey to Biarritz.† After his return, Bismarck

\* Count Gustav Castell-Castell, at that time Captain of Artillery and Aide-de-camp to the King.

† The allusion is doubtless to Bismarck's visit to Biarritz in October 1864.

tried every possible subterfuge and evasion, and then brought the whole affair to its present point. He, the Duke, was ready to make every possible concession. But Bismarck wanted annexation. The treaty with Italy\* was concluded *before* the Castein Convention, and Bismarck has been preparing for war for two years, and taking measures accordingly. That time the matter failed on account of the opposition of the King, who "would not take the leap." It was for that reason alone that the Gastein Convention was concluded. The Duke says that the whole tale about the German reforms and the Parliament, &c., is a mere imposture. Bismarck only wants to round off Prussia. What of Prussia he will have to give up after the war is quite immaterial to him, so long as he secures more square miles through compensation in other directions. He wants Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse, perhaps Saxony as well. The Duke hopes that Austria and the other German States will ultimately be victorious. Of the Duke of Coburg he says that he is one of the men who always want to have a part to play, and cannot wait until the turn of the wheel has again brought things round to a point where they can get their chance again. He himself knows how to wait. That one must say for him. He produces an exceedingly good impression upon one with his calmness, his dignity, and his conscientious bearing. He is waiting here now for the King, but does not know yet to whom he is going to turn next.

For the rest, things are quiet here. Munich is like a dead city. The news of the victory of the Austrians † in Italy has caused delight.

THURNAU, June 28.

I have been here since yesterday. From Munich to Nuremberg there was no sign of war. At Nuremberg things began to show signs of military activity. There was a battery of the 3rd Artillery Regiment at Bamberg. I met Captain von Massenbach, and gave him my *Allgemeine Zeitung*, whereat he was much delighted. The soldiers behaved like rough village louts on a Sunday; they brawled and hooted abominably. The keeper of the station restaurant poured out his grief over the sad times to me. Where the elegantly garbed Kissingen visitors used to dine, the soldiers are now blustering about. On the way to Lichtenfels I met trains full of cuirassiers. At Lichtenfels there were sentries on duty. All is empty about here. Who knows whether the Prussians may not arrive before I leave? Still, the battle they have lost in Bohemia, ‡ which we read of in the papers to-day, will doubtless make them somewhat more cautious.

\* On the negotiations with Italy in the summer of 1865, see Sybel, *Be-gründung des Deutschen Reichs*, vol. iv. p. 129 of the popular edition.

† The battle of Custozza, June 24.

‡ The engagement at Trautenau on June 27.

MUNICH, July 3, 1866.

The latest news from the theatre of war in Bohemia has aroused a feeling here which does not say much for the strength of character of the populace. Now all at once people are beginning to discover that it would have been better to remain neutral; the Prussian needle-guns are irresistible, &c. In addition to this, our Army, which might very well have liberated the Hanoverians, has lost weeks without any earthly reason, or at any rate without any known reason. At the Bavarian headquarters they heard the guns at Langensalza, and never stirred. If the war is really being directed from Munich, if the General Staff is under the control of an ex-professor,\* and all orders are received *via* the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it is impossible to carry on any war. The indignation of the Bavarian officers is said to be great. The result of all this is that the weak people are losing courage, and the others are railing worse than ever. That the present military system of the Confederation has not proved efficient, and that the present constitution of the Confederation has outlived its day, is gradually becoming clear to everybody. At seven o'clock last evening I started home from the Bayrischer Hof, where I had dined at the *table d'hôte* with the Duke of Augustenburg's gentlemen (the Duke is at Langenburg for a few days). However, it was an hour and a half before I reached home, for in the Ludwigstrasse I met Tauffkirchen,† Deroy, and Gustav Castell, with whom were some others. So we stood and talked over the political situation for an hour. In the Briennerstrasse I met with Countess Lerchenfeld and six old ladies, who clustered round me, and likewise began a political discussion. Then I went with the ladies to the office of the *Bayrische Zeitung* to get the special edition, from which, however, there was nothing new to be gleaned. People are beginning to realise here that we are much to blame for our conduct.

Pfordten's delay during this winter bearing its evil fruit. It looks to me as if we should fall between two stools. Perhaps the Bavarian Army Corps will now begin to act with some energy. Frau von der Tann declares it will. It is to be hoped so, but it would have been better, while the impression of the first successful engagements in Bohemia and the news from Italy were still fresh, to advance to the relief of the Hanoverians. The favourable opportunity has now been allowed to slip, and I cannot blame the *Ostdeutsche Post* for inveighing against Bavaria.

The King is at Berg again. The *Bayrische Zeitung* announces that for the purpose of communication with the Ministry the telegraph is being installed between Berg and Munich, and Privy Councillor Pfistermeister, to facilitate rapid communica-

\* Von der Pfordten had been a professor at Würzburg and Leipzig.

† Count Tauffkirchen, then *Stadtrichter* (Sheriff) of Munich.

tion between the King and his Ministers, will remain here at Munich!

MUNICH, July 5, 1866.

The news from Bohemia is producing a very dispiriting effect here. Moreover, the Bavarian Army, owing to the sheer incompetence of its leaders, has not come to the rescue of the Hanoverians. The *Bayrische Zeitung* excuses this by saying that at headquarters "they did not know where the Hanoverians were." Is anything more ridiculous conceivable? In our War Ministry things are proceeding on the old bureaucratic, red-tape lines. Self-satisfaction and dilatoriness everywhere. Von Lutz, the Minister of War, so far as I can judge from the sittings of the Upper House in committee, is a man of very small intellectual ability. A man like this, who, in addition to the rest, recently banged his head against the door in getting off his horse and thereby made himself more incapable than he was before, is now at the head of the Bavarian Army Administration! Prince Karl is a nervous old gentleman; the officers on the General Staff are some of them no better than the Minister. I am watching the progress of the war with alarm. At any rate it is a good thing that our Bavarian soldiers are quite extraordinarily pugnacious, especially when they are well fed. It is possible that the soldiers will make up for the deficiencies of their leaders.

Here, where even in quiet times we have no other recreation than argument and discussion, there is no end to the railing and the putting right of other people. The news of the battle between Königgrätz and Josefstadt the day before yesterday has made a tremendous sensation.

Some one who is not without influence took it into his head to propose me as *Kultusminister* (Minister for Public Worship and Instruction). He consulted me about it first. I said, "No, thank you," though, for in the first place I do not wish to be a Minister at all; in the next place, not with these colleagues; and in the third place, not Minister of Public Instruction. I should never be safe from intrigues of every sort. Moreover, the Minister of Public Instruction has the Musical Academies under him, and I should have the pleasure of coming into conflict with Richard Wagner, &c. I should be sold and betrayed on all hands.

6 P.M.

Dined with Pfordten and several diplomatists. Pfordten told me that a proposal for an armistice has been sent from Paris to Vienna. So peace is in prospect. It would thus seem that we should continue the war with Prussia alone, which I think is madness. Pfordten had a dispute with Könneritz at *table d'hôte*. The former declared that he preferred Bismarck to the Prussian Liberal party, who cared just as little for justice. Rosty\* was of opinion that Austria will continue the war with

Secretary to the Austrian Embassy.

Prussia after she has given up Italy. There is general delight that the Bavarians have at any rate fought. The Prussians are at Brückenau and at Neustadt-on-Saale. We have no news of Prince Alexander of Hesse's 8th Army Corps, and so the Prussian troops have penetrated between the 7th and 8th Army Corps. Now the armistice will bring this campaign to an end too.

MUNICH, July 7, 1866.

I had business at Ansbach yesterday, so started from here at six o'clock. At the station I was met by the editor of the *Neueste Nachrichten*, who showed me a telegram: "Napoleon imposes the condition that Prussia is to evacuate Bohemia, or he will invade the Rhine Province." I have heard no more about this condition since. At Ansbach I heard that the Frankfurt Bourse is revelling in anticipations of peace, and that the rate had risen tremendously. At Ansbach every one was anxious to pack. They were all terrified of the Prussians. The cowardice of humanity is no greater than I would have believed. What more particularly angers me is that the authorities too seem to have lost their heads. This illustrates how demoralising our bureaucracy is. We have no men anywhere, only scribbling old women. Because a few hundred cuirassiers and Uhlans lost their heads, fled from a cavalry engagement at Fulda and arrived breathless at Würzburg, the whole of Lower Franconia lost heart. I hear a good many instances of the incapacity of our military administration. President zu Rhein telegraphed to Munich that orders must in any case be issued that Würzburg was not to be defended if the Prussians came! Meanwhile the Prussians had withdrawn again over the Bavarian frontier.

The engagement fought by the Bavarians near Diedorf and Rossdorf\* was very respectable. General Zoller defended himself well. They even made prisoners and lost none. Here they keep on talking nonsense. For instance, they say that the Emperor of Austria has passed through, on his way to Prince Karl's headquarters, and from there will go to St. Petersburg! Then he is to go to Paris, or to Strassburg, and so on.

I am beginning to believe that peace is still a long way off. If it be true that Napoleon is imposing too harsh conditions on Prussia, for instance, the reinstatement of the banished German Princes, withdrawal from Bohemia during the continuance of the armistice, &c. (I say "harsh" from the Prussian point of view), then the King of Prussia will absolutely refuse them, and Napoleon will march on the Rhine Province. Then we shall have a European war. We shall see before long. There is much to support this view. It would probably suit Napoleon very well if Prussia did not accept the present conditions of peace, it would give him a splendid opportunity of occupying the Rhine Province. In that case, however, Germany might possibly turn against France. The

\* Battle of Hünfeld, July 4.

confusion of German political affairs would reach its zenith. I hope that I am wrong, but such a development would be by no means impossible. For the present, we need not despair of the armistice. But what will come afterwards is anything but clear. That things will be as quickly settled as in the year fifty-nine seems to me improbable. According to the latest news the panic of the Würzburgers was absolutely baseless, as no dispersed cavalry arrived there at all.

MUNICH, *July 13, 1866.*

The last few days there has been great excitement here over the engagements in and about Kissingen.\* The public have given vent to their excitement in abuse, as is usually the way with ordinary people. I had an opportunity to-day of dining with an officer (Dürig), who was General Zoller's orderly officer, and brought his body here. Dürig has taken part in every engagement and told us a great deal. The soldiers have fought very well everywhere. The head administration of the General Staff and of the Commissariat Department leaves much to be desired. He said that at Kissingen the visitors were walking about the streets on the very morning of the battle, until the first shell fell in the streets, and then they crept into the cellars, where many a one doubtless perished. Zoller was killed by a shell, which killed Dürig's horse as well. Both fell at the same time. Dürig picked Zoller up, but he was mortally wounded. The fragment of shell had torn away his right side in the region of the liver. Dürig brought the body out of the fight, and then by great good fortune got it through the Prussian fighting lines to Schweinfurt, where they arrived just as the Prussians were expected from the same quarter.

Dürig went back to Bamberg to-day. There are the most contradictory rumours concerning the armistice. Some say that it is concluded; others, that the negotiations have come to nothing. All the same I think that peace is desired on all sides and the Prussians have only dragged out the negotiations in order to gain time and territory. If the armistice does not become an accomplished fact we shall be in the unfortunate position of being obliged to fight with France against Prussia, a political situation which I regard as discreditable. The time cannot be far off when German consciousness will react against this and will condemn those who entered upon such an alliance. And yet we cannot be expected to fight against Austria and France at the same time. There are positions, like that in which Bavaria found herself in the year 1805, when one is forced into an un-German alliance without the possibility of an escape. General Zoller's funeral yesterday was very imposing. I joined the procession and went with the Minister for War, behind Prince Adalbert. The funeral oration was insignificant. The

\* On July 10.

parson made use of the singularly inappropriate expression that "the deceased had fallen a victim to his patriotism." At the outside, that might be said of a man who had been murdered, not of any one who had fallen on the field of honour.

The Deputies for the town of Munich have paid a visit to Pfordten, to demand an alteration in the Ministry, as far as Pfordten's colleagues are concerned.

I regard the present catastrophe with the utmost calm. It was unavoidable, for the opposition between Austria and Prussia had to come to a point and be settled; and it was better now than ten years later. It is salutary, too, because it will do away with many rotten institutions in Germany and in particular will demonstrate clearly and *ad hominem* to the small and medium-sized States their pitiable unimportance. That this will be unfortunate for the dynasties, I admit, but it will be fortunate for the people.

The King did *not* receive Dürig (although at Holnstein's\* suggestion he made him a present of a horse). But a "high war lord" who refuses to receive an officer returned from the battle-field! Is it not enough to make people rail?

MUNICH, *August 13, 1866.*

On my arrival at Munich on the evening of the 12th, I went to the Club, where I found Gustav Castell and Tauffkirchen. The latter informed me that Bavaria would be compelled to make cessions of territory. They talk of the cession of a portion of the Palatinate to France and a portion of Under Franconia to Darmstadt. Whether Bayreuth is to be given up to the Duke of Coburg is not yet decided. The war expenses that Bavaria will have to pay are said to amount to thirty million gulden.

The Duke of Augustenburg is here again, on his return from a visit to his brother Christian in Switzerland.

I was at a public meeting last night. I stood it, despite a temperature of 77 degrees Fahr. and a stifling atmosphere, reeking of beer and perspiration, until eleven o'clock. Kolb spoke against joining Prussia; Völk for it. The opinion of the meeting was divided. There was only unanimity in the applause when the bravery of the Army was praised, when the administration of the Army was condemned, and when von der Pfordten was abused. The most striking thing about the meeting was the excitement revealed in the faces of the audience. I could not find room in the hall and spent the evening on a beer-stillage in the buffet, from which I could see and hear without being seen, which to me was of special importance.

Everything, in high politics, now depends on the decision of the King of Prussia. Bismarck wishes to give way to the Emperor Napoleon and give him Saarbrücken, Luxembourg, and part of the Bavarian Palatinate; the King is obstinately opposed

\* Master of the Horse (*Oberst-Stallmeister*), Count von Holnstein.



to this. If the King does not give way there will be war between Prussia and France. Then we shall have to side with Austria and Prussia against France. Whether this decision is very patriotically German I will not determine, whether it will meet with the approval of the people I doubt; but it seems to me that that is what will happen.

Patriotism and popular feeling are not much considered just at present. If they are anxious to avoid this contingency, they must come to some understanding with Prussia, and there does not seem to be much inclination for that either in Berlin or in Munich.

The dispossessed German Sovereigns are intriguing at all the Courts of Europe for foreign intervention. Official and unofficial agents are running themselves off their legs. The German people are making speeches and railing, and in the meantime the events with which they will suddenly be faced are preparing without their intervention and then they will have to hold their peace and pay. It has always been the same, and it will be for some time longer.

MUNICH, *August 18, 1866.*

I went yesterday to see the new Minister for War,\* to return his call. He is an elegant officer, and you can see at once that he is a man of large fortune, independent position, and good breeding. In contrast to his predecessor, Lutz, who looked wry and unwholesome, he produces a fresh, agreeable impression upon one; and yet they declare that this Minister for War has not the capacity to reorganise the Army. What is lacking in the Bavarian Army is thorough technical knowledge and the necessary educational establishments. They have been preaching this for thirty years to Prince Karl, so old M. assures me, but he considers the present training quite sufficient.

With regard to the peace negotiations in Berlin, they say, amongst other things, the following: Von der Pfordten told Bismarck that he did not understand why such hard conditions of peace were imposed on Bavaria, when Saxony, Würtemberg, and Hesse were being so favourably treated. In reply, Bismarck said: "What do you expect? Austria is interceding for Saxony, Russia is interceding for Würtemberg and Darmstadt — no one is interceding for you!" A bitter criticism of von der Pfordten's policy.

Here they were anxious to get into the good graces of the Emperor Napoleon, and they sent Perglas to Paris. But he was not even received by Napoleon, and his mission fell through. If I were malicious, this would delight me.

Yesterday there was a report about that Bavaria had concluded an alliance with Prussia and placed a hundred thousand men at her disposal, in return for which Prussia withdrew all her demands for cession of territory and pecuniary indemnity. On

\* *Freiherr von Pranckh.*

inquiry, however, it turned out that the rumour was an invention. The King is busy devising scenery for the opera *William Tell* and is having costumes made for himself, dressed in which he parades his room. Meanwhile it is a question whether his kingdom is to lose thirty thousand inhabitants of Franconia and seven hundred thousand of the Palatinate.

The Duke of Nassau is here. He wears blue spectacles and looks like an owl. Why he wears uniform I do not know; perhaps the Prussians have taken away his civilian clothes. I think it comprehensible, and from the purely human standpoint quite excusable, for these banished, or as they now say "dispossessed," monarchs to appeal to foreign Powers for help against Prussia's "oppression." From the German point of view, however, there is no justification for it, and in the interests of Germany it is to be hoped that their intrigues will prove unsuccessful.

My presence is still viewed with the greatest suspicion. If Privy Councillor Aretin were a real basilisk, he would have annihilated me with his glances long ago. I can read similar suspicious thoughts in the faces of many others. Prince Ludwig is not yet out of danger. They have not yet found the bullet.

Bavaria will probably pay twenty million gulden and be obliged to cede a small portion of Lower Franconia and a portion of Upper Franconia, Hof, &c. That is the latest news.

During the discussion over the drafting of the Bill touching the war indemnity to be paid to Prussia, the Chamber of Deputies expressed the wish: "That his Majesty the King would be graciously pleased to use his influence in such a direction that, by means of a closer union with Prussia, the path be entered upon which, at the present time, is the only one that can lead to the wished-for goal of a United Germany, co-operating with a freely elected parliament constituted with the powers demanded for the effectual guarding of national interests and the repulse of possible attacks from abroad." The Reporter of the Senate (Chamber of Senators), Freiherr von Thüngen, could not recommend the adoption, of the motion, but proposed something to the following effect: "We desire that his Majesty the King, in the event of an attack by a foreign Power on German territory, will endeavour, with all the forces of the nation and of the Army to repulse the attack." Prince Hohenlohe, on the contrary, at the sitting of the Upper House on August 31, 1866, spoke in favour of the motion. "It seems to me," he said, "that this motion is of extreme importance. It brings us at once into the German question and testifies to a change of opinion in the whole country of such a sweeping character as I have never encountered in the course of my political life. When, seventeen years ago, in the sitting of November 12, 1849, I spoke on the reorganisation of Germany in the sense of the proposals of Prussia at the time, and advocated a closer associa-

tion with Prussia, I did so and was obliged to do so, expressly recognising that I was at variance with the opinion of the Bavarian people. I bowed then to the opinion of the majority. Since then numerous projects in a greater German spirit have cropped up and disappeared again. I have never regarded them as practicable. To-day we see ourselves confronted by a motion passed by a great majority in the Chamber of Deputies, which anxiously recommends the reorganisation of Germany in close union with Prussia. You will think it consistent on my part, my lords, if I support this motion and recommend its adoption. But if you ask, in your astonishment, how it is possible that such a reversal of opinion could have come about among the Bavarian people, the answer is not hard to find.

"After Austria withdrew from the German Confederation, after the dispersal of the German Confederation, we were face to face with the question: 'What is to become of Bavaria?' Three ways lay open before us, the founding of a South-West German Confederation, the isolation of Bavaria, and a falling back on Prussia. That the founding of a South-West German Confederation was ever within the domain of practical politics, I suppose no one has ever seriously maintained. At any rate, no real supporter of this parochial idea of Germany has come in my way. To place Bavaria as an independent State in the centre of the great European Powers seems to me equally impossible. No one will maintain that such a position can be maintained by any State of five million inhabitants, without the support of a greater Power. Consequently there is only left to us to consider whether we will lean on France, as in the time of the Rhine Confederation, or Prussia.

"I must now, to the honour of my country, declare that not even during the worst days of our recent history has there come forward one advocate of a French alliance, with the exception, perhaps, of a Munich local paper, which has defended the suggestion. Union with Prussia, therefore, remains the only course. But now the question arises as to whether the time has yet arrived for endeavouring to bring this alliance about. There is an objection that could be raised, and has been, though not in this august Chamber, *i.e.*, that it is unworthy of Bavaria to stretch out her hand to her victorious enemy so soon. I confess that I have never been able to understand this objection. We have concluded Peace with Prussia; but peace means reconciliation, and excludes every thought of bitterness or revenge. It is the prerogative of civilised nations to regard war as a political necessity, in contrast to the negro races of Central Africa, who wage war for lust of booty and of blood, and finally slaughter and devour their captives.

"Among civilised people, animosity ceases when the political conditions which have produced it disappear. Much more should this be the case with peoples of one and the same race

who are dependent on one another. Another objection here raised was that we should first wait to examine the Constitution of the North German Confederation before deciding in favour of entry or against it. But I will ask you to remember, my lords, that this delay may be very dangerous to Bavaria. Who can guarantee that the present peace of Europe will remain undisturbed? Should an event occur to shatter this peace, Bavaria would be left completely isolated and forsaken. The disadvantage of having no champion, no friend, and no allies has been experienced to the full by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Berlin. I think it would be more advisable to secure a position in the North German Confederation at the present moment, when the details are by no means settled or the organisation complete, and when it is still possible to secure favourable conditions for the independence of Bavaria and its dynasty, than afterwards to knock at the door of a house, if I may use a metaphor previously employed by our respected Second President, the construction of which is complete, which has, so to speak, taken its final form, and the doors of which can be closed against us. If we apply then, we shall either be excluded or obliged to agree to conditions which might mean the destruction of our dynasty, and of our racial character. It has also been urged that Prussia does not wish for our alliance; I think I know the feeling in Prussia, and I feel bound to say that this objection to an alliance with South Germany exists only in one party, the so-called *Kreuzzeitung* party, which regards constitutional life in South Germany as an abomination. The majority of the Prussian people do not share this aversion, which is entertained least of all by the Government. The fact that the Prussian Government has made no proposals inviting us to enter the Federation, or to make an alliance, is perfectly natural in view of the position of Prussia with respect to France. This, however, is no reason why the South German States and their representatives should withhold their opinion. I mean to say that even if Prussia is obliged to consider the attitude of France, the German nation is big enough to say what it wishes, what it considers advisable, justifiable, and politic for its own welfare, without reference to the wishes and hopes which may exist beyond the Rhine. I am also of the opinion that the supposed animosity of France to Germany is merely an artificial creation of under-hand party intrigues. The French nation is too generous, too self-reliant, and too noble to feel any apprehension at the organisation of a united Germany.

"I admit that the formulation of the proposal leaves something to be desired. But if alliance with Prussia is necessary, and if it is necessary now, it is our duty to express this as the proposal before us does, though imperfectly. I do not regard the proposal as an attempt to mediatise Bavaria, but as merely expressing the desire of the country to abandon to some extent

its present isolation. It can thus only be a basis for further negotiations. I therefore recommend its acceptance in the interests of our Fatherland, in the interests of Bavaria and of the preservation of Germany."

The proposal of the Chamber of Deputies was rejected by the Upper House. Besides Prince Hohenlohe, its only supporters were Count von Fugger-Babenhauseu, Count von Pappenheim, and the Prince of Oettingen-Wallerstein.

At the same session, the Upper House discussed the further proposal sent up from the Chamber of Deputies:

"That his Majesty the King may be pleased to guarantee to the Bavarian people the proffered further development of their domestic institutions, in particular the reform of Army organisation, the reorganisation of the educational system on the basis of absence of tests, and the assurance of full freedom of conscience, and that his Majesty may be pleased to direct the immediate proposition of draft measures of social legislation in this sense."

The Upper House agreed to this proposal in the sitting of August 31, 1866. Those who voted against it were Archbishops von Scherr and von Deinlein, Bishop von Dinkel, Count von Seinsheim, and Freiherren, Karl and Karl Maria von Aretin.

### *Journal.*

MUNICH, September 1, 1866.

The Landtag summoned to discuss the conclusion of peace is now at an end. The introduction of the peace proposal gave me no opportunity to make a speech, and I thought I should have got through without being disturbed, but during the discussion of a financial measure, the Chamber of Deputies almost unanimously adopted a proposal requesting the Government to ask for a close union with Prussia and the German Parliament. This question was therefore also submitted to us, and it was impossible for me to keep silence. Every one knows my opinions and expected that I should make a speech on this proposal. This I did at yesterday's sitting. There is not the least doubt that public opinion in Bavaria in all classes and districts is in favour of a union with Prussia. This, of course, is not the opinion of the Court and the Ministers. They regard the proposal as an attempt to mediatise Bavaria, and therefore oppose it, as also does the Ultramontane party, which, however, is rapidly losing ground. But the opponents of Prussia have no counter proposals to make. No one has proposed a union with Austria, not even the Ultramontane party; no one dares to propose union with France or the revival of the Rhine Confederation. Not a single voice is raised on behalf of the South-Western Confederation. And yet nobody believes that Bavaria can remain isolated. None the less my speech must have given great offence to the Court party and the

Ultramontanes and my prospects of office are greatly diminished in consequence. I have, however, a reputation as a friend of Prussia, which is further justified by my political past, so that the only course open was for me to abide by this view and to urge it publicly, the more so as I have the whole Chamber of Deputies behind me. In the Upper House, the opposition against me was very weak. Pfordten had received a somewhat violent telegram from Bismarck concerning the murder of a Prussian officer by a Bavarian soldier,\* but he begged the House not to oppose Prussia too violently on that account. Thus, I found little real opposition in the Chamber, and the Prussian tendency of my speech was quite agreeable to Pfordten. There is no doubt that I shall be scarified in the Ultramontane Press, that is, in the *Volksbote*, and in the *Neue Bayrische Kurier*.

In ultra-Bavarian circles there is a hope that something may be secured by delay and inaction. They still believe that it will be possible to retain the independence of Bavaria; they hope, like the Micawber family in *David Copperfield*, "that something will turn up!" Meanwhile time is passing and Bavaria is slowly tottering to its fall. If they could resolve upon decisive negotiations with Prussia, they would even now be able to secure very tolerable terms for the King and the country. This, however, they will not do, and will be an easy prey for some one in the first great European crisis. I have, at any rate, said what I think.

MUNICH, October 11, 1866.

My journey to Munich came at a very interesting moment and was exceedingly useful, as it allowed me to observe all the bearings of the situation. Immediately upon my arrival I sent for Dr. Schanzenbach † to examine Philipp Ernst's knee. After ordering the necessary plasters he proceeded to talk politics. I saw that he must have some special news, for there was an atmosphere of statesmanlike importance about him which I had not previously observed in him. The riddle was speedily solved when he told me that for the last fortnight he had met the King almost every evening at the house of Paul Taxis. His judgment of the King was very favourable, and it becomes more and more obvious that the neglect and the mistakes of which the King has been accused are really due to the Cabinet. My instincts were not deceived; it is true that Pfistermeister and Lutz ‡ purposely kept the King in isolation in order that they might pursue their protection policy undisturbed in conjunction with

\* A Bavarian soldier had shot a Prussian officer from a railway carriage window.

† A distinguished physician with a large practice in the best society.

‡ Pfistermeister was Ministerial Councillor and head of the Civil Cabinet; Lutz was a Councillor of the Court of Appeal and afterwards Minister; he then held a Cabinet appointment.

Pfordten and Bomhard. In consequence the King knew nothing of the military memorial service. It was Pfistermeister who induced the King not to attend the funeral of General Zoller, not to visit the hospitals, &c. It appears that Schanzenbach has helped to open the King's eyes. The King then consulted the ex-Minister Neumayr,\* and resolved to make some changes in the Cabinet and to summon Neumayr, Tauffkirchen, and Feilitzsch. Negotiations are still in progress; it is said that Neumayr is to be Cabinet Minister or Minister of the Royal Household, while the two others are to have posts as Cabinet Councillors. Pfordten will then have to retire. The King wishes me to take Pfordten's place, and said so. Hence the newspaper articles. The Ultramontane party, and probably also Neumayr, are now working in the opposite direction, for the latter cannot forget an attack I made on him in the House. Public opinion is no less favourable to me than before. My speech has greatly helped my case, as the great majority consider an understanding with Prussia necessary, so long as the North German Federation is not firmly organised, and to these views I first gave expression without reserve. The unmeaning policy of Pfordten is generally condemned. The very day after my arrival I was again surprised by an article in the *Neueste Nachrichten*, in which it was definitely asserted that I had been chosen to replace Pfordten. The worthy citizens of Munich who all read the *Neueste Nachrichten* over their coffee naturally accepted this news as official. Some said they had seen me making a State visit to the King, others that the King had come to me to ask me to take the Ministry, others asserted I had declined because I had formerly been passed over, and so on.

The truth seems to be that the King has not abandoned his plan, but that intrigues are being made against it from all sides. Vecchioni,† whom I saw this afternoon, says it is very likely that the former Cabinet Councillors will be reinstated, and that all will remain as it was. The *Augsburger Postzeitung* prophesies misfortune upon my appointment to the Ministry. The local newspapers regard my appointment as the beginning of a golden age, while the *Augsburger Allgemeine* pointedly ignores me.

In any case these intrigues will continue for some months longer. The Provisional Cabinet will continue until December 1, so von der Tann tells me. But if Pfistermeister is definitely deposed, it will be impossible for Pfordten and Bomhard to remain.

My appointment depends upon the alternatives that Neumayr may consider it to his interest to increase his popularity by including me in a new Ministry, or may be afraid that my presence will do him harm. In the latter event, no doubt, the worthy

\* Max von Neumayr, formerly Minister at Stuttgart and Minister of the Interior.

† The editor of the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*.

Bray,\* or some other nonentity from the Bavarian Diplomatic Service would be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

MUNICH, *November 3, 1866.*

On October 25 I received a letter from Holnstein† under date October 18, inviting me to Munich to discuss my entry to the Ministry, and the day after a second letter with a circular from the Minister Pfordten, and a request from the King to give an opinion upon it. I therefore set to work immediately and was ready a few days afterwards. On the 31st I came to Munich. The first person I saw was Tauffkirchen; I showed him the circular and my opinion, with which he entirely agreed, though upon his advice I made some modification of the concluding clauses.

On November 1, Holnstein arrived. He began by offering me, in the name of the King, the Ministry of Domestic and Foreign Affairs, and the post of Prime Minister, and also held out to me the prospect of the post of Chief Royal Chamberlain. *Un honneur que je goûte fort médiocrement.* I expressed my approval, and suggested some changes among the other Ministers. We agreed that Bomhard must retire, but that the other Ministers could remain. The conclusion of the matter was, however, deferred until Holnstein should have spoken with Neumayr, and this he was to do on the 2nd. In the meanwhile I proceeded to make inquiries, and discovered that at the moment there was no sufficient reason for a change of Ministers, and that I could not calculate upon a specially favourable reception by public opinion. My entry to the Ministry would be generally approved, but there is no great anxiety for my appointment. Parties were not yet organised, and the anti-Prussian feeling is not yet sufficiently pacified. At the same time I cannot conceal from myself that the King's desire to have me as Minister in accordance with the communications of Holnstein proceeds from his passion for Wagner.† The King remembers that I formerly characterised the removal of Wagner as an unnecessary measure, and hopes that I will be able to secure his return. I have no desire to form a Wagner Ministry, though I also consider that Wagner's return *later* would be by no means a misfortune. This fact, and the consideration that after the beginning of the Landtag, or perhaps immediately before, my position would be stronger than it now is, seeing that at this moment the Ministry seems to be due to a Court intrigue, confirmed my satisfaction

\* Count Bray-Steinburg, then Minister in Vienna, and Foreign Minister in 1870.

† Count Holnstein, Master of the Horse.

‡ In a letter of January 17, 1867, published in the *Münchner Neueste Nachrichten* (No. 574) of December 8, 1904, Richard Wagner claims the honour of having first advised King Ludwig to confide in Prince Hohenlohe and to ask for his advice.



when Holnstein came the next day and said that Neumayr was decidedly against me. As, however, Neumayr is already distasteful to the King, and will not long maintain his position, he will not trouble me for long. Meanwhile Holnstein will attempt to retain the King's favour and to represent my interests. At the same time I hear from another quarter, namely, from Dönniges\* and Umbscheiden, that the Chamber would be on my side if I were to form a Ministry immediately before a meeting of the Landtag, but that if the present Ministry continues until the opening of the Landtag, a change would be more difficult. I have therefore written to Tauffkirchen giving him a free hand to act in this direction if he thinks it necessary. I have been able to stop the intrigues of Neumayr through the influence of Dönniges and Umbscheiden and have thus prepared the ground for my own operations. Thus, if the King should insist upon his idea that I should form a Ministry before the meeting of the Landtag, I have made arrangements for my recall by telegraph, and in the meantime the Press will be worked in my favour.

I am leaving here this evening and shall try and get through my business as quickly as possible, that I may return at the proper time, or may be at least within range of a telegram, which could be sent to me to Viktor at Rauden.

The projects here proposed are so stupid and so dangerous to the country that in all humility I regard my entrance to the Ministry as a necessity. I am on the trace of a plot for making Neumayr Prime Minister and Bray Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Je l'ai ébruité* and have, perhaps, nipped the matter in the bud.

In the above-mentioned circular of the Minister von der Pfordten, issued on November 5, 1866, the following passage occurred, regarding the future position of Bavaria with respect to North Germany:

"Entrance into the North German Confederation can in no case be regarded as an object of Bavarian policy. Since the year 1848 Bavaria has consistently pursued the principle of agreeing with every reform of the German Confederation by which Austria and Prussia have been equally affected, but of refusing a constitutional union with either of these great Powers alone. This is both in the interests of Bavaria and in those of Germany as a whole, as such a measure would imply both the mediatisation of Bavaria and the disruption of Germany. In accordance with this principle, the Bavarian Government refused the Imperial Constitution of 1849, and declined to enter the so-called 'Three Kings' League' with the Erfurt Parliament. Similarly, after the failure of the Congress of Princes in the year 1863, Bavaria declined to reorganise the Confederation apart from Prussia. Similarly again,

\* Von Dönniges (1814-1872) had been recalled from his post as Bavarian Agent in Switzerland, and was then living as a private individual in Munich.

Bavaria is now forced to decline entry to the North German Confederation."

The opinion of the Prince which is alluded to above deals with this point and observes:

"As the policy of the Bavarian Government upon the German question has been of an essentially negative nature since 1849, so also his Excellency's policy now aims at maintaining Bavarian independence by a policy of negation.

"In my opinion, however, recent events have made the position of Bavaria so dangerous that it is impossible to see any adequate guarantee for the independence of the Throne and country as forthcoming from a waiting policy. The preponderance of Prussia in Germany has been an accomplished fact since the secession of Austria from the Confederation and the extension of Prussia. This extended Prussia now rules the German North, stands at the head of thirty millions of inhabitants, and can dispose of an Army of nearly eight hundred thousand men. An alliance of friendship between Bavaria and the German North is the alliance of a stronger with a weaker power, and will be respected by Prussia just so long as it is to her interest.

"Experience shows that a constitutional alliance can offer permanent guarantees, and such an alliance is, therefore, on a different footing. The German Confederation, notwithstanding its defects, lasted for fifty years, and this permanence was derived from its character as a constitutional alliance. Though Prussia worked for decades to secure its dissolution, the disruption of the federation was only caused by a conjunction of extraordinary circumstances. Hitherto, Bavaria has never existed without the protection of some such constitutional federation, for the German Imperial Confederation and the Rhine Confederation might both be considered as of this character.

"Now, however, the experiment of independence is to be tried at a moment at which the existence of secondary States is endangered apart from other facts, by the general tendency to the formation of large States, and by the precarious nature of European peace.

"If Bavaria was a State either able or likely to be self-sufficient the danger would be less. But could Bavaria be politically self-sufficient supposing that her frontiers were menaced? Would she, if thrown upon her own resources, be able to defend even the Palatinate against France?

"Bavaria is just as unable to stand alone in the organisation of her economic resources. If the Zollverein were confined to North Germany, and the South were excluded from membership, it would still extend over an area of thirty million inhabitants. The industries of Bavaria could never bear the strain that would arise. If the North German Confederation agreed to form a common organisation of means of communication, of railways,

posts, and telegraphs, of coinage, weights, and measures, if a uniform civil and penal legislation were there secured, and if Bavaria were excluded from all these advantages, a force of attraction would be exerted upon the South German population, the consequences of which would be only too speedily obvious.

“Reference has recently been made with some confidence to Belgium and Switzerland in order to prove the possibility that Bavaria could exist as an isolated State. But it is forgotten that Switzerland and Belgium either have definite geographical boundaries or a definite national character which can flourish in this isolation, while they are also supported by many external circumstances which are wanting in the case of Bavaria; of these the most important is the fact that they are not likely to be absorbed into any larger unity by the force of national sympathy.

“This leads me to speak of the greatest danger which threatens Bavarian independence. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the Bavarian nation is penetrated by the impulse to unity which has seized all the German races. This ‘impulse to unity which has been existent for decades,’ as the circular describes it, has been fostered and cherished by constant expressions of sympathy from the German Government. Further expression was given to this tendency by the motion proposed in the Chamber of Deputies on August 30.

“Such a catastrophe as the death of the French Emperor would bring the revolutionary elements to the front, and in such a case the tendency of the German population to unification would assume dimensions which cannot be foreseen. Even now this attitude is steadily becoming more prevalent in Southern Germany. At the present moment it is still possible to rely upon the particularism of the South German population in order to secure a certain measure of special independence. At the present moment the antagonism of the South Germans to Prussia and their loyalty to the native dynasties is strong enough, based upon these tendencies, to secure favourable conditions on the conclusion of a new Federal Convention. This is, however, but a transitory frame of mind and should, therefore, be utilised at once, and particularly when the question of a new German Constitution is under discussion.

“If it is generally recognised that the dissolution of the German Confederation threatens the existence of the secondary States, and if it is the duty of a Minister of his Majesty the King to confront these dangers, and to secure the rights and independence of his Monarch, that course must be followed which will lead most surely to this end and will protect the Crown for the longest possible time against aggression at home or abroad. The circular states, with entire justice, ‘that the secondary States exist not so much through their own power as in virtue of their historical and contractual rights.’ This is the very reason why the duty

of self-preservation demands the earliest possible return to this basis of contractual right."

*Journal.*

MUNICH, *December 12, 1866.*

Yesterday I returned early from Vienna and immediately wrote to Tauffkirchen to ask him to call upon me. He appeared at one o'clock and informed me that he had not spoken to Holnstein, but had inferred from the assertions of Schanzenbach that the influence of Neumayr was stronger than ever, and that he had succeeded in convincing Holnstein that the Chamber was *against* me. Neumayr had probably told King Ludwig and Prince Karl he would undertake to keep me out of the Ministry, and had thus soothed the apprehensions which these dignitaries had entertained of his entrance into the Cabinet. It thus appears as if my proposed entrance to the Ministry would not be secured. But in any case, says Tauffkirchen, the Chamber will decide in favour of my programme and my position will thereby be improved. In the evening I met Tauffkirchen, who had been summoned to Holnstein; he promised to call upon me at eight o'clock. This he did, and it then appeared that the situation had materially changed. After the arrival of the King in the night of the 10th and 11th, Pfordten had handed in his resignation; Neumayr is ill in bed, and the King is asking for Holnstein's advice. Tauffkirchen has therefore advised him to induce the King to accept Pfordten's resignation, to allow the Privy Councillor Daxenberger to lead the Ministry until the Chamber has assembled and expressed its opinion, and to postpone the formation of the new Ministry until then. This programme is in entire agreement with my former proposals. In any case, the Chamber will express an opinion in accordance with my views and then my appointment is certain, and my position excellent.

This morning Tauffkirchen called upon me, and said that this had been done. The King is going to Hohenschwangau and is taking Lutz with him. Lutz is not against me and will be won over by the prospect of obtaining the Ministry of Justice. Thus I am certain that no intrigues will be begun against me in the meantime. Neumayr will be overthrown, and assessor Riedel will come in as a simple Cabinet Secretary or Councillor.

*December 17.*

On the evening of Friday the 14th, Holnstein came to me and informed me of the King's desire that I should confer with Schlör,\* whom the King desires to keep in the Ministry. "I was to come

\* Schlör, Director of the East Railways and an influential Deputy, had been made the first Bavarian Minister of Commerce. He then represented the constituency of Amberg.

to an understanding with him," as Neumayr had told the King that all the Ministers would resign if I entered the Ministry. Tauffkirchen called upon me the next morning and brought the letter from Lutz, the Councillor of the Court of Appeal, containing this commission for me; he also brought my criticism of Pfordten's circular in order that I might have both documents at hand during my conversation with Schlör. I found Schlör at the Ministry and gave him the papers with the necessary observations. The result of the conversation was that we are agreed upon the main points, though Schlör regards the attempt to secure a Federal Convention with Prussia as neither necessary nor desirable at this moment. I promised him to draw up a programme and to submit it to his notice. I immediately hastened to communicate this result to the King through Holnstein. In the evening I drew up my programme, discussed it on Sunday with Dönniges, and then gave it to Tauffkirchen, who considered that it was not sufficiently definite and drew up a new programme which he brought to me on Monday. This I was the more easily able to accept, as I had heard in the meantime from Reuss that in view of the approaching debates of the North German Parliament, the North was not disposed to open negotiations with South Germany out of consideration for France. At the conclusion of our discussion I asked Tauffkirchen whether he would allow me to tell Schlör that he had drawn up the programme, and also inquired whether he would be eventually prepared to take over the Ministry of the Interior. He replied in the affirmative to both questions, and requested that if possible he might also be publicly announced as the author of the programme, supposing that my proposal to him were to take effect. To this I agreed, as I have every respect for his motive, which is to gain ground in public opinion by this means.

On the evening of the same day I gave the programme to Schlör. On the next day (Tuesday) he brought it back and declared himself agreed. Tauffkirchen was there. Some alterations were arranged, and then I sent it to Holnstein. In the meanwhile I had heard that the appointment of Tauffkirchen as Minister would arouse much public misgiving, and I therefore composed my letter to Holnstein so as to make it appear that I proposed no Ministerial changes with the possible exception of the Minister of Justice, for which post I proposed President Neumayr. Now it is the 20th and I am waiting for the King's answer.

The "programme" mentioned in the above note runs as follows:

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\* Ludwig von Neumayr, President of the Court of Appeal, brother of the former Minister, a lawyer of high reputation, member of the Landtag for the constituency of Munich.

## I

(1) The object of Bavarian policy, which, though remote, must steadily be kept in view, seems to us to be the maintenance of Germany, the union of all or at least of the greater number of the German nationalities in a Federal State, protected abroad by a strong central Power, and at home by a Parliamentary Constitution, preserving at the same time the integrity of the State and Crown of Bavaria.

Direct and immediate attempts to realise this object we regard as, for the moment, premature. Austria has retired from the Confederation and is turning for security at this moment to its non-German elements. The formation of a South German Federal State under the leadership of this united Austria we regard neither as desirable nor as practicable. Prussia is occupied with the formation of a Federal Alliance having the character of a unified State among the smaller States of the German North, and is not at the moment ready to admit the South German States to this alliance; nor do we regard the unconditional entry of Bavaria into the North German Federation as the best means of securing unity. We should consider such attempts to secure incorporation in the Prussian State as absolutely incompatible with the duties of the Royal advisers of Bavaria.

Further, we should regard an attempt to open negotiations for a union producing any other form of Federal State with Prussia as a hopeless undertaking at this moment, when North Germany herself does not feel the necessity for such a union. It is, therefore, for the present abandoned.

A South-West German Federation with a Parliamentary Constitution might possibly be secured between the States of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and those parts of Hesse which are not united with North Germany, provided that there was a real desire for such union in the population of the above-mentioned States. This, however, is not the case; an attempt would only serve to emphasise and increase existing disruption and is therefore to be deprecated.

Thus far it is clear that on the question of an organic reunion of all the German States, Bavaria is at present, unfortunately, in our opinion, reduced to adopt a waiting policy.

(2) These considerations do not, however, entirely define the present task of Bavarian policy.

Bavaria as a secondary State cannot exist without an alliance with some first-class European Power. Some such support is especially necessary at a moment when the Constitution of the German Confederation has been shattered and the possibility of serious conflicts in Europe cannot be disputed. That first-class State which Bavaria should join, and of which Bavaria should declare herself the ally in case of war, is, in our firm opinion, Prussia.

It cannot be Austria, the organisation of which offers no guarantee that we should ever attain our object; it cannot be France, for France would only agree to such an alliance in the hope of rounding off her frontier line, while the revival of an alliance stigmatised by history would arouse great misgiving.

An alliance with Prussia would enable us, not indeed, to secure the maintenance of peace in Europe, but to turn the scale in favour of its preservation.

It cannot, however, be a mere alliance; the relative position of the Powers at this moment will oblige Bavaria, in return for a definite guarantee of the suzerainty of her King, to place herself under the command of Prussia in the event of war, for which reason the organisation of our forces must be considered with reference to this possibility. We think that we may at once proceed to prepare the way for such an alliance.

Though we feel bound to state that Bavaria would stand by Prussia, if she were to be attacked, it is none the less self-evident that together with this alliance friendly relations must as far as possible be maintained with the other Powers and especially with the Empire of Austria.

(3) With reference to the German secondary States of the South-West Group, our policy, in accordance with what we have said, will aim at securing for them a similar alliance with Prussia and with ourselves.

## II

(1) In view of the objects of Bavarian policy on the national question, it is the task of the Bavarian Government to aim at securing a common and uniform system of legislation and communication for all the German States.

(2) The discussion and achievement of social legislation and of a common regulation of religious procedure is to be conducted upon these principles and to be accelerated as much as possible.

(3) Military organisation is to be on the principle of the obligation of universal service while avoiding those abuses which have given rise to reasonable complaints of the Prussian system.

Legislative regulation of all exceptional resolutions permissible in time of war seems advisable.

The investigation and punishment of ordinary crimes and misdemeanours committed by soldiers in time of peace is to be left to the civil courts, though infringements of the law by officers are to be regarded as crimes against military honour and on that account to be subject as previously to military jurisdiction.

(4) The association of capital to improve and to support decaying commercial or agricultural credit is imperatively urged. In the department of the State finances the strictest order is to be secured and the Customs system is to be simplified. Efforts are to be made gradually to remove the dangers affecting the credit

of the State, which arise from the State's guarantee of bank business and of the issue of State bank-notes.

(5) The strict subordination of all administrative classes to the law will gradually inspire the nation with respect for the law. The simplification and the consequent strengthening of the administrative organisation is desirable, together with a uniform administration of the guardians of the public peace. These measures will meet the reasonable demands of the nation respecting public order and security. Actual defects in the laws in this direction, if such exist, are to be removed by modifications duly proposed.

(6) Complete independence of the judicature and the administration of justice is to be preserved, while control of the judicial officers is to be maintained by a disciplinary law. The discipline of solicitors and attorneys is to be secured by Chambers, to be elected by those concerned.

(7) Peace between the various religious bodies and in particular peace with the authorities of the Catholic Church is to be secured so far as compatible with conscientious observance of the existing laws. Any sacrifices may be made to meet the demands of the time for public education.

(8) The right of the Landtag to demand the submission of legislative proposals from the Government is recognised.

(9) A Bill will be proposed for the extension of the Upper House.

(10) In conclusion it seems necessary to revise the competence of the Ministerial Council and thus to facilitate the formation and maintenance of a uniform Ministry for the protection of the Crown and the Constitution.

#### *Contemporary note by the PRINCE.*

There are some further points to be considered on taking office.

The formation of a uniform Ministry is desirable to secure the co-operation of the collective Ministers guided by one spirit and by similar principles. Proposals upon this head, the scheme of a joint Ministry of this nature and for the Ministerial Presidents, will form the material of a subsequent proposal. The President of the Cabinet might be a Minister without a portfolio; this would secure the advantage that the direct adviser of the Crown would be responsible to the Chambers. A Minister without a portfolio is, however, unknown to the Constitution, and the creation of this office would require the consent of the Chambers to an alteration in the Constitution; I therefore consider that it would be advisable to abandon this for the moment and let the matter rest with the proposed appointment of Herr von Neumayr.

As regards individual Ministers, Herr von Pechmann may be left in possession of his office. He is a straightforward and



highly respected man, who has an opportunity of securing the confidence of the country by the proposal of his social measures. There is also nothing to be said against Herr von Pfretzschner and Herr von Schlör.

The Minister Gresser is perhaps lacking in energy, but this defect may be compensated by the co-operation of the whole Ministry upon important questions affecting ecclesiastical affairs.

The Minister Bomhard is best replaced by Herr von Neumayr.

Count Tauffkirchen regards the moment as inopportune for his entry to the Ministry in view of the bureaucratic prejudices, and would prefer an appointment as Ministerial adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Imperial Councillorships thus vacant would be best filled by the appointment of men who possess the confidence of the country, are inspired by sentiments of loyalty and have practical experience of constitutional work or economic administration. I nominate Count Hegnenberg-Dux, Dingler for the Palatinate, Neuffer or Fikentscher for Regensburg.

*From the Journal.*

MUNICH, December 22, 1866.

Yesterday evening at eleven o'clock Holnstein came to me and said that the King had arrived but was still wavering, as there was much opposition to me on the part of the Royal Family and especially King Ludwig. He says I am regarded as a traitor who would deliver up Bavaria to Prussia, &c. The matter is further delayed by uncertainty respecting Neumayr, whose resignation is practically certain. While we were still talking a messenger came from the King, bringing Neumayr's resignation to Holnstein.\* Thus another obstacle is removed. Holnstein then wrote another note to Lutz, requesting an interview with him to-day upon the matter.

The interview with Lutz has taken place. All the several points of the programme were discussed, and he asked for further information upon those respecting the Interior. He wished to know whether by the expression "strict subordination to the law, &c." I intended to make the executive further dependent upon the judicature, to restrict the executive, and to do this by proposing Bills. He had no objection to offer to the administrative Court of Justice. Upon the questions concerning the independence of the judicature and the administration of justice, he asked whether any positive changes were proposed, which I denied, and confined myself to explaining that if a programme were to be published, it must include every branch of the administration and that this point could not therefore be omitted.

\* After his dismissal from the post of Minister of the Interior, in November 1865, Neumayr had been out of office. The "offer of resignation" must therefore mean a request not to be called to office on the occasion of the approaching changes in the Ministry.

As regards the maintenance of peace between the religious bodies, he asked whether I was inclined to make concessions to the Church and to make changes or improvements in its favour, to which I gave a general denial. I said that I considered an understanding with the Church highly desirable, especially upon the relationship of the Concordat to the Constitution. He considered the legal regulation of the Ministerial Council dangerous, and especially any further proposals of a law of responsibility to the Chambers, considering that our object might be secured without this measure.

Eventually we agreed that I should abandon any immediate alteration in the Ministry in order that individual Ministers might have an opportunity of justifying themselves against any attacks of the Chambers. He wished that even the Minister of Justice should remain. It was impossible, he considered, to do business with the King before Christmas. I might therefore leave to-day but ought to be back on the evening of the 27th to be at the King's disposal on the 28th.

On the evening of the 27th I returned to Munich and informed the new Ministerial Councillor von Lutz, who is the head of the King's Privy Council, of my return. He called upon me on the morning of the 28th and informed me that the King proposed to appoint me Minister of the Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs in place of Pfordten. He said that my appointment as Premier had also been discussed, and that he must therefore ask whether definite assurances had been given through Count Holnstein. I replied that this had certainly been the case, but that I set little store by the title of Premier, as this title presupposed a Ministerial solidarity and a completely representative character in myself which was and would remain out of the question. I should therefore prefer to content myself with the Presidency of the Ministerial Council. We then had a long discussion upon precedence and considered the pros and cons of the question, whether I should reserve precedence for myself or not. I eventually resolved not to make precedence a condition of my entry.

We then turned to consider the remaining points of the programme. As regards the relations with the ecclesiastical powers, he advised that this point should be omitted; it might seem that we were ready to make concessions to the Ultramontane party, and this would immediately raise a storm. Upon other points the King requested me to formulate the main features of my political views in a special document, to state whether I was ready to submit every despatch to a Minister or to a foreign Government to the King's consideration, as Pfordten had done. I hastened to explain that I should be quite ready to guarantee this, as it could only be agreeable to me to be certain of the King's concurrence in every measure proposed. As regards diplomatic appointments he explained that the King would always be ready

to agree to my proposals, but he pointed out to me that the Ministers were in close connection with the nobility, and that every Minister recalled would make a large addition to the number to my enemies (to this I am accustomed).

After describing Neumayr's aims he explained his views on the question of the Cabinet and its relation to the Ministry. He considers it desirable that the King should take an active part in the business; he does not wish the King to be nothing more than a machine for signing his name, in the hands of his responsible Ministers, and wishes to guarantee this position for the King. In general he promised to act with me loyally and openly. He strongly advised that Dönniges should not be employed in the Ministry; he could only be useful in Switzerland, but not at any Court. He could not be employed in Florence on account of the bad impression that would be made in Rome, and his boorishness, &c., made him impossible at other Courts. On this point I could convince myself by the perusal of his despatches.

The conversation turned upon the appointments to the seats in the Upper House; I suggested Hegnenberg, whose appointment I desired. To this he could only object that in his opinion a popular man or a high legal authority should be appointed. He said that Hegnenberg's time was over. I replied that though a man might be past work in the Chamber of Deputies, he might yet be very useful in the Upper House and for that reason I should consider the appointment of Hegnenberg as valuable in itself and likely to make a good impression. He thought President Neumayr would be a better choice. He, however, cannot be spared from the Lower Chamber. Finally, I must mention the fact that I referred to the quarrel which had broken out a few years before in the two Chambers concerning the right of making propositions. I pointed out that my opinion was unchanged, and Lutz agreed that this point should be mentioned in the memorial intended for the King. He thought there was no need for me to mention Wagner, as he would not return in any case before spring.

After the discussion I went to Tauffkirchen, who saw a pitfall in the request of Lutz for the abbreviation of the programme. He said that there was a rumour in the town that I was unfaithful to my principles, and that it would be therefore advisable to keep strictly to the document I had already issued, as otherwise it might be said that I had issued another programme.

This I did, and then wrote the memorandum of December 29 for the King,\* with a supplement in which I declared my readiness to submit the "decrees" to the King. Both documents were given to the Cabinet Secretary on the morning of the 29th.

In the afternoon I called upon the Minister of the Interior,† to whom I explained the situation. He showed some embarrass-

\* The abstract of this document has not been preserved.

† Freiherr von Pechmann.

ment at first, and I could see that he had some feeling against me. I detailed to him the points of my programme. He informed me of his measures with reference to the Press and went on to observe that I should undoubtedly become President of the Ministerial Council, which would cause a difficulty, for the President hitherto had always defended the Ministry as a whole against the attacks in the Chambers, and that this would now be impossible in the case of the Bills proposed. I gave him no answer, as I did not wish to inform him that I had asked the King for my appointment as President of the Ministerial Council.

The Minister Gresser\* received me with a somewhat apprehensive and embarrassed manner. He listened attentively to my communications, and explained to me the principles upon which he proposed to conduct the Ministry of Public Worship; these were the utmost possible independence for the Church, wherever ecclesiastical matters were concerned, the improvement of education, the removal of school inspections from the exclusive possession of the clergy, &c.

About seven o'clock I went to Pfretzschner,\* whom I found in his office, and informed him of the object of my visit. He told me he had already learned my programme from Schlör. He admitted that he was especially anxious to know that my programme emphasised independence of Bavaria. He was opposed to entry into the North German Confederation and was very reserved upon the question of the South German Confederation. He agreed to the principles of alliance with Prussia and subordination to Prussian leadership in the event of war after the provision of certain guarantees. But he wished to see the freedom of Bavaria secured and also to conclude alliances elsewhere. He then referred to my speech and admitted that it had given occasion to different interpretations, and that it had aroused a certain apprehension. The Bavarian party cannot believe that the Forward party is in earnest with its assertions that the independence of Bavaria shall not be infringed.

He then turned to the question of the solidarity of the Ministers, saying that they had always adhered to Pfordten and had had one heart and one mind. If a change of Ministry implied a change of policy he would be forced to ask himself whether he could remain in office. I referred him to the wording of my programme and told him that Schlör and Lutz were already agreed upon it. He hinted that a new programme might be drawn up, but I told him that I had already submitted my principles to the King, so that the composition of a new document was impossible, and people were in any case reproaching me with changing my programme every day.

To-day, Sunday the 30th, Dr. Lang called upon me in the morning and gave me some interesting information concerning the constitution of the Press bureau; I informed him of my

\* Minister of Public Worship.

† Minister of Finance.

programme in a few words. He will make use of the information for his autograph correspondence. Marquardsen then arrived from Erlangen; I also informed him of my principles; he replied that he was in entire agreement, and thought it likely that his friends would assent. Then came Schanzenbach, who talked politics in his somewhat poetical fashion and spoke of Tauffkirchen as the most suitable Minister of the Interior. Tauffkirchen came to me in the evening in the hope of sending me off with several fleas in my car. He began by saying that doubts had reappeared in the Cabinet, that people seemed disinclined to follow me and to expect that I should enable the King to postpone the constitution of the Ministry until after the Landtag. He then referred to the dangers which threatened me should I enter this Ministry, saying that I should wear myself out and that I had better take Völderndorff into the Ministry, since his own appointment as Ministerial Councillor would be regarded as evidence of my weakness, seeing that his share in my programme was already known. I did not believe in the dangers which he thought would arise before me in consequence of my entry into the existing Ministry, as public opinion of the Ministry is very diverse and the agitation against it is chiefly the work of Tauffkirchen; this agitation has been going on all summer, and ended in the fall of von der Pfordten. However, I regarded the matter as sufficiently important for a conversation with Lutz and called on him at ten o'clock in the evening. He said there was no question of any hesitancy on the part of the King with respect to myself. The delay in drawing up the documents was due merely to formal reasons; he had spoken once more to the Ministers and had secured their assent to the programme; only Pfretzschner had proposed a common discussion, but he had been speedily crushed and everything was now in order. In the morning I should be asked to wait upon the King, and if I now retired I should place the King in the greatest embarrassment and expose myself to the reproach or suspicion that I had been intimidated by the Landtag at the last moment. I hastened to inform him that I had no intention of retiring, but that I had merely thought it advisable to hold myself ready in case the King hesitated to begin the definite formation of the Ministry. We therefore agreed to let the whole matter rest, and he promised me not to discuss it further even with the King.

On the following day, December 31, Lutz came to me at half-past twelve and told me that the King wished to see me at one o'clock. I had barely time to get into a dress-coat and white tie and to drive to the Palace in a cab, as no carriage was available.

The equerry conducted me to the King's room, the ordinary living-room. Here I found the King in a black dress-coat with an Order. He received me very kindly, sat down on the sofa and

invited me to take an arm-chair. I thanked him for the confidence he had placed in me. He then said he understood that I had not wished to be Premier. I replied that I had declined, for the reason that this post did not exist here, but that I should be very grateful if I could secure the Presidency to the Ministerial Council. He discussed the Ministers and said it would be better if I became Premier, "as then I could keep the other Ministers in better order," complained of the Ministers, spoke unfavourably of Pfretzschner, who was unstable, very favourably of Schlör, and fairly well.

Then he chanced to remember a conversation we had had on April 7, when I had advised him to adhere more closely to Prussia. After that we went on to speak of the war, of Prince Alexander of Hesse, of various other topics. He asked me about my correspondence with Queen Victoria, about the Prince of Wales, about Prince Albert, &c. There was also some talk of the Press. I said that, since things were discussed in the taverns, it made little difference whether the spoken word were also published in the petty newspapers. This led us to the question of beer-drinking, to the climate of Munich, to the life of the people in Munich, and much besides. I recommended to him Hegnenberg for the Upper House, spoke also of its extension and then said that as yet I should not come in Ministerial uniform. He thought it was quite unnecessary. I replied that I should regard myself as a functionary as soon as I had taken over the official duties, and also that I renounced my rank. This he would not permit, assuring me that he would cause the necessary orders to be given to the Chamberlain's office. I accepted this with thanks. He then said he hoped to have a longer talk with me later, and allowed me to take my leave.

I have since heard that he was greatly pleased with our interesting conversation. I must add, too, that another matter he alluded to was his grandfather and his uncle being opposed to me, but he told me that he had not allowed himself to be shaken. I expressed my admiration for his firmness of character. I also explained to him why his father was so distrustful of me.

The Prince's appointment as Minister of the Royal House and of Foreign Affairs and President of the Council of Ministers took place on December 31, 1866.

THE BAVARIAN MINISTRY

1867-1870









PRINCE HOHENLOHE  
AT THE TIME OF THE BAVARIAN MINISTRY

## THE BAVARIAN MINISTRY

1867-1870

*Memorandum of January 4, 1867.*

*Results of the discussion in to-day's Cabinet.*

After I had explained the reasons which prompted me to move that the Bill\* should not yet be debated, but should first be referred to the Governments of Würtemberg, Hesse, and Baden, with the request that they would intimate whether they were in favour of arranging joint conferences of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of War, to discuss the question whether a common, homogeneous scheme of Army reorganisation should be introduced in these States, the objection was made by the Minister of War that he wished to bring the debate on the Bill to an end as soon as possible. This, however, could not be done during the present session unless the debate were proceeded with immediately in the Council of Ministers, the Council of State and the Chamber. He must be ready by 1868, and if he could not begin in the spring, he could not be ready by that time. Schlör said it would be no use, the Würtembergers had another idea. Meanwhile, he admitted that we might try the experiment. Finally, the Council agreed in the opinion that the discussion of the Bill should be begun in the Council of Ministers. In the meantime I could address the necessary inquiries to the Governments concerned.

The negotiations with the South German Governments were opened by a despatch to the Bavarian Legations of January 9, and led to an agreement with Würtemberg of January 18, according to which Freiherr von Varnbüler was to invite the four southern States to a conference at Stuttgart on February 3. An agreement fixed the objects, with respect to which joint action was to be aimed at, and by a "secret convention" Bavaria and Würtemberg agreed not to let themselves be deterred by any opposition from Baden or Hesse at the conference, but mutually to introduce the regulations as to which unanimity might not be attained. In regard to the South German fortresses

\* On the reorganisation of the Army.

this secret convention provided that Baden should be induced to keep up Rastatt, while Bavaria and Würtemberg would maintain and govern Ulm and Neu-Ulm as a joint place of arms.

Conformably to the agreement the invitations to Stuttgart were issued by the Government of Würtemberg.

Meanwhile, the debates of the Chamber of Deputies on the Address to the King gave the Prince his first opportunity of a public declaration of the aims of his German policy.

*Speech in the Chamber of Deputies on January 19, 1867.*

Gentlemen, — The motion before you furnishes me with the opportunity I desired of defining the position which the Government intends to take up on the German question.

I shall endeavour to do this as plainly as possible.

Since the dissolution of the German Confederation and with the secession of Austria from Germany, the position of the Central German States has been completely changed and has become undeniably more perilous.

I shall forbear to throw a retrospective glance upon the Bavarian policy of the last few years or to inquire whether Bavaria was offered the means and opportunity of obviating this dangerous turn of affairs.

Practical politics are directed to the facts of the present; the past can be left to the judgment of history.

Gentlemen, I have, on several occasions, had the opportunity of expressing myself upon the subject of the relations of Bavaria with Germany, and I have always done so with the greatest frankness. To-day I define once more the goal of Bavarian policy to be the maintenance of Germany, the union of all the German peoples, and, in so far as this may not be possible, of the greater number of them, in one Confederation, protected from without by a powerful Central Government, and within by a Parliamentary Constitution, with concomitant preservation of the integrity of the Bavarian State and Crown.

If now, gentlemen, I acknowledge this Confederation as the goal of Bavarian politics, still I must not shut my eyes to the perception that such a goal is not to be attained immediately.

At the conclusion of the Treaty of Prague, Prussia was required in the formation of a closer confederation to confine herself to the north of the line of the Main, and, by signing the treaty of peace, she has acknowledged this limitation as binding. You may regret these facts, but you cannot contest the consequences that are attached to them.

It follows from this that Prussia is obliged to repel any attempt on the part of the South German States to enter into the North German Confederation.

It further follows that this Government cannot attempt to

enter into negotiations for the union of Bavaria with the North German Confederation.

I must, moreover, declare just as frankly that the development of North German federal relations, in its present form, shows such a marked tendency towards the creation of a single State, that I should not consider it consistent with the dignity of the country or the duties of the Government to seek for unconditional inclusion in this North German Confederation. I, at least, would not give my vote for such unconditional inclusion, nor would I undertake the responsibility for it.

I do not believe, either, that the formation of the North German Confederation would be delayed by any consideration for South Germany. Nor would its promoters be at all likely at the present moment to modify the character of the North German Confederation in order to favour the entry of the South German States.

We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the progress of Germany on the road to unity is but a slow one.

But if I now recognise the difficulties that stand in the way of the organic reunion of the German race, I am, nevertheless, firmly resolved to oppose every step that might hinder the attainment of the goal I have pointed out.

Gentlemen, the Government will not form a South-West German Confederation under the protection of a non-German Power. Such an alliance in the second half of the nineteenth century is simply an impossibility. Nor would it suit the position of Bavaria any better to enter a constitutional league of South German States under the leadership of Austria. If I apprehend aright the course of development of internal affairs in Austria, it appears to me that the German element is falling more and more into the background and that the Government is seeking support among the non-German elements of the Monarchy.

A constitutional league with an Austria so placed seems neither desirable nor feasible.

On the other hand, I should rejoice to see the Austrian Monarchy emerge strengthened and invigorated from the internal struggles in which it is involved, so that it might fulfil its civilising mission as the Power of the eastern frontier. I shall strive to effect the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations between Bavaria and Austria.

Gentlemen, another reason why the Government will not lend a hand in the formation of a compact South-West German Confederate State is that an agreement between the Governments and peoples on this matter is certainly unattainable, and that such a Federal State would further widen the breach between South and North Germany.

But although I have declared that the Government contemplated no step that would remove us from the aim of a common German policy, I must not confine myself to this negative standpoint. This would be to proclaim a policy of isolation. As a

state of the second-class Bavaria cannot exist without an alliance with one of the European Great Powers. We need such support especially at the present moment, when the constitution of the German Confederation has been torn up and the possibility of European conflicts cannot be denied. But the Great Power to which Bavaria must attach herself, and whose ally she must openly declare herself to be in case of a foreign war, is Prussia.

This alliance, to secure which is one of the tasks of the Bavarian Government, involves as a result that Bavaria, in return for a definite guarantee of the sovereignty of her King, will place herself under the leadership of Prussia in the event of a war with a foreign Power. It involves also the obligation that the Bavarian Army shall be organised in such a way as to render possible its participation in such a war. This alliance will gain in value if it has for its effect not only to increase the military power of Bavaria, but at the same time to determine the other States of South-West Germany to undertake a correspondingly powerful military organisation. The Government is exerting itself to bring about this agreement and thereby to further the drawing together of South and North Germany, preserving, however, at the same time our independence, as far as in us lies, from any desires of annexation, from whatever quarter they may come.

Permit me now, gentlemen, to conclude by once more summing up in a few words the task of Bavarian policy. It is to prepare the way for a constitutional league with the other States of Germany, so soon and so far as this is possible, while preserving the sovereign rights of Bavaria and the independence of the country. Meanwhile we shall await the attainment of this goal, the creation of a Power that shall command respect, not through the organisation of the Army alone, but also through the improvement of our internal conditions on liberal lines, through the raising of our self-respect and confidence in our own national existence.

If we are successful in this task, then our alliance will be sought. We shall not be obliged to look anxiously about for shelter, and we shall be able to obtain a solution of the important question of the reorganisation of the Zollverein, worthy of the dignity and interests of the country.

*Extract from a letter of FREIHERR VON ROGGENBACH  
to the PRINCE.*

NEUWIED, January 24, 1867.

. . . Whoever has had to deal, as I have, for six long years with the political and moral confusion which Herren von Beust and von der Pfordten have brought about in the poor heads of our South German countrymen by their State papers, their agents, and their organs in the Press, and whoever is not blind to the dangers which this Babel of tongues is preparing for the continuance and future of our people and for the development of the

German State, must welcome your utterance with the most sincere and heartfelt joy. It tells me that so considerable a State as Bavaria and so important an element in the European system as South Germany has at last returned to the influence of an intelligent and honourable, single-minded and cautious leadership, and that the dark powers are now swept away, which for years have been trying to fan a flame which they hoped would consume Prussia and the healthy development of German civilisation, but which has now finally devoured themselves and their evil devices.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, January 25, 1867.

Reuss \* read to me a despatch from Bismarck, which expressed the satisfaction of the Prussian Government with my declaration in the Chamber. To this, Bismarck appends some remarks on Army organisation and finance, which Reuss is to submit to me, in order to have them technically answered.

In respect to the German question, the despatch said that the South Germans were deceiving themselves, if they thought Prussia desired confederation with the South on the same basis as in the North. There they were forced into a closer union from regard for their own safety. As far as the South was concerned, Prussia would be content if she had a guarantee that the South would not lean upon foreign Powers, and if the mutual protection and care of material interests were assured, Prussia would go as far as Bavaria desired in the fusion of the South with the North. If the South was not willing to limit its autonomy in the same way as the North, then she was prepared to enter into negotiations on a broader basis.

Upon the question of how I conceived the constitution, and, in particular, the limitation of autonomy, I reserved myself for further pronouncement. He declared himself ready to ask his Government whether I might read its despatch to the King, which I considered to be necessary.

On February 3 the Stuttgart Conferences were opened under the presidentship of Freiherr von Varnbüler. Besides the four Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Ministers of War and several Commissioners took part in the proceedings.

In the opening discussion Minister von Freydorf of Baden, said he desired that clear expression should be given to the desire for the unification of Germany which had doubtless been the main inspiration of the proposed joint measures and which, in the opinion of the Government of Baden, urgently demanded a frank adherence to the Prussian military constitution. He, therefore, proposed a resolution in the following terms:

"The assembled representatives of the four South German

\* Prince Reuss, at that time Prussian Minister at Munich.

Governments recognise it as a national necessity to regulate the military forces of their countries according to the principles of the Prussian military constitution, so that in case of war they may be available as component parts of a German Army."

Prince Hohenlohe in reply said that the motion of Baden might easily lead to misconception, especially as the proposed wording did not exactly correspond to the *actual* state of Germany's political relations. The rest of the debates were chiefly concerned with the question how far adherence to the Prussian military system should be carried. After consultations between the War Ministers a final protocol was agreed upon, which had the approval of all the members of the conference. The Minister of Baden then added the following declaration to the protocol, with reference to his repeated utterances in the course of the verbal proceedings on the position which his Government considered itself obliged to take up on the question of the adjustment of German constitutional relations, especially with regard to the North German Confederation about to be formed:

"The Government of the Grand Duchy of Baden is of the opinion that the stipulations here drawn up do not stand in the way of possible military agreements on the part of the Grand Duchy with the Kingdom of Prussia, or with the North German States, and reserves to itself, according to circumstances, the right of making such agreements."

The Hessian Minister, von Dalwigk, thereupon announced "that he, too, considering the peculiar position which the Hessian Government would have to occupy in the presence of a North German Confederation, would feel obliged to accompany the assent of his Government to the resolutions by a reservation, in the same terms as that made by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Baden."

The final protocol,\* signed on February 5, begins with the declaration that the assembled delegates recognise it as a national necessity to increase and organise the military forces of their countries, so that they may be capable of joint action that shall command respect. They agree, therefore, to an increase of their military forces as far as possible, and to a system modelled on the principles of that of Prussia. As such principles the following are laid down: universal compulsory service, the three years' term, the division of compulsory service into service in the Standing Army, liability for the Reserve, and liability for the Landwehr. The objects are a homogeneous organisation, to fit the army for joint action, similar tactical units, the greatest possible agreement in regulations, arms, and ammunition, common manœuvres and uniform training of officers. "With regard to the fortresses of Ulm and Rastatt," concludes the protocol, "a decision will be deferred until the conclusion of the negotia-

\* Printed in Aegidi and Klauhold, *Das Staatsarchiv*, vol. xii. No. 2733.



tions for liquidation, which are to be expedited as far as possible." \*

Immediately after the Stuttgart Conference, on February 6, 1867, the Prince had an interview at Mühlacker with the Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden. He wrote to the Grand Duke:

MUNICH, *February 19, 1867.*

Your Royal Highness gave me permission to address you directly by letter, if it seemed necessary to make any further communication on the political questions we discussed at Mühlacker. At the present moment, when the North German Reichstag is about to open, it appears urgently necessary for the South German Governments to come to an understanding upon the position they are to take up with reference to the resolutions of the North German Parliament. It may be foreseen that on the conclusion of the deliberations, if these lead to a satisfactory result, the question will be put to us, in what way we wish to regulate our relations to the North German Confederation.

In this connection the following points might be raised:

- (1) The Maintenance of the sovereignty of the individual State.
- (2) The Strengthening of Germany in order to repel danger from without.
- (3) The Satisfaction of the people's national aspirations.
- (4) The Facilities of access to German Austria.

I believe it would be advisable for the South German States of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and (as far as possible) Hesse to act in unison on the following basis:

(1) We make an offer to Prussia and the North German Confederation to enter into an indissoluble league.

(2) Prussia to have the presidency and the chief command in war.

(3) The four States to enter the Federal Council, Bavaria with six votes, Würtemberg with four, Baden with three, and Hesse with two. The Federal Council, thus extended, to conduct the affairs of the league and to settle disputes among its members.

\* Article VII. of the Peace of Prague stipulated that a commission should assemble at Frankfort-on-the-Main to which all claims against the late German Confederation should be presented for settlement. Austria and Prussia wished to be represented on this commission. All the other States of the former Confederation had the same privilege. Article VIII. gave Austria the right to remove from the fortresses of the late Confederation the Imperial property and the Austrian share of the movable federal property, or otherwise to dispose of it. This "Commission of Liquidation" met in the autumn of 1866, and by the summer of 1867 had carried its work so far that Austria and Holland, the latter for Luxembourg and Limburg, had had their claims paid off in money. The claims of the other States had also been fixed by the auditors. It was resolved, however, not to proceed to an actual division, but rather to adjourn the final settlement of the question.

(4) To be established by treaty: rights of citizenship and naturalisation for the whole of Germany; the German Zollverein; identical weights, measures, and coinage; the laws of banking; similar legal procedure; similar arrangements in the matter of railways, telegraphs, posts, and shipping.

(5) The common arrangements provided for under (4) will be regulated on the initiative of the Federal Council, and, so far as legislation may be required, they shall be dealt with on the lines of the laws relating to exchange and commerce. The legislature will be: in the North the Reichstag of the North German Confederation; in the South, the Chambers of the four States. Regarding the military constitution, Prussia recognises the conclusions of the Stuttgart Conference.

(6) The South contributes a share, to be fixed by agreement, towards the Navy of the Confederation, and towards the representation of its commercial interests by the Consular Service.

(7) The share of the cost and of the garrisoning of the fortresses and harbours of the League will likewise be regulated in principle by agreement and fixed by the Bundesrath.

(8) A condition of the compact is the simultaneous conclusion of an alliance of the whole of Germany with Austria, by which the integrity of German territory shall be mutually guaranteed, while, by a modification of the Peace of Prague, the German Confederation shall be recognised by Austria.

I lay the more stress on the last point, since, with the influence of Austria making itself more and more felt here, a favourable disposition and assent to the conclusion of a confederate agreement with Prussia is only to be gained if, at the same time, in the alliance, compensation can be offered to Austria for the diminution of her influence in South Germany through the creation of a confederation of the Southern States with the North. In permitting myself to lay this sketch before your Royal Highness, I beg you for an expression of opinion on it and an intimation whether your Royal Highness desires a detailed exposition. I should be particularly grateful for the favour of an early answer, for the reason that I am expecting to receive overtures from Stuttgart in the next few days, to which I will not reply before I know the views of your Royal Highness.

In conclusion, I beg to observe that the document ratifying the results of the Stuttgart Conference is now before his Majesty the King, and will be sent off shortly. I venture to recommend that the exchange of ratifications may graciously be made as soon as possible after the arrival of our document in Karlsruhe, since the publication of the results of the Conference appears to me desirable in the interests of all.

On the reception given in Berlin to the Prince's first public declarations, Prince Reuss, hitherto Prussian Minister at Munich, wrote to him:

BERLIN, *February 20, 1867.*

I arrived here yesterday morning and saw Count Bismarck at once, and had much to tell him about Munich and about you. I need not tell you that he entertains the best wishes for the success of your Ministry, and will do everything in his power to support you. I mentioned to him your wish with regard to an eventual avowal of the existence of the secret agreement.\* Count Bismarck realised that it would be agreeable to you and also to the Government of Würtemberg, and advantageous to your position in the country, if you could avow the secret treaty. He has no objection to this being done, and would only wait until the uproar in the French Chamber has quieted down a little. Perhaps, therefore, until after the interpellations on the Emperor's foreign policy.† Then he thinks it would be well to prepare the way for it by means of apparent indiscretions in the newspapers; he would, however, be glad to know your views, in case you should wish the publication made in another way.‡ He directed me to write to you and to tell you at the same time that, whenever you might find it necessary to address him directly upon this or any other matter, he would be quite ready to open a direct private correspondence. He has complete confidence in Werthern,§ but thinks that, before the latter should be admitted to similar confidence where you are concerned, it would, perhaps, be more agreeable to you to communicate through him (Bismarck). Montgelas|| he described as a good man of business and an honourable man, but thought that that was the limit of his qualifications, and that it was not easy to enter upon more intimate affairs with him.

In the same spirit the Duke of Ratibor wrote to the Prince:

BERLIN, *March 3, 1867.*

This evening I was at a ball at Puttbus's, and there had an opportunity of speaking to Bismarck. He began to talk about you of his own accord, as he stood at the buffet, and drank a glass of champagne to your health, and to the success of your endeavours. I told him you had written to me, and he understands perfectly well that you have to go carefully to work down there. Here, he said, nothing more would be asked of Bavaria than she was willing to give, if one could not get a thaler one

\* The offensive and defensive alliance concluded simultaneously with the treaty of peace.

† The debate in the French Chamber on foreign policy took place on March 14-18.

‡ The publication of the offensive and defensive alliance followed on March 19, 1867, immediately after the first debate in the North German Reichstag, which concerned Luxembourg. — Sybel, *Begründung des Deutschen Reichs*, vol. vi. p. 58.

§ Prussian Minister at Munich.

|| Bavarian Minister in Berlin.

would take a groschen. There would be no compulsion at all. The material interests of South Germany — this for the benefit of your adversaries down there — rendered a treaty with the North German Confederation necessary; without that even the Zollverein would be endangered, and thereby the whole prosperity of those countries would be at stake. This cannot be repeated too often to the people of the South. He recommends prudence and no precipitation. He takes the greatest interest in all that happens at Munich.

The Queen expressed herself yesterday in the same sense and sends you many greetings. Field-marshal Wrangel also asked me to congratulate you on the results you have achieved hitherto, he has the best hopes for the future and sends his kind regards. Herr von Vincke, too, spoke to me about you, and was pleased with the way things were going. You see that all parties here are for you. Bismarck also considers the leadership of Bavaria among the South German States as a matter of course, and has rejected every proposal from Würtemberg and Baden, which was not made in conjunction with Bavaria.

GRAND DUKE FRIEDRICH OF BADEN *to* PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

KARLSRUHE, *March 4, 1867.*

Accept my best thanks for your two letters of February 19 and 20, from which I gathered with great satisfaction that our conversation at Mühlacker would be the beginning of a confidential intercourse, the value of which I fully appreciate.

We discussed the movement for a closer union of the South with the North of Germany, and in this connection we have already spoken of the different stages of development through which we think the work of union will be accomplished.

I have consequently welcomed your proposals with sincere thanks, as a highly valuable attempt to give effect to these aspirations, and I shall now try, after a thorough examination of the question, to give you my views on it in brief.

Speaking generally, I am quite ready to enter into further negotiations upon your proposals, but should be very glad to receive from you more detailed information, in order to learn more closely the extent and significance of certain points.

The four fundamental ideas of your proposals I take to be the expression of the difficulties and prejudices to be overcome in the South German States. I recognise therein the points which you are obliged to treat with circumspection, in order to bring about a state of transition which may prepare the way for a more intimate union with the North. On the other hand, I do not fail to appreciate the difficulty of so combining these four principles that they may be made acceptable to the steadily consolidating North German Confederation.

The first of the eight points in which you discern the foundation for concerted action of the South German States defines the relation to North Germany as an indissoluble league, and, in fact, as a broader league in contradistinction to the closer league of North Germany. This idea is sufficient to make all the other points appear more or less subordinate, in so far as they depend upon a union with Prussia. I shall, therefore, not stop to-day to enter into details, but will only recommend two questions to your kind consideration.

The class of legislation for which it is indispensable to obtain complete uniformity throughout Germany is to be found chiefly in the domain of material interests. Here, no doubt, the question of the Zollverein will furnish the most convenient means of solving the difficulty which at present consists in the want of an assembly of all the German States in a common Reichstag. Confidential communications from Berlin tell us that the admission of delegates from the South German Governments to the Federal Council, and of South German Deputies to the North German Reichstag for tariff matters, and therewith the transformation of the latter body into a Tariff Parliament, may be expected as a possibly imminent first step towards a closer union of North and South. Once a beginning were made in this way, it would, doubtless, soon be extended so as to cover other spheres. All the difficult questions of legislation would thus find their solution in a natural and practical way, and it might indeed be good policy to prepare the way for these solutions by a proposal directed to that end.

The prospect of the participation of the South German Governments and popular representatives in the corresponding organs of the North German Confederation, and in particular the prospect of the formation of a Tariff Parliament, would, I presume, cause a modification in the fourth clause of your proposals, since what you proposed should be settled by treaties could now be obtained in part by means of legislation.

Supposing, however, that a treaty of alliance is to be concluded between the several South German States and the North German Confederation, which shall follow the lines of the former German Act of Confederacy, I ask myself whether it were not more advisable to keep as closely as possible to this old treaty of confederacy, and thereafter, to endeavour to bring to maturity the germs in it which are capable of development. Little as was the good this old institution was able to accomplish in the course of its long existence, since it provided no remedy for the rivalry of two Great Powers in the same league, yet the basis seems now to be furnished upon which the most important constituent parts of the old federal constitution may be founded. This basis is the Peace of Prague, the end of the protracted dualism, so injurious to Germany.

Article IV. of the Peace of Prague gives a prospect of a national

union of the South German States with the North German Confederation. Austria recognises by anticipation this broader league in its new form.

This is the second point which I would specially deal with, viz., No. 8 of your proposals.

Having regard to the steadily growing Austrian influence in Munich, you consider it imperative, in order to gain the assent of Bavaria to the conclusion of a treaty of confederacy with Prussia, that Austria should be offered an alliance with Germany as compensation for the diminution of her influence in South Germany, owing to the formation of a league between the South and the North.

I can easily imagine how difficult it must be for you to deal with the Austrian sympathies in certain high quarters and to represent in opposition to them the new spirit created by the Peace of Prague. I will also willingly admit that certain prejudices can only be combated by being treated with the greatest possible forbearance. Hence, I am quite prepared also to discuss further with you this most important point of your proposals, although I could not favour such a *condition* of the conclusion of a treaty with Prussia. I should like, however, to prove to you in every way that it is my earnest desire to support you, so far as I can, in your splendid but difficult task.

My reasons against the proposal for such an alliance of the whole of Germany with Austria under the circumstances specified are of various kinds.

In the first place, it seems to me necessary to know whether Prussia is disposed to accept such a condition, lest through her refusal the desired understanding should be prevented. I cannot believe that Prussia would be disposed to modify the Peace of Prague in one of its most important points, and thereby to bring about a European question which this very treaty is intended to obviate, since it recognises a national union of South and North Germany as a matter of internal politics.

I do not consider a guarantee of Austria's German territory to be advisable, so long as the development of that Empire is hindered by a struggle of the most pernicious kind, which is always accompanied by the danger of disturbing Germany in her own internal development or involving her in external embarrassments.

It might therefore be preferable to await the consolidation of the Austrian Empire before Germany undertakes an obligation the fulfilment of which might be perhaps scarcely practicable.

Finally, I venture to express a doubt whether it can be in the interests of Bavaria to appear in the face of Prussia as the champion of Austrian interests, before Austria herself has intimated such a wish.

In these circumstances might it not be more proper to offer a prospect of the regulation of the relations of United Germany

to Austria in the Treaty of Confederacy, as is done in the draft Constitution of the North German Confederation with respect to the South German States?

This form is far more acceptable for *all* parties, and it should answer sufficiently the interests which you seek to consider.

I certainly consider the elaboration of all such proposals to be desirable, so as to be prepared for the time when the constitutional labours of the North German Confederation shall have reached their conclusion. Inasmuch, however, as the position of affairs has considerably altered since our conversation at Mühlacker, owing to decisive utterances in Paris and Berlin which have shed quite a new light on many questions, it appears to me desirable that in view of this position of affairs we should for the present adopt a waiting attitude.

The proceedings of the Reichstag in Berlin and the whole development of the North German Confederation must before long afford us a definite basis for the form and substance of the union we desire. It will then be easy for us to secure this basis and make it more effective.

Meanwhile I believe you will agree with me when I describe the federal relation with Prussia, which is at present aimed at, as a state of transition, which will eventually lead to the whole German territory being covered by *one* constitution. I shall receive your further communications with the greatest interest and with sincere gratitude.

On receipt of this letter the Prince sent the Ministerial Councillor Count Tauffkirchen to Karlsruhe, to explain further the views of the Bavarian Government to the Grand Duke. After the return of Count Tauffkirchen he wrote to the Grand Duke:

MUNICH, *March 14, 1867.*

I beg to express to your Royal Highness my most dutiful thanks for your gracious letter of the 4th inst. as well as for the gracious reception which your Royal Highness was pleased to grant Count Tauffkirchen.

Your Royal Highness's letter and the report of Count Tauffkirchen have given me a new proof of the kind favour with which your Royal Highness honours me, and they afford me at the same time evidence of such a general agreement of views that my hope of a profitable co-operation of the South-West German States in the German question has received new life.

Before, however, I touch more nearly upon the questions discussed, I beg your Royal Highness to permit me to preface my remarks by the assurance that the observations made in my letter of February 19, about paving the way for friendly relations with Austria, were in no way due to influence of the Court of Vienna or of the Austrian party existing here, but were the expression of my own firm conviction, according to which an

alliance between Germany and Austria appears to be the fittest means of obviating European complications and preserving peace, which is no less urgently needed by the South-West German States than by Austria.

If I now sum up the result up to the present of our exchange of ideas, then I think I may define my standpoint, which indeed till now has been only a strictly personal view, in the following terms:

The time is close at hand when, hastening the conclusion of the North German Confederation, the Prussian Government, in accordance with Article LXXI.\* of the draft Constitution, will demand the regulation by treaty of its relations to South Germany. It is urgently to be desired that at such a juncture an agreement of the South-West German States upon the attitude they shall take up in this question may have been attained as far as possible.

This agreement can be prepared without delay, if the basis on which it rests is independent of the modifications, which the deliberations of Parliament may introduce into the draft of the North German Constitution.

The basis of constitutional law upon which alone we can move freely and correctly and be exempt from all limitations, is Article IV. of the Peace of Prague. This permits the formation of a League of German States (*Staatenbund*) with the exclusion of Austria, on the plan of the German Act of Confederacy of June 8, 1815, with the modifications rendered necessary by the altered conditions of the time, while at present the admissibility of a closer union with the North, taking the form of a Federal State, and especially of a joint legislative body, seems doubtful according to the final words of the Article in question.

With the double purpose (1) of removing these doubts and thereby being in a position to give voice to the legitimate aspirations of the nation, and (2) of obviating the danger of a disturbance of the peace of central Europe, it would be well to prepare the way at the same time for an alliance with Austria, and to do this in a manner similar to that adopted in Article LXXI. of the draft Constitution of the North German Confederation with reference to the regulation of relations with South Germany.

Not until after the conclusion of such an alliance shall we be able to proceed to the consolidation of the German Constitution with a central Government and Parliament.

\* Article LXXI. of the draft read as follows: "The relations of the Confederation to the South German States shall be regulated immediately after the establishment of the Constitution of the North German Confederation by means of special agreements, such agreements to be laid before the Reichstag for approval." On the motion of Lasker and Miquel the following clause was added to the Article by resolution of the Reichstag of April 10: "The admission of the South German States, or of one of them, into the Confederation shall be effected by means of Federal legislation on the proposal of the Presidency of the Confederation."



In this connection I think I may formulate my ideas in the following four propositions:

(1) Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and South Hesse associate themselves in a joint proposal to the North German Confederation for the establishment of a League of States on the pattern of the former German Confederation, with the exclusion of Austria.

(2) The Act of Confederacy of June 8, 1815, is to form the basis of the deliberations upon this joint proposal, and is only to be so far modified as may be rendered necessary by the altered situation due to the secession of Austria, the transference of the Presidency to Prussia and the preservation of the Zollverein.

(3) To this new Treaty of Confederacy there is to be added an Article preparing the way for an alliance with Austria, in terms similar to those of Article LXXI. of the Constitution of the North German Confederation.

(4) The development of this constitutional fabric into a Federal State with a Parliamentary constitution is to be reserved.

I shall not undertake to-day to formulate the modifications which appear to me necessary in the Act of Confederacy, as I am awaiting the proposals which the Minister of State, Herr Mathy, was kind enough to promise Count Tauffkirchen, and which I look forward to with lively interest.

With reference to the way in which the four States are to combine for this joint application to the North German Confederation, I will to-day only say this, that the calling together of a South German Parliament to this end does not seem to me desirable, on the contrary, the more privately the work of combination can be carried on, the better prospect there will be of its being exempt from disturbing influences.

Your Royal Highness touched upon the question with Count Tauffkirchen whether an attempt should not be made to ascertain the views of Count Bismarck on the subject of an Alliance with Austria. The present condition of the Eastern question obviously imposes upon him the greatest reserve in this connection, and perhaps on this account it would be preferable to keep the whole of the plan which I have just formulated a complete secret for the present, and at least until Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden have arrived at an agreement on its main points.

The Grand Duke thanked the Prince for this letter by return, on March 16. As he was on the point of leaving for Berlin, he postponed the continuation of the essential negotiations until his return from this journey. While in Berlin he wished, without communicating the Prince's project to Count Bismarck, to endeavour to ascertain the latter's views on the development of relations with South Germany. "As however," the Grand Duke continued, "I do not wish too long a time to elapse without informing you of my opinion of your last letter, I shall afford you

a verbal opportunity of learning my views. Dr. Gelzer, Councillor of State, has undertaken to visit Munich, where he will probably arrive on Tuesday the 19th. He is an old, intimate, and well-trying friend of mine. The implicit confidence which I have in him on this account allows me to extend the same confidence to the most various affairs of life, and hence he has been exactly informed of your proposals and letters as well as of my views. It would give me much pleasure if you would have the kindness to put the same confidence in Herr Gelzer, and to give him an opportunity to state my views as well as his own. I therefore recommend him most particularly to your kindness." Gelzer's name had been known to the Prince from his youth when his religious writings were especially esteemed by the Prince's mother.\* The choice of this man for verbal negotiations on the German question was therefore peculiarly welcome to the Prince, and on Gelzer's arrival at Munich on March 21 conversations took place between him and the Prince which led to a complete understanding. At the same time the Württemberg Minister, Freiherr von Varnbüler, was also present in Munich for a similar purpose.

*Journal.*

*March 12, 1867.*

Wagner having called on me the day before yesterday, but having subsequently excused himself on account of illness, I wrote to him to-day, asking him to come to me this evening. He came at half-past six. At first he was somewhat embarrassed, spoke of indifferent things and excused himself, saying that he really had no right to come to me at all. I put him in a more comfortable frame of mind by saying that we had two points in common, we were both hated by the same party and we were united in equal veneration for the King. Thereupon he became more communicative, spoke about the way in which the King had been treated and so tormented that he had twice written to him that he would abdicate; and told me, amid protestations of not wishing to take credit to himself, that it was *he* who had recommended me to the King as Minister. Then he came to the task of Bavaria as a German State, whose population united the versatility of Franconia with the imagination of Swabia and the native strength of Bavaria; said that the King was just the man to rule this German State and to realise the ideal of the German spirit (*Deutschtum*); went on to speak of his artistic aims, of his experiences in this country, of his plans for the establishment of a school of art, of the obstacles that had been put in his way, and came finally to the Cabinet. Among other things he spoke of the necessity of my remaining in the Ministry. To which I replied that this did not depend upon myself; that I could not guarantee that attempts would not be

\* See p. 33.

made to undermine the King's confidence in me, and that I was the less sure of retaining this, since the King, following the tradition of the Royal House, did not treat with me direct, but only through the Cabinet. He then said that this could not continue so; whereupon I drew his attention to the danger of engaging in a conflict with the Cabinet, a danger of which he must be well aware. He mentioned my political programme, into a few details of which I entered.

Finally he expressed the hope that the King would never lose confidence in me.

At the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of March 16, 1867, the motion of the Deputies Dr. Edel and Dr. Völk for the establishment of a supreme administrative tribunal (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*) had been under discussion. The motion corresponded to a resolution of the Chamber of June 27, 1865, for which reason, after a lengthy speech in its support by Dr. Edel, no one else rose to speak. The President therefore closed the discussion while reserving to the Reporter and the representative of the Government the right of making final remarks by the Reporter and the Government Advocate. Thereupon Minister von Bomhard rose and declared the question to be not yet so mature that the Government ought not to demand time to take it into further consideration. The President observed, after this speech, that he regarded the utterance of the Minister of Justice as a reopening of the discussion, and assumed that Herr von Bomhard had spoken as a Deputy, since his remarks were scarcely reconcilable with the former attitude of the Ministry. In the now reopened discussion Dr. Völk proceeded to deliver a sharp attack, reminding the Chamber of the fact that as long ago as June 27, 1865, the Minister of the Interior had declared that the question of an administrative tribunal had been carefully gone into, and that he was firmly convinced of the necessity of its establishment. "It is no light matter," he said, "for the political life of a State at the present time, if it can be said of it with a shadow of justification that it is without a helm; and that is what is now said of the Bavarian State."

### *Journal.*

March 17, 1867.

On Sunday, March 17, 1867, I returned at half-past eleven at night from Ansbach. I found a letter from Schlör, in which he informed me that the day before there had been a scene in the Chamber of Deputies, which decided him to ask me to fix a Ministerial Council for Monday the 18th. Bomhard, it appeared, had risen quite unnecessarily at the sitting of Saturday and spoken in a way that made public property of the fact that a difference of opinion existed among the Ministry on the question of the

administrative tribunal. After I had been present at a committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Ministers assembled at my house at one o'clock. Here Bomhard the Minister of Justice was reproached for his error, and given clearly to understand that he must resign. He granted that he had gone rather too far in his speech, but would not admit that this should involve his dismissal. He would not retire, but would lay the matter before the King and leave the decision to the King. Whereupon he went away. The rest of us, with the exception of Prantke, remained together and discussed what we should do, and then agreed that Schlör should draw up a memorial to the King by the next day.

On Monday evening Varnbüler, Schlör, and Tauffkirchen dined with me, and after dinner we had a long talk about the relations of South Germany to the North German Confederation.

The next morning Varnbüler and I discussed the German question, and at noon the Ministers, with the exception of Bomhard, met again at my house. We all thought Schlör's memorial too abrupt, and Gresser was commissioned to draw up a more polite one. In order that the King should not hear Bomhard's version only, and perhaps be talked over to his side, I proposed that they should authorise me to go on the following day to the King and give him a provisional verbal account of the state of affairs. I also wrote to Lutz, to get him to ask the King to receive me instead of Pfretzschner, who was obliged to be at the sitting of the Upper House, as I had a very urgent matter to lay before him in the name of the Council of Ministers. At half-past eleven at night I received an answer that the King, before granting me an audience, wished to know the object of my visit. The next morning I replied that I had been commissioned to inform the King verbally of the views of the Cabinet, and that, if the King desired me to present a memorial in writing, I must first call the Council together in order to draw up a collective note.

To this missive an immediate reply was sent, that the King would receive the Prince the same day at half-past twelve.

On April 30 the resignation of the Minister of Justice, von Bomhard, took place. A Bill providing for the establishment of an administrative tribunal was laid before the Chamber of Deputies on November 27, 1867.

*Report to the KING respecting the relations of Bavaria with the other German Confederate States.*

MUNICH, March 20, 1867.

In order to proceed with any prospect of success with the negotiations respecting the position occupied by Bavaria with regard to the other German States, such as were announced by Prussia, as being in preparation with Würtemberg, Baden, and

Hesse, and as undoubtedly to be extended to Austria, as well as to enable him in all things to perform his duty in the present exceedingly difficult situation, Your Majesty's obedient servant requires above all to be thoroughly assured that his opinions regarding the means of accomplishing the end in view fully coincide with those of his Royal master. He needs your Majesty's confidence, and that in such a degree that not only this country but the Governments before mentioned shall not doubt for a moment the existence of this unanimity and of this confidence. Your Majesty will not fail to appreciate that, unless this conviction is firmly established and general, any attempt at a salutary solution of the question before us would be doomed to failure from the outset. In justification of this view, the undersigned ventures to remind your Majesty that during the last few weeks *rumours* which have been current have been sufficient to bring to a standstill the negotiations opened with the Grand Duke of Baden and with the Minister von Varnbüler of Würtemberg, and to strengthen the party in Karlsruhe which is working for admission into the North German Confederation.

The undersigned feels that these considerations impose upon him the duty of submitting to your Majesty with all frankness, and as precisely as possible, the position he feels bound to take up with regard to the impending negotiations.

Only in the event of your Majesty being pleased to sanction this position in its main lines, will the undersigned be able to accomplish the task graciously imposed upon him, and the more clearly and unquestionably your Majesty may be pleased to acknowledge this unanimity, the more hopefully will he be able to proceed with the work.

The danger which threatens the Kingdom through the continuance of the present state of affairs is a double one:

(1) Any European complication, however favourably it might result for one or other of the Great Powers, might prove the greatest danger to the existence and independence of Bavaria, should Germany be involved in it.

(2) The aspiration of the German people to realise their national ideal, even against the will of their Governments, may lead to internal struggles which would threaten the dynasty.

It must therefore be the task of the Government:

(1) To conclude alliances, by which the danger of European complications would be averted.

(2) To strive for the formation of a national union of Germany, which would satisfy the legitimate demands of the nation, without infringing the sovereign rights of your Majesty or the integrity of Bavaria.

The less it can be disputed that at the present moment Bavaria is still in a position to *hinder* the accomplishment of any of these designs, the more certain does it appear that

the word of Bavaria may have a great influence on their attainment.

This possibility, however, depends upon circumstances of a transient nature, and the opportunity now offered may be a brief one.

On the occurrence of a European complication, or the outbreak of a powerful national movement in South Germany, this opportunity would be irretrievably lost. From these considerations your Majesty's obedient servant, the undersigned, believes it his duty to oppose the idea that it would be in the interests of the Kingdom to wait until Austria is able to resume her former position in Germany. I neither consider such a change in the relations of Austria to be probable in the present form of the Austrian Monarchy, nor do I believe the re-entry of Austria into the German League to be possible, in view of the uncompromising opposition of Prussia, nor indeed, according to information I have received from Vienna, is it within the intentions of the Austrian Government.

In any case the attempt would lead to a European war, which would undoubtedly jeopardise the existence of Bavaria.

But, apart from such danger of war, should Bavaria continue to occupy an expectant and completely isolated position, Prussia would not fail to take advantage of this isolation in the treatment of pending material questions, which would greatly endanger the welfare of the country and indirectly the maintenance of internal law and order.

The undersigned therefore believes it his duty to advise most strongly the entry into the negotiations proposed by Prussia respecting the relations of the South German States to the North German Confederation, and the arrival at a previous understanding, as far as possible, upon joint or, at any rate, similar action on the part of the South-West German States in this question. It is becoming daily more obvious that Prussia is not disposed to wait long before taking the question in hand, and in this connection the undersigned would draw attention to the speech of the King of Prussia of February 24, and the speech of Count Bismarck of March 11, 1867,\* which make it appear

\* King Wilhelm, in his Speech from the Throne on February 24 (at the opening of the first Reichstag of the North German Confederation), said, with regard to South Germany: "The regulation of the national relations of the North German Confederation to our fellow countrymen south of the Main has been left open by the treaty of peace of last year as a matter for agreement. For the attainment of this mutual understanding our hand will be held out frankly and willingly to the countries of South Germany, as soon as the North German Confederation shall have made sufficient progress in the establishment of its Constitution to be in a position to conclude treaties. The maintenance of the Zollverein, the joint administration of domestic affairs, and the measures to be taken in common for the security of German territory, will furnish the fundamental conditions of the understanding which, it may be anticipated, will be the object of the endeavours of both parties." Count Bismarck, speaking on March 11,

the more impossible to postpone the opening of negotiations with the South-West German States for a concurrent treatment of the question.

As to the course to be pursued in this work of coming to an argument, the undersigned deems it unquestionably right to propose to your Majesty that which is in accordance with current treaties, and is therefore the correct course and will not endanger peace, which seeks its points of departure in the most recent events, is therefore wisely conservative, and which is more calculated than any other to preserve the position of Bavaria and the rights of your Majesty.

The basis is afforded by the Treaty of Prague of August 23, 1866, which provides by Article IV.:

(1) That Germany is to be newly constituted without the participation and with the exclusion of Austria.

(2) That the South-West German States shall be free to arrange a national union with the North of Germany; but that, nevertheless,

(3) In contradistinction to the States of the North German Confederation, an international independent existence shall be preserved to the South-West German States.

This last requirement is fulfilled by the formation of a League of States, while a Federal State, which is distinguished from the former especially by possessing a joint legislative body (a federal parliament), would overstep the limits laid down.

The most recent precedent with which a connection is to be made is the German Confederation, from which Austria has seceded, but which, even if formally dissolved, can nevertheless not be considered as completely abolished so far as concerns the actual connection of the German States among themselves. The German Act of Confederacy of June 8, 1815, would therefore afford a fitting foundation.

A reconstitution of the German Confederation, with the exclusion of the Austrian States, upon the foundation of the Act of Confederacy, and with only those modifications therein which are obviously brought about by the altered circumstances, that is the basis, according to the conviction of your obedient servant, upon which an agreement of the South-West German States is to be attained and negotiations opened with the North.

Under the name of the German Confederation a league of States would hereby be created, which might undoubtedly serve as a transition to a closer federal union, but which could not for the time being be described as a constitutional confederation in the proper sense of the words.

said of South Germany: "As regards the important question of power, I consider the union of North Germany and South Germany, in the face of all questions where the North German Confederation is attacked, to be in all points assured. It is assured by the needs of the South and by the duty of the North to stand by her."

The members of this Confederation of States would be: The North-German Confederation, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Southern Hesse.

Prussia, as chief Power of the North German Confederation, would have the Presidency.

An equitable division of the voting powers would have to be considered as far as possible.

For the regulation of military relations, the separate treaty of August 22, 1866, and the Stuttgart resolutions would furnish the standard.

Article XIX. of the Act of Confederacy would have to be modified in such a way as to secure the existence of the Zollverein.

The centre of legislation would lie in the Chambers of the separate States, and for the North German Confederation in its Federal Council and Parliament.

The admission of South German Deputies into *this* Parliament should be declined.

In all other points the independence of the separate States would remain undisturbed.

As surely as a unification of Germany can be prepared on these lines, which in the given case also allows the possibility of the German provinces of Austria being included later, so surely will such a form not permanently satisfy the legitimate desires of the German nation as to its share in collective legislation and the powerful protection of German interests abroad.

In the opinion of the undersigned, the means of avoiding European complications during the natural and irresistible progress of this work for the unification of Germany, and of preserving the integrity of the separate States, and especially of Bavaria, is to be sought by preparing the way for an alliance of this German League with Austria, which would secure to both the possibility of *peaceful* reconstruction and development.

It should therefore be provided in the new Act of the German Confederation, in complete analogy with Article LXXI. of the draft Constitution of the North German Confederation, that an alliance of this confederation with Austria is to be prepared as soon as possible.

Your obedient servant has hitherto only been able with the utmost caution to make indirect inquiries as to the reception of this idea of his. Nevertheless, even these inquiries give the prospect that neither in Vienna nor in Berlin would such proposals be unfavourably received.

At Karlsruhe they seem inclined to consent to the plan, nor does your obedient servant doubt that the Government of Würtemberg will agree to it.

The undersigned now most respectfully begs your Majesty to authorise him to open negotiations on this basis at Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Darmstadt, and to look for opportunities at Berlin and Vienna.



Whatever may be the outcome of the negotiations, this much is certain and should be well considered, that by the mere fact of their being opened the position of Bavaria in regard to Prussia will be materially improved, in connection with the following rather burning questions, which are pending, viz. :

- (a) The liquidation of the property of the Confederation.
- (b) The abolition of the salt monopoly.
- (c) The renewal of the Zollverein.\*

After the reading of the present report, your Majesty's Council of Ministers, with the exception of the Minister von Bomhard who was not present, have declared themselves to be in agreement with its details and proposals.

*Marginal Minute of the KING on the preceding Report:*

The authorisation herein requested is granted.

LUDWIG.

MUNICH, March 30, 1867.

*Memorandum of the PRINCE.*

*Conversation with MINISTERIAL COUNCILLOR LUTZ,  
March 29, 1867.*

Lutz was quite pale with inward excitement when I called on him. He knew that it was a question of his whole future. I began by telling him that as yet I had had no opportunity of conferring with a candidate for the Ministry of Justice. That I had other plans, as he had already heard from Tauffkirchen. These plans could not, however, be carried out without a complete *revirement* of the Ministry. It was a question of himself. But it was difficult, if not impossible, for me at present to propose any change in the Ministry, since I was not at variance with the other Ministers, and entertained real esteem for Gresser and Pechmann in particular. It might, however, appear desirable and necessary for the next few months to have a Ministry to which the world, and especially our neighbours, would look with respect, in that case it was needful to have sensible men in the Ministry, so I had thought of him. I then explained to him how it was impossible that he alone should enter the Ministry in place of Bomhard, and said that the difficulty lay simply in the fact that,

\* By Article VII. of the Treaty of Peace of August 22, 1866, Prussia had agreed to the provisional continuance of the Zollverein, but had reserved to herself the power of giving six months' notice, and, after indirect taxes as well as Customs Duties had been declared a federal matter by the Constitution of the North German Confederation, had immediately demanded a corresponding amendment of the Zollverein legislation. Accordingly the Bavarian salt monopoly had to come to an end, and on May 9, 1867, an agreement was concluded respecting it.

if the Ministry of Justice were now filled, there would be no place for him later on.

He replied, saying how thankfully he recognised the confidence which I placed in him, but he believed he would meet with opposition on the part of the King. He told me that once before he had been proposed for the Ministry of Public Worship in Koch's time, and that this had fallen through owing to the King's opposition. Nor could he come forward of his own accord.

I replied that *at present* I could not commence any intrigue against my colleagues, as there was no pretext for it, but that such pretexts might occur later. Even without a pretext it might appear urgent to introduce new blood into the Ministry. In view of this it was desirable that he should hold himself available, and postpone taking the Ministry of Justice for a few months.

In reply to his question whether it were possible to drag along with Bomhard, I assured him that it would make us too ridiculous.

Finally we agreed that he should tell the King I had thought of Steyrer,\* but had not yet spoken to him, and considered it desirable that the matter should remain in suspense and the Ministry be carried on as it was, after Bomhard had received his dismissal.

For the rest, he wished to tell me frankly that influences were at work which inclined the King more favourably to Bomhard. Consequently, he no longer had the King in hand in this matter and could not answer for anything.

*Report to the KING respecting negotiations with the North German Confederation.*

MUNICH, March 31, 1867.

Your Majesty has been pleased by Royal sign-manual of the 30th inst. to authorise your most obedient servant to open negotiations in Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, and Darmstadt, in order to bring about an understanding between the South-West German States with a view to joint, or at least concurrent, action in the coming negotiations with Prussia and the North-German Confederation.

Meanwhile the endeavours of Würtemberg and Baden to range themselves in harmony with your Majesty's Government on this question have found actual expression.

Freiherr von Varnbüler, Minister of State in Würtemberg, and Dr. Gelzer, Councillor of State of the Grand Duchy of Baden, the latter at the special request of the Grand Duke of Baden, were lately in Munich for a preliminary discussion with your most obedient servant of the bases of an agreement.

The results of the discussion with Freiherr von Varnbüler

\* Then Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Justice.

are stated in the accompanying sketch,\* which fully agrees with the proposals of the 20th inst., approved by your Majesty, which are again attached in original, and on that account, although it has no official character, it affords a firm hope that Würtemberg will entirely accede to the plan draw up by the undersigned.

Councillor Gelzer also declared himself, on behalf of the Grand Duke of Baden, in complete agreement with the main features laid before him of the attitude to be observed in the negotiations with North Germany.

The prospects of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden coming to an agreement on the proposed lines are therefore good. On the other hand, events are proceeding with a rapidity that exceeds all anticipation. The North German Parliament — of this there can hardly be any doubt — will by next month have brought its task to an end.

The idea of an alliance between the contemplated Confederation of German States and Austria seems, from official declarations in Berlin and Vienna, to offer every prospect of success, and perhaps it is only a question of the first step. At the same time, the question of Luxembourg is becoming more and more serious for Germany, and urgently calls for union.

The undersigned considers it his imperative duty most respectfully to draw your Majesty's attention to these circumstances and to the dangers which delay must threaten to the position of Bavaria in this question, at the same time most humbly praying that your Majesty may be pleased to sanction the conclusion of the agreement discussed with Freiherr von Varnbüler, and the opening of corresponding negotiations with the other South-West German States.

*Minute by the KING in the margin of the preceding report.*

I approve the request here made, with the addition that, when the agreement is concluded, the refusal, formulated under Clause II., of the South German States to enter the North German Confederation, is to be expressed in a still *more decisive manner*, and *most strictly* adhered to in the sequel, and that the recognition, comprised under Clause IV. (6), of the necessity of a parliament † seems to me to be not unobjectionable, and even superfluous, and that I should, therefore, prefer to see it avoided.

\* This "sketch" has not been preserved. Its contents may be inferred from the report of March 20 and from the resulting agreement of May 6, 1867.

† According to this provision, "*with respect to the further growth of federal legislation. the right of national representation in the league is to be recognised.* For the time being the legislation of the league was to be dependent on the approval of the Chambers of Estates in the South and of the North German Parliament in the North.

Clause IV. (8) I interpret, and therefore approve, in the sense that the regulation by treaty \* will take place immediately upon the regulation of general relations, and before the new Treaties of Confederacy come into force.

LUDWIG.

MUNICH, *April 11, 1867.*

At this juncture the progress of negotiations was interrupted by the international complication brought about by the French designs for the acquisition of Luxembourg.

On the afternoon of April 1, 1867, Herr von Werthern received the following telegram from Count Bismarck:

"Information is urgently desired from your Excellency as to what impression the alleged sale of Luxembourg to France makes upon the Bavarian Cabinet, and what disposition we might count upon in Bavaria in case we came to a complication with France about it."

BISMARCK.

An undated memorandum of the Prince records the contents of this telegram, and continues:

"Werthern replied: 'Public opinion expects that Prussia will protect the rights of Germany in Luxembourg. Cabinet (*i.e.*, Ministry) takes this feeling into account, while it judges at the same time the circumstances impartially.' To-day I have given Werthern a hint not to lay too much stress on the constancy of public opinion in Bavaria in his written reports to Bismarck, and to tell him there was much party spirit in it, and the mood might change at any moment."

On April 2 the following despatch was sent to the Bavarian Minister in Berlin, Count von Montgelas:

"Yesterday evening Baron Werthern expressed to me Count Bismarck's desire to know the views of the King's Government on the Luxembourg affair. I hastened to obtain the decision of his Majesty the King, my most gracious master, and now in what follows accede to that desire:

"Count Bismarck will recognise the difficulty of making a binding pronouncement upon a matter, of which I have at present no official cognisance, and in which I have to rely upon newspaper reports and the telegraphic account received here last night of Count Bismarck's declaration in the Reichstag.†

"As far as it is possible in the circumstances to form an opinion, the King's Government entirely shares the point of view indicated by Count Bismarck, to which it would only add that, in view of the treaties of April 19, 1839, and July 27, 1839, it considers any alienation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, without the

\* Of relations with Austria.

† April 1, on Bennigsen's interpellation.

free consent of the Wallram line of the House of Nassau, as legitimate successors, to be inadmissible. In any case, the Bavarian Government is confident that Count Bismarck has neglected, and will neglect, nothing which may serve to protect by peaceful means the rights of Germany in this matter.

"Should events take a more serious turn, which God forbid, then the King's Government will expect to receive confidential information from Count Bismarck without delay.

"You will be good enough to communicate the contents of this despatch to his Excellency Count von Bismarck."

In a telegram to Werthern of April 2, Count Bismarck expressed a wish to learn, through the mediation of Bavaria, what attitude he might expect Austria to take up in the event of a war with France. After an inquiry had been sent by telegram in cipher to the Bavarian Minister in Vienna, the Prince addressed the following letter to the Minister on the same day:

"By cipher telegram of to-day's date I have requested your Excellency to endeavour to obtain reliable information regarding the disposition of the Imperial Government in the event of the Luxembourg question leading to war.

"It is true that the latest utterances of the Prussian Government give rise to no direct or definite apprehension, but they are, nevertheless, calculated to challenge a serious examination of the question, what position the King's Government is to take up. The King's Government has to keep in view, besides the urgent necessity and desire for the preservation of peace, the obligations incumbent on it towards the whole of Germany and Prussia in particular, and, taking this into consideration, it has replied to an inquiry of Count Bismarck by the despatch of which a copy is enclosed.

"If the value of friendly relations between Bavaria and the rest of Germany and Austria was already insisted upon in my circular of February 24, 1867, the importance of a declaration on the part of the Imperial Government which would give expression to such friendly relations becomes so prominent in view of the recent complications that the question of the maintenance of peace may be said to depend chiefly upon the position which the Imperial Government decides to take up in the matter.

"How valuable the maintenance of peace is for Austria at the present moment, how dangerous even an armed neutrality would be to the development of the contemplated changes in the constitutional life of Austria, will certainly be admitted by Herr von Beust. By an attitude favourable to German interests it is scarcely to be doubted that the Austrian Government would not only avoid this danger, but would form a connection with Germany corresponding to the interests and desires of all parties. In any case, it is of the highest importance to

the Bavarian Government to be informed of the decision of Austria in this respect.

"By command of his Majesty the King, my most gracious master, I commission you to address, as soon as possible, confidential inquiries in this sense to Herr von Beust, and authorise you to make known to him the contents of this despatch. Your Excellency will inform me with all possible haste of his answer, and of all matters affecting this question."

On April 3 a Ministerial Council was held, at which the Prince assured himself of the unanimous approval of his colleagues of the steps hitherto taken by him. On the same day Count Bismarck telegraphed to Herr von Werthern:

"Tell Prince Hohenlohe the following quite confidentially. Diplomatic communications from France assert that the Luxembourg transaction is concluded. The Emperor can no longer withdraw, although I have told Benedetti that in the present state of public opinion we could not and would not give way. On the other hand, Count Perponcher reports from The Hague that a conclusion has not been reached, and that he hopes to hinder it. In the present position of things in Germany we must, in my judgment, be prepared to risk a war, however poor an object Luxembourg may be in itself. The attitude of the nation in the matter, its honour being at stake, must decide. In any case, we should both, to the best of our power, make the most of the favourable influence which this incident will have upon the consolidation of the national cause, and at the same time not allow ourselves to be taken by surprise should war occur at any moment. The British Government seems secretly disposed to view the prospect of a war not quite without pleasure, hoping that France will be worsted, ready, perhaps, to lend its aid, as soon as fortune favours us."

Herr von Werthern sent this telegram to the Prince, who was at the moment dining at the Royal table.

*Memorandum by the PRINCE "on the statement to his Majesty the KING, April 4, at 11 a.m."*

At to-day's audience I made a statement to the King on the position of the Luxembourg affair. I asked what answer should be given to Count Bismarck's despatch of yesterday, and was authorised to declare that in case of war Bavaria would stand by the side of Prussia in conformity with the secret treaty, but that South German conditions made it appear urgently desirable that Bismarck should await the result of the inquiries in Vienna before proceeding to extreme measures.

On April 5 it was laid down, in a note to Herr von Werthern, "that, in case the Luxembourg affair should lead to an armed

conflict with France, the Bavarian Government regards it as established by the treaties already concluded that it shall stand by the side of Prussia and the other German States."

Julius Fröbel\* was next sent to Vienna on April 3, to hasten the negotiations opened with Austria on April 2. He returned to Munich on the morning of April 7, and reported — according to a memoir of Count Tauffkirchen — he had spoken with Beust on the evening of April 4. Beust had said that he was in no way involved with France. The nature of the situation pointed to benevolent neutrality. Austria could at that time have no motive for intervening in the affair even though Prussia were prepared to reciprocate, for instance, in regard to the Eastern question, by a guarantee against the occupation of Bulgaria by Russia. There was proof, however, that Prussia was opposing the endeavours of the Government in the country. This must in any case cease. Above all, Prussia must herself come forward. Bavaria had lost through her treaties the independence necessary for the rôle of mediator. Besides this, Fröbel had brought the following advices: Beust had to be extremely circumspect. The party of the higher aristocracy were inimical to him. If victorious they would bring in a Metternich Ministry with an absolute régime and a French alliance. Beust's success at the Landtag in Prague† might have a decisive effect upon his position. Heinrich von Gagern was now committed to the Bavarian programme. Fröbel supposed that Napoleon would prefer a congress to a war.‡

Count Tauffkirchen observed that so far from the independence of Bavaria being impaired by the treaty, it assured to the King of Bavaria the right of declaring war, and in that event pledged Prussia to assist. If Austria had an interest in preserving the independence of Bavaria and South Germany, and in the non-extension of the North German Confederation, this could in no way be better secured than by accepting mediation.

*Memorandum by the PRINCE, April 8, 1867.*

Audience of the King to-day. I read to him Bismarck's despatch informing us of the peaceful turn taken by the Luxem-

\* Fröbel, who had been in the service of the Austrian Government from 1862 to 1866, and was at this time working at Stuttgart for the Government of Würtemberg, had already been sent by the Prince to Vienna on February 26 to find out what position Freiherr von Beust would adopt towards the Prince's German programme. — Fröbel, *Ein Lebenslauf*, vol. ii. p. 469.

† After the dissolution of the Bohemian Landtag, the elections, which had taken place between March 22 and 29, had given a large majority to the German Constitutional party. Beust himself had been elected by the Chamber of Commerce of Reichenberg. — Beust, *Aus drei Viertel-jahrhunderten*, vol. ii. p. 111.

‡ Count Tauffkirchen's notes agree entirely with Fröbel's own report. — *Ein Lebenslauf*, vol. ii. p. 77.

bourg affair. He then touched on various other subjects. Later spoke of the Ministry. He asked which of the Ministers I regarded as specially able. I mentioned Schlör. He then spoke of Franckh and Orff; I recommended the latter, he spoke for Franckh. Finally he seemed to give in. Then he turned to Gresser, said he was not equal to his post, and wished that the Ministers would fall foul of him as well as of Bomhard, so as to get rid of him. I said this was impossible, but that he could easily be accommodated with a Government presidency somewhere, which was what he was fitted for.

*Despatch to the Bavarian Legation in Berlin.*

MUNICH, April 9, 1867.

In the report of the 6th, received here the 8th inst., stress is laid on the fact that Count Bismarck would like a definite statement by the Bavarian Government as to the attitude it would adopt in the event of war with France. I considered this question already settled by my cipher telegram of the 6th inst., and by similar explanations to Herr von Werthern; I have not, however, omitted to obtain from H.M. the King further commands, by which I am now empowered to state that, if war should break out between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of the French over the Luxembourg question, the Bavarian Government would deem that the case provided in the treaty signed at Berlin, August 22, 1866, had arisen, and accordingly would be prepared to act in the sense of that treaty. I must add, however, a reiterated assurance that his Majesty's Government, far from pressing for war, is prepared to co-operate in every suitable way towards the maintenance of an honourable peace, and, indeed, to exhaust all suitable means to that end.

This despatch is marked with the King's concurrence, dated April 9.

*The GRAND DUKE FRIEDRICH VON BADEN  
to PRINCE HOHENLOHE.*

KARLSRUHE, April 9, 1867.

On the day of my return from Berlin I received a visit from State Councillor Gelzer, who came to give me a verbal account of his journey to Munich. All that he told me as to the reception which you accorded him, and about the exchange of ideas which he had with you in regard to the weightier questions of the moment, could not but confirm in a high degree the impressions I brought back at the time from the conference at Mühlacker.

Councillor Gelzer assured you in my name that the chief object of his visit was to establish confidential relations between you and me in addition to the ordinary business channels of



communication, which seems to me highly desirable for the happy solution of national problems. Councillor Gelzer told me repeatedly with grateful satisfaction with what good will the confidence with which he approached you was reciprocated, and I look upon this basis of confidence as of the highest value in all our present and future intercourse.

As to the agreement which was drawn up at your desire during Councillor Gelzer's stay at Munich, and communicated to me as a foundation for future negotiations with Berlin, you know, both from my verbal and written statements, and from the recent communications of Councillor Gelzer, how from the bottom of my heart I regard the present questions and aims. It was with my fullest concurrence that Gelzer, in his conversations both with you and with Count von Tauffkirchen, laid stress upon these three points:

(1) That the union of North and South Germany in one single federated State — whether by the inclusion of the Southern States in the North German Confederation, or by the further development of the Zollverein — has always appeared to me the most desirable of ends, for the attainment of which I would shrink from no personal sacrifice. That so long as this end remains unattainable, however, I consider myself bound not to hold aloof from any attempt that might bring us at least some steps nearer to it.

(2) That for this reason I have already declared myself prepared, and I now renew that declaration, to meet with full confidence proposals emanating from yourself for an understanding regarding our common negotiations with the North German Confederation, because I attach the greatest value to a straightforward co-operation with you, so long as I am able to remain faithful to my own convictions; in short, I consider it a patriotic duty to support your position and your influence in Bavaria as far as in me lies.

(3) That I can fully appreciate your ruling desire to work in the best possible way for the preservation of European peace, and to prevent Germany from being split into two hostile camps, and that in this connection I understand your proposals regarding Austria as formulated in No. VI. of the agreement drawn up by you.

I thought it necessary once more to emphasise these three points in order to set before you the animating motives of my position and opinion with regard to your endeavours. I am anxious that you should be perfectly clear as to my intentions and convictions.

Another question, however, is this: how would the agreement be regarded at present in Berlin? During my stay there two points seemed to me very significant in this connection.

First, I do not believe that an open ear or a complete understanding can be expected there for any other interest whatsoever,

until the Constitution of the North German Confederation is assured.

Next, I was able while there to satisfy myself that immediately after the adoption of the Constitution of the North German Confederation, the discussion of a revision of the Zollverein (which is only to be expected) would take precedence of all other negotiations. I think myself the more obliged to draw your attention to this, because in Berlin Count Bismarck did not disguise from me what an unfavourable impression had been made there by a memorandum on the Zollverein question which had just been received from Munich.\*

I am very grateful to you for your latest kind communication regarding the sanction which you obtained from the King to take the first steps in the matters herein mentioned.

With you I wish from my heart that the Luxembourg affair may not further disturb the development of German relations. But at all events this question may become a touchstone for the true worth of the German nation, and in this case unity and strength may grow out of it.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, April 10, 1867.

The question of the cession of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to France has in a few days brought the peril of war between France and Prussia alarmingly near. It is beyond doubt that Bavaria would not be able to avoid participation in such a war, considering the wording of the treaty of alliance of August 22, 1866, and the feeling in the country. It is the more imperative to seize every available opportunity to avert the danger of war, or at any rate to diminish it, by an alliance calculated to strengthen us.

From this point of view, Count Bismarck's invitation to join in obtaining information as to Austria's inclinations towards concluding an alliance with Prussia and Bavaria is also acceptable.

The preliminary official steps in this direction undertaken by Count Bray have led to the somewhat cold reply which your Majesty will find in the enclosed despatch of the 7th inst. Meanwhile, Baron Beust has spoken on the subject to a private person, who, commissioned by your most obedient servant, the undersigned, has been to Vienna to discover the Minister's views. It appears from this that Austria would not be absolutely disinclined to adopt an actively friendly attitude towards Prussia. Negotiations would rather deal with the strengthening of the promises and guarantees, particularly on the Eastern question, which Prussia and Germany in general would offer the Austrian

\* Memorial from the Bavarian Ministerial Councillor Weber.

Government. If the undersigned could succeed in effecting a reconciliation of the interests of Prussia and Austria in this matter, the position of Bavaria in her negotiations with Prussia would be substantially strengthened thereby. For this reason the undersigned considers it important not to neglect any expedient which might conduce to this end. I have already personally represented to your Majesty that one such expedient (which even if unproductive of a definite result, might yet indirectly serve to smooth down many obstacles) would be afforded by the sending of a confidential agent to Berlin and Vienna. The duties to be associated with this mission are given in the enclosed draft instructions which are humbly submitted for your gracious approval.

I have respectfully suggested that the person entrusted with this important and difficult mission should be Count Tauffkirchen, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. . . . It would relieve the mind of your most obedient servant, if before coming to any definite decision your Majesty would receive Count Tauffkirchen, and be pleased to determine whether the undertaking of the proposed mission by the Count would correspond with your Majesty's intentions.

The draft of an instruction enclosed with the report indicates as the business of Count Tauffkirchen's mission to the Courts of Berlin and Vienna:

(1) To mitigate and, as far as possible, to remove, all obstacles standing in the way of an alliance between Prussia and Austria.

(2) To bring to a conclusion such an alliance either in general, or in particular with regard to the Luxembourg question, and to enter into the same on the part of Bavaria, subject to the assent of his Majesty the King.

(3) To aim at obtaining thereby from Prussia favourable conditions for the opening of the proposed negotiations concerning the position of Bavaria and of the other South-West German States towards the North German Confederation, and to conclude an agreement thereupon subject to the approval of his Majesty the King.

With the King's consent Count Tauffkirchen departed on his journey. From Berlin he wrote to the Prince on April 14:

"Bismarck has overwhelmed me with attentions in a quite remarkable manner. He seems to need Austria very particularly. So much the better, if we succeed in finding access there. . . . The King of Prussia spoke of your Highness with the fullest confidence and appreciation, and charged me with many greetings for you. . . ."

The Count's mission to Vienna was unsuccessful. After a conversation with Count von Beust on the morning of April 18, he wrote to the Prince on April 19: "I consider it quite beyond

doubt that the only advice to give the King is to recall me." \*

PRINCE HOHENLOHE *to the BAVARIAN LEGATION in Berlin.*

MUNICH, April 23, 1867.

Some days ago Baron Werthern read to me a despatch from Count Bismarck, in which the Royal Prussian Government wishes to know whether the Royal Bavarian Government is prepared of its own free resolve to share with Prussia the responsibility which protection of Luxembourg's independence may have either directly or indirectly. The despatch further insists that the German Governments must make it clear to themselves which is to their interest: whether to bear the consequences that may arise from the refusal of the concession to France — and in this event it is questionable whether Bavaria be suitably equipped — or whether to decline these consequences, in which case the Governments concerned must make clear whether they are resolved publicly to defend their declining of war and their consequent assent to a policy of peace.

Since the Royal Government has already declared, in the despatch of April 9, 1867, its readiness to stand side by side with the Prussian Government throughout the development of the Luxembourg question, in honourable fulfilment of the special treaty of August 22, 1866, it follows that her resolution holds good, even independently of the phases, as yet unknown to her at that time, of the policy regarding this question pursued by the Royal Prussian Government. In this case, however, responsibility for the possible outbreak of war should all the less be laid to her charge, as co-operation in the decisions in question was not possible to her.

On the other hand, of their own free determination — therefore apart from the Treaty of Alliance — the Bavarian Government consider it right not to shrink from a war necessary for the preservation of Germany's honour and of her position in Europe, but otherwise to leave no means untried which may conduce to the maintenance of a peace that is consistent with this honour and dignified position. They must desire the maintenance of such peace the more earnestly in proportion to the greatness and imminence of the injury that war with France would bring to South Germany, and the difficulty which the military powers of South-West Germany would find in offering an effective resistance to an attack by the French Army.

The Royal Government find a further reason for their earnest desire to preserve peace in the attitude of the Imperial and Royal Austrian Cabinet, which, according to the latest news received

\* This conversation is repeated in Beust's despatch of April 19 to Count Wimpffen in Berlin, printed by Beust, *Aus drei Vierteljahrhunderten*, vol. ii. p. 119.

from Vienna, is resolved to confine itself to a watchful neutrality. Accordingly, though it cannot be doubted that such a peaceful policy corresponds most nearly to the interests of Bavaria, yet the Royal Government has no hesitation in declaring that it is prepared even publicly to defend this policy and its consequences. This they can only do, however, if they are made acquainted with the measure of the concessions which are to be made to France, for the purpose of preserving peace. The Royal Government must, therefore, reserve its answer to this portion of the question asked until such time as it shall have received fuller explanations regarding the state of the negotiations between the Powers concerned, and regarding the conditions of the settlement of the difference arising between Prussia and France.

So far as the Royal Government, through the communications of Baron Beust, is acquainted with the content of the Austrian proposals for mediation,\* it does not hesitate to declare now that these form an acceptable basis for negotiation, and only wish to add that France should, at the same time, recognise the new relations prevailing in Germany.

The question as to the condition of the Bavarian Army will be answered in the most unreserved manner by Major-General and Quartermaster-General Count von Bothmer, who has gone to Berlin to-day for that purpose.

I beg your Highness to read this despatch to Count von Bismarck, and to be good enough to ask him for information as to the present state of negotiations.

The negotiations meanwhile set on foot with Würtemberg concerning the adjustment of relations with North Germany, led to an understanding which was expressed in the following "Ministerial declaration" of May 6-16, 1867:

"The undersigned, impressed by the high value of common action on the part of the States of South-West Germany, particularly Bavaria and Würtemberg, in the pending negotiations with the North German Confederation, agreeably to Article LXXI. of the draft Constitution, have, with the gracious consent of their Sovereigns, come to an agreement upon the following points:

"I. Bavaria and Würtemberg are prepared, at the instance of Prussia, to enter into negotiations with North Germany, as to the conclusion of the National Confederation contemplated for in Article IV. of the Peace of Prague.

"II. Entrance into a common confederation by the extension of the Constitution of the North-German Confederation to the Southern States cannot be accepted as a basis for these negotiations; rather is the conclusion of a more comprehensive confederation with the North German Confederation to be aimed at.

"III. For the constitution of this more comprehensive Confederation, the principles of the Act of Confederation of June 8,

\* As to Austria's proposals, see *Sybel*, vol. vi. p. 92.

1815, with the alterations necessitated by the secession of Austria, and by the demands of the time, are to be taken as the point of departure.

“IV. The Bavarian Government stipulates for the preparation of a draft, the outlines of which shall be laid down as follows:

“(1) The Confederation consists of the North German Confederation, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and South Hesse.

“(2) The purpose of the Confederation is to safeguard the national solidarity, to preserve the integrity of the Confederation's dominions, and to further the well-being of their inhabitants. All members of the Confederation have, as such, equal rights; they are mutually pledged to hold the Act of Confederation inviolable.

“(3) The business of the Confederation shall be conducted by a Federal Council under the presidency of Prussia, on which votes shall count in the following proportion:

Prussia 17

Bavaria 6

and the other Sovereign Princes and free towns of the Confederation as provided in Article VI. of the Act of Confederation of June 8, 1815.

“(4) Articles III. and IV. of the draft Constitution of the North-German Confederation will be recognised as a basis for negotiations relative to the settlement of the common concerns of the Confederation.

“(5) In order to obviate later difficulties in framing the laws of the Confederation, and having regard to experience gained under the ruling of the earlier Act of Confederation, the regulation of each single one of these common concerns shall, as a fundamental law of the Confederation, follow the lines of the agreement as far as possible.

“(6) In considering the framing of these laws, the qualification for national representation in the Confederation is to be acknowledged; while, however, and for so long as the relations of the Parliament of a more comprehensive confederation to the Parliament of the North German Confederation present insuperable difficulties, the framing of laws for the more comprehensive confederation shall be dependent on the consent of the Diets in the South, and in the North on that of the North German Parliament. The Federal Council prepares the Federal law.

“(7) In the North, executive power is vested in the presidency of the North German Confederation, in the South in the individual Sovereigns.

“(8) With the double purpose of removing the difficulties which may arise in the national development of the extended Confederation from the concluding words of Article IV. of the Peace of Prague, and to provide a guarantee for the maintenance of European peace, the provision laid down in Article LXXI. of the

draft Constitution of the North German Confederation should be added, viz. that a way should be paved for an alliance of the Confederation with Austria, if that is not attained simultaneously with the conclusion of the Treaty of Confederation.\*

"V. With regard to the military relations of the Southern States, particularly of Bavaria and Würtemberg to the North, arrangements have been made by the treaty of alliance that has been concluded, and by the South German States among themselves, in accordance with the Stuttgart resolutions of February 5, 1867.

"VI. The actual negotiations shall, according to the Prussian Government's previous suggestion, be undertaken in the form of conferences of the several Ministers in Berlin.

"VII. Preliminary declarations on this question by Bavaria and Würtemberg shall, so far as practicable, be sent to Prussia only after previous agreement, but in any case shall immediately be communicated to each other, and a direct correspondence between the undersigned shall be established as the form for these communications.

"VIII. Bavaria undertakes to obtain, if possible, the adhesion of Baden and Hesse to this draft agreement, and offers Würtemberg her good offices in this particular."

By a communication dated May 6, from the Bavarian Ministry of State, Baden and Hesse were invited to join this union.

Simultaneously the project was confidentially communicated to the Austrian Government.

The union of Bavaria and Würtemberg was thoroughly examined by the Ministry of Baden. The Minister for Foreign Affairs von Freydorf made the following remarks upon it:

"(1) From Nos. I., II., and IV., everything must be eliminated that hinders the entry of the South German States into the North German Confederation.

"(2) No. V. is to be understood as not excluding a further union in military matters of the South German States with Prussia, or with the North German Confederation. (Baden was at that time carrying on negotiations with Prussia regarding a military convention.)

"(3) No. IV. (5) is 'quite impossible,' if the Confederation is to be realised within measurable time.

"(4) No. IV. (3) and (6) are equally impossible, hence a legislative enactment, by means of the addition to the North German Confederation of a number of South German delegates, is requisite."

Count Bismarck, to whom these proposals of reform were communicated with the consent of Bavaria and Würtemberg on May 14, 1867, observed concerning them to von Türkheim, the Minister of Baden at Berlin, that he would not agree to a confederation on the lines of the protocol of May 6, but did not

\* For the after-wording of this clause, see note p. 228.

wish to say this definitely and publicly. As to the modifications proposed by Baden, he reserved his declaration until Bavaria and Würtemberg should have agreed to them. For the present, he would only say this much with certainty, that Prussia, in the first place, desired a further confederation with the South, and indeed, looked upon this as the basis of the renewal of the Zollverein; but that for this confederation, as also for the Zollverein, there must be found a form of simple agreement upon ordinary business, not merely upon such as was to be foreseen far ahead. Without this indispensable premise, he would rather renounce both confederation and Zollverein with the South or with the States who were fundamentally in opposition. According to Count Bismarck's desire, it would be in this sense that Baden should prosecute the negotiations. In a like sense Bismarck wrote to the Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe on May 17:

"The basis of the Ministerial declaration of May 6 cannot be accepted by us. Common legislation (No. IV. (4)) we look upon as a benefit, not so much for us, the North German Confederation, as for the South German States. With regard to the Customs especially, it is impossible for us to bind ourselves to a condition which as a general ruling demands, in addition to a decision of the Reichstag, the consent of eight South German Chambers, and would practically give a veto to any single one of the latter. The only mode of common Customs legislation which we can accept is by means of an enlargement of the Federal Diet and the Reichstag for that purpose, through the participation of delegates from South Germany."

Meanwhile the Government of Baden had forwarded to Munich their proposed alterations in the protocol of May 6, and, since these were partially accepted by Prince Hohenlohe, the agreement so modified seemed to afford a possible foundation for common negotiations between the South German States and the North German Confederation. By a decision of the Grand Duke, May 27, 1867, the Ministry was, therefore, empowered "to enter into negotiations in common with the three other Governments regarding the foundation of a more comprehensive Confederation of the South German States with the North German Confederation, on the basis of the Ministerial declaration of May 6-16, with the modifications proposed in Prince Hohenlohe's note of the 22nd inst."

But the course of these negotiations was interrupted by the Prussian Government's own initiative in the question of the Zollverein. At the end of May the Prussian Ambassador, Baron Werthern, informed Prince Hohenlohe that Count Bismarck was thinking of arranging a conference of Ministers in Berlin, in order to deliberate about the reconstruction of the Zollverein, and the questions relative thereto. The Prince supposed that the adhesion of the South German States to the North German Confederation might also come under discussion, and hence he wished to



conclude the understanding with the rest of the South German States before the Berlin Conference. He therefore informed Baron Werthern that the postponement of the conference until the end of June would be desirable. At the same time the Bavarian Minister in Stuttgart reported that Varnbüler wished to meet the Prince for a consultation as to the impending conference. In consequence the Prince went to Nördlingen on May 30, 1867, for a conversation with Barnbüler. He was accompanied by the Ministerial Count Tauffkirchen.

*Note by* COUNT TAUFFKIRCHEN.

MUNICH, May 30, 1867.

Upon the invitation which will be found among the official papers, the Minister of State, Prince Hohenlohe, went to-day with the Ministerial Councillor, Count Tauffkirchen by an early train to Nördlingen, where Freiherr von Varnbüler was already present.

The following conversation then took place between the three persons named in the station-master's sitting-room.

Baron Varnbüler read aloud his despatch to Count Degenfeld of the 29th, and handed it to the Prince for further reference.

He added the comment that the mission of Count Tauffkirchen had called forth a very profound feeling of dissent in Paris. The French Minister in Stuttgart, to whom he had truthfully declared that he had neither any share in this mission, nor any knowledge of it, had made use of the words: "If it comes to war and France is victorious, Bavaria will have to pay dearly, very dearly, for this step." Baron Wächter's reports from Paris entirely agree with this. Baron Beust, also, had expressed himself in an unfavourable and unfriendly manner concerning the plan of Bavaria and Würtemberg to Baron Thumb, who, according to instructions, had maintained the greatest reserve as to the question of the reconstitution of Germany. Varnbüler read aloud a portion of one of Thumb's recent despatches, according to which — so at least Varnbüler read — Beust had said to him that he did not intend to throw a sop to the Ultramontanes in Bavaria. The word "alliance" will be now imported into the conflict between Prussia and France, and will give the greatest offence in Paris. It would, therefore, be very advisable to substitute another mode of expression, and he must, on Würtemberg's behalf, the more strongly insist upon this change, as even during the consultations such an aggressive underlying meaning to the expression had not in reality been very remote.

Varnbüler continued: According to the latest reports from Berlin, there did not at present exist there any intention of entering into a National Union with the South, even in order to avoid an exceptionally threatening war with France. Varnbüler read aloud portions of a report from the Minister

Baron Spitzemberg, dated May 24, 1867, according to which Count Bismarck had declared to him that he proposed confining himself for the present to a regulation of tariff affairs, and would not go further unless one of the Southern States expressly desired it. He did not desire even a special military convention. An energetic and consistent carrying out of the Stuttgart resolutions would suffice for him. Spitzemberg thereupon put it to him whether it would not be advisable, for the abridgment of the conferences on the tariff arranged for after Easter, to allow a preliminary settlement of the main lines by a conference of Ministers. Bismarck took up this idea very willingly. He thought the invitation to the conferences should be conveyed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs without a previously fixed programme, and that in the invitation the agenda should only include the Zollverein and subjects in direct connection with that, such as the patent laws and the condition of trade. The Ministers of the larger States of the North German Confederation were to be invited. He feared that people in Munich would be distrustful, and would want Varnbüler to sound Prince Hohenlohe. He, Varnbüler, had gladly accepted the idea — though with express limitation of the conference to tariff affairs — because he deemed that a favourable occasion for such negotiations was afforded by the present endeavour to spare the susceptibilities of France and to draw in Austria. He had, however, left to Bismarck the sending of the invitation to Munich. He had deemed this verbal explanation necessary, since he had learned from Munich that Prince Hohenlohe had been dilatory in answering, and that there was an intention to repeat the invitation — indeed, such a second invitation had reached him at eleven o'clock last night, the 29th, through Baron Rosenberg, and presumably the same message had been received simultaneously by Baron Werther.

In respect to the attitude which the Würtemberg Government would take up towards the question itself, he added that they would abide by the draft of May 6, 1867, and settle the matter as far as possible by a treaty.

The Tariff Convention would have to decide:

- (1) The sphere of the tariff's application.
- (2) The sources of revenue.
- (3) The mode of distribution.

The Customs, the rape tax, the salt tax, and, in any case, the tobacco duty, were to be recognised as the sources of revenue; taxes on drinks, on the other hand, were to be excepted. New taxes should only be introduced by common consent.

Equality of distribution must be insisted upon. Whether the treaty should be for a fixed time, and whether terminable with or without notice, he left undecided as yet.

As for the rest, the final decision is to be left to an assembly chosen by popular election.

The views contained in Weber's memorial had made a bad impression in Berlin, and if they were upheld by Bavaria, would have as a consequence her exclusion from the Zollverein. He himself, moreover, could not concur in them. As Bismarck had given notice of his intention to hold these conferences of Ministers before his departure for Paris (on June 5), a speedy decision was necessary. Varnbüler gave up the idea of grouping together the corresponding propositions of the Zollverein treaty, and of the Constitution of the North German Confederation.

He finally remarked, in regard to the military conditions, that the Würtemberg Government would be prepared for a perpetually operative system of military service, was ready to enter into the contemplated union with Bavaria, and would attach great importance to this, as making it possible to oppose a *jait accompli* to any later pretensions of Prussia.

Prince Hohenlohe expressed his thanks to Baron Varnbüler for these communications, and considered them so urgent that he resolved to take the mail train just going back to Munich, in order to be able to report the same day to his Majesty concerning both the subjects touched upon in his conversation.

In conclusion Baron Varnbüler emphasised his wish for concurrent action by Bavaria and Würtemberg, and suggested how important it would be for Bavaria at the present moment to be represented in Berlin by some person who might be in a position to give certain information as to the frequent fluctuations of opinion there.

By 3.35 P.M. Prince Hohenlohe and Count Tauffkirchen were back in Munich, and after the former had learned from Baron Werthern that a further invitation to the conference of Ministers had not yet reached him, he sent the attached minute to Berg that same evening.\*

### *Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, May 30, 1867.

Upon a telegraphic invitation from Freiherr von Varnbüler, your most obedient servant, the undersigned, betook himself to Nördlingen early this morning for a confidential interview.

The occasion of this was a telegraphic invitation from the Prussian Government, already received by Herr von Varnbüler (but already announced to and hourly expected by your most obedient servant), to participate in the conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs which is to be opened in Berlin during the next few days. This conference of Ministers is to be the introduction to the tariff conference, and is to limit itself to the question of the reconstitution of the Zollverein. According to Varnbüler's statements, not only does the Würtemberg Government attach the greatest value to a general acceptance

\* See following report.

of this invitation, but Freiherr von Beust also has declared himself in unconditional agreement with the aims of this conference.

Your most obedient servant considers he should the more strongly advise an acceptance of the invitation, because according to Article VII. of the Peace of Berlin, August 22, 1866, there is no justification for declining; moreover, the announcement of the Zollverein is to be apprehended; and finally, because the present moment, at which moderation is imposed upon Prussia owing to her strained relations with France, seems highly favourable for such negotiations.

As to the instructions of your obedient servant on this occasion, further proposals shall follow.

Freiherr von Varnbüler also delivered to your most obedient servant, the undersigned, the enclosed note, in which the interchange Ministerial declarations in the sense of that of the 6th inst., approved by your Majesty, is made dependent on an alteration in the framing of Article IV. (8), which, as calculated to remove the objection raised by Austria against the word "alliance" in your Majesty's previous note of the 15th of last month, is therefore to be regarded as a decided and most welcome improvement.

The undersigned sets the greatest looks upon a speedy interchange of these Ministerial declarations as of the greatest importance, and therefore humbly submits this proposal:

That your Majesty should consent to the immediate despatch of telegrams:

(1) Consenting to a participation in the conferences of Ministers, on condition that these be confined to the business of the Zollverein.

(2) Agreeing to the modification of the Ministerial declaration of May 6, proposed by Freiherr von Varnbüler.

*Marginal Rescript by the KING.*

Both these proposals approved.

LUDWIG.

SCHLOSS BERG, May 30, 1867.

*Declaration under the KING's sign manual, May 30, 1867.*

In assenting to the negotiations undertaken between Bavaria and Würtemberg, as well as to the documents addressed to Karlsruhe and Darmstadt, I have started from the supposition repeatedly put forward by you, that the introduction of negotiations between South Germany and Prussia as to a reconstitution of the Confederation is not to be urged, and will in no case be urged by Bavaria; that, however, it seems to me that caution is now doubly necessary, as it concerns not merely the preserva-

tion of Bavaria's independence, but also the safeguarding of European peace in view of the excited feeling in France and in Austria against Prussia, on account of the former's existing and determined interpretation, no matter whether justified or not justified, of the Peace of Prague.

LUDWIG.

*Letter from the PRINCE to the BAVARIAN LEGATION in Vienna.*

MUNICH, May 30, 1867.

The following strictly confidential communication as to the grounds upon which his Majesty's Government seeks to effect a union of the South German States in regard to their national relations with the rest of Germany, has been called forth by a verbal declaration of Freiherr von Beust which his Majesty's Legation reported on May 12, 1867, and by a more explicit note from the Imperial Cabinet of the 15th of last month, read aloud to me by Count Trauttmansdorf. The frank expression of the latter makes an equally frank reply the duty of his Majesty's Government.

Neither the Bavarian nor any other of the South German Governments has entered into a compact which in any way limits their right to settle their national relations to the rest of Germany according to their own free judgment. The Nikolsburg preliminary treaty of July 26, 1866, to the second Article of which the Treaty of Peace concluded between Prussia and Bavaria on August 22, 1866, refers in Article V., does not contain such a limitation, see in particular the clause\* subjoined to Article IV. of the Peace of Prague of August 23, 1866. It contains no obligation, but only the expression of the right of the South-West German States to form a union among themselves. Though the Royal Bavarian Government found themselves isolated during the peace negotiations, owing to circumstances not unknown to the Imperial Government, and were by this led

\* Article III. of the Peace of Berlin (between Prussia and Bavaria) dated August 22, 1866: "His Majesty the King of Bavaria recognises the terms of the preliminary treaty concluded between Prussia and Austria at Nikolsburg on July 26, 1866, and for his part concurs in the same, so far as the future of Germany is concerned." Article IV. of the Peace of Prague, dated August 23, 1866: "His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the German Confederation hitherto existing, and gives his assent to a new constitution of Germany without the participation of the Austrian Imperial State. His Majesty likewise promises to recognise the lesser confederation which his Majesty the King of Prussia is about to establish north of the line of the Main, and declares himself agreeable that the German States south of this line shall mutually enter upon a union, whose national relation with the North German Confederation shall not prejudice a closer agreement between the two, *and which shall have an international independent existence.*" The addition of the last eight words distinguishes the Peace of Prague from the otherwise similarly worded Article II. of the Nikolsburg preliminary treaty.

to conclude a treaty of alliance with Prussia on August 22, yet they certainly did not violate the treaties by this, nor, in particular, the Peace of Prague of August 23, in which they had no share.

As to the question whether these treaties are incompatible with the pledges undertaken by Prussia at Prague, the Royal Government do not at the moment consider themselves obliged to express an opinion, but must, however, take measures to prevent this silence being understood as consent. On the other hand, the Bavarian Government fully recognise their moral obligation to hold fast themselves, in their *future* treaties with Prussia, to the standpoint taken up by this Power in consequence of the Peace of Prague, and the full responsibility they would incur if European complications were to ensue in consequence of their participation in any deviation from this treaty. They are convinced that they have pursued this course consistently and not unsuccessfully in their relations with the other German States; they believe that these states also have remained true to the proposals of May 6, and they must oppose with decision the supposition that in this proposal any deviation from the Peace of Prague is to be found.

There cannot be any doubt that by the previous formation of a federation of South German States, the reconstitution of Germany according to the terms of the Peace of Prague — therefore without Austria — has been facilitated. The reason why such a federation has not been consummated has hitherto lain in the purely negative attitude taken up by the Governments of Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, and in the lack of any sympathy with this idea among the people — circumstances which would have made any such attempt hopeless from the beginning. The Bavarian Government have, therefore, been obliged to confine themselves hitherto to the partial union which found expression in the resolutions of the Stuttgart Conference.

As to the point soon to be considered, that though the North German Confederation has been concluded, no union of the South German States exists, I meet with two extreme views.

According to the one, the presupposed case under which Prussia would have assumed a qualified obligation has not occurred; therefore Prussia has now an unlimited discretion to enter into treaties with the South German States as she pleases.

According to the other, the formation of a union of South German States is the preliminary condition, without which any national *rapprochement* of the South German States, or of any one of their number, with the North German Confederation, would constitute a breach of the Peace of Prague.

I cannot acknowledge either of these conceptions to be just.

Article IV. of the Peace of Prague contains two main points:

(1) The recognition of the right of the German States to form a National Confederation in place of the former German Confederation, with Austria excluded.

(2) The limitation of this right by the obligation of Prussia to allow an independent international existence to the States south of the Main included in the Confederation.

The objection attaching to the international independent existence of single States within a National Confederation is dissipated by a consideration of the earlier law of Confederation, especially Article II. of the Act of Confederation of July 8, 1815,\* which recognises the independence of the separate States which are subject to the decisions of the Federal Assembly. A union of the South German States with North Germany, on the basis upon which the earlier Act of Confederation rested, is therefore not contrary to the Peace of Prague. The Bavarian Government believe they might strive for such a union, even without the previous formation of a Federation of South-West German States, without thereby incurring the responsibility involved in a deviation from the principles of the Peace of Prague.

Though the Royal Government, therefore, would deem themselves perfectly *justified*, even without the previous consent of the other Governments, in pursuing the path they have taken, yet the advice of the Imperial Government to adopt a merely waiting attitude lays them under the obligation of once more deliberately examining the question of *opportunity*, of actually existing national political considerations. Bavaria, which has certainly not been separated from Germany by the events of the past year, has the national task and duty of knitting anew the severed national ties as speedily as possible. In this feeling of duty the Government is in accord with by far the greater majority of the people.

Bavaria has no intention of taking the initiative in this direction, as is clear from the wording of Article I. in the draft of May 6, 1867, but thinks she should leave this to the North German Confederation.

If, however, the tender of such negotiations were made by Prussia, the Royal Government would not be in a position to defend in their own country a refusal to enter into these negotiations. But, granted they could succeed in forcibly repressing this national impulse, they would certainly lack power to induce the other South-West German States to maintain a like passivity. Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse *will* negotiate with the North German Confederation. Bavaria has the choice of taking up an influential position with regard to these negotiations, and of hindering, as far as possible, any overstepping of

\* *Völkerrechtlicher Verein der deutschen souveränen Fürsten und freien Städte*, B. A. 1, 2.

the limit set by the treaties, or of renouncing all influence upon this reorganisation, without thereby escaping the dangers that may possibly arise from it.

The material interests of Bavaria and of the rest of Germany are so closely intermingled that Bavaria could only allow this bond to be severed in case of utmost necessity, and always with danger to her own existence as a State. The Royal Government, therefore, will not, and cannot exclude themselves from negotiations with the North German Confederation as to the reconstitution of Germany.

The Royal Government, which has manifested plainly enough the wish and the effort for a nearer approach of Austria to Germany, will during these negotiations endeavour to ward off all stipulations which, according to their views explained above, are contrary to the Peace of Prague, and all proposals likely to hinder any later peaceful *rapprochement* with Austria. I think that the Imperial Government will scarcely be able to ignore the weight of these arguments, or the danger which would lie in the exclusion of Bavaria from Germany in any peaceful adjustment of German relations, and in particular in the adjustment of relations with Austria, reinvigorated by her constitutional development. I therefore hope that the Imperial Government, if not consenting, will not obstruct or hinder the action of the Bavarian Government in this matter, and will refrain from stepping in the way to prevent the Bavarian Government from attaining their end.

In order, moreover, to remove any misconstruction of the word "alliance" in Article IV. (8) of the draft, the Governments of Bavaria and Würtemberg have agreed to a different mode of expression in this place, so as to avoid the word.

His Majesty's Envoy is commissioned to acquaint Baron von Beust confidentially with the contents of this despatch, and expressly to request him to consider the same as exclusively intended for the Imperial Government, and not designed for further communication.

In accordance with the preceding transactions the form of Article IV. (8) of the Ministerial declaration of May 6 was thus altered:

"There should be added to the Treaty of Confederation a provision copied from Article LXXI. of the draft of the Constitution of the North-German Confederation, that an understanding with Austria answering to the community of nationality is to be aimed at, in so far as this is not attainable simultaneously with the conclusion of the Treaty of Confederation."

In this form the treaty of May 31, 1867, was consummated, and simultaneously with it the following "Special Convention" as to Würtemberg's and Bavaria's common action in the negotiations with the North German Confederation:

"I. In the event of the unanimity requisite for the alteration



of the law of confederation not being attainable, it shall be insisted upon that for a change in a provision of the Treaty of Confederation a majority of three-fourths shall be necessary, assuming that the proportion of votes provided for in Article IV. (3) of the Ministerial declaration is adopted.

"II. It shall be insisted upon that the share of each member of the Confederation in the Federal right to declare war, the representation of the interests of the Zollverein by a Consulate-General, and the contributions (proportionate to their standing) to the German Navy by the individual States belonging to the Confederation, shall be settled by treaty.

"III. The Bavarian Government will also confer with Prince Lichtenstein as to the attitude which he thinks of adopting on this question."

*Note by the PRINCE regarding the Conference of Ministers in Berlin June 3, 1867.*

Having left Munich yesterday at twenty minutes past five, I arrived in Berlin at twelve o'clock to-day. Count Montgela received me at the station, and accompanied me to the Hotel de Rome, where I found awaiting me an invitation to a Ministerial Conference to be held at two o'clock. Baron Varnbüler came beforehand and gave me a general sketch of the position of the affair, and of the proposals of the Prussian Government. At two o'clock I drove with Ministerial Councillor Weber to Count Bismarck's. There we found the Ministers von Varnbüler, Dalwigk, and Freydorf, as well as the Privy Councillors Delbruck and Philippsborn, and von Nordeck, Councillor of the Legation, who had come with Freydorf.

Bismarck opened the proceedings with a short speech, setting forth the Government's standpoint. I then began the discussion, remarked that I had come in order to announce the willingness of the Bavarian Government to take part in negotiations concerning the reconstruction of the Zollverein, although I had had no knowledge whatever of the programme and plan of the subject of negotiations. I must, however, observe that the standpoint of the Prussian Government, as expressed in the protocol, did not at all coincide with the views of the Bavarian Government. The entry of our deputies into the North German Parliament was an arrangement which could not count on any support from us. Hereupon Baron Varnbüler asked, How then did the Prussian Government think the legislative organ should be composed? To which Bismarck answered that the distribution of votes on the Council of the Federal Council for tariff purposes would be analogous to that on the old Diet. The legislative organ would be a body analogous to the North German Reichstag, elected by direct suffrage, one Deputy to each 100,000 inhabitants. Its com-

petence would be decided by the treaties. He said that if we entertained the idea of giving our adhesion to the Tariff Parliament, Prussia proposed that we and South Germany should form our own tariff area, which would place us on as good a footing as possible with the North German Confederation and the North German Zollverein. Prussia, however, will not relinquish the project. The dissolution of the Zollverein will be the consequence of non-acceptance. So far as the election of Deputies was concerned, Bismarck would advise direct suffrage; but he left that to us, and recommended the convening of the Diets.

I then proceeded to say that we had had quite a different conception of a Tariff Parliament. We had had in mind an assembly to which the North German Parliament and the South German Chambers would make over certain rights, which should concern itself with matters relating to the tariff and to trade, but which should not be admitted into the North German Parliament. After Varnbüler and Freydorf had declared themselves in favour of the Prussian proposals, and Dalwigk had observed that for him, too, nothing remained but to consent, Bismarck put forward once more the advantages which a Zollverein Parliament would have over the present arrangement.

I admitted that merely with regard to tariff affairs such advantages were not to be ignored, yet that I must draw attention to the political side of the question. The sending of delegates to the North German Parliament for Zollverein business would lead us by degrees into the North German Confederation. But it was against our wish to allow ourselves to be drawn into this indirectly and by degrees. If we were to enter it, we should prefer to do so of our own accord. I therefore once more proposed to call together a special assembly, to which the North German Parliament should make over certain functions connected with the Zollverein, just as in this respect also the South German States would resign certain functions in its favour.

Bismarck declared himself to be decidedly against this. It might mean a dissolution of the North German Confederation. Dear to him as was the Zollverein, he could not sacrifice the North German Confederation to it. Von der Heydt concurred in this. Bismarck then proceeded to say that those who wished to make mutual arrangements must partially renounce their independence. He acknowledged my frankness and would declare here what he would not say publicly, that Prussia will not incommode the South German States. The Prussian Government did not particularly desire our entrance into the North German Confederation; they would even be greatly embarrassed by the entry of eighty South German Deputies into the Reichstag. Varnbüler suggested that the assembly might perhaps be called "The Assembly of Tariff Delegates," and Dalwigk referred to the English Constitution. The Reichstag might resolve itself into

committee, after the English fashion, &c. Since no further resolution was taken on this point, Bismarck now produced the draft of a convention and read it aloud to us.

Discussion upon this continued till 8.30 P.M., and the protocol was drafted which on the following day was agreed to by Würtemberg and Baden, while I made a separate declaration.

There is no room for doubt that Prussia would rather abandon the Zollverein than allow the idea of a Parliament to fall to the ground. What his Majesty should decide it is difficult to advise. On the side of acceptance there is the circumstance that if we have the Zollverein it would put an end to further discussions over the constitution of a federation, and consequently also to the dangers arising out of the dissolution of the Zollverein. If the King wishes to attempt the dissolution of the Zollverein with another Ministry, I am ready and willing to retire.

While the preliminary treaty of June 4 was at once signed by Baden and Würtemberg, and by Hesse on June 7, Prince Hohenlohe declared that for the present he could only look upon this draft as a Prussian proposal, and must reserve the declaration of the Bavarian Government concerning it. In Munich, Article VII. of the treaty appeared incompatible with the preservation of the independence of Bavaria as a State. According to this Article, powers of general legislation as to Customs and indirect taxes should be exercised by the Federal Council of the Zollverein as the general organ of the Governments, and by a Parliament as the general representative of the people. "The agreement of the resolutions passed by a majority in both Assemblies," said the treaty, "is necessary and adequate for the establishment of federal law." Bavaria opposed the arrangement of common legislation in tariff affairs binding the several States, which seemed to indicate a mediatisation of the separate States, and wished the development of the ordinary business affairs of the Zollverein to proceed upon the lines of the treaty.

In order to press this point of view, Count Tauffkirchen, already appointed Minister at St. Petersburg, was sent once more to Berlin on June 14. On the main issue he had no success, but he gained two points: that Bavaria should count for six instead of four votes in the Federal Tariff Council and that representatives of the frontier States should be admitted to the negotiations with Austria and Switzerland. The name of "Tariff Parliament" was also agreed upon for the Legislative Assembly. With a protocol containing these provisions, the treaty of July 4 was completed. The signing of the definitive Zollverein treaty by the representatives of all the Powers took place in Berlin on July 8.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, July 18, 1867.

After the Council of Ministers to-day I went to Lutz, in order to tell him that there was no getting on any longer with the vacancy in the Ministry of Justice, and that I had decided to propose *him*. He was pleased at this, but advised the postponement of the matter till the King's return from Paris.\*

I think he was afraid he might have to make the journey to Paris. He then complained about the Minister of the Interior, and assured me there was no getting on with him any longer. The Deputies made fun of him, and the affair with the Burgomaster of Nuremberg would bring the King down upon him. A Herr von Wächter was Burgomaster there. Pechmann had proposed him to the King as *Regierungsdirektor*. The King said he did not wish this, for then a Radical would be elected in Nuremberg and difficulties would arise regarding the ratification. Pechmann insisted and asserted that a Conservative would in any case be elected, and then the King gave in. Now it appears that the people of Nuremberg want to elect a very progressively minded Herr von Stromer and that Pechmann's assertions were made in the air. We both agreed in an unfavourable criticism of Pechmann, and Lutz declared that Pfeufer looked forward to being made Minister of the Interior. In this way I shall attain my end. In conclusion I asked him how things stood with my proposal regarding Hegnenberg-Dux, and received the welcome intelligence that the King had nothing to urge against it; so I hope to get Count Hegnenberg as Minister in Berlin. I will also make a fair copy of the proposal as to the transfer of the Ministry of Justice to Lutz, and give it to the King as soon as he comes back from Paris.

The Prince's "programme" which had obtained the assent of the King and of the Ministers remaining in office, also included as an object to be aimed at "a single authority for the combined services which ensure the maintenance of public safety."

To a query of the Prime Minister concerning the position of the work of preparation for this reform, the Minister of the Interior, Freiherr von Pechmann, replied on July 11, 1867, that "very cogent considerations and difficulties stood in the way of the much-discussed transformation of the Corps of Gendarmerie into a civil institution at present or in the immediate future," and that in particular the certainty had arisen "that in the event of this transformation being effected the total expenses for the Gendarmerie (at present 1,500,000 gulden) would be not inconsiderably increased, and the periodical recruiting of men to the ranks would be very greatly endangered." The Minister

\* King Ludwig left for Paris on July 20, and returned on the 29th.

had thereupon decided in favour of a system according to which the Gendarmerie should remain a military institution, officers and men belonging to the military class and subject to military discipline and justice. With respect, however, to the civil duties assigned to them they should be brought into "immediate relations with the police authorities." Administrative control of the Gendarmerie should be transferred from the Ministry of War to the Ministry of the Interior, in whose budget the total expense for the Gendarmerie should be included. In this regulation of the Gendarmerie the Minister appealed to the example of Prussia and to experience obtained there and in other States.

Prince Hohenlohe formulated his objections to this plan in the following letter written with his own hand to the Minister of the Interior:

MUNICH, *July 21, 1867.*

The undersigned has received his Excellency's esteemed note of the 11th inst., and has the honour to express his most grateful thanks for it. He regrets, however, not to be able to express agreement with the proposed measure. The entire re-organisation of the Gendarmerie is an absolute necessity, if the work of thorough internal reform which has been taken in hand is to be carried out with success; it is therefore an essential feature of the general policy of the Government, and for this reason the undersigned also considers (whilst he leaves untouched the settlement of details and the form of the arrangement, as being of course the proper province of the Minister of the Interior) that he is specially interested in the decision of the fundamental principle to be followed in this reform, and therefore ventures to examine the question more closely.

The esteemed note of the 11th inst. makes plain that his Excellency the Minister of the Interior, Freiherr von Pechmann, also considers that the transformation of the Gendarmerie into a civil institution is the right thing to do. The undersigned not only shares this view, but he is entirely convinced that the Government cannot enter upon the impending discussion of the budget with any other measure, that any attempt to retain the Gendarmerie as a portion of the military establishment would make the whole reform useless, and would besides be a perfectly futile attempt, certain to bring upon the Government a crushing defeat in the Chamber as well as in the estimation of the public. That the abolition of this close connection with the military — and in particular the dismissal of the military officers — would meet with great difficulties, the undersigned has never concealed from himself, but it is just this latter point with which the reform of the institution must above all begin; for this it is which chiefly hinders the Gendarmerie from responding to justifiable claims. It is such an utter anomaly to place the men appointed for police service and for carrying out the orders of the Administration under

the command of superiors who are quite strange to the business, have no knowledge at all of police matters, do not possess the least experience of the service for the maintenance of public safety, and are not subject to the administrative authorities, that only the weightiest reasons should provide a motive for such a contradictory arrangement.

Such reasons the undersigned cannot at present discern.

Why the disappearance of the very costly apparatus of the commanders of a Corps of Gendarmerie, and of an additional number of Staff Officers, should increase the expenses of the Gendarmerie is not easy to see. But even if the cost of the Gendarmerie by its organisation as a civil institution were to mount up to double as much, the Chamber would much prefer to pay three millions for a properly reorganised Gendarmerie than only half a million for the present institution. That, however, the present recruiting of the Gendarmerie does not provide the best material; that so many young inexperienced soldiers, who have joined the ranks more for the enjoyment of the life than for the sake of the service, are not the right stuff to make protectors of life and property: as to this there is but one voice throughout the whole country. Besides, if the recruiting for the Gendarmerie has hitherto been so difficult, then according to experience it is just from the disinclination of serviceable men to place themselves under the command of military officers and to be worried with drilling and other military exercises and extra duties that are perfectly unnecessary to the service Police.

After the intended reform the military organisation of the Gendarmerie would be reduced to the retention of military discipline, subordination to military law, and the filling up of the officers' posts with officers of the line; and though even in this particular a concession would be made to a principle which the undersigned upholds, by the prospect of advancement for capable brigadiers. Military discipline can of course be retained without the Gendarmerie belonging to the military establishment; I need only refer here to the Customs officials on the frontiers. It is the less easy to support the maintenance of martial law, because in future its application will be reduced to a minimum even in the Army. The only question that remains is whether the officers should belong to the police or to the military establishment. This question, however, is settled by the inevitable concession that "whenever the officers of Gendarmerie are commanded to assist in civil duties, either by an order of the Minister of the Interior or by that of a district government, they must punctually comply with such orders received." To insist on a man's obedience to some one who is not set in authority over him appears, however, to be contrary to reason, and therefore perfectly impracticable. Whether the War Office can have any interest in possessing a corps which can be attached to the Army neither in peace nor in time of war, and which, besides, "may not be subject

to any other military instructions than those of its own superiors," and therefore forms a State within the State, may fairly be doubted; and it may finally be suggested that the affair should be decided by the inclusion of the costs of the Gendarmerie in the budget of the Minister of the Interior; for to place a military institution on the Civil Service Estimates cannot be thought of, and is at all events not practicable.

The undersigned earnestly begs your Excellency to take this question once more into consideration. Information as to the attitude of the members of the Landtag will convince your Excellency that a plan like that contemplated has not even the smallest prospect of success, and moreover the undersigned would greatly regret if this proposal were brought forward in the Council of Ministers and he were obliged to offer a determined opposition to it. . . .

*Journal.*

July 24, 1867.

After the departure of the King I was at first occupied with the question of North Schleswig. France has informed Berlin that Prussia's claim to a guarantee for the Germans\* cannot be considered well founded. Thile is uneasy about this. Denmark's answer to Prussia on this subject sounds evasive, yet does not preclude an understanding. It would be wise for Prussia not to push this thing to extremities. I have said this to Werthern, and have drawn his attention to the fact that Prussia would remain very much isolated. I have also spoken about this matter to Lesourd, the Secretary to the French Legation, and have advised caution.

Meanwhile the Sultan's journey through Bavaria has been taking place and gave me much to do. Inquiries in London and Paris led to the result that the Sultan will stay at Nuremberg on the night of the 25th. I immediately proposed to the King that he should order a Prince of the Royal Family to receive the Sultan, and despatch me also. To this he assented. I now telegraphed to Ferad Pasha at Aachen, informed him of this, and offered a supper. The answer came that the Sultan could not accept the invitation to supper as he could not fix the hour of his arrival, but that he would be glad to see the Prince. From Count Pückler at Coblenz came the list of forty Turks belonging to the Court who had to be invited to the supper. So everything was made ready for the journey, and all the world was set in motion to arrange things suitably at Nuremberg.

\* On June 18, Prussia, by a Note of her Minister in Copenhagen, had declared "the necessary guarantees for the protection of the Germans" and the taking over of a portion of the debt of the Duchies to be the pre-suppositions of the provision made in the Peace of Prague (Article V.) for the return of the northern districts of Schleswig to Denmark. This led to France's intervention.

July 25.

Preparations having got thus far I made my way early this morning to the railway station, my pockets full of telegrams to the Head of the Administration, the commandant of the town, &c., which I submitted to Prince Adalbert for his approval (he was punctual at the railway station), and then despatched. At six o'clock I got into the saloon carriage with the Prince. We got on quite well together. The Prince is very pleasant and was exceedingly charming. His political views show much discretion.

At Gunzenhausen I wanted a cup of coffee; on the way to the restaurant, however, I met the Ranger of the district, Geiger; he is half blind and was going to Nuremberg on account of his eyes, and as I could not get him away from the spot I was obliged to get into the train again hungry. Here I found the Prince before a heap of twelve sausages with much bread and a lot of beer. He ate *all* the twelve sausages! It made me quite faint to see him. By twelve o'clock we were in Nuremberg. We had begged off the official reception. So no one was there except the railway staff in uniform. The Prince invited me to sit in the carriage with him. The people greeted us with cheers in a very friendly way. The Prince was much pleased with this manifestation.

At one o'clock we had dinner, at which the generals were present. After dinner there was a siesta, as the Prince calls it. At four o'clock we went over the Castle. As, however, the Prince buried himself too deeply in the torture-chambers, underground passages, &c., I lost myself with Moy,\* and went for a walk through the town, which was unusually lively. All Franconia had come by train. When we came back to our lodgings on the Burg we received the intelligence that the Sultan would arrive at ten o'clock.

Accordingly our drive from the Burg was arranged for nine o'clock. Moy and Count Kreith went in advance. I drove after them with the Prince in a State carriage.

The streets were crowded with people, shoulder to shoulder. We waited in the Royal saloon. Punctually at ten o'clock came the signal that the train was approaching. It soon pulled in, amid the breathless excitement of the crowd. The band struck up. It was a long time before the train could draw up at the right spot to allow of the Sultan's alighting upon the carpet in front of the Prince. Meanwhile the public had climbed on to the roof of the carriages in order to see him alight, to the great annoyance of the Turkish Minister to Berlin, who had got out first and was very much displeased at this cool behaviour of the Nurembergers.

At last the carriage door could be opened. The Sultan, a little man with a black beard and kindly black eyes, got out. The Prince ushered him into the waiting-room, and there made him a

\* Von Moy, Master of the Ceremonies.



ceremonious speech in French, which Ferad Pasha translated. During the Prince's speech the Sultan scratched his beard and looked very much bored. As soon as Ferad had translated the speech to him he answered very softly, on which the Prince again said a few polite words. The Prince then presented us to the Sultan; when he mentioned my name the Sultan stretched out his hand to me, but I was standing so far away that it was only after an apparently shy hesitation that I could reach his hand. After the introductions were at an end the Sultan got into his carriage; at first he wanted Ferad to come with him, but the Prince insisted very nicely that he must have the honour of driving with him; and as Ferad was obliged to keep near at hand I at once invited him to get into the next carriage, which had room for two. I sat beside him, and left Count Zech to look after the Imperial Princes (who had been left sitting in a carriage somewhere and wanted to drive away). Ferad Pasha now declared, however, that the *premier chambellan* must go with us too, so we stuffed him in between us. We arrived safely at last at the Bayrischer Hof through the frightful crush. The people behaved fairly well, only howled now and then and peered into the carriages with the greatest curiosity, and were naturally disappointed when they saw my Bavarian uniform instead of the expected turban.

In the hotel the Prince went with the Sultan into a special apartment. I was likewise invited to join them. The Sultan sat on a sofa, crossed one leg over the other and conversed with us with the help of Ferad Pasha. Soon after this the Prince said: "I think we must go now," upon which the party broke up.

July 26.

The Sultan yesterday decided to stay in Nuremberg till noon to-day. We could therefore sleep our sleep out, which was the more desirable as supper with Prince Adalbert lasted till one o'clock.

This morning early came the news that King Otto\* is to receive extreme unction to-night. That again will make a great deal to do.

At eleven o'clock I drove down with Moy. We first visited Ferad Pasha. Then when the Prince came I went down to accompany him on his farewell visit to the Sultan. The Sultan sat on a sofa with the Prince. A door on to the balcony was open, so that the neighbours and even some of the people in the street could see the interview. The Prince invited the Sultan to step on to the balcony for a minute and show himself to the people. There were a few cheers, but more in jest than from any particular enthusiasm for the Sultan, which one could hardly expect from Nurembergers.

Conversation was again conducted through Ferad Pasha.

\* Of Greece, who resided in Bamberg.

The Sultan has a *blasé* and sceptical, but friendly, appearance, and a great idea of his own importance. He makes quite the impression of a Polish landowner. His tarboosh is different from those I saw in the East. Apparently the fashion has changed. The present red caps are shaped like little flower-pots turned upside down and are very ugly. He wore a black frock-coat like a Protestant parson; so did the little ten-year-old Prince. At the station, whither we repaired after the visit, the little boy was fetched and sat in front of Prince Adalbert with a very grave air.

Here the conversation dragged on for a considerable time. At last the announcement came that everything was ready. The Prince accompanied the Sultan to the carriage, and there took his leave. The Sultan shook hands with me also, got in, and after some delay the train departed. On the way from the station to the train I again drove with Ferad Pasha. I asked him about his political impressions. He thought people in general were very peaceably inclined. The Schleswig question alone gave him some anxiety. The King of Prussia, however, had expressed himself in a very peaceful manner.

In his Eastern fashion he spoke very flatteringly to me, said he had been very glad to have made the acquaintance of *un des hommes les plus distingués de l'Allemagne*; whereupon I fired off the reply at his head that I had earnestly desired *de faire la connaissance de l'homme d'état qui depuis bien des années avait pu conduire la politique de l'empire Ottoman avec tant de talent et de succès*.

Prince Adalbert finally commissioned me to draw up a telegram for him informing the King of the result of our mission and the *remerciments sincères* of the Sultan.

Then at one o'clock dinner, and at 4.20 our departure for Munich, with which this interesting episode concluded.

No better news of King Otto.

On the return journey to Nördlingen I received a telegram stating that King Otto had died at 6.15 P.M.

MUNICH, August 5, 1887.

Yesterday I was commanded to go to the King at Berg at twelve o'clock. In the train I found the Minister from Reuss, Herr von Schmertzling, who had an audience for the same hour. At Starnberg we found an open carriage, which took us to Berg. Herr von Schmertzling was very much surprised at the countrified appearance of the Royal establishment. The whole arrangement of the Court is almost *bourgeois*. The passages are always swarming with scullery-maids and women carrying all sorts of household utensils. Sauer\* met us on the steps. While the Minister from Reuss was with the King I went to Ministerial Councillor Lutz to ask him about the Ministry.

\* Von Sauer, the Aide-de-camp.

The resignation of Pechmann appears to have fallen into the background. As for the Minister of Justice, he showed me a long list of all the possible candidates whom he had discussed with the King. The chief candidates are Neumayr, Steyrer, Seuffert, and Metz. Neumayr and Metz are unacceptable to me, because they belong to the *coterie* of wire-pullers. Steyrer is dull. Seuffert also is not suitable. The delegates who were mentioned here, like Hohenadel, Streit, Stenglein, &c., are all impossible persons; I remain convinced that Lutz is the only one who suits me. He is an able, energetic man. In his political views he agrees entirely with me, and I should find him a support in the Council of Ministers. I therefore told Lutz that I should propose him to the King.

Soon after this I was summoned to the audience. The King was very gracious. He informed me at once that the Queen of Greece had measles, therefore I need not go to Bamberg. Then we began to speak about the Greek question,\* whereupon I informed him of Tauffkirchen's proposal, according to which the affair should be discussed in St. Petersburg; in this he concurred. He attaches no value to the whole business and wants to let it drop.

I now told him that Napoleon is coming to Salzburg on account of the Mexican catastrophe, read him a letter from Dönniges which speaks about the German sympathies of the Emperor Napoleon, and then touched upon Hegnenberg, to whose appointment to Berlin the King agrees,† upon Holnstein's journey to Dessau, and other matters. Finally I produced my proposal regarding the Ministry of Justice, suggesting Lutz's name. I asked whether I might give him this directly, as it would not be suitable to let Lutz himself give it to him. He consented to this, but said he could not dispense with Lutz. To which I replied that I had written out the proposal as an *acquit de conscience*, and could leave it with him. When I was taking my leave he spoke again about Paris, told me how the Emperor had warned him not to engage himself too deeply with Prussia, and then dismissed me with greetings to my wife, to whom he sent a bouquet. I then went downstairs again, breakfasted with Herr von Schmertzing and Sauer, and then travelled back to Munich.

The talk also turned upon Paumgarten. The King thought Paumgarten should be appointed Minister in London, whilst I mentioned Count Hompesch, who also seems to stand high in favour. It would not be displeasing to him to send Dönniges to Italy, but I told him that I would examine into this more closely.

\* Financial claims by King Ludwig I. on the Greek Government from the time of the Bavarian dynasty.

† Count Hegnenberg-Dux declined the post at Berlin, whereupon Freiherr von Perglas, till then in Paris, was appointed to Berlin.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, August 4, 1867.

If your most obedient servant, the undersigned, may venture to touch upon a question which lies outside the sphere of his official duties, he hopes your Majesty will excuse this step with the gracious reflection that your obedient servant, as President of the Council of Ministers, is obliged to set before your Majesty such obstacles as may impede the profitable action of the Council of Ministers. Among such obstacles must be reckoned the continued vacancy of the Ministry of Justice, though he very well knows that insuperable difficulties prevented an earlier appointment of a new Minister.

Now, however, the consultation over the new civil proceedings is nearing its end in the legislative committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Before the final arrangement is made the responsible chief of the Department of Justice should examine into this once more, in order fully to protect the interests of the Government; apart from this, too, the Minister of Justice cannot be absent from the negotiations in committee of the Upper House. The drafting of the budget cannot be postponed any longer, and cannot possibly be carried out on behalf of the Ministry of Justice by any one else so suitably as by the man who has to defend it in the Chamber. Finally, however unimportant the matter may be itself, a speedy decision is necessitated by the impending Congress of Jurists; for very scathing criticism of Bavaria will certainly be provoked, if when the time comes for the assembly the Department of Justice still lacks a presiding chief.

All these reasons have induced your Majesty's most faithful subject to seek a suitable person whom he could propose to your Majesty for nomination to the vacant office. Undeniably the selection is extremely difficult. For although it is above all requisite that the future Minister of Justice should be a thorough lawyer and man of business — recognised as such not only by those colleagues who are in close contact with him, but by wider circles as well — yet the undersigned is of opinion that these qualities alone would not suffice.

Bavarian law and judicial administration are themselves in need of complete and radical reform. Only a really energetic man, who knows how to be strict without being tyrannical, will be equal to this difficult task, and, moreover, only a man whose official life has not blinded him to the faults and shortcomings of his profession, who understands the needs of the present day with regard to a popular administration of justice, free from the ancient routine of tradition.

However, it is the opinion of your Majesty's most faithful servant, that all this would not suffice if the Minister of Justice were not at the same time a person who would deal with the country's representatives on a basis of confidence,

and one who might hope to count on their support in carrying the inevitable financial and disciplinary measures through the Chamber.

Finally, the general political situation undoubtedly requires that the man who enters the Ministry should be in accord with the other Ministers, and therefore on this ground alone it would be inadvisable to select a person from any party representing extreme views in one direction or another.

Should your Majesty's most faithful servant now sum up what, according to his deepest conviction, is required of the future Minister of Justice, and should he pass in review all the higher legal officials who could possibly be taken into consideration, he would feel constrained — after mature reflection — to designate Ministerial Councillor Lutz as the most eligible candidate. As your Majesty has known him for years, the undersigned can afford to be brief, and need, indeed, no more than cursorily allude to the fact that he would be a Minister who would have the preservation of Bavaria's independence much at heart, as also that he possesses the requisite energy and strength of will to carry out the prescribed legal reforms. As regards his special qualifications in the practice of law, Herr von Lutz has won a high reputation, not only in Bavaria but throughout the German legal world, by his prominent share in the deliberations concerning the German code of commercial law, and your Majesty's most faithful subject furthermore feels it incumbent on him to observe that Councillor von Lutz is inaccessible to the spirit of *coterie* and personal intrigue occasionally discernible in the higher official circles of the law, so that in this matter also he would be the very man to take stringent measures. Your Majesty's most faithful subject does not ignore the fact that the proposal to withdraw so loyal and reliable a worker from your Majesty's immediate service is in no slight degree exacting, yet nevertheless, the conviction that the interests of your Majesty imperatively require the post to be filled by a thoroughly competent man, renders it the duty of your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, to put forward this most humble proposal.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, August 23, 1867.

After the Emperor Napoleon's wish to see me at the station\* had been communicated to me yesterday by the French Minister, and furthermore, after receiving the King's command last evening to convey his greetings to the Emperor and Empress, I repaired to the station at a quarter to twelve in the forenoon to await the train.

\* On the return journey from Salzburg, where the meeting with the Emperor of Austria had taken place, lasting from August 18-23. On August 17 King Ludwig had received the Emperor at Augsburg.

It arrived punctually. General Fleury immediately inquired if I was there, and as soon as the door was unlocked I was invited by the Emperor to get in. After greetings had been exchanged, and he had expressed his gratitude to his Majesty the King for the reception accorded him in Bavaria, the Emperor remarked that he still took a keen interest in Bavaria, having spent his youth there. I took the opportunity of reminding him that he had already expressed this sentiment many years before in Paris, when I had had the honour of being presented to him.

He then took me apart to the window of the compartment, and opened the political conversation with these words: "*Vous trouvez beaucoup de difficultés?*" I replied that the position of the secondary States was certainly a difficult one. "The Press must also be taken into account," the Emperor continued. To which I replied: "*La presse chez nous est encore très peu civilisée.*"

He answered, laughing: "*Oui, chez nous aussi elle n'est pas très civilisée.*"

Then he continued seriously that he hoped peace would be preserved. He was always in favour of peace; mankind required peace, and the idea of the expansion and strengthening of one country being a menace to a neighbouring State *est passée de mode*. Certainly much depended on Prussia. Public opinion was easily exasperated in France, and the question was whether Prussia wished to expand still further the North German Confederation. I then recalled to him, that Bismarck had himself declared that he did not want us. "*Oui, M. de Bismarck,*" replied the Emperor, "*m'a aussi parlé avec beaucoup de modération, mais,*" he added with a smile, "*il prétend que ce sont les états du midi qui le forcent à aller plus loin.*" I replied that this pressure emanated from one party, and that as regards admission to the North German Federation there was, generally speaking, indifference.

Hereupon, gazing at me half interrogatively he said: "*Je regrette que vous n'ayez pu former la confédération des états du midi de l'Allemagne. Mais c'était impossible?*" Without entering more minutely into the question, I referred to the material interests which unite us with North Germany, and remarked that the reason of this aversion to a South German Federation lay partly in the dread that these material interests might be injured thereby. He then reiterated assurances of peace, and I seized the opportunity of remarking that a union of Austria, Prussia, and the rest of Germany, and an alliance of this Confederation with France, was certainly the best means of preserving peace and protecting civilisation; which the Emperor seemed to receive favourably, for he said: "*Oui, la civilisation est bien menacée.*" He spoke further of the dangers of the social movement, and then terminated the conversation.

Thereupon the Empress appeared, and talked to me about

my brother \* and my sister-in-law in Salzburg, about my family, &c., and thence arose a more extended conversation concerning the leave of absence allowed to Ministers, until the Emperor came with the reminder that it was time to start. He regretted being unable to converse longer with me, commissioned me to express his thanks to the King, and hereupon I got out. There had also been in the carriage the French Minister and his wife and Herr von Radowitz,† who enjoys the special favour of the Imperial Court.

*The GRAND DUKE FRIEDRICH OF BADEN to PRINCE HOHENLOHE*

KARLSRUHE, August 29, 1867.

Such a long period has elapsed since you were good enough to write to me, that I almost hesitate to refer again to the subjects then touched upon. Yet thanks can never come too late, and I therefore still hope that you will be kind enough to accept mine to-day, belated as they are. An entire change of circumstances has, however, meanwhile come about, and the Luxembourg question which then disturbed us has already given way to others.

It seems to me that the state of affairs in South-West Germany has undergone improvement by the renewal and revision of the Zollverein. We have, at least, forged firmer ties with North Germany, and hence can, in a political sense, develop still better relations. This prospect appears to me to have given an undeniable impulse to the Salzburg meeting. The prevention of an alliance between South-West and North Germany is the subject of constant anxiety in Paris, as I have personally assured myself.

The attitude of the South German Governments will be of decisive importance in the further development of Franco-Austrian plans. We shall perhaps soon be in a position to reply to preliminary questions, and therefore the tasks with which we both began our first business intercourse again come before us.

Having regard to these possible future tasks, it seemed to me important to direct your attention to a circumstance whose advantages I regard as so conspicuous that I will not delay affording you the possibility of utilising it.

When the King of Würtemberg went to Paris, I met him *en route*, and he then spoke to me of his wish to meet the King of Prussia, should the latter come to our country as usual late in the summer. As the King of Würtemberg generally resides in Friedrichshafen until the end of September, I offered

\* The Austrian Comptroller of the Household, Prince Konstantin zu Hohenlohe.

† Councillor of Legation to the Prussian Mission.

to bring about the meeting in question, should the King of Prussia realise his intention of spending Queen Augusta's birthday at Schloss Mainau. I promised at once to acquaint the King of Würtemberg, should the plans of their Prussian Majesties remain unchanged. At present it is very probable that these intentions will be realised, as the King of Prussia is expected in Baden-Baden very soon.

It is needless to say how gratifying it would be if the King of Bavaria could make up his mind to seize this opportunity of likewise paying a visit to the King of Prussia on the Lake of Constance. On the other hand, I will not delay in submitting this question for your earnest consideration, and thereby give you the assurance that I should consider myself fortunate in affording the King the requisite opportunity at Castle Mainau. The distance from Hohenschwangau and Lindau is not great, and from Lindau the King could pay a visit to Castle Mainau and back in one day. I need not say that should the King be pleased to stay longer with us it would be a great pleasure.

Therefore I place my good offices, as also my hospitality, at your King's disposal, and should be glad if you, too, would participate. Meanwhile I think I must leave it to you alone whether to utilise my ideas or no. You would greatly oblige me if you would give me an early hint concerning the possible acceptance of my proposal, so that I might put myself betimes in communication with the King of Prussia. The Queen of Prussia's birthday is on September 30, and both their Majesties go to Hohenzollern first.

I trust you will not misunderstand my intention, and will remain convinced of the extreme esteem of

Your affectionate friend,

FRIEDRICH, GRAND DUKE OF BADEN.

### *Report to the KING.*

AUSSEE, September 1, 1867.

Your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, with his humble duty, has the honour to report that he has received a communication from the Grand Duke of Baden, in which he proposes a meeting between your Majesty and the Kings of Prussia and of Würtemberg.

Your Majesty's most obedient servant considers himself bound to lay this letter before your Majesty, as best able to judge in how far a proposal of the kind accords with your Royal interests.

If it is permitted to the undersigned to express an opinion, he permits himself to remark with the greatest respect that the meeting with the King of Prussia and the visit to the Island of Mainau, in the company of the King of Würtemberg, offer many advantages. Apart from the object of maintaining the friendly relations of your Majesty with the Court of Prussia,



the presence of your Majesty at the meeting of the South German Monarchs would prevent the inception of biassed schemes, which are in opposition to the intentions and the interest of your Majesty.

While submitting everything to the wise judgment of your Majesty, your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, begs for your Majesty's august commands as to the answer which he is to send to the Grand Duke's letter.

*The GRAND DUKE FRIEDRICH OF BADEN to PRINCE HOHENLOHE.*

KARLSRUHE, *September 5, 1867.*

From your kind reply of September I received to-day, I gather with gratitude that you gladly entertain my proposal. So I hasten to let you know that a letter received to-day from the King of Prussia informs me that he would be much pleased if his Majesty the King of Bavaria would pay him a visit during his sojourn with us. The King, too, considers Mainau a suitable spot for this meeting. He will in all likelihood visit Baden soon after the opening of the Reichstag, stay there a few days, and then come to Mainau. The days have not yet been fixed, but are sure to be arranged soon, and then I will at once let you know.

But now I still have a question: Do you think it right, and in furtherance of the event, that I should myself write to the King of Bavaria and invite him to Mainau? I would in this case say to the King that as the King of Würtemberg wished to come in order to visit the King of Prussia, it appeared to me a duty to afford him the opportunity of taking a similar step in a pleasant way, &c. I should be grateful if you would communicate to me your opinion thereon.

*MINISTERIAL COUNCILLOR VON LUTZ to PRINCE HOHENLOHE.*

HOHENSCHWANGAU, *September 10, 1867.*

The day following your communication of the beginning of this month came your Highness's communication to his Majesty the King, as well as the annexed letter from the Grand Duke of Baden. I need scarcely write to your Serene Highness in detail concerning the reception of the matter at the critical point. That I was prepared for the need of much eloquence if the invitation to Mainau was to be accepted, your Serene Highness can easily imagine. And indeed I have not neglected to bring forward all the reasons in favour of a journey to Mainau, more especially the motive which your Serene Highness was kind enough to suggest to me, furnished by the zeal of Herr von Varnbüler — but up to the present in vain. Until to-day the considerations for and against were

being weighed daily; the reasons against the journey were, however, brought out by his Majesty with such insistence, and so much importance was attached to them that I finally received orders to-day to communicate to your Highness his Majesty's decision to refuse the invitation to Mainau with thanks. His Majesty has, at the same time, commanded me to add the following: according to his Majesty, it is undoubtedly to be inferred from the date of the invitation and the motives of the Grand Duke that the meeting at Mainau was intended as a political demonstration against the meeting at Salzburg, and this probably implies that the South German Princes desired to proclaim loudly to the whole world their dislike of a Franco-Austrian alliance, or of any French or Austrian interference in German affairs, whilst, on the other hand, they wished to attest their adherence to Prussia, as well as to the endeavours to unite South Germany with North Germany, and this in spite of the danger of France or Austria taking it amiss. The sense in which this declaration of defiance was interpreted by the Grand Duke is sufficiently explained by the Speech from the Throne in Baden.\* Now, far from being disposed to seek a Franco-Austrian alliance, Bavaria will, on the contrary, staunchly and faithfully abide by the alliance already concluded; nevertheless, his Majesty is unable to take the Grand Duke's point of view, since the Salzburg meeting does not seem to offer sufficient ground for a declaration of defiance against the other Powers, would furthermore tend to unite Bavaria more closely to Prussia than is necessary, and only encourage the latter in further encroachments. In Berlin itself the affair appears to be viewed more calmly now than at first, as is apparent from the moderate language of the official Press. Moreover, further propositions might easily be made at Mainau, a refusal to which might indeed produce more unpleasant results than the avoidance of an opportunity for their advancement.

I may add that his Majesty would have no objection, in fact that it would be pleasing to his Majesty, if your Serene Highness would go to Mainau, possibly taking Councillor von Völderndorf with you. If your Serene Highness asks me how this is to be interpreted, I can but point to the conclusion of your letter, where it says: "If his Majesty were to despatch me *alone*, it would not serve the purpose." All endeavours to interpret this passage in the sense that your designs would not be furthered by associating Völderndorf with yourself have failed to gain the point. I re-enclose the Grand Duke's letter, having retained a copy in case of need. If your Serene

\* In his Speech from the Throne of September 5 the Grand Duke said: "The . . . treaties of peace have . . . placed Prussia at the head of the North German Federation, and have left the Southern States free to enter into a national union with this Federation. It is my firm determination to strive unceasingly towards the consummation of this union."

Highness would once more recur to the matter in a report, a different result might possibly be achieved. This, however, is merely my private opinion.

As regards the Minister of Justice, I hope to be able to report definitely during the next few days.\*

*Report to the KING.*

AUSSEE, September 13, 1867.

In a letter from your Majesty's private secretary, your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, has received commands to refuse with thanks the meeting with the Kings of Prussia and Würtemberg contrived by the Grand Duke of Baden.

Your Majesty's most faithful subject will at once carry out this command, and at the same time ventures respectfully to report that according to a telegram received yesterday from titular Privy Councillor Daxemberger, the King of Würtemberg has refused the joint meeting with the King of Prussia, but has, on the other hand, reserved to himself to visit the King of Prussia alone at Mainau. Hereby the supposition on which the most respectful proposal of the 1st inst. was based falls to the ground, and supplies a suitable reason for refusing.

Meantime, after the receipt yesterday by the undersigned of a communication from the Grand Duke (concerning your Majesty's most faithful subject's provisional intimation that he would make a report to your Majesty), in which the Grand Duke writes: "I hasten to acquaint you that a letter from the King of Prussia informs me to-day that it would give him great pleasure if his Majesty the King of Bavaria would visit him during his stay with us." The undersigned humbly submits to your Majesty's august judgment, whether your Majesty would think fit to pay a visit from that to be paid by the King of Prussia, at a different time to the King of Würtemberg; it would in this case only entail an act of courtesy without any political significance. How far this would bear the character of a return for the visit paid to your Majesty by the King of Prussia, your Majesty's most faithful subject is incapable of judging, by reason of his ignorance of previous events, and, moreover, he considers that he should refrain from further criticism of a matter which now tends to assume the character of a question of etiquette.

*To the GRAND DUKE OF BADEN.*

AUSSEE, September 13, 1867.

Your Royal Highness's gracious communication of the 5th inst. was received by me simultaneously with his Majesty the

\* The appointment of Councillor Lutz as Minister of Justice took place on September 16, simultaneously with the appointment of Commissioner of Police Lipowsky as Private Secretary to the King.

King's reply to my report as to the meeting with his Majesty the King of Prussia. His Majesty commands me to thank your Royal Highness heartily for the kind proposal to arrange a meeting with the Kings of Prussia and Würtemberg. Now, however, that news has been received of his Majesty the King of Würtemberg's refusal, and of his determination to pay a separate visit to his Majesty the King of Prussia, his Majesty considers that he also is not in a position to accept your Royal Highness's kind invitation.

I have now conveyed the contents of your Royal Highness's last communication to his Majesty the King, and begged his Majesty to come to a conclusion concerning a possible separate visit.

As regards your Royal Highness's question, I can indeed scarcely anticipate your Royal Highness's decision, yet considering the turn which the matter of the meeting of the Monarchs has now taken, I think it best respectfully to advise your Royal Highness not to send an invitation to my most gracious master his Majesty the King. If it is possible to determine the King to visit his Majesty the King of Prussia and your Royal Highness, I will take the necessary steps. If later on I consider an invitation from your Royal Highness advisable, I presume I may venture to recur to the matter.

#### *Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, *September 19, 1867.*

From your Majesty's private secretary's communication, your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, learns that your Majesty intends to return the King of Prussia's visit at a suitable date in Berlin, and not at Mainau. That your Majesty's most obedient servant should venture to recur to the subject is due to the feeling of responsibility which his position imposes on him, and which renders it his duty to safeguard your Majesty's interests to the best of his ability.

He therefore ventures respectfully to submit the following considerations:

Great dissatisfaction would be aroused by the omission of this visit (which would be a return visit from your Majesty according to the deduction that the undersigned believes must be drawn from Councillor Lutz's communication), for the Grand Duke of Baden and the King of Prussia have reckoned positively on your Majesty's visit, as is obvious from the Grand Duke's letter; and the Grand Duke's communication enclosed in this report appears to be written in the same tenor.

Herewith the question acquires political significance, and your Majesty's most faithful subject dares not conceal from your Majesty his fear that, in view of the position which Prussia now occupies in Germany, and of the means which

are at the disposal of the Prussian Government, this dissatisfaction on the part of the Prussian Monarch might be fraught with the most serious consequences for your Majesty, and also for Bavaria.

Occasions and circumstances may arise when your Majesty may stand in need of the friendly sentiments of the King of Prussia, and these occasions may arise so soon that a delay in re-establishing friendly relations seems very much to be deprecated.

The undersigned cannot, therefore, refrain from advising your Majesty as respectfully as urgently in your Majesty's own august interest, to pay a visit to Mainau.

Should your Majesty decide otherwise, your most faithful subject believes that he has acted up to his duty in making this dutiful representation, and can refuse responsibility for all consequences which the omission of the suggested visit will bring about.

*The GRAND DUKE FRIEDRICH OF BADEN to PRINCE HOHENLOHE.*

KARLSRUHE, *September 23, 1867.*

Accept my best thanks for your kind letter of the 13th inst., from which I was glad to gather that you have not yet quite given up hopes of inducing the King of Bavaria to pay a separate visit to his august uncle. I much regret that my proposal for a simultaneous meeting between the three Monarchs caused expressions of hesitancy to reach Munich from Stuttgart, and that this prevented your King carrying out an arrangement which would be so unobjectionable, considering the near relationship of the King of Prussia.

In support of your efforts, I therefore permit myself to communicate the following information concerning the plans of their Majesties of Prussia.

On September 27 the King arrives at Schloss Mainau, and remains until October 2, on which day he will start on his journey to Hohenzollern. On October 1 the King will be with us and receive the visit of the King of Würtemberg, and it is probable that during the next few days they will return this visit at Friedrichshafen, on their way to Hohenzollern.

So the possibility still remains of your King paying the King of Prussia a separate visit at Mainau or in Hohenzollern, or may be in Sigmaringen. The stay in this Principality will certainly occupy three days, and my uncle, the Prince of Hohenzollern, will, of course, be delighted to have your King as his guest. For this, too, I undertake to make any necessary arrangements.

I trust that in this communication you will only recognise the intention of being as useful as possible to you in the execution of your difficult office.

PRINCE HOHENLOHE *to the* GRAND DUKE OF BADEN.MUNICH, *September 30, 1867.*

I have not been able until now to answer your Royal Highness's most gracious communication of the 23rd inst., as the decision of the King, my most gracious master, had not come in, and I had not quite given up hope that the journey to Mainau might yet take place. Meanwhile, it has been decided in the negative, and I can only beg your Royal Highness to allow me to curtail the expression of my regret, and to dispense me from entering into details concerning the reasons of the decision.

The final result of the Prince's efforts was that King Ludwig decided to meet the King of Prussia in Bavarian territory on his return journey, which took him from Sigmaringen to Nuremberg. The meeting took place between four and six o'clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1867, in the Augsburg railway station.

On September 28 the Chambers met. Their first task was the consideration of the new Zollverein agreement.

*Speech of the PRINCE in the Chamber of Deputies,  
October 8, 1867.*

Gentlemen, — The proposals which you have just accepted are certainly the most important which have been submitted for your discussion during the session of the present Chamber. Their great political importance seem to justify me in taking occasion to say a few words about the foreign policy of the Government, and especially about our position as regards the German question.

On the last occasion on which I had opportunity of addressing you on this question, you received me in this honourable House with such a high measure of flattering confidence that I should fear its loss if I were not now ready, after the lapse of nearly a year, to give you an unreserved account of the action of the Government in a matter which touches the national feeling of the German people as profoundly as it trenches upon its material interests.

I shall try to prove to you and also to the country that the Government has not lost sight of these aims, which I then indicated as those of Bavarian policy, that it has ceaselessly striven to attain them; also that it has not given up hopes of success, and therewith hope for the future of Germany and Bavaria. I know that these efforts have been declared insufficient by some, that the course has been regarded as set, the goal easy to reach, and that the admission of South

Germany to the North German Federation is regarded as the simplest solution of the German question.

Gentlemen, if even at the time when only the rough draft of the North German Federal Constitution was known, the Government held it to be incompatible with its duty to try to bring about unconditional admission to the North German Federation, admission, that is, without previous alteration of the Federal Constitution, so much the more does it now maintain that attitude, when this constitution is definitive, and no alteration is contemplated.

Reasons of home and foreign policy have caused Prussia to include the North German States under a form of constitution to which one cannot deny the merit of paving the way for the political unity of North Germany, but which precisely on this account may more and more differ in its evolution from the character of a Federal Constitution in the exact definition of the term.

I have certainly acknowledged that no federal conditions can suffice for national requirements unless the individual contracting parties make the required sacrifices for the furtherance of the common weal; but the amount of the sacrifice which admission to the North German Federation would demand from South German States does not correspond to the degree of independence which these States are justified in desiring, and are, so far as I can see, in overwhelming majority determined upon maintaining.

The free constitutional evolution of South Germany, as it has shaped itself during fifty years, affords the South German people the right and the power of thus deciding.

The question how far the Nikolsburg preliminaries and the Peace of Prague would supply just ground for trying to extend the North German Federal Constitution to the whole of Germany may, therefore, be properly passed over here. However, these treaties have been concluded with due consideration for actual relations between the Powers, and their importance cannot be ignored by any one called upon to take the facts in question into account, and who is bound to avoid everything which might lead the destiny of our Fatherland into unforeseen courses.

Besides, the Prussian Government has itself explained that it demands union with the South, by no means on a similar basis to that upon which union with the North German States reposes. It only demands an unequivocal statement by the combined nations which would both afford the certainty that the Southern States had not yielded to hostile tendencies against North Germany, and that the well-being of the collective material interests of the German people would be guaranteed by joint systematic arrangements.

Consequently, when reasons of foreign policy as well as a

consideration for the preservation of the independence of the country made the union of Bavaria with the German North appear impossible on the basis of the North German Federal Constitution, those holding office under Government had to seek other means of effecting this union. For the Government could and would not shirk the task, which was defined by me on January 23 in these words:

"By a unification in conformity with treaties, to render possible a German coalition on a basis compatible with the integrity of State and Crown."

Here three different courses were conceivable.

First, the formation of two Federal States, a South German to correspond to the North German, with joint means for certain specified objects.

Secondly, an international federation of all separate German States, analogous to the former German Federal Constitution.

Thirdly, an international union of the South German States with the North German Confederation.

Against the attempt at a constitutional association of an independent South German Federal State with the North German, the aversion of those States with whom Bavaria had to found this South German Federal State bore witness. Ranged against it were the clumsiness of an organisation which would have contained the germ of discontent, and finally the danger of further widening the breach between North and South Germany.

The international union of all German States on the basis of a treaty according to international law had become impossible owing to the dissolution of the former German Confederation, and owing to the North German Federal State which had just been called into life. It could not be expected that Prussia would renounce the North German Federal Constitution, the fruit of her victories.

So nothing remained for the Government but to labour towards the reunion of Germany, while acknowledging existing facts.

These facts were before them: the retirement of Austria from the Confederation, that close corporation the North German Federal State, and the abandonment of the South German States to their own resources.

Therefore the way to an international union of the latter with the North German Federation was clearly indicated.

The provisos for the attainment of a satisfactory issue in this direction were perceived by the Government to lie in the common agreement of the South German States regarding the necessary steps to be taken, and the concessions to be made in order to create a practical, efficient alliance with the North. In view of this, as soon as I had taken over the management of affairs the Government began diplomatic negotiations, which referred primarily to common action concerning the



measures rendered necessary by a loyal fulfilment of the alliance with Prussia for defence and offence.

You are aware that on this account a meeting of the South German Ministers took place at Stuttgart, and that a series of important arrangements were there agreed upon with regard to military organisation, and I hope that the military conferences, then fixed for the month of October, and consequently soon about to assemble here, will still further develop the steady organisation of the South German armed forces.

No sooner was this result achieved, than political negotiations also were begun. I need scarcely state that these negotiations were accompanied by great difficulties — difficulties which were augmented not a little by the critical state of the Luxembourg question.

It would lead us too far to set forth in detail the course and phases of these transactions; briefly to characterise the general result, these have led to a provisional understanding of the basis on which to confer with the North German Confederation.

Concurrently the idea of an alliance of this Federal State with Austria has always been kept in view as a necessary complement to the national aspirations.

Gentlemen, far be it from me to ignore recent events, or to identify myself with vain efforts to undo the past. Now, as ever, I am of opinion that a Constitutional Confederacy of South German States under the leadership of Austria is impossible. Yet on that point I do not hesitate to declare that neither Austria nor France has made any suggestions or proposals in this direction. But the less need there now is to fear an irremediable separation of Germany into a North and a South Germany, the more stringent is the obligation laid upon us not to exclude Austria, the natural ally of Prussia, and of the whole of South Germany, from following that path which alone can guarantee the peace of Europe upon the firmest foundations.

These considerations cannot fail to influence those general outlines to which the Government deemed it necessary to adhere in a conjoint constitution. These general outlines may be comprehensively defined thus: the subjects contained in Articles III. and IV. of the original rough draft for the Federal Constitution — and therefore presenting no inconsiderable sphere of legislation and administration — were declared to be of common interest and to be treated as federal matters, whilst as to the rest, the union was to bear the character of a confederation under Prussian presidency.

Whilst these negotiations were proceeding, the Government received an invitation to take part in the Berlin Tariff Conference. The Government was the less able to absent itself as it was pledged thereto by the decisions of the Berlin Treaties of Peace, and also by its solicitude for the country's material welfare.

The treaty resulting from this conference is now submitted for your consideration.

You will readily perceive that the conditions on which Prussia made the maintenance of the Zollverein contingent could not but influence the further development of the work which had been begun. The Government had necessarily to wait for the new organisation of the Zollverein to come into force with its resultant consequences, ere it was possible to judge of the form in which the proposed confederacy could be carried into effect side by side with it.

Therefore the Government cannot regard its task as completed. Now, as ever, it will persist in that policy which alone it recognises as the right one. In union with its South German confederates, and with due regard to existing treaties, it will endeavour to establish the national alliance with North Germany on the basis already gained.

The Government is, however, conscious of the responsibilities imposed upon it by the duty of maintaining Bavaria's administrative independence, and by the critical situation of Europe. Consequently the course to be pursued by the Government is clear. I will endeavour to indicate this course as simply and clearly as possible.

We do not desire the admission of Bavaria into the North German Confederation, we wish for no constitutional alliance of the South German States under the leadership of Austria; we want no South-West German Confederation, entirely isolated, or possibly even protected by a non-German Power. As little do we wish to pursue a policy suitable for a great Power, neither do we believe that the final end of Bavarian policy is to be sought in the *rôle* of mediator.

This is what we do *not* desire.

What, on the other hand, we do desire, and what we shall henceforth aim at, is the national alliance of the South German States with the North German Confederation, and thereby the unification of the now divided Germany in the form of a confederation. This is identical with the concessions of the Nikolsburg preliminaries and the Peace of Prague.

Gentlemen, I do not say union of Bavaria with the North German Confederation, I say the union of the South German States. And I am desirous that there should be absolute clearness on this point. As matters stand at present, it is my conviction that it would be neither politically sound nor expedient, nor even — let no illusions be harboured — feasible by peaceable means for *separate* States south of the Main to enter into closer union with North Germany.

The national tie, which has yet to be forged between us and the North German Confederation, must embrace the *entire* South. Only in this form is it either permissible or at the present time even practicable.

Herewith, gentlemen, I have expounded the fundamental principles on which I have hitherto conducted the foreign policy of Bavaria, and have indicated the goal which the Government is striving towards.

During the discussion of the proposals laid before you to-day you will have an opportunity of declaring whether or not the course adopted by the Government is in conformity with the views of the country.

Whatever judgment you may, however, pronounce on my political labours, you will at any rate agree with me that there must be no severance of the tie which guarantees the vital interests of Germany, and without which the idea of a national alliance of *any kind whatsoever* cannot be entertained.

The Prince's speech was well received in Berlin. The Ministerial *Provinzial-Korrespondenz* discerned a sincere national aspiration in the Prince's declaration, and hoped that the Bavarian Premier's policy would produce important results in the further development of the German question. Prussia would attach less importance to the names under which national relations were fostered than to actual unifying association in the discharge of practical tasks and the furtherance of the nation's welfare. The semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* praised the anti-dualistic tenor of the Prince's speech, remarking, with regard to the refusal to enter the North German Confederation, that Prussia would make no efforts to alter this resolve. As regards the statement concerning the formation of a Federal State consisting of the North German and the South German States, as well as concerning the Alliance with Austria, further explanations must be awaited. Respecting the declaration that this confederacy should embrace the whole South, and that no separate State should enter into a closer union with the North German Confederation, it insisted that on this point each separate South German State must be free to form its own decision. In the Chamber of Deputies the Government proposals met with no material opposition. The draft of a Bill concerning the election of Deputies to the Tariff Parliament accorded the franchise to all "who paid a direct tax to the State." Against this limitation of universal suffrage a motion was brought forward by Deputies Kolb and von Stauffenberg that "every self-supporting member of the Bavarian State" should be an elector. The motion was rejected by the Chamber. On October 22 the proposal was accepted in the Chamber of Deputies by 117 votes against 17.

Affairs took a different turn in the Upper House. In Committee the Government proposals had been rejected by 9 votes to 1. On October 26 the discussion in plenary sitting took place, and the issue was beyond question adverse. This consideration induced the Prince to accord a favourable reception to Prince Löwenstein-Wertheim-Rosenberg's amendment, which at any

rate promised to avert the danger of an immediate and definitive rejection. The amendment ran: "Whereas this House will always be prepared to make sacrifices for the continuance of the Zollverein and, in consideration of the great benefits which it confers on the country, so long as these sacrifices are confined to the sphere of material interests, though not if the independence of Bavaria is endangered — this House resolves only to accord its consent to the convention submitted on the express condition that the right of acceptance or rejection in all questions concerning the Customs and internal taxation previously conferred on the State of Bavaria by the Zollverein treaties should also be mentioned in the new treaties."

Prince Hohenlohe stated that as a private member he had no hesitation in voting for this amendment, but that as a representative of the Government he did not feel in a position to pronounce on its consequences. The Government, however, would consider itself bound to express its special approval if the proposed resolution were passed. Thereupon the Löwenstein resolution was passed by 47 votes to 3. The same evening the Prince started for Berlin with Freiherr von Thüngen, Reporter to the Upper House, once more loyally to uphold the Bavarian *liberum veto*.

The following are notes by the Prince on the journey to Berlin:

*Notes on the journey to Berlin, October 27, 1867.*

Left Munich in consequence of the resolution of the Chamber of Senators, to try whether further concessions are to be obtained in respect of Prussia's veto, and to give Herr von Thüngen the opportunity of convincing himself of the position of affairs in Berlin. On the 27th we — Thüngen, Weber, and I — arrived in Berlin. Perglas\* was at the station, and told me that Bismarck would receive us at two o'clock.

At two o'clock to Bismarck's. I introduced Thüngen, explaining the object of our journey.

Thüngen then took up the conversation, justified the point of view of the Chamber of Deputies by a statement, and expressed the wish that the assent of the Deputies might be rendered feasible by Prussia's amicable attitude, thereby hinting that the alliance with Prussia would be the firmer for not being brought about by compulsion.

In a lengthy explanation Bismarck developed the point of view of the Prussian Government, protested his German proclivities, referred to the negotiations of the Treaty of Peace, in which he had opposed the interests of Bavaria to the dissentient trend of opinion, but declared that Prussia was deterred by consideration for federal colleagues from granting further concessions to Bavaria.

\* The newly appointed Bavarian Minister in Berlin.

Then Thüngen proposed granting, if not to the Governments, then to the majority of the non-Prussian parliamentary delegates the right of veto.

Against this Bismarck intimated that the North German Constitution would be thereby endangered. He then gave assurances that the Prussian Government had no wish to exercise any kind of pressure upon South German States.

To Thüngen's wish to extend the term of ratification until new elections had taken place in Bavaria, Bismarck thought he could not accede either; but declared that even if we were prevented from being punctual to the term of ratification, the identical conditions offered in June should hold good. He spoke openly and not like a horse-dealer.

Then we retired, after Bismarck had invited us to dinner at five. When we arrived we found Delbrück and Keudel, with several members of the family. Delbrück confirmed what Bismarck had said, regretted if I should have to leave the Ministry; but declared that no concessions could be made.

Herr von Keudel was perfectly acquainted with the state of feeling in Bavaria.

I again asked Bismarck whether he had brought any pressure to bear upon the Würtemberg Government in respect of the fortress of Ulm, which he categorically denied. On the contrary, it would be very acceptable to Prussia if Bavaria obtained more influence in Ulm. Should Würtemberg request a contribution from Prussia for the upkeep of Ulm, this would be granted, and no rights would be claimed during peace; but they would then merely have to request that Ludwigshafen, which was the most important spot strategically, should be fortified as a counterpoise. Rastatt was of little account, and was only of importance to Baden. Ludwigshafen and Germersheim would be the actually important fortresses in a war against France.

We had nothing to fear from Austria. Austria had no alliance with France, for then alliance with Russia would be contemplated, and England too could not look on quietly if France were to blockade the Baltic Ports.

Relations with Austria would gradually improve. An alliance between Austria, South German States, and Prussia he designated as *le couronnement de l'œuvre*.

Next day, the 28th, audience with the King. He requested us to speak. Baron Thüngen expounded his views and those of the Upper House. The King replied in great detail, but very decidedly, that he could not agree to any modification of the treaty which would necessitate an alteration in the Federal Constitution. If we did not think we could join, we ought to retire. But he did not believe that the majority of the country were on the side of the Senators.

He then spoke at length upon Prussian policy in general. Prussia had been forced into the recent annexations against her will.

For fifty years there had been peace in the land, and it had never occurred either to his father, to his brother, or to himself to take what belonged to their neighbours, until he had been forced to do so by the events of 1866. He had shown moderation to Bavaria.

The Bavarian representatives quitted Berlin on the evening of the 28th, and returned to Munich on the evening of the 29th October. This journey convinced Freiherr von Thüngen that the desired veto was unattainable by Bavaria. On the morning of the 30th the Prince made a communication to the committee of the Chamber of Deputies concerning the result of the journey. Thereupon this committee decided not to adopt the modification of the treaty voted by the Upper House. This proposal was accepted without discussion the same afternoon by a plenary sitting of the Chamber of Deputies; as also a proposal of the committee expressing confident expectation that Prussia, as presiding Power, would not exercise the right of veto conceded to it, according to Section XII. of the treaty, in a manner prejudicial to Bavaria's domestic interests. To this proposal Prince Hohenlohe had declared that the Government had no objection to the form in which the wish was submitted by the committee, since Prussia had declared that she merely wanted to make use of the power of opposition in respect of a desired alteration in the legislation or rules of administration should, according to Prussia's well-considered conviction, the prosperity or the receipts of the Zollverein be thereby endangered.

On the evening of October 30 the combined committees of both Chambers deliberated. On October 31, the last day before the expiration of the term of ratification fixed by treaty, the plenary sitting of the Upper House took place at eleven o'clock. In committee this House had previously decided upon acceptance of the treaties by 8 votes to 1. At the public sitting, Herr von Thüngen had expressed himself in the same sense. The acceptance ensued by 35 votes to 13. The same evening the ratification of the treaty was communicated to Berlin.

#### *Conversation with* BARON BEUST.\*

*November 6, 1867.*

Baron Beust began by disclosing what he had heard in Paris and London, remarking that the Emperor Napoleon was still taken up with the idea of a congress for the adjustment of the Roman question, and also that it was necessary to support the Emperor in this. There was no question of a congress of Catholic Powers, but of all the Powers having Catholic subjects. He was under the impression that we had already received an invitation,

\* This was the Prince's first meeting with Beust. — See Beust, *Aus drei Vierteljahrhundertern*, vol. ii. p. 138.

which I denied. It would, it is true, involve the question of necessary funds for the Pope's maintenance, possibly obligatory Peter's pence. However, he let that drop, and then recurred to the German question.

He said that he had had an extended conversation with Goltz in Paris, and that he had called the attention of the latter to the necessity of settling the German question in such a manner as to deprive the French of an excuse for war. There was a general impression that Prussia desired to incorporate the whole of Germany with itself, and it was imperative that the French should be disabused of this idea by a South German Confederation of Union. The form was immaterial. Goltz had agreed, and had named this condition of affairs, this project, a "provisional consummation." Beust acknowledged that such an arrangement could only be achieved with the consent of Prussia, since Baden would only consent on the order of Prussia. Varnbüler\* had expressed his agreement with this, but had nevertheless protested against a South German Parliament. Beust seemed to attach little importance to this. He was of opinion that the international union of the South with the North already existed through the defensive and offensive alliances and Zollverein treaty, and that now it was merely a matter of the South German States forming the union contemplated by the Peace of Prague. He repeatedly advised consideration of the matter, which I promised. In answer to my question as to what he imagined would be Austria's attitude, he replied that Austria would keep aloof, thinking thereby to further matters. He maintained that peace could only be preserved by the formation of a South German Confederation of this kind. If, therefore, we took steps at Berlin, he would support us. Roughly speaking, it is the idea of a Rhine Confederation under a Prussian protectorate cropping up again. He also made the characteristic assertion that the revolutionary party in Rome being now discomfited,† the Governments of Europe were again in possession of greater power, and that in Germany also the opportunity ought to be seized to subdue the revolutionary element.

Beust's and the Emperor Napoleon's idea would probably find its realisation in a union of South German States in military and diplomatic matters.

To my inquiry whether this end might not be obtained by simply waiting, he eagerly remarked that war would not thereby be avoided.

It seems that the fixed resolve prevails, if we do not willingly acquiesce in the idea, of forcing us to do so at the first opportunity.

\* Beust had a discussion with Varnbüler on November 6 in the train between Bietigheim and Stuttgart. According to the report of the Minister of Baden in Stuttgart, Beust had said that every symptom of independent vitality in the South German States would operate in the direction of peace.

† By the defeat of Garibaldi at Mentana on November 3.

In any case, information should be obtained in Berlin and Stuttgart, what Bismarck's opinion is, and what Varnbüler has promised.

Bavaria can, after all, acquiesce in a union of the kind if no actual Federal State is to be constituted therefrom. Whether Würtemberg and Baden will give up their Ministers and be inclined to hand over the representation of their interests to South German Federal Ministers remains to be seen. Military unification has likewise made no great progress up till now, and justifies no great hopes.

*Report to the KING on the position of the South German States.*

MUNICH, November 23, 1867.

Your Majesty, through your Majesty's secretary, instructed your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, to supply information concerning the actual condition of the South German States, and the measure of success attained by your Majesty's most faithful subject in respect of the aim in view, namely, a confederation embracing the aforesaid States. As to this the undersigned begs, with his humble duty, to report as follows:

As your Majesty is aware from reports previously furnished, the negotiations with the South German States begun in March of this year had the object of forming a common basis for the negotiations connected with the North German Confederation.

The result was the Ministerial declaration arranged between May 16 and 31 of this year between Bavaria and Würtemberg, according to which certain subjects of a more general nature are in future to be submitted to the deliberation of a further confederation, to be concluded between North Germany and the South German States.

Yet since the negotiations as to the renewal of the Zollverein had meanwhile taken place, your Majesty's most faithful subject thought it best to omit further steps for the present, and to await the coming into force of the new Zollverein and its consequences before entering upon further negotiations concerning an alliance with the North German Confederation.

Thus, the undersigned also omitted to bring the projected Ministerial declaration between Bavaria and Baden to a conclusion, and, with your Majesty's permission, sent a despatch on August 5 in last year to your Majesty's Minister at Karlsruhe, in which was expressed the wish of your Majesty's Government to allow negotiations to drop meanwhile.

From Minister von Varnbüler's despatch, read to your Majesty's most faithful subject by the Minister for Würtemberg, it appears that the Würtemberg Government likewise intends to desist from further steps which had as object an alliance with North Germany.\*

\* On December 11, 1867, during the discussion of the Foreign Budget in the Second Chamber, Freiherr von Varnbüler said it was the distinct



The condition of this negotiation may therefore for the present be regarded as satisfactory. Yet the undersigned cannot conceal from himself that the interests of Bavaria are not furthered by this purely negative attitude; the circumstances as they stand at present are so immature, the current of public opinion so powerful, that if the Government loses control of the initiative other elements might call forth independent events which would threaten the autonomy of Bavaria. The circumstances of the dismemberment of Germany, as it stands at present, appear so unbearable to the majority of the population that it will be always endeavouring to effect an alteration; and, if a feasible form of union is not suggested, it may be foreseen that the idea of joining the North German Confederation unconditionally will gain more and more adherents. Especially is this the case with Baden and Hesse, whose attitude always remains doubtful, and renders passive expectation well-nigh impossible.

But a new element has cropped up lately in this difficult political question. Your Majesty's most faithful subject has received intimations that a procrastinating attitude of the South German States causes anxiety to the Governments both of Austria and of France, and that in these countries the stipulations of the Peace of Prague will only be regarded as fulfilled when the contemplated union of the South German States is within the range of practical politics.

Although it does not seem advisable to the undersigned to knit the South German States into a Federal State analogous to the North German Confederation, an undertaking which would meet with direct opposition from Würtemberg, and especially from Baden; yet he believes that the moment should now have come when these States might consider an alliance from which might at least follow concerted military organisation and concerted deliberation concerning an identical political attitude.

But whether a more extended political alliance — a South German Federal Union — can be herefrom moulded, will primarily depend on the attitude of the Prussian Government, without whose consent neither Baden nor Hesse, scarcely even Würtemberg, will acquiesce in an idea of the kind.

Therefore it is the more necessary to be assured of Prussia's favourable acceptance of a course of action in the sense indicated above; further, to procure more particular information concerning the ideas of the Austrian and French Governments; and, finally, to be able to count on Würtemberg's general co-operation — all of which were merely hinted at in a recent conversation between your Majesty's most faithful subject and Baron Beust.

opinion of the Government that there was no cause to exceed these limits after having concluded the two treaties with Prussia and thereby fulfilled its national duty. As early as November 7 the Würtemberg Chargé d'Affaires had imparted a note from Freiherr von Varnbüler to von Freydorf, the Baden Minister, the contents of which were to the same effect.

All these steps can, however, only be taken in the strictest confidence and with the utmost caution and discretion; they should only be considered as informative, and in no way contemplate obligations binding on Bavaria.

In so far as your Majesty agrees and decides to confer authority for these preparatory measures of information, the undersigned will take it in hand and dutifully report progress and make further suggestions.

*Rescript by the KING in the margin of the above report.*

I am much concerned about the independence of my Crown and the autonomy of the country. It was for this reason that I asked you for a statement on the political situation. Your account somewhat reassures me, as I gather that you will succeed in averting pressing dangers by forming a South German coalition. I am glad to express my thanks, and my recognition of your efforts, and I agree to the steps which you propose. As this matter has my constant attention, your reports are very acceptable.

LUDWIG.

HOHENSCHWANGAU, November 26, 1867.

PRINCE HOHENLOHE to FREIHERR VON VARNBÜLER  
at Stuttgart.

MUNICH, November 30, 1867.

Your Excellency shared the view that the subject treated in the Ministerial statement of May 16-31 of this year should lie dormant for the present. It had as object to effect an understanding between the Governments of Würtemberg and Bavaria as to paving the way for the national alliance, contemplated in the Peace of Prague, between the South and the North. As far as I am concerned, I have not abandoned the view that the idea of such an alliance should be given up, for then, as now, I considered it a pressing necessity that it should be striven for on a basis guaranteeing the independence of the Southern States, in order to avoid the danger of being drawn against our will into the North German Federation Constitution, by the increasing centripetal force in our national life. But I thought it necessary to come to some conclusion in the first place as to the Zollverein business, and I suppose I may conclude that in this, too, your Excellency shares my opinion.

But now the question of what is to be done comes inevitably nearer, and I think I am not wrong if I anticipate that the agitation will no longer remain passive if the Governments of the Southern States restrict themselves to purely negative action.

Besides, I have proofs that a merely negative policy would be regarded as unsuitable in other ways. Doubtless it is also known to your Excellency that, in circles whose importance

cannot be over-estimated, the opinion obtains that the conclusion of the treaties of alliance and the Zollverein treaty would only correspond to the intentions of the Peace of Prague if (according to this opinion) the union of the South German States amongst themselves, stipulated in Article IV., and upon which the national union of the South with the North was made contingent, should come into force. One may agree to this or not; we in the South cannot, I think, ignore this view, the less so as I have received intimations that even an attempt in this direction — the commencement of negotiations — would affect these circles very favourably.

Now that his Majesty the King has empowered me to take the necessary steps, I am above all things anxious to learn your Excellency's opinion on the matter, in view of the esteem in which I have always held your Excellency's great gifts of statesmanship and of my earnest desire to act in concert with Würtemberg in the German question. Meantime, as an unpretentious private piece of work\* I have endeavoured to formulate the subject under consideration and venture, quite confidentially, to enclose this sketch for your Excellency's information. It would be of the greatest value to me to have your opinion of it in general, and also on individual points. If certain details, such, for instance, as the inclusion of a Prussian plenipotentiary in the Military Commission, seem to go too far,† they are based on the idea that without the assent and practical assistance of Prussia a union of the South German States in any form would be impossible, and that therefore, in order to gain Prussia's approval, it is absolutely necessary to make provisions in her favour.

I have not yet touched upon the question as to the manner in which the work of the legislative factors is to make itself felt in these matters of joint interest.

I repeat, however, that I am placing this sketch before you solely as a friend and not as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that I do not wish to take further steps without first hearing your Excellency's opinion.

#### DRAFT

In consideration of Article IV. of the Peace of Prague, which presupposes a union of the German States south of the Main as a condition of a national union with North Germany, their Majesties and Royal Highnesses the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg and the Grand Dukes of Baden and Hesse, the latter on behalf of those portions of his Grand Duchy lying south of the Main, are agreed as follows:

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\* The following draft was the work of Councillor Freiherr von Völderndorff. Concerning the latter's close business and personal relations with the Prince, *see* his posthumous, and unfortunately uncompleted, publication: *Vom Reichskanzler Fürsten von Hohenlohe*, Munich, 1902.

† Article VI. paragraph 2, of the following draft.

## SECTION I

Article I. — The Kingdoms of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and the southern division of the Grand Duchy of Hesse shall unite in a coalition of States, and shall henceforth bear the name "UNITED STATES OF SOUTH GERMANY."

Article II. — The joint concerns of this coalition shall be adjusted by the Executive of the Union, which shall consist of representatives of each of the United States.

The seat of the Executive of the Union shall be at the place for the time being appointed.

Article III. — In the Executive of the Union Bavaria shall have six, Würtemberg four, Baden three, and Hesse two votes.

Likewise the seat of the Executive shall be transferred annually in such a manner that in the course of fifteen years it shall be twice at Darmstadt, thrice at Karlsruhe, four times at Stuttgart, and six times at Munich.

The State which is the seat of the Executive of the Union for the time being shall hold the presidency.

Article IV. — The States of the Union shall undertake to lay all disputes with members of the Union, as well as with foreign States, before the Executive of the Union.

In case an amicable settlement is not to be reached the dispute shall be referred to a court of arbitration, concerning the convocation, composition, and procedure of which detailed regulations shall forthwith be made.

Disputes with non-Union States shall be treated as matters of joint interest if the Executive of the Union considers that the State of the Union is in the right.

Article V. — The Army of the United States of South Germany shall be a common one, subject to the existing special agreements in regard to Hesse.

Uniform organisation and uniform institutions shall be introduced into the Army so far as is necessary or useful for action in the field.

In time of peace each Army Corps to be under the sole command of the head of the respective States by whom alone it is to be sworn in; the corps only to be used within the borders of the respective countries, subject, however, to regulations for the garrisoning of federal fortresses.

Article VI. — For the maintenance of the uniformity of the Army institutions, and for the elaboration and control of the measures dealing therewith, there shall be at the seat of the Executive for the time being a Military Commission, in which each State of the Union (except Hesse) shall be represented and possess one vote respectively.

The power shall be reserved of making further arrangements for the representation of Prussia on this commission by a plenipotentiary with a deliberative voice in the proceedings.

Article VII. — For the training of South German officers a joint Military Academy shall be established at Munich, a joint Riding School at Stuttgart, and a joint Academy of Engineers and School of Gunnery at Karlsruhe. Joint manœuvres of the Army Corps of the three above-named States shall take place annually, and the supreme command shall be held by the State which is the seat of the Executive for the time being.

Article VIII. — Ulm, Rastatt, and Gernersheim shall be declared fortresses of the United States of South Germany. Their supreme control and administration shall be vested in the Military Commission. In other respects the general principles of the federal regulations hold good for their garrisoning, command, and maintenance.

The Military Commission will at once subject these regulations to the necessary revision, and at the same time draw up a complete scheme of defence for the territory of the United States of South Germany, to be put into execution as soon as possible and at the common cost.

Article IX. — Representation abroad shall be allowed to any State of the Union where the latter considers it necessary. But any State of the Union which maintains a Legation at a foreign Court shall be bound to take over the protection of subjects of other States of the Union that have no representative there equally with that of its own. Where none of the United States of South Germany is diplomatically represented, the Prussian Minister's protection shall be obtained for subjects of the domain of the South German Union.

Article X. — With regard to the Consulates, efforts shall be made to secure the appointment of joint South German Consuls. In places beyond the seas, and elsewhere where it may be deemed advisable, the protection of the North German Consuls shall be obtained for the subjects of the United States.

Article XI. — Throughout the United States of South Germany there shall be common civil rights, to the effect that as regards domicile, the carrying on of industries, manufactures, and commerce, admission to public offices, taxation, and the enjoyment of all other civil rights, and finally with regard to the protection of the law and prosecution, the subject of a State of the Union shall be dealt with as a native. Those regulations which concern the relief of the poor and their admission to local unions are not affected hereby. Likewise, for the present, existing treaties between the separate States of the Union dealing with the reception of exiles and the care of sick and the burial of deceased subjects shall remain in force.

In time of peace every subject of the United States of South Germany shall be free to discharge his military service in the Regular Army, Reserve, and Landwehr in the State in which he resides permanently.

Article XII. — Throughout the territory of the United South

German States there shall be a common civil law and penal code, and a common civil suit and criminal action. Simultaneously, conformity with the legislation of the North German Federation shall be aimed at as far as possible.

Article XIII. — For the maintenance of legal uniformity, joint Supreme Courts shall be established immediately common legislation has been established.

A common Supreme Court of Commercial Judicature for the United States of South Germany is even now being established at Nuremberg.

Article XIV. — Further concerns of the Union are :

(1) The regulation of the system of weights and measures, the coinage, and the establishment of principles in regard to issues of funded and unfunded paper money.

(2) General banking regulations.

(3) Patents.

(4) The protection of literary property.

(5) The rafting and shipping industries on the waterways passing through the territories of several different States, as well as the condition of these waterways, and river and other water dues.

(6) Regulations concerning the mutual execution of decisions in civil matters, and the discharge of requisitions in general.

(7) Measures touching the sanitary and veterinary police.

Article XV. — An international bond between the United South German States and the North German Federation, in so far as it does not already exist in the alliance and tariff treaties, shall be brought about by a treaty by which the subjects specified in Articles XIII. and XIV. shall be jointly regulated.

A second section of the draft contains provisions for the "national union" of the United South German States with the North German Confederation.

Freiherr von Varnbüler replied to the Prince's letter of November 30, 1867, at New Year 1868, to the effect that the joint execution of military arrangements was necessary; but as regarded the other points he must question whether they furnished material for an organic union of South German States, and whether a federal organ, without common popular representation, would satisfy public opinion. But a South German Parliament he did not want.

From December 4-7, 1867, conferences took place at Munich between the Ministers of War of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden, for the purpose of carrying out the Stuttgart resolutions of February 5. Prince Hohenlohe opened these conferences with the following address :

"Before the commencement of the military conference, I permit myself, gentlemen, to express to you, as representatives of

the Governments of the Kingdom of Würtemberg and the Grand Duchy of Baden, the thanks of the Bavarian Government, in that his Majesty the King of Würtemberg and his Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Baden have commissioned you to take part in the conference. Herewith begins a complement of the Stuttgart Conferences which took place in February, and which we cannot too highly value.

"Should it be, as I doubt not, the intention of all South German Governments to adhere to the treaties of alliance concluded with Prussia, and in eventualities that may ensue to defend the integrity of German territory jointly with our allies of the North, then the co-operation of the South German States will not hinder, but further the attainment of this object.

"The mutual understanding of the South German States will not estrange us from the North, but facilitate the fulfilment of our alliance duties; it will allow us to foster those peculiarities to the maintenance of which we in South Germany attach importance; it will permit us to uphold that measure of independence which we may retain without prejudice to the common end in view; finally, it will strengthen us, and make us valuable allies.

"In this sense I wish your deliberations, comrades, the best of progress and every success."

After this welcome, the negotiations were continued by the Military Commissioners alone. The final agreements were recorded in two protocols of December 7, 1867. The first of these protocols sets forth, in the first instance, that the Stuttgart resolutions have been carried out, as far as has been hitherto possible for individual States, in all points and by all. For the supplementation and explanation of former points agreed, it is considered desirable, in accordance with the North German Federal Military Constitution which has meanwhile been promulgated, to attain, as far as feasible, a war footing of 2 per cent. and a peace effective of 1 per cent., and thereby in principle three years' service. Further provisions concern the maintenance of an experienced staff of non-commissioned officers, the peace effective of cavalry, the necessity of identical drill regulations, identical ranks for officers, and identical designations for non-commissioned officers. The second protocol binds the three Governments to negotiations concerning joint manœuvres to be arranged for the coming summer or autumn, and contains the following provision in respect of the fortresses:

"Regarded from a military point of view, the question of the fortresses of South Germany can be satisfactorily settled only in connection with the system of defence of the whole of Germany, and therefore the Ministers of War here assembled regard it as in this respect a military necessity that a body should exist which — with constant regard to Germany's system of defence in general — should settle details respecting individual fortified places and positions.

"As, however, the fulfilment of this necessity must first be considered in all its aspects, its existence shall merely be stated here, but a definitive decision not pronounced."

*Report to the KING concerning the reconstitution of the Upper House.*

MUNICH, December 12, 1867.

In the programme which your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, placed before your Majesty ere taking up his appointment, and which received your Majesty's august approval, the reform of the Upper House was mentioned as a desirable measure.

In order to meet this wish, the fulfilment of which seems necessary and profitable to the interests of the State, your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, ventures to place before your Majesty six bills,\* by which, according to his conviction, — without danger to the genuinely conservative bases of the Constitution, — the institution of the Upper Chamber would escape constant attacks and find redress for the justifiable criticisms which of late have been so frequently levelled against it.

The six bills are intimately connected. The bill concerning the amendment of the law of entail confers on the commoner with landed property the possibility of admission to the hereditary peerage; it thus does away with the exclusiveness of this privilege, without destroying its conservative character.

On the other hand, the bill for the amendment of Section VI., paragraph 3, of the Constitution summons to the Senate a number of old noble families with landed property, who have hitherto, obviously for no special cause, been excluded therefrom by the maintenance in their family estate of the ancient, genuinely Teutonic principle of tenure in common. Your Majesty's most faithful servant is of opinion that such families as the Crailsheim, Egloffstein, Seckendorff, Thüngen, Tacher, &c., should not be unrepresented in the Upper Chamber of the Kingdom of Bavaria. . . .

In like manner the result of the bill for the representation by proxy of hereditary Senators will be to render it possible for those families who are called by the Constitution to the Upper Chamber to exercise their right † more frequently than constant and almost unavoidable hindrances admit at present.

Against this increase of the hereditary element it seemed advisable to claim a further extension of the Royal prerogative of nomination, and this is the object of a bill which would raise the

\* The six bills were the work of Freiherr von Völderndorff. See his work: *Vom Reichskanzler Fürsten von Hohenlohe*, p. 22.

† The bill was to authorise the representation of hereditary members by a kinsman during the session.



number fixed by Paragraph 4 of Section VI. of the Constitution from one-third to one-half.

Finally, with special regard to the bill for the extension of the Chamber of Senators, the undersigned ventures respectfully to refer in general terms to the underlying motives. In attempting a reform of the institution he believes that he ought to confine himself to the strictly essential, and more especially that he should refrain from suggesting an entire reorganisation of constitutional regulations for the Upper Chamber, since such might lead to lengthy debates and possibly to far-reaching proposals in the Chamber of Deputies, whereas the bill in its actual brief wording does, in fact, meet the most urgent requirements, and yet on the whole leaves the basis of the Constitution of the Upper Chamber untouched.

The bill concerning the quorum of the Upper House is founded, as the preamble shows, on a resolution previously moved by prominent members of this Chamber, and will satisfy an extremely urgent need.

The undersigned was of opinion that before a Cabinet deliberation took place on the bills in question, which might be placed before the Chambers as emanating from the joint Ministry, your Majesty's orders should be obtained, and consequently ventures to make the most respectful suggestion that your Majesty should ordain the discussion of the six annexed bills by the Cabinet Council.

From the preambles of the bills the following may be quoted :  
(1) Amendment of the law of entail.

Some doubts may exist as to whether the law of entail, as set out in the Bavarian Constitution, is intrinsically desirable, and should therefore be reintroduced. Presumably, however, there is no doubt that, though the law sanctions the establishment of entails, their restrictions to the nobility is not in accordance either with material conditions or with the views of the present day concerning equality before the law. Should the Government, therefore, endeavour to remove this anomaly, and, by abrogating the present prerogative of noble families, grant to every one the right of tying up his property for the benefit of his family in a form hitherto only possible for the nobility, this can in no case be challenged as unjust or inopportune.

But neither does such extension of the right of entail seem unfair or unimportant, since it thus makes way for the admission to the Senate of commoners with landed property; the institution of hereditary senatorship ceases to be a privilege of the nobility, and becomes the common property of the whole nation.

(2) Bill for the conferment of hereditary Senatorship on persons in joint ownership of property.

The Constitution does not merely start from the principle that the bond of entail should be inadmissible without the simultaneous operation of the law of primogeniture. It also refuses

to invest with any political importance a family estate where no preferment of the first-born takes place. It may be urged that the institution of entail is the outcome of the restricted manner of succession which obtains at the present time, and there is good reason for the opinion that, if once the estate were allowed to be tied up in favour of the family, it would be fairer and more natural to grant the usufruct to all members of the same family than to single out the favoured first-born. But the Government would not propose an innovation so far-reaching and even hazardous, thinking it better simply to allow entail, as such, to continue, according to Bavarian tradition.

On the other hand, a change seems called for by the injustice of ignoring the political importance of such family property as rests on the ancient, truly German basis of joint usufruct by all members of the family in favour of him who takes his stand upon the right of primogeniture. The question of the divisibility of usufruct and of administration is merely a private family matter and cannot alter or lessen the importance of landed property as such.

Now in the provinces of Franconia the number of properties of the kind indicated is not inconsiderable, and indeed the greater part of family landed property in Bavaria has remained unrepresented in the Upper House in consequence of these distinctions.

Therefore an alteration must be considered as equitable as it is desirable.

(3) Bill concerning life Senators. Among those deficiencies in the constitution of the Upper House, which make themselves specially felt at present, is the circumstance that there are too few legal, administrative, financial, and military members; and precisely for this reason the rendering of reports on such subjects encounters great difficulties.

However politically correct in the Constitution is the principle for the composition of the Upper House, that the King's prerogative of nomination must stand in a certain relation to other categories, and little as it might be desirable to give up the character of independence of the Upper Chamber, in favour of the political tendency of a particular time, with its liability to rapid change, by the unlimited nomination of peers, yet, on the other hand, the numbers prescribed in the Constitution for the King's prerogative of nomination appears to be placed too low, and still more will this be the case when the Chamber is possibly strengthened by elected members.

All these reasons are in favour of undertaking the proposed increase of the proportion of life Senators to hereditary Senators from one-third to one-half.

(4) Bill for the reinforcement of the Chamber of Senators.

This Bill provides for the reinforcement of the Chamber of Senators by twenty-nine elected members, namely:

(a) Five representatives of the Universities, the Polytechnic, and the Academy.

(b) Eight representatives of commerce and industry.

(c) Eight representatives of landed property.

(d) Eight representatives of towns.

If the Government proposes, not a reconstruction, but a reinforcement of the Chamber of Senators, it is primarily because it considers that in the two-Chamber system — in so far as the latter is to have any actual political importance at all — the Upper Chamber must by heredity and life-long nomination preserve a certain stability, that it must thereby bring the conservative element to special account, and will for that very reason be capable of preserving the quickly shifting momentary moods of political life from excess precipitation.

Further, it cannot be ignored that the landed property which is now represented by the hereditary members of the Upper House furnishes a legitimate element in the formation of a Chamber of Peers, and one which is justified by the historical as well as the material importance of the interests at stake. Finally, that the prerogative of Royal nomination furnishes a necessary means of attracting men of talent from these ranks, who could be raised in no other way, into parliamentary life. It follows that whatever is accomplished in the way of reform of the Upper House must come about through the attraction of these elements, and by this means, without obliterating the character of the institution, a more lively development of the impetus given to political life by free discussion and opinion will be rendered possible.

Therefore a reinforcement must take place by elected members.

Naturally the number of elected Senators must stand in a certain relation to the other categories, and if the Bill in question will allow twenty-nine members elected by vote to be appointed, this represents scarcely twice the number of those at present nominated for life, and the hereditary members will not in future outnumber the elected and nominated members put together. With regard to the categories from which to choose, a general election in local districts is barred from the first, for there would exist no inherent reason for opposing to the Lower Chamber — which rests on this basis — a representation in the Upper Chamber resting on an identical basis.

On the other hand, the Government believed that an amendment of election methods, solely by restriction to the upper classes of tax-payers, could not be regarded as either sufficient or desirable, since thereby the Upper Chamber would rest solely on the privilege of wealth, and would scarcely gain an increase of prestige in the general estimation of the people.

Hence the proposed class system of election follows as a matter of course, and in this connection it should be the orders

of society called forth by modern political life that should be kept in view, and not the pre-existing classes, which have now become historic. With special regard to the clergy in this matter, they have hitherto been represented in the Upper House in a suitable manner, and it was therefore possible to pass them over in the reconstitution.

*The PRINCE'S speech in the Chamber of Deputies during the discussion of the Bill for Military Organisation December 13, 1867.*

In yesterday's and in to-day's debate the province of foreign policy has also been touched upon. I shall, however, refrain from commenting in greater detail upon many a statement, many a bitter remark; otherwise I should be under the necessity of propounding to you once more the principles which I feel myself bound to maintain in Bavarian policy, and I should fear to weary you by the repetition. Furthermore, these very statements are based on those fears of future approaching events to which one party clings with a certain predilection. I shall therefore confine myself to-day to a few general observations. You will agree with me, gentlemen, that the present time imperatively demands increased efforts in military matters, and the greatest possible extension of our military force. We are living in a time of transition. Former alliances have been destroyed, and fresh ones are in course of formation; the sufferings of Europe have reached, if I may say so, an acute stage, and feverish excitement points to the early approach of great disturbances. Of what nature the culmination of these crises will be no man can say, yet there can be no doubt that we also shall not be unaffected. We shall be forced to make sacrifices, but these sacrifices will pass the limits of our endurance if we are not heedful to meet the coming danger forearmed, and armed at all points. The development of Europe and Germany may continue on the same lines; but Bavaria must gain the respect which is her due by an adequate expansion of her inherent strength, and must, as a part of the whole, take up that position which alone is worthy of her.

That our present military organisation is not equal to this object was expounded yesterday and to-day in eloquent terms, but it is beyond doubt that a mere reform of military organisation is not sufficient if the old principles persist. Equally insufficient, finally, would be a military system copied from the Swiss. Nothing, therefore, remained to the Government but to have recourse to the military system which is now proposed. It is a system which has success on its side, and which affords certainty of creating an army which is ready to fight; one, moreover, which by its homogeneous system and training has the advantage of being a force equal to, and capable

of, combined action with our allies. By introducing this military organisation we shall inspire the Army with that confidence in its own strength and its own thoroughness without which military success is not to be thought of; we shall, by this combined system, connect ourselves more closely and intimately with the whole of Germany, and at the same time we shall retain and defend that independence which Bavaria can and will uphold — without detriment to the agreement for offence and defence — by opposing right supported by might, to any force which may threaten. Therefore I recommend you to pass the Bill.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, *February 19, 1868.*

The result of the elections\* has been to make the Ultramontane party arrogant, and it now thinks that the Government also must immediately come over to its side. Secretary to the Cabinet Lipowsky's thoughtless and wavering character affords it the opportunity. This man, who wishes to keep in with all parties and believes true statecraft to consist therein, hears much and digests little, but intrigues the more. The article in the *Süddeutsche Presse*, against the Ultramontane party, has called forth his indignation, which he has, in fact, expressed to Fröbel. All the same, I do not believe that the King, as he maintains, gave him any pretext for this manifestation. Of course the Ultramontane party is annoyed at Fröbel's article, because it thwarts their plans, which aim at separating the Government from the Reform party, and drawing them completely into the Ultramontane camp. There is a rumour that Schrenck is to replace Schlör.

Trauttmansdorf† would like to get rid of Schlör, and appoint in his stead a Minister who would be wiser on the one hand, and more Ultramontane on the other. He maintains that he wants me to remain; but at the same time wishes me to make a decided deviation to the side of the Ultramontanes. Fröbel says that he is opposed to Beust. I do not share the opinion. I think that here Beust acts with the Ultramontanes, and in Vienna against them.

To-morrow Schlör's election will decide the matter here. I hear various conjectures. Some think he will be elected, others not. In any case his removal from the Ministry would be no misfortune.

MUNICH, *February 22, 1868.*

So Schlör was elected yesterday. Had he not managed to get in he would soon have had to quit the Ministry; but as

\* To the Tariff Parliament, which took place on February 10.

† Count Trauttmansdorff, Austrian Minister.

things have turned out he can remain. Whether this is an advantage is another question. At Trauttmansdorff's I had a long conversation with Feilitzsch concerning the Press in general. We were so far agreed that nothing can be done without money, and as we are short of cash we cannot accomplish much.

Dr. Haas has brought Völderndorff some articles which he has had inserted in several papers, and which, in furtherance of my interests, discuss the matter of Nuremberg Castle,\* and condemn Pfordten. Völderndorff did not know how to construe the amiability of the Austrian Ultramontane Press agents until I told him that Trauttmansdorff had given me to understand that their side did not wish for the fall of the present Ministry. The gentlemen consider the moment too inopportune for bringing forward an understanding with Prussia. They fear the impression my fall would make in Berlin, if it were occasioned by the Austrian party. In Berlin the blunders of the King of Hanover† have aroused a mood of exasperation against Austria, which they now have no interest in increasing. So it seems I shall have peace for a time. The Order of St. Stephen will accentuate this mood.

In the evening Lipowsky came to me to complain of the foreign Press, and to beg me, by order of the King, to take steps against it. His real object, however, was to see if I would tell him something about the successor to the sick Minister von Pechmann. He made himself very agreeable, and seemed to be waiting for a disclosure of the kind. But I kept silence. In addition he spoke of the reports about the King, and complained of the people in Munich and their evil tongues.

To-day, Princess Maria Theresa arrived with Prince Ludwig.‡ I received her at the station with Moy and Trauttmansdorff. She looked quite brilliant in her new toilette, and was very pleasant and graceful. We were presented, escorted her to

\* After the conclusion of peace the King of Bavaria had offered to King Wilhelm, in a letter of August 30, 1866, to become the joint owner with him of "the venerable castle of his forefathers," and to inhabit it during any visits he might pay to Bavaria. This offer was accepted with thanks by King Wilhelm. The matter did not come to an assignment of property or, in fact, to a political treaty. It was settled by a semi-official manifesto of February 15, 1868.

† King George of Hanover celebrated his silver wedding on February 18, 1868, at Hietzing, and received a great deputation of Hanoverians; to whom, in an after-dinner speech, he expressed his hopes of his restoration to his dominions. The Hanoverian Legion, which had been formed on the occasion of the Luxembourg complications, had left Switzerland for France in January 1868. On February 20 Count Beust was interpellated in the Chambers concerning the profuse supply of Austrian passports for the Guelph Legionaries by the Viennese Police Department to Switzerland, and concerning the after-dinner speech of King George.

‡ Prince Ludwig of Bavaria had married Maria Theresa, Archduchess of Austria-Este-Modena, on February 20, 1868.

the carriage, and then drove home. Their Royal Highnesses made their State entry, of which I saw nothing. The King is in bed. Few people believe that he is ill.

MUNICH, *February 24, 1869.*

Fröbel has just told me that he lately received an admonitory letter from Baron Gruben, the Taxis official in Ratisbon, requesting him to come to an understanding with the clerical party. Gruben, so Fröbel tells me, is an agent of the Society of Jesus, who is attached to Prince Taxis in order to exploit his enormous fortune in the interests of the Order. In company with Dörnberg he was Chief Agent during the Congress of Princes in 1863, and on that occasion discussed a scheme for a constitution with Fröbel, and together with him laid it before the Emperor; however, he struck out Fröbel's too-democratic additions, and thus the thing failed. At that time some far-reaching plans were concocted at Ratisbon; the Hereditary Prince was to have the Rhine-lands, and on this point negotiations were also commenced with Napoleon. Hence the Ratisbon Ultramontanes' fury with Fröbel.

Pascal Duprat, the well-known Republican, was here lately at Fröbel's, and recounted to him his experiences in Hungary, whence he came. The Hungarian Left doubts the continuance of the present Liberal *régime* in Austria, and in view of approaching catastrophes has already opened negotiations with the Southern Slavs, with the intent of creating or preparing an Empire of the Danube or a Federation of the Danube. The Southern Slavs will not hear of a union with Russia, but nevertheless accept Russian money in order to promote their own schemes therewith.

*March 4.*

During the last few days I have been very busy. The death of Minister Pechmann and the question of a successor have been my chief preoccupations. As it seemed to me that Lipowsky was trying to outflank me in the nomination of a Minister, I stated on Wednesday in the Cabinet Council that I detected a desire to complete the Ministry without consulting me; if this were actually the case I should tender my resignation. The stroke told. The Ministers received a salutary fright, the King was at once informed, and on Thursday evening he sent for me to discuss all manner of things. He also touched upon the Ministry of the Interior, asked about Hörmann, whom I, however, characterised as unsuitable. The Neumayr party are working for Hörmann. On Friday Lipowsky came to ask me my opinion direct. I told him frankly that I did not want Hörmann on account of his relations with the Neumayr clique. We also discussed Schubert, of whom he speaks in the highest terms, and Pfeufer, whom he does not much advocate.

On Saturday came news of the death of King Ludwig I.\* Hence much business, many telegrams, notifications, &c.

This has rather put the Ministerial question in the background. Added to this, the King is ill again — fever, &c.

On Monday the Budget of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was discussed in committee. The Reporter was only going to grant me 200,000 gulden for the Legations, but I declared that I could not go below 250,000 gulden, and would tender my resignation if they were not accorded. Thereat great ill-humour in the committee, and finally consent to my demand.

Yesterday, Tuesday, March 3, many callers at the Ministry. Among them Stenglein, who wanted to know if we were going to take up as passive an attitude at the next election to the Chamber as we did at the time of the elections to the Tariff Parliament. I replied in the negative. He said that in that case there was a prospect of forming a Liberal party if we would assist the members of the Chamber to election.

MUNICH, *March 22, 1868.*

This evening Lipowsky came to see me, and said his Majesty had commissioned him to ask what points I wished to put before him concerning the nomination to the Ministry of the Interior.† His Majesty could not receive me, as his Majesty had a swelled cheek.

I replied that I had partitioned his Majesty to hear me orally concerning the nomination of a Minister before anything was decided, that I must insist on this petition, and would commit myself to nothing further. Should his Majesty not grant this petition, I must still adhere to my resolution. Lipowsky protested that he had done his utmost to induce the King to see me to-day, but without success. I said that I regretted the necessity of insisting. I owed it to myself.

On March 30 the President of the Government Board, von Hörmann, was appointed Minister of the Interior.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, *March 30, 1868.*

Your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, has been informed by the Prussian Ambassador that his Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Prussia will go to Turin for the wedding of the Crown Prince of Italy on April 20 and will pass through Munich. The journey will probably take place in the week following Easter.

\* Died at Nice on February 29.

† In the report of March 21 the Prince had requested an audience, in order verbally to set forth his views concerning a nomination to the office of Minister of the Interior.



As the King of Prussia and other members of the Royal Family have paid several visits to your Majesty's Court, which your Majesty has not yet been able to return, it is perhaps possible that the considerations of etiquette prevailing between the Royal Courts will not permit the Crown Prince of Prussia to visit your Majesty's Court on this occasion.

Yet, as the Crown Prince is going to Italy by way of the Brenner Pass, he cannot avoid Munich.

Your Majesty's most faithful subject thinks it right to bring this to your Majesty's notice, as he fears that it might perhaps produce a disagreeable impression on your Majesty if the Crown Prince made a stay in Munich without visiting the Royal Court. If this should be the case, and your Majesty should wish to receive the Crown Prince's visit, the undersigned could introduce the subject through Baron Perglas in Berlin, and remove the impediment of etiquette which perhaps exists by referring to a proposed visit by your Majesty to Berlin, whose date need not be specified.

Your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, therefore respectfully ventures to beg for your Majesty's august commands whether, and in what sense, he shall provide Baron Perglas with instructions.

In the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of April 6, 1868, the Deputy Ruland had violently attacked the Government on account of several articles in the *Süddeutsche Presse*.

Hereupon Prince Hohenlohe said: "I must, above all things, insist that the Government has no actual Government Press. I wished for no Government organ, and therefore allowed the *Bayrische Zeitung* to cease publication. The *Süddeutsche Presse* is not a Government organ. It receives no instructions, and therefore the Government is not answerable for any statements which it contains. You may possibly consider this relation as surprising, but you will agree with me if I say that I have too high an opinion of the Press in general to conceive a great important newspaper working according to precept, thinking to order or according to suggestion. Such an organ would only be imaginable in the restricted form of a Government Gazette, for which separate sections of the Government would be responsible.

"Therefore I must consider as baseless the attacks which have been made upon the Government concerning the Government Press."

*Report to the KING concerning the South German question.*

MUNICH, April 10, 1868.

In your Majesty's august mandate of the 5th of this month your Majesty asks for the explanation of the reasons of failure of the attempt at forming a South German Confederation of States.

Therefore your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, hastens with his humble duty to report as follows:

The foundation of a South German Confederation of States, which was to be accomplished according to the terms of Article IV. of the Peace of Prague, had from the outset only a prospect of success if the idea obtained your Majesty's entire approval, and if hope was thereby afforded that your Majesty would accord his most unconditional concurrence in the diplomatic action proposed.

From your Majesty's august mandate of January 28\* of this year, your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, gathered that your Majesty by no means entirely approved the proposed conclusion of the treaty, and that your Majesty entertained scruples concerning it. This had the effect of awakening fears in the mind of your Majesty's most faithful subject, that the success of the proposed measures would be doubtful from the outset.

Notwithstanding this the undersigned did not delay to place the matter before the Cabinet, in accordance with your Majesty's commands. In order to facilitate a careful and advantageous discussion, he has supplied every Minister with a copy of the draft of the treaty, and put before them in writing the tenor of previous negotiations, as well as the reasons which led him to make the proposal. No sympathy was shown the proposal by the Cabinet. During the discussions objection was raised by nearly all the Ministers, and only the Minister of War expressed himself in favour of a mutual understanding between the South German States, at any rate in essentials.

This much has already come to light: that there does not exist among the Cabinet that complete unanimity of views concerning the desirability and advantage of the project which is so imperative for carrying into effect a far-reaching plan such as this.

Apart from these circumstances which oppose the plan, external and internal relations have meanwhile so shaped themselves that your Majesty's most faithful subject can no longer reckon upon the success of the diplomatic steps suggested to your Majesty at the beginning of the year.

Your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, never doubted that direct elections to the Tariff Parliament would result in the way they have resulted in the greater part of Bavaria and in the whole of Würtemberg; for there have long been sufficient indications to suggest the alliance of Clericalism and Democracy which has since been openly displayed. But as this alliance has already led to such important external results, and since there has been an assertion of Republican tendencies in the agitation carried on under the cloak of Conservative interests, it is obvious that a South German Confederation would

\* This document cannot be found.

not have the slightest chance of making way in South German public opinion without the simultaneous grant of a combined South German Parliament to oppose the North German Parliament.

But, according to the opinion of your Majesty's most faithful subject, with the turn which affairs have now taken the concession of a South German Parliament would be supremely dangerous, for the union of Ultramontanes and Republicans would only make use of this Parliament in order to destroy absolutely the authority of the South German individual Governments, which their unbridled Press is already working against, and striving night and day to undermine. It would only tend to further their schemes, which keep in view a federally constituted Republican South Germany, united to Switzerland, as the final object to be attained. There are indications that this scheme would not be regarded unfavourably in France, since on the further side of the Rhine it is thought that a protectorate of such disintegrated State organisations could easily be established.

As regards foreign political affairs, your Majesty knows from former suggestions put forward by the undersigned that the sole reason why he once more, and in so resolute a manner, took up the difficult project of forming a South German Confederation was that at the end of last year those constellations were ruling which alone render the accomplishment of this confederacy possible. These, on the one hand, are the *entente cordiale* between Austria and France, and, on the other hand, Prussia's inclination to contribute towards the preservation of peace by using its influence with Baden and Hesse, and simultaneously bringing gentle pressure to bear on Würtemberg, with intent to induce the States to fulfil the Prague stipulations. Of these two provisos neither exists at the present time. A coolness has obviously arisen between Austria and France; it would seem that France has given up hopes of provoking Austria to a course conducive to French interests, and will therefore strive to gain her ends by other means. Prussia, however — which manifestly was at any rate not unwilling at the time of the confidential preliminaries, commenced by your Majesty's most faithful subject, the undersigned, in accordance with your Majesty's authorisation of November 30 last year — has since then clearly changed her mind. The decided declarations against the scheme of a South German Confederation made by Baden in the official *Karlsruher Zeitung*, and the repeated announcement inspired by Prussian official papers that no such South German Confederation could be entertained, indicate that Prussia is no longer at all inclined to support a possible scheme.\*

\* From the beginning Baden would only agree to consent to the project of a Southern Confederation if its establishment offered the prospect of a closer union with the North German Federation. In a conversation

Under these circumstances no endeavour to carry out a measure such as was at one time suggested to your Majesty would have any prospect of success, and your Majesty's most faithful subject is of opinion that Bavaria should not expose itself to a failure of the kind. Should circumstances alter and become more favourable to the establishment of a South German Federation, the undersigned will not delay in taking the matter in hand; for now as ever he is of opinion that the supreme danger to South Germany still lies in the unfulfilled stipulations of the Peace of Prague. To this end he will carefully watch the course of events and the political constellations, in order that he may be in a position to take up the project again at the right moment. Nevertheless, as was most respectfully observed at the commencement of this report, the only hope of success lies in your Majesty's and the entire Ministry's unconditional consent to and implicit confidence in the scheme.

*Minute by the KING on the above report.*

I have perused your representations and await further reports.  
LUDWIG.

MUNICH, *April* 15, 1868.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, *April* 18, 1868.

As the Crown Prince \* had sent word yesterday that he wished to speak to me to-day and would like me to breakfast with him I betook myself to him at nine o'clock.

At the beginning he alluded cursorily to my relations with the King, which I did not enter into further. We then went on to speak of international politics. I took the opportunity of warning him that above all things Prussia should refrain from acting too aggressively towards the South, pointed to the Republican-Ultramontane waves in Würtemberg, the tone in Bavaria, and, above all, to France. This he seemed to perceive, then talked further about Würtemberg and tendencies there, *not* about Baden, and was on the whole very reserved. When conversation touched

with the Minister of Baden in Berlin on December 1, 1867, Bismarck considered the projected Southern Confederation as untenable in many respects, but advised against immediately discountenancing it, and recommended a continuance of negotiations. About the same time he refused the request expressed in a private letter from the Minister Mathy, asking him to announce his readiness to receive Baden into the North German Federation, and only leaving the date undetermined in consideration of the state of Europe; Bismarck at the same time advised the Government of Baden "not to define too precisely a purpose which would drive the most powerful South German States into antagonism."

\* The Crown Prince of Prussia arrived at Munich on April 17, and took up his quarters in the Palace. He stayed till the evening of the 18th.

upon Prussian intrigues in Austria, he seemed to disapprove, and in fact his conversation generally seemed to reveal a certain opposition to Bismarck.

Concerning war with France, he said that the alliance of South German States with Prussia naturally involved concerted action with Prussia, inquired who would be Commander-in-Chief of the Bavarian Forces, then touched upon the Prussian Army's preparedness for war, and said it was at any rate equal to the French. He also laid stress upon the courage of the Bavarian Army. On the whole, he talked very peaceably, said he hated war, yet that war was sometimes unavoidable, but was never to be recommended as a means to an end.

He seems to regard the union of Germany under Prussian leadership as self-evident; on the other hand, it appeared to me that he preferred moral persuasion to force.

BERLIN, *April 26, 1868.*

From eight o'clock until this morning at seven I spent mostly in sleep, which I could do the more comfortably as I had the whole carriage to myself. Nearing Leipzig, I looked out of the window from time to time, and observed at the stations several members of the Tariff Parliament, seeking for food, in a forlorn condition. Later on the members became communicative, drank bad coffee together, and ate sandwiches.

By 12.30 we were in Berlin. I was received by the whole Legation, and by Privy Councillor Weber. Viktor was still at Potsdam, but arrived soon after I had taken possession of my abode. A very pretty sitting-room and a large bedroom on the third floor.

At three o'clock came Perglas, who made various political communications. He says no one knows what Bismarck will do if a motion is brought forward for the enlargement of the powers of the Tariff Parliament; Bismarck is an unknown quantity. In the matter of the fortresses he showed me an answer which Bismarck had sent, and which is friendly. I fear he has committed himself rather too soon.

Varnbüler has not yet come. He is in bed, but they say he is not really ill, only fears a bad reception.

I talked over the difficulty of my position with Viktor. Then came Roggenbach, who declared that Bluntschli had no intention of bringing forward a motion concerning the enlargement of the powers of the Tariff Parliament. It all depended upon whether bringing forward such a motion would aggravate my position in Bavaria; in this case Bismarck would find means of restraining the National Liberal party. After I had explained to him the drawbacks to me of such a motion, Roggenbach wanted to effect its omission, only I should have to try to influence the Bavarians, which can be done by Luxburg. The only thing Bluntschli proposed was to make it possible for single States

to join the Tariff Parliament upon certain questions, *i.e.* to incorporate specific matters of their own State in the tariff organisation.

Then he also touched upon an idea of his own: he wondered whether the surplus from tariff receipts might not be spent upon certain fortresses which would be converted into a species of federal fortresses. The Tariff Federal Council would then have to be augmented by a Military Commission.

I went to the theatre in the evening. There Count Henckel von Donnersmarck came to us, and declared that the National Liberals all wanted to elect me first Vice-President, and that a desire was now expressed to unite with the Free Conservatives over the election of a second Vice-President. The affection of the National Liberals is quite gruesome to me, but the opinion is gaining ground that it would be unwise to anger South German antipathies by further provocations. I still hope to bring the Free Conservatives to the point of declaring themselves against an extension of the powers of the Tariff Parliament. There is a very well-organised party spirit here, which has its advantages.

I have not yet spoken to Bismarck. To-day is the opening. As Bavarian Federal Tariff Councillor Perglas has to call for cheers for the King, which much preoccupies him. But it cannot be avoided.

BERLIN, *April* 28, 1868.

Yesterday service was at twelve, which I attended at the Catholic Church, and at one o'clock the opening of the Tariff Parliament. The assembly in the White Hall was most brilliant. When we entered, the hall was still well-nigh empty, as the Protestant service in the Castle chapel was not yet concluded. Mutual greetings were exchanged. I found many acquaintances of my youth, grown old; for instance, Rosshirt, whom I had not seen since Heidelberg; Oheimb, the Detmold Minister, whom I had not seen since Bonn. The former is an Ultramontane member of the Tariff Parliament, Oheimb is Federal Councillor for Detmold. The hall gradually filled with functionaries and officers, who had been either invited or ordered to be present in order to fill it.

At length the sermon came to an end, and the King's procession descended the steps. It was all very gorgeous. The King passed through the hall, only stopping when he came to me, to inquire after the health of his Bavarian Majesty. Then he again left the hall, and meanwhile all present ranged themselves, on the left of the throne the members of the Federal Council, Bismarck and Perglas in front; on the right were empty chairs for the Princes, whilst we stood opposite the throne. Then the King appeared with the Princes, took up his position at the throne standing, covered his head and read the Speech from the Throne. We were all in a state of tense expectation; on me the speech had a tranquillising effect, and the general impression will prob-

ably be the same. The cheers at the entrance of the King were led by Baron Frankenberg, President by seniority. At the close of the Speech from the Throne this duty was performed by Perglas. The formula had previously been discussed by Perglas, Delbrück, and Bismarck, whether it should be "King of Prussia" or "King Wilhelm." "King Wilhelm" was decided upon as it was thought to show greater consideration for South German susceptibilities. Perglas performed his part very well. After the opening ceremony the sitting was announced for three in the afternoon by the President by seniority. Previously I had an audience of the King. As usual he received me very kindly. He complained of the South Germans' perfectly unfounded fears. It was unjust, the King said, to impute a thirst for conquest to him. He then complained of the insults with which he was persecuted in South Germany. I made excuses for ourselves on the grounds that we could do nothing against the Press, as our legislation was deficient. He replied that he was not reproaching us. We then spoke of the Tariff Parliament. I emphasised the importance of its behaving quietly, and not trying to exceed its powers. The King agreed with me, but pointed to the elements which are asserting themselves in Darmstadt and pressing for admittance to the North German Federation because their position was untenable. However, at the same time he admitted that if Prussia were really to accede to these wishes, the French would regard it as a violation of the frontier of the Main, and that therefore it might bring about a war. As the King was fatigued and others were still waiting, the audience lasted but a very short time.

At three o'clock the sitting of the Tariff Parliament took place. Hereat only the appointments to committees was effected. At four I paid some calls, at six I dined at Perglas's, with Viktor, Luxemburg, and Berchem. At eight I had arranged to visit Bismarck. As usual I found him very pleasant and complaisant. In his remarks on the Tariff Parliament he was guarded. He expressed the hope that all would pass off quietly. We then went on to discuss the fortress question, regarding which he stated his approval of the plan for the distribution of federal property, and emphasised the necessity of Bavaria's occupying the preponderant position in the question of the administration and garrisoning of Ulm, whereas Würtemberg was more concerned with Rastatt; he also said that Prussia did not contemplate injuring the South German States, more especially Würtemberg and Baden, by calling upon them to disburse sums of money. The main point was to make South Germany capable of defence. An understanding should be arrived at regarding the up-keep of Mayence, Rastatt, and Ulm. This would, however, be the natural outcome of the deliberations on the distribution of federal property. As regards war with France, it was as impossible to say anything definite about it as about the kind of weather to be

expected in July. However, he did not believe that there would be war, as France would think twice before joining issue with Germany. The French plan of campaign was to invade South Germany with 50,000 men and force the States into neutrality. This would certainly be a difficult moment for South Germany, for though Prussia would instantly have 200,000 men at Coblenz, and within a brief delay 500,000 wherewith to march on Paris, still it required time. If we were prepared, and able to detain the French, so much the better.

At nine o'clock I went to the Queen. She spoke at length about the King of Bavaria, and expressed her sympathy with him. She hoped that he would soon marry. Later on the King came, then Roggenbach, Watzdorf, and Viktor. Various matters were discussed, particularly the address,\* which is condemned by all Conservatives. Bismarck is said to be against it, but expresses himself with caution. Here they are obviously anxious not to offend the National Liberal party.

At the sitting of the Tariff Parliament on April 28, 1868, Prince Hohenlohe was elected First Vice-President by 238 out of 301 available votes (59 were for Freiherr von Thüngen).

He accepted the election in the following words:

"Permit me, gentlemen, to express to you my heart-felt thanks for the honour you have done me in electing me as your First Vice-President. I am, however, aware that I owe this honour, not to my own merits, but to the consideration which a great portion of this assembly believes to be due to the South German members. Yet this conviction does not lessen, but increases my gratitude. For if I may be allowed to say so, you here extend to us a friendly hand, which we clasp in the confidence that South German peculiarities and South German opinions will be treated in this assembly with respect and recognition, and that we shall succeed in discharging the task allotted to us by the treaty of July 8 of last year in patriotic concord and devotion.

### *Journal.*

BERLIN, April 29, evening.

This forenoon a sitting of committees came first. I found Franckenstein, Aretin, and Eichthal, who were members of said committee. Twesten was elected chairman, a few unknown persons as secretaries.

Then the election of the President and Vice-President took place. This lasted an hour or two. Simson was chosen by a large majority, and I also, whereupon I returned thanks, which made a good impression, as I expressed myself easily and fluently.

\*The National Liberal motion of Metz and his colleagues proposed the presentation by the Tariff Parliament of an address to the King of Prussia.



The substance, too, was praised as being full of tact. I was glad to have made my *debut* thus. It is no easy matter to speak before this assembly. A number of members were introduced to me immediately afterwards.

Hugo's \* election was only confirmed by the second ballot.

Then I went home to change, and at four o'clock we drove to the great banquet. It was a brilliant and splendid assembly, a great sight, the King and Queen very amiable. Casino and theatre in the evening.

BERLIN, May 8, 1868.

After arriving yesterday morning at eight o'clock in Berlin, I first sent to Roggenbach to obtain exact information as to the condition of the conferences respecting the address. And Roggenbach soon came, and told me the wording of his preamble, to the Order of the Day, to which I thought I could quite agree. The matter was also gone through with Tauffkirchen and Luxemburg, who arrived somewhat later, and it seemed that, after previous party discussions, the motion on the simple Order of the Day was considered to have the chief chance of being carried. Anyway, the withdrawal of the von Thüngen party was decided, should the simple Order of the Day not be carried, and the two Würtemberg Ministers had also made up their minds to leave the hall. I went to the sitting with the intention of voting for the address on the Order of the Day.† Bennigsen spoke first as prolocutor for the address. He was thoroughly calm and moderate, and his speech made a good impression. Then Thüngen spoke with conciliatory intention, but not particularly well. His reference to the friendship between South and North Germany being "a tender plant" was obviously unfortunate, for it provoked great hilarity in the assembly. Following him, Blankenburg spoke in favour of the simple Order of the Day, and Bluntschli for the address. Blankenburg had moved the simple Order of the Day, but accompanied by riders which were very acceptable. His speech was witty, but he reckoned too much on arousing the hilarity of the House. Bluntschli spoke at some length, diffusely, tired the assemblage, and thereby injured his cause. I now discovered that only the National Liberals and the South Germans in favour of joining the North German Federation were *against* the simple Order of

\* Prince Hugo zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen, Duke of Ujest.

† The preamble to the Order of the Day of Freiherr von Roggenbach was worded as follows: "Whereas the reconstitution of the Zollverein on the basis of the Tariff treaty summons the representatives of the German people to combined action in legislative matters, and thereby affords a pledge of a continuous development of the national institutions and a peaceful fulfilment to legitimate national demands for the active union of the powers of State; whereas harmonious concerted action in executing the tasks of the Tariff Parliament is the chief means to further this end — the Order of the Day is moved before the motion for the address."

the Day, and that all other parties were *in favour* of it, except these members who, like Ujest and Roggenbach, had signed the preamble to the Order of the Day. Thereby I should have found myself, as Bavarian Minister, in the dubious position of voting not only against Conservatives and Ultramontanes, but also against the federalist groups. Thereby, notwithstanding the moderate wording of the preamble to the Order of the Day, I should have placed myself in the position of the party whose aim it is to effect the abolition of independence of single States. Such a position would have been more than equivocal, and would have compromised the Bavarian Government as such. After all the speakers against the address had urged adhesion to the treaties, and Thüngen himself — to the horror of his party — the continuous development by means of treaty, I decided to vote for the simple Order of the Day, and discussed the matter with Edel and a few other Bavarians, who quite approved of my decision. Even Stauffenberg, who had been obliged to vote against the simple Order of the Day, advised me to vote in its favour.

The majority accepted the simple Order of the Day,\* thereby terminating a disagreeable debate of several days' duration. After the sitting this result was much discussed, but the great majority of those competent to judge are inclined to regard it as advantageous. For even if the national question is thereby adjourned, still it is in accordance with the present mood in South Germany, and will tend materially to reassure people's minds, which is the chief point for the time being, if the *rapprochement* of the German races is not to be menaced. In view of the French I would have preferred a different result, for they will be pleased with this one. However, if irritation in France is thereby allayed and peace secured, it certainly is a fortunate result.

During the entire debate and the previous consultations Bismarck behaved with great reserve. They say that apprehensions of war are increasing here, especially in consequence of reports from England. I shall make some diplomatic calls to-day, and hope to hear something more definite.

On May 21 a banquet was given by the town of Berlin at the New Exchange, in honour of the South German members of the Tariff Parliament. Count Bismarck made the first speech, which concluded with a hearty "*Au revoir!*" to his South German brethren. Thereupon Prince Hohenlohe replied:

"The enthusiasm evoked in the hearts of South Germans by the words of the Federal Chancellor will prove to you that a *rapprochement* has taken place between the South and the North, which instead of being diminished has been increased by the

\* By 186 votes to 150. The majority was composed of Conservatives, the Progressive party, and the South German group.

labours of the Tariff Parliament. I believe you will agree with me when I say that the achievements of German intellect have drawn closer the ties which link together the German races. To this fraternising of German intellect has been allotted a mission which is far higher and more glorious than other so-called civilising missions. (Enthusiastic applause.) Let us hold together in this spirit, in this mission. I call for cheers for the union of the German races!"

After the Prince, Völk spoke on "the Future of the German State."

### *Journal.*

BERLIN, May 23, 1868.

In consequence of the number of fatiguing debates I had to discontinue my jottings. And indeed little of importance has occurred. The debates were interesting, but these have been taken down in shorthand and printed. Apart from the debates, a conversation with Varnbüler concerning the fortress question was of importance, as also some talks with Bismarck, and finally a consultation which Bluntschli had asked for. Varnbüler looks upon my position here askance; the Vice-Presidency of the Tariff Parliament, my good understanding with Bismarck, who knows that I do not deceive him, my relations with the Court, &c. — all this "poisons" him, and was the reason why his illness — which, however, was *bona fide* — was prolonged more than was perhaps necessary.

At my first interview with Varnbüler the fortress question was discussed.\* Varnbüler wanted to arrive at an understanding, but thought that he could easily get the better of me alone, and therefore wished to negotiate with me direct. I, however, summoned Völderndorff from Munich with the documents. At the interview we agreed that it was necessary to arrive at an understanding between Bavaria and Würtemberg *before* convening the Liquidation Commission. Yet, whether it will be effected

\* The Federal Liquidation Commission had adjourned on July 31, 1867, without carrying into execution the actual settlement that Bavaria had desired. The respective claims had only been determined arithmetically. This legal situation obstructed the territorial States' free control of the movable effects in the South German fortresses. Hence in April 1868 the Bavarian Government had prompted negotiations with the object of "distributing, by definite apportionment, the movable effects of the sometime federal fortresses, which up to the present was actually common property." According to the wishes of the Bavarian Government, members be called upon to deliberate on the formation of a standing South German Military Commission, and upon uniform fortress regulations. In affairs, concerning the fortress of Ulm, it was a matter of the utmost urgency that there should be an understanding between Bavaria and Würtemberg, since from its geographical position it could fulfil its purpose only as a homogeneously administered fortified position.

is an open question, and therefore I did not assent to Varnbüler's wish; instead of giving up the convening of the Liquidation Commission, I formulated the protocol in such a manner that the convoking of the Liquidation Commission was *not* contingent on the consummation of an understanding between Bavaria and Würtemberg regarding Ulm. Varnbüler also wished that before the outbreak of a war with France, Prussia should give assurances:

(1) That we shall take part in the peace negotiations after the war.

(2) That after the war the constitutional situation shall remain as it is.

On this I remarked that Prussia would never agree. Varnbüler wanted to know if I had any objection, doubtless in order to refer it all to Bismarck. Meanwhile, as I am leaving to-morrow, I have let Perglas know, so as to keep an eye on Varnbüler. Bluntschli has been with me, to tell me that surely something ought now to be done to further the national question; but nothing could be effected without Bismarck, and Bismarck was considerate to Bavaria, and therefore much depended upon us. Baden and Hesse, he continued, could not possibly remain longer as they are now; Bismarck would include them also in the North German Confederation; he did not care a bit about France, but did for Bavaria. Might not something be offered to us, an exceptional position, by which we would be so favoured that we could then more easily venture upon an alliance. Bavaria was a State of justifiable importance, which could not be treated like Baden and Hesse.

To my inquiry what he understood by the favoured position of Bavaria, he said that diplomacy and the Army might be left to Bavaria; to the King a post of honour, possibly a Vice-regency, might be conceded. I explained to him that it was very difficult to represent these concessions as sufficient. Those against entering the North German Confederation would not allow themselves to be decided thereby. The dynasty would not, in order to avoid one eventuality which was no certainty, accept something positively distasteful. However, I left it to him to communicate his views to me by letter. Roggenbach, to whom I spoke later, took the opposite view. He considered that nothing should be done now. There was no reason for it.

BERLIN, May 24, 1868.

During my parting visit to Bismarck conversation first turned on the Tariff Parliament, on its success, on the closing Speech from the Throne, which had not pleased the National Liberal party, a fact emphasised by Bismarck with a certain *empressement*, and I then turned the conversation to the Army and fortress question. As regards this, he repeated what he had already told me, namely, that he would prefer if the discussions with the

Bavarian Military Commissioner could be managed alone, without another from Würtemberg, as a disturbance of public opinion might easily be aroused by a combined discussion. As for the fortress question, he obviously has a high opinion of the Distribution Commission, and begged that the question might not be let drop. Concerning the military importance of Ulm, he did not express himself clearly; but from what he said he seemed to fear that if we gave over Ulm entirely to Würtemberg, unless the fortress were previously quite dismantled, then Austria would lay hands upon it when opportunity arose. How serious generally is Austria's attitude to Bavaria he sought to prove by relating that at Nikolsburg they had declared themselves ready to cede Austrian Silesia if the boundary of the Inn might then be shifted; in like manner, audacious politicians at Nikolsburg had spoken of a cession of old Austrian Würtemberg from the Black Forest to Ulm. In any case, Bavaria's right to garrison Ulm must be discussed during the distribution. It is a good thing that we did not engage ourselves further to Varnbüler, and during the deliberations with the Würtemberg Commissioners it is imperative that we should not concede the smallest point, since Prussia is certain to support us for fear of Austria garrisoning Ulm in the future. Bismarck does not wish the Liquidation Commission to be convened before the end of August, for he attaches so much importance to it that he would not like to be without knowledge of what is taking place there, and yet will not cut short his leave at an earlier date.

I then asked whether the question of the South German Confederation had not again been mooted from an Austrian quarter since Count Wimpffen's disclosure of the conversation between me and Beust in November. He, of course, observed that I only put this question in order to know what he would say to the South German Confederation, and he at once stated that he himself was in reality not opposed to it; he did not share the opinion that a division of Germany would bring about the permanency of the Main frontier, but he did not enter into the matter further. However, he added, that if he was unable to declare himself in favour of it, it was because he would thereby offend public opinion and more especially the National Liberals, who would see in it an attack on the union of the German races. He, on the contrary, saw in it the means of effecting an understanding. To my remark that for the promotion of this project a good understanding between Prussia and Austria was of importance, he replied that Beust had always been very reserved, that he had represented the Tauffkirchen mission in a false light and had omitted to take advantage of it, and that in consequence there had been a closer union between Russia and Prussia. He did not ignore the consideration which Beust owed the French, but regretted — whether sincerely or not — that a *rapprochement* between Prussia and Austria had hitherto been impossible. As

regards the war question, he repeated to me what he had previously said, that the French could only place 320,000 men in the field, whereas North Germany could have 500,000 at its immediate disposal.

He further repeated to me a conversation he had yesterday, in which an opponent of the treaties of alliance from Würtemberg had expressed himself to the effect that on the outbreak of war with France we should all have to advance against the French. He (Bismarck) had replied that it was an absolutely unjustifiable assumption to suppose that Prussia would make use of the treaties for wars of conquest. He did not know *what* Prussia was to conquer; he enumerated the border lands, mentioned Poland, Bohemia, Belgium, and Alsace.

At length we parted on the most friendly terms. I refrained from alluding to the question of accrediting the Bavarian Minister by the North German Confederation, as I thought it advisable to abstain from exposing myself to an evasive answer; moreover, I preferred to mention the matter to Werther.

*Speech delivered at the dinner in the Bayrischer Hof on Constitution Day, May 26, 1868.*

Gentlemen, — If there is a day on which we may be proud to call ourselves Bavarians, if there is a festival which justifies us in looking upon the past with lofty satisfaction, and upon the future with joyous confidence, it is the festival which to-day celebrates the union of Prince and people, that union which is the basis of our freedom, our independence, and of our existence as a State. That we are able to celebrate this festival in unclouded gladness is due to our dynasty, and therefore it is fitting that there should rise before us to-day the stately figures of those monarchs who, in our own time, have held the fate of our country in their hands.

Thus we see first King Maximilian I., well named the Good by his people, the never-to-be-forgotten giver of the constitution: that exceptional Monarch who, of his own free will, offered the constitutional bond which has now for fifty years linked together Crown and people in harmonious co-operation.

We see King Ludwig I., unfaltering and self-confident, ascending the throne of his fathers, and in a long reign, and a still longer life fraught with blessings, striving, in righteousness and steadfastness, towards those goals which his exalted mind singled out as right. What King Ludwig was to Bavaria, what he was to the world, has lately been set forth by more eloquent lips than mine; yet all eloquence must be put to shame in face of his achievements, and of the tears with which his people accompanied him to his last resting-place.

Recollections of King Max II. unite to form a harmonious picture; his hearty enthusiasm for truth and justice, his gracious

clemency, his vigilant conscientiousness, which always enabled him to find the means of maintaining peace with his people, or if it was disturbed, of re-establishing it on a firm basis.

Over all this princely line hovers a guardian spirit of fidelity, which repels any temptation to turn and twist the Royal pledge.

Thus our most gracious Sovereign Lord, his present Majesty King Ludwig II., has assumed the reins of Government under the auspices of illustrious examples.

On him also a rich profusion of intellectual gifts has been bestowed, richer, perhaps, than on any of his predecessors; and we are the readier to discern a sure guarantee for the future, in that the King has succeeded, during the brief duration of his reign, in promoting progress in our internal circumstances in a manner which realises our fondest hopes. And just as the King has declared to his people to-day in sublime words, "that, following the example of his ancestors, he too will hold aloft the banner of the constitution," so we offer him to-day the expression of our gratitude, our veneration and our love, the love of his people, which is the true foundation of every princely throne.

*Report of FREIHERR VON PERGLAS, the Bavarian  
Minister at Berlin.*

BERLIN, May 25, 1865.

Although I have already verbally acquainted your Highness with the intimation of the French Ambassador at Berlin, I do not omit to set forth the matter herewith in writing.

Monsieur Benedetti came to me yesterday and lodged a formal complaint against the phrasing of a passage in the speech made by your Highness at the banquet at the Exchange, to wit, when your Highness spoke of the "so-called civilising mission of another nation." As the applause which greeted this idea and its wording, and the general opinion obtaining here, both go to prove that the passage refers unmistakably to France, he regretted exceedingly that your Highness should have felt inclined, as Minister of Bavaria, to use the phrase publicly; for it is being exploited by the Press, and on account of the still more insulting expression "so-called," has produced a very bad impression in France. He felt bound to characterise your Highness's action as not *courtois*, in view more particularly of the complete and absolute reserve displayed by the French Government and the French Ambassador at Berlin on the occasion of the meeting of the Tariff Parliament, and with general reference to the domestic policy of Germany; hence he could not consider the attitude of your Highness as satisfactory or justifiable and made no secret to myself of the fact that he had drawn up his report to Paris from this point of view, the more so as his impressions were shared by all with whom he had discussed the subject.

M. Benedetti had characterised the action as directed against the Emperor personally. In this case, and in reply to his remonstrances as a whole, I denied the existence of any direct intention on the part of your Highness to manifest an official or ministerial disregard of the feelings of France; further, I reminded the Ambassador of my mission to Paris, during which your Highness continually gave proof to the French Government, through myself, of the value which was attached to the maintenance of close and satisfactory relations with the French Government; hence I could not admit that your Highness had intended offence to any nation in the position of France, and least of all to the person of the Emperor.

M. Benedetti requested me to transmit this communication to your Highness, he retained his attitude of protest, but did not change the character of the friendly and satisfactory relations subsisting between him and myself.

*Note of the PRINCE under date May 28, 1868.*

The despatch of Freiherr von Perglas induced me, upon the occasion of the conversation with the Marquis de Cadore, to express my astonishment to the latter upon the communication from Benedetti transmitted through Perglas. I informed him that it was a total misconception for the Ambassador in Berlin to regard this as an official expression from the Bavarian Minister, that I had spoken as a member of the Tariff Parliament, had made no reference to the French Government, and could, therefore, only express my regret if this utterance, which must have been imperfectly reported, should have given rise to misunderstanding.

*To the BAVARIAN MINISTER in Berlin.*

BERLIN, May 28, 1868.

In consequence of the communication contained in your report, I called yesterday upon the Marquis de Cadore, the Imperial Minister accredited to this Court, and expressed my astonishment at the fact that M. Benedetti had ventured to make a communication of this nature to myself through your Excellency. I observed that I could only assume this to be merely the private opinion of M. Benedetti, a view also shared by M. de Cadore. I further added that my expressions were not to be regarded as the official views of the Bavarian Government, and that in speaking to that toast, I had made no reference to the French nation, and therefore regretted any misunderstanding to which my expressions might have given rise. This communication is intended merely for the official information of your Excellency, and implies no direction to you to pursue the subject any further.



*Journal.*

MUNICH, June 5, 1868.

Yesterday I was at a dinner given by the French Minister to Prince Napoleon on the occasion of his passage through the town.\* In addition to the Prince's suite and the staff of the French Legation, the guests included Count Castell, Count Moy, General von der Tann, Herr von Schrenck, and the Austrian and Italian Ministers.

I sat next to the Prince. During dinner he discussed various points affecting the domestic administration of Bavaria, the composition of the Upper House and its proceedings, the budget, &c. He seemed to be very well informed, and his questions were intended only to secure confirmation of what he had previously been told.

After dinner the Prince took me aside in the course of the evening, and began a conversation upon points of more vital political importance:

He spoke of Würtemberg, which he knows well, and said that the spirit of the Würtemberg officers had changed in a remarkable degree; they were dissatisfied with their position as officers of a small army, and were anxious to become part of a German army. He then referred to the Zollverein, and to the dangers with which the new organisation threatened the independence of the individual South German States, seeing that the proposal was not a convention, but a union, which would make us parts of a larger whole: he mentioned the comparison with Belgium, which had been already drawn in the well-known despatch of Count Quadt, but concluded by saying that nothing could be done. He also referred to the treaties of alliance, and contested their reciprocity. He said that he had asked Bismarck whether he would recognise a *casus fœderis* supposing that Bavaria, in order to conquer the Tyrol, should declare war upon Austria, to which Bismarck had replied, "*De droit, oui; de fait, non.*"

He said that the South German Federation had previously been a possibility, but was so no longer. Würtemberg would renounce her independence in favour of a *Grande Allemagne*, but not in favour of Bavaria. If, indeed, the King of Bavaria were willing to stake his all to mount horse and to drive out the King of Würtemberg and the Grand Duke of Baden, with the help of the revolution, it might then be possible to found a South German Kingdom which would have Austria and France for its good friends and allies. He added: "*Je n'ai jamais compris la triade avec deux souverains et une confédération,*" this Triad could only be founded upon a centralised monarchy; this, however, was a dangerous method and therefore required a monarch of matured experience, very popular in Germany and resolved to act with boldness.

\* Prince Napoleon stayed in Munich from June 3 to 5 during his tour in Germany. King Ludwig could not make up his mind to receive him.

Passing to the question of war, I ventured to remark that I could not understand the general desire for war in France, as no one would gain anything thereby.

He admitted this, but said that the peculiarities of the French character must be considered. The Frenchman could not wait like the German. What he considered desirable he attempted to secure forthwith. Commercial intercourse was greatly hampered, and the Frenchman thought that the disturbances would cease after the war; as his immediate position was intolerable he hoped that war would bring peace and quietness and an improvement in trade.

"*Quant à moi,*" he added, "*je trouve que la guerre est un immense malheur qu'il faut éviter à tout prix, elle n'aura que des conséquences funestes, et vous serez perdus les premiers. L'unité allemande sera faite. Vous avez donc tout intérêt à désirer la paix.*"

Moreover he was convinced that Prussia did not desire war, as she had nothing to gain by it; there was no reason to upset the process of German development. He added, however, that though he thought the independence of the South German States was now menaced, yet that the danger was not immediate and that the actual situation might continue unchanged for many years.

Throughout the conversation he displayed a great admiration for Bismarck, and a great respect for Prussian institutions. He regarded the talk of Prussia's domestic difficulties as a nonsensical exaggeration. He is well acquainted with the worst side of the Prussian character and regards the South Germans as more talented, more self-reliant, and more appreciative of the pleasures of life, whereas the North German was by nature restless and ever working for profit. At the same time he laid great stress upon the remarkable discipline of the Prussian nation, upon the military system and the administration.

Eventually he spoke of the King. He said, "*On dit que votre roi est charmant, qu'il a beaucoup d'esprit et de talent, mais il est timide!*" I replied that I was sorry he could not make the King's acquaintance, but his Majesty had been very unwell and needed change of air in the mountains; this the Prince regarded as perfectly natural.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, June 5, 1868.

Your faithful servant ventures with his humble duty to apply to your Majesty for a grant of leave from June 12 until the end of the month for the purpose of recuperation in the mountains after the exhausting work of the past winter and of his stay in Berlin.

At the same time he humbly requests your Majesty to consider the possibility of previously granting him an audience to receive his report by word of mouth upon his stay in Berlin, especially upon his conversation with Prince Napoleon.

Your Majesty's gracious permission would enable his humble servant to put an end to those reports continually disseminated by parties and ambitious individuals, which represent your humble servant as deprived of the gracious confidence of your Majesty.

*Marginal Rescript of the KING.*

After I have received you in audience, I am ready to grant the leave for which you ask in the hope that it may secure the necessary recuperation of your health and powers.

LUDWIG.

SCHLOSS BERG, June 13, 1868.

*Journal.*

AUSSEE, June 15, 1868.

Before leaving Munich, I wished to make a report to the King upon my stay in Berlin, and also upon my conversation with Prince Napoleon, and therefore sent a request for an audience. The Secretary Lipowsky replied saying that the King, "as a mark of his gracious confidence," would probably receive me on the day of the procession. During divine service I was informed that the King would receive me immediately after the procession.

I found the King remarkably amiable and cheerful. He asked whether the flowers which he had sent to me from Hohenschwangau arrived in good condition, at which I seized the opportunity to renew my thanks. We then spoke of my stay in Berlin; I told him that my final impressions were better than I had dared to hope at first, that even the National Liberal party recognised the constitutional claims of Bavaria, and understood that Bavaria was too big to enter into a relationship with the North German Confederation analogous to that of Saxony or Mecklenburg. In any case I said there was nothing to be feared from Prussia for the present. The conversation then turned upon the Ultramontane party, with which the King showed much indignation. I explained that the party was necessary to the interests of the dynasty, but was to be kept at arm's-length as the Ultramontanes were anxious to unite Bavaria with Austria, and were, therefore, not to be trusted. With this the King fully agreed. When I observed that this party was aiming at my overthrow and were already prepared with a new Ministry, he said that the appointment of Ministers rested with him. He expressed himself as entirely satisfied with my toast on the date of the Constitution Celebration, and especially referred to the eloquence of my speech. He then spoke of the Ministers, and said that I must exert greater authority, and that they must do what I told them as I was Premier.

I replied that for this purpose I required only the King's confidence, and some proof that I possessed this confidence, which could best be secured if he often saw me personally, and issued his

orders to the Cabinet directly through me. Passing to the visit of Prince Napoleon, he said that the Emperor's ill-humour (if such had been provoked by his refusal to receive the Prince) might be soothed if he wrote him a polite letter. I disputed this and said, "*Qui s'excuse s'accuse*," adding that nothing could be done now, and that if the King afterwards desired to win the favour of the French Court, this could best be secured by a short visit to Paris. When I told him that Prince Napoleon had been very sorry not to see him as he had heard so much of his Majesty, he seemed to be vexed and continually reverted to the point. The conversation then turned upon the *Meistersinger*, which was to be produced on the 21st by Wagner and Frau von Bülow. In conclusion I asked for a fortnight's leave.

In the evening Gustav Castell accompanied me to the theatre. He said that Holnstein had told him that I now possessed the King's full confidence, though my position a few weeks previously had been uncertain. Holnstein had told him that Lipowsky had been negotiating with Platen, who was to take my place. There must be a misunderstanding here. I am more inclined to think that negotiations have been opened with Windthorst — in any case Lipowsky has been intriguing against me. Before my departure on the next morning, I therefore commissioned Völderndorff to look out for some one to take Lipowsky's place, and at the same time to discover whether negotiations upon my successor had really been opened or not, in order that I might arrange for his removal after my return.

The protocol of December 7, 1867,\* had urged the military importance of organising some body which "should systematise the best points of junction between individual places and positions, while steadily keeping in view the defensive system of Germany." It had been originally intended to entrust this task also to the commission already charged with the continuance of the negotiations as to the regulations of the communal property of the German States. On April 9, 1868, the Bavarian Government advised a resumption of the work of the Liquidation Commission, which had been adjourned on July 31, 1867, proposing that the South German commissioners should also be requested to discuss the formation of a South German Military Commission. Baden agreed with this proposal on condition that the commissioners to be appointed should have the unrestricted right of discussing the composition and the competence of the proposed standing commission, the formation of which was contemplated. The negotiations in Berlin between Bavaria and Würtemberg concerning Ulm ended in a convention which presupposed the South German Military Commission, and the performance of the proposals advanced by the protocol of December 7, 1867, thus became

\* See p. 267.

immediately necessary to the execution of this convention. Moreover Bavaria was now anxious for this commission to be formed before the Liquidation Commission resumed its labours. Hence it was thought desirable not to delay in meeting the wishes of the Baden Government which were directed to secure the representation of the North German Confederation in the proposed commission. The Bavarian Minister at Karlsruhe therefore laid before the local Ministry on July 3, 1868, a draft of "the general principles of the organisation of a South German Military Commission," which was to come into existence at Munich on July 15. The draft provided the commission with very extensive powers. Fortress authorities were "to be subordinated and pledged by oath" to the commission and were "to receive all instructions directly through the commission." The Baden Government regarded this demand, more especially because of the shortness of the notice given, as "unexpected and discourteous," and, on July 6, declined the invitation.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, July 10, 1868.

Inasmuch as verbal communications made by the Minister of the Grand Duke of Baden give reason to fear that the South German Military Commission initiated notice by your Majesty's most faithful servant, the undersigned, in conjunction with the Minister of War, will cause misgivings at Karlsruhe, and whereas these might perhaps be removed by a personal interview with the Archduke, your most faithful servant ventures to crave your Majesty's gracious permission to proceed to Baden-Baden under pretext of private business, there to endeavour to allay the doubts of the Grand Duke and obtain his consent to the proposals in question.

At the same time the undersigned most respectfully ventures to crave your Majesty's gracious permission to take this opportunity to stop on the way at Stuttgart in order to arrange personally with Freiherr von Varnbüler for the ratification of the Compact of Ulm.

*Journal.*

BADEN, July 14, 1868.

Early on the 13th I arrived in Stuttgart, where I found a telegram from Varnbüler, who told me to expect him back from his country house at ten o'clock. However, as early as nine o'clock he sent to ask if he might come to see me; whereupon I went to him.

He received me with the remark that he had just received the King's ratification and had accordingly given orders to draw up the protocol, and was ready to proceed at once to its signature and the exchange of copies. Next he pointed out

what concessions Würtemberg had made.\* By the transfer of the Deputy Governorship to Bavaria — in other words, the abolition of the Würtemberg Vice-Governor — he said that the second city of the kingdom, in case of the Governor being incapacitated, was given into the hands of Bavaria; the Director of Engineering was likewise a heavy sacrifice, and it was only with great difficulty that he had managed to arrange all this.

Besides, the matter was bound to cause him grave difficulties in the Chamber — difficulties which he could only grapple with successfully if we, on the other hand, met him on the question of communications. On this point he had already come to an understanding with Herr von Schlör, and he begged me to support Herr von Schlör's views.

He expressed as his wishes the abbreviation of the appointed period within which the line from Heidenheim to Ulm was not to be built, the question of a branch southwards from Ulm, and the accelerated completion of the railway from Ansbach to Crailsheim. He was desirous that these points should be embodied in a State compact. I told him in reply that I had not as yet discussed the subject with Schlör, who was away on leave, but promised to do my utmost to meet his wishes.

As regarded the Military Commission, he was convinced of its necessity. He had only to recall the points which were laid down at Munich: (1) The railways, mention of which in this general matter he would not admit. As military men understood nothing of railway affairs he could not let the direction of these out of his hands, but could at most allow an opinion to be given upon railway construction from the strategical point of view. (2) The question of the Presidency. If the Commission met at Munich, then to give Bavaria the Presidency into the bargain would be too much. If it sat anywhere else, he had no objection to raise against the proposal. He had gathered from the Prussian Minister that Baden had taken umbrage at the fact that we had held the conference and had signed the protocol of May 23 at Berlin, that Baden was annoyed at being out-voted and that all sorts of difficulties were being raised there. It would certainly not be difficult for me to clear up the misunderstanding with the Archduke.

He was ready, he declared, to send some one to a conference but advised the postponement of the Liquidation Commission in order to gain time, for a conference of the South German States, and for the organisation of the Fortress Commission — as he recommended its being called.

If the Liquidation Commission were put off till September 10 or 20, then the preliminary conference could be held in the course of August. Otherwise, on September 1 everything would be still *in nubibus*.

\* Bavaria, by the Compact of Ulm, was accorded the right of appointing the Deputy-Governor and the Director of Engineering.

He then spoke about the elections, which had turned out so ill, because the Ultramontanes, on whose support the Government had reckoned, had at the last moment made a complete *volte-face* — and that in obedience to direct instructions from Rome!

Next he began upon Degenfeld,\* whom he wishes to recall as soon as he can, viz., as soon as the elections of Knights, in which class Degenfeld had friends, should be over, then he will send either Linden or Soden. If he should find it impossible to appoint Linden, I might help him out of the dilemma by writing a letter in favour of Soden. He will keep me informed as to this.

After this interview was concluded, the protocol was signed. The exchange of documents will be made by Gasser, who, all this time, was in bed.

At two o'clock I went to Baden. There a letter awaited me from the Grand Duke's Aide-de-camp, asking me to come to see the Grand Duke at eight o'clock the same evening. I found the latter quite restored to health. I opened my address at once with an exposition of the circumstances and an explanation of the misunderstanding, pointing out that no arrangement had been come to with Würtemberg, and that the discussion as to the Military, otherwise called the Fortress, Commission had only arisen out of the Ulm conferences; laid special stress on the necessity of an understanding between the South German States on the Fortress question; emphasised the fact that, particularly in view of the fears prevailing in Baden and Würtemberg as to some that a payment would have to be made, a previous standing agreement and the formation of an organ of administration would be advantageous, and asked for his consent. I made it clear that any participation on the part of Prussia in the Commission would not be tolerated by Bavaria and Würtemberg, and that I feared, if no arrangement were arrived at, that the liquidation proceedings would lead to a mutual increase of ill-feeling between these States and North Germany. Lastly, I insisted that the very attacks which were being made upon the scheme of the South German Military Commission on the part of the Ultramontane Press went to prove that it would not tend to the dissolution of the treaties of alliance, consequently that Baden could not be forced thereby into a course of action opposed to her present policy.

The Grand Duke answered at great length. He expounded his policy, which he said was by no means directed towards any surrender of his sovereign rights; its basis was only this, that it behoved the smaller States of Germany to guard against groundless and extravagant ideas of sovereignty and to foster no illusions as to their status. Maintenance of the existing compacts of alliance, combined with reliance on Prussia, was the mainstay of their existence. He

\* Ambassador from Würtemberg at Munich.

had no desire to be admitted into the North German Confederation, but the military organisation must, as far as possible, be put on the same footing as the Prussian. The Military Commission, proposed by us, constituted a power in the hands of the South German States which could be directed against Prussia, if a change of feeling should occur and the Ultramontane-Democratic elements become predominant here. He would like the compact of alliance to be framed on the basis of the Peace of Prague, and this could be best accomplished by a Military Commission for Germany as a whole and a common administration of all the fortresses, not merely those of South Germany. This object could most readily be achieved by seizing the opportunity offered by the liquidation negotiations. I answered that a predominance of the Ultramontane-Democratic elements was still very far off; but, if it ever did come, such a complete reversal of present conditions would accompany it that no Military Commission would then be wanted, but the compacts of alliance would be denounced. The commission, therefore, was no longer in question. As regarded the Peace of Prague, it was precisely the union of the South German States that this presupposed. Thus our proposal was far more in accordance with the Peace of Prague than the Grand Duke's own idea. Should the Grand Duke wish, in the course of discussion on the Military Commission, to make proposals relating to a union of the South German Military Commission with the military power of the North, it was always open to him to do so. We, too, desired no separation; what we desired was combined action in case of war, but at the same time no participation by a Prussian Commissioner in the deliberations of the Commission. That we could not and dared not allow. Our position was different from that of Baden, and we must do our best to maintain it. Moreover, I looked upon this as a point of honour which touched the King. He, the Grand Duke, could as Sovereign pursue a national policy, and carry it as far as he pleased, but I as Bavarian Minister could not advise the King to renounce his independence. I therefore begged him at any rate not to refuse the conference. To this the Grand Duke declared himself ready to agree, and suggested that the War Ministers might meet to discuss the question of the Military Commission as well as the bases from which to start in the negotiations as to liquidation. The postponement of the term fixed for the opening of these negotiations met with his approval — the more so as he attached importance to General Beyer, who has not yet returned here, being consulted.

I begged permission to be allowed to discuss details with Freydorf, and this he also agreed to.

*July 14, evening.*

Herr von Freydorf arrived this evening from Karlsruhe to see me. I repeated in connection with the misunderstanding what I



had already told the Grand Duke, and urged upon him the matter of the Military Commission. Herr von Freydorf was actually resolved (as Riederer\* assured me subsequently) to commit himself to nothing. He deemed it hazardous in the interest of his position with the Liberal party of the country to pledge himself to a step which the National Liberal party might count as a defection on his part from his Prussian proclivities — this much he frankly admitted himself. Accordingly, he insisted from the first that we should keep to the original programme and discuss the question of the Fortress Commission during the liquidation negotiations; then the wholesome influence of Prussian opinion would exert its due weight. He was inclined to think that the agreement which had been proposed in October 1866 should be held to determine the present case.

To this I answered at once that times had changed, that what had been possible then could not now be carried out, and that, so far as Bavaria and Würtemberg were concerned, any participation on the part of Prussia in the administration of South German fortresses would not be accepted. Further, he had much exception to take to individual provisions of the points settled between the Bavarian War Minister and Suckow, declared himself unable to understand how the Commission could grant money by a vote of the majority against the will of the Governments, repeated the objection which had already been raised by Riederer, that the Commission presupposed a renunciation of individual sovereign rights on the part of the South German States, and generally took up the same intractable and timid attitude he always adopts if a question arises of doing anything that might give offence at Berlin.

I reassured him by reading the passage from Perglas's report according to which the King of Prussia had expressed his approval of the idea of the South German Military Commission, refuted the objections relating to individual points of the proposal, and assured him that we never contemplated a hostile attitude towards Prussia, but were wishful to uphold, though by diplomatic means, the connection between the Military Commission and the Prussian War Ministry. He should not aim at the impossible, but accept whatever good was to be got out of the Commission. Then he came to the formal difficulties, saying the Grand Duke was going away, that the War Minister had not yet arrived, that they could not make up their minds yet, &c.

So, in order to arrive at some result and shake the Baden Government from its negative attitude and at any rate to procure its attendance at the preliminary conference, I urged that he might at least agree to this much, that a preliminary conference should be held among the South German States, or rather their representatives, to determine the position to be taken up at the Liquidation Commission; and in order to render

\* Freiherr v. Riederer, Bavarian Minister at Karlsruhe.

participation therein possible for Baden, I proposed the assembling of this preliminary Conference at Munich on August 20. If necessary the opening of the Liquidation Commission could be postponed till about September 10. This he finally consented to—the more readily when I assured him the Grand Duke had given his approval.

Accordingly we agreed that, entirely apart from any previous correspondence, but solely on the basis of our verbal discussion, the proposal should be made on the part of Bavaria that a conference of the members associated on the Liquidation Commission, or of the War Ministers as well (or at any rate the Baden Minister of War, the Grand Duke appearing to attach importance to this point), should meet at Munich on August 20, at which conference (1) an understanding should be arrived at as to the general principles which the South German Governments will assume as a starting-point in the liquidation proceedings; and (2) further, on the part of Bavaria and Würtemberg the proposal for a permanent Fortress Commission or Military Commission should be brought under discussion. It is true Freydorf maintained that this could lead to no result, as no one knows yet whether the liquidation negotiations will lead to any clear declaration of the subjects to be referred to this commission; at the same time he had no objection to raise against the conference, and will lay the matter before the Grand Duke and the Council of Ministers. Thus we are not called upon to wait to see what answer they give us here, but may arrange at once the necessary preliminaries. Meantime arrangements for the Liquidation Commission can also be so far advanced as to ensure all the necessary material being ready.

*July 15.*

This morning I saw the Prussian Minister, Count Flemming. I made no scruple about informing him what I have settled with Freydorf. He asked the reason why we had again abandoned the original idea of seizing the opportunity of the Liquidation Commission to hold the preliminary conference regarding the Military Commission. I told him that a Military Commission arising out of the Liquidation Commission, on which Prussian Commissioners sit, would inevitably be regarded with distrust in South Germany, that I considered the holding of such a commission necessary in the general interest of all, and that we would not consent to the participation of a Prussian commissioner or authorised agent in the discussions. The proposal for a common administration of the erstwhile fortresses of the German Confederation, as had been suggested in October 1866, was now impracticable. Then I demonstrated the emptiness of the apprehensions which had been expressed by Freydorf in the Prussian interest in opposition to the South German Military Commission, pointing out the repeatedly declared wishes of the South German Governments to keep intact the Compacts of Alliance.

Count Flemming begged me to dictate these points in precise terms, that he might draw up a report to his King dealing with them. To this I agreed all the more willingly, as it gave me an opportunity of having the matter represented to his Majesty in the manner most nearly corresponding to our intentions.

Count Flemming, to whose advice the Grand Duke attaches great importance, declared himself agreeable to the assembling of the conference on August 20, which suggests a hope that the Baden Government will consent to be represented at the conference in question.

On July 16, at an early hour I again left Baden.

### *Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, July 22, 1868.

If your Majesty's most faithful servant, the undersigned, presumes to express his opinion to your Royal Highness on one of those matters which are usually reserved for your own gracious judgment, he may venture perhaps to count on forgiveness, if your Majesty will most condescendingly take into consideration the fact that there are certain decisions in connection with your Majesty's private life which are of paramount importance as affecting the interests of the State in general.

Your Majesty has entrusted the undersigned with the conduct of Foreign Affairs, with the duty of safeguarding the maintenance of the Monarchy and your Majesty's rights. Whatever, therefore, is capable of exerting an influence on the welfare of the State, and the State's independence and power, the undersigned, your Majesty's most devoted servant, is bound to make the subject of his constant care and anxiety.

To this category belong emphatically the relations of your Majesty with foreign Sovereigns.

Your Majesty is aware of the dubious position which the secondary States of Germany, and Bavaria in particular, have occupied since the War of 1866. By the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, Bavaria is left in a situation which demands the utmost circumspection and sagacity, if the kingdom is to preserve its independence in the face of disturbing elements that grow more and more formidable. Albeit under existing conditions the kingdom can form no alliances with foreign Powers, yet in the friendly relations of your Majesty with foreign Sovereigns — especially such as can make their voices heard and respected in the councils of the European Powers — is to be found a guarantee which we should by no means regard too lightly. Among such Powers, Russia is undoubtedly to be included. Your Majesty's personal relations with the Russian Court are at the present moment of the best and most friendly description. This your most faithful servant, the undersigned, has always noted with pleasure and satisfaction in the

interest of your Majesty. He cannot, therefore, fail to desire that this state of affairs should be maintained undisturbed. To secure this object an excellent opportunity is afforded by the presence of the Imperial Family at Kissingen. Your Majesty has been pleased to acknowledge as much in presence of the undersigned and to express your Majesty's intention of paying a visit there to the Czar and Czarina. Your Majesty's most faithful servant would not therefore venture to recur a second time to this subject had he not reason to apprehend that your Majesty might have received advice of an opposite complexion from another quarter, and the opinion has been expressed that such a visit is not necessary or is without political signification.

Your most faithful servant, the undersigned, believes, on the contrary, that the omission of this visit would undoubtedly be regarded by the Imperial Russian Court not merely as a sign of indifference, but as a direct slight. Should this give rise to a feeling of pique on the part of the Imperial Family, the consequence would be that in future emergencies when your Royal Highness might find desirable the support and intercession of the Russian Court, your Majesty, instead of such support and intercession, would meet with decided hostility. In the opinion therefore of the undersigned, even a brief visit to Kissingen, it may be with only a small suite, perhaps on the occasion of the Czarina's birthday, will be of great and far-reaching importance. To leave no room for the suspicion that your most devoted servant, the undersigned, shares the views of those who attribute a small degree of importance to your Majesty's visit to Kissingen, he holds himself bound to inform your Majesty most respectfully of his opinion, and, in the consciousness of the most loyal attachment, urgently to advise your Majesty to be graciously pleased to pay a visit to the Imperial Russian Family at Kissingen.

King Ludwig betook himself to Kissingen on August 2, accompanied by Prince Otto, and remained there in close and frequent intercourse with the Russian Imperial pair until August 10.

On August 13 Prince Hohenlohe went to Kissingen.

### *Journal.*

STARNBERG, *September 28, 1868.*

In obedience to the Royal command I came to this place to attend, as Minister of the Household, the marriage of the Duchess Sophie with the Duc d'Alençon, son of the Duc de Nemours. Prince Adalbert and Minister Pfretzschner were appointed to act as witnesses. As the latter preferred to spend the night at Starnberg, I decided to leave yesterday afternoon at half-past two. We arrived at four o'clock, took possession of our rooms at the Hotel am See, and then took a walk, dined at five o'clock and

then went down again to the shore of the lake in hopes of seeing something of the illuminations which were to take place nominally in honour of the Czarina of Russia then staying at Berg. But it was nine o'clock, and as nothing happened we preferred not to wait about any longer, and soon got to bed. The fireworks and illuminations would seem to have been very fine, but very little could be seen here. It was Sunday, and consequently a numerous and beery contingent of the general public had taken post under our windows, and kept up a horrible din and shouting. At intervals they sang "popular airs," but these almost immediately degenerated into mere brutish yells. However, I soon fell asleep, especially as a wholesome storm of rain dispersed the gang. This morning I went to the railway station to see the Empress of Russia depart. Tauffkirchen\* was there too, to pay his respects to the Empress. The King accompanied the Empress and travelled some distance with her on the railway in the direction of Munich, but I do not know how far.

At ten we drove over to Possenhofen in my carriage, which I had had brought here yesterday. It was not eleven o'clock yet, so we were taken first to our rooms. In mine there was a villainous bad smell. Soon the time for the wedding ceremony arrived, which took place in a hall of the Castle transformed into a chapel. The guests assembled in the adjoining *salon*, where a grand piano further blocked the scanty space available. Pfretzschner and I hastened to get ourselves presented to all personages of rank. Besides the family of the Duke Max, Prince Adalbert and Prince Karl were there. The latter bowed to me across the room with a look such as one generally bestows upon a scorpion. Then Count and Countess Trani. The Hereditary Princess Taxis wore a mauve or violet dress trimmed with white. Others present were the Comte de Paris and his brother, the Duc de Chartres, two young and well-built princes, but who give the impression rather of Prussian than of French princes. The Duc de Nemours looked like a French dandy from the *Cercle de l'Union*. He wore the Order of St. Hubert, as did his son, the bridegroom. The Duc de Nemours recalls the portraits of Henri IV., yet he has a certain look of his own that makes you set him down as a pedant. The young Duc d'Alençon is a handsome young man of a fresh countenance. The Prince de Joinville and his son, the Duc de Penthièvre, have nothing very striking about them. The former is old-looking and bent, too old-looking for his age, dignified and courtly. The Duc de Penthièvre has a yellow, rather Jewish face, and speaks with a drawl, but was very kind and friendly to me. Duke August of Coburg is as tedious as ever. I was interested to become acquainted with his wife, the Princess Clementine, a clever, lively woman.

\* Count Tauffkirchen was at that time Bavarian Minister at St. Petersburg.

The Princess Joinville, a Brazilian Princess, is rather mummified, with big rolling eyes in a long, pale, wrinkled face. Then there were two daughters of Nemours there too, one grown up, the other a little girl. The ladies were all in "high dresses." The bride in white silk, trimmed with orange blossom, with head-dress of orange blossom and a tulle veil. On the sleeves braids of satin, after the pattern of the Lifeguardsmen's stripes. A lady-in-waiting attached to the Nemours party wore a flame-coloured silk with straw-coloured trimmings. When all were assembled, we proceeded to the chapel. The bridal couple knelt before the altar. Behind them, on the left, Prince Adalbert, behind him we two Ministers, and then behind us the gentlemen of the House of Orleans. On the other side the Duc de Nemours and the Duchess, likewise all the Princesses. Haneberg began the ceremony with a suitable address. Nobody cried, but Duke Max looked rather like it once or twice. The bride appeared extremely self-possessed. Before the "affirmation" the bridegroom first made a bow to his father, and the bride did the same to her parents. The Duchess's "Yes" sounded very much as if she meant "Yes, for my own part," or "For aught I care." I don't wish to be spiteful, but it sounded like that to me. After the wedding, I kissed the Duchess's hand, and congratulated her. She seemed highly gratified and pleased. The pause between the wedding ceremony and the State dinner we spent in our room. I forgot, by-the-by, to say that during the Mass a military band played an accompaniment to the religious ceremony. It began with the overture to one of Verdi's operas, I don't know whether it was *Traviata* or *Trovatore*. It was but a mediocre performance, the sort of stuff you hear played at dinners.

The State dinner was held downstairs in two halls. In one sat all Royal personages and myself along with Pfretzchner, in the other the courtiers. The health of the bridal pair was drunk without speechmaking. I sat between the young Princess of Coburg and Duke Ludwig. The dinner was not particularly long, nor was it particularly good either. On rising from table there was some more standing about, and then all the company separated. The Orleans Princes took their departure at once, about half-past four, as did the other Princes. Only the Duc de Nemours stays on till the day after to-morrow with his children.

We drove back to Starnberg in one of the Ducal carriages, from whence we return to-day to Munich by the eight o'clock train.

At dinner the "Wedding Chorus" from *Lohengrin* was played. It must have been singularly agreeable to the King's ex-*fiancée*. Another odd coincidence was that the very evening before, the lake and mountains were illuminated (for the Czarina), and the King had to celebrate in this way his erstwhile *fiancée's* bridal eve.

The Comte de Paris spoke to me about war and peace, and maintains that popular feeling in France is opposed to war. But he said it was difficult to gauge public opinion in France, the Press is so wanting in independence.

He is a sensible, well-meaning man, who would make an excellent Constitutional King of France.

MUNICH, *October 1, 1868.*

At to-day's reception of the diplomats appeared the Papal Nuncio amongst the rest, and brought me an article in the *Neueste Nachrichten*, in which the bestowal of the "Golden Rose" by the Pope on the Queen of Spain, and the bestowal of the Order on Bucher at Passau is criticised. The Nuncio deplored this. I answered that I much regretted these extravagancies, and that I was prepared, if he cared to entrust me with the task, to take the necessary steps for criminal proceedings against the paper inculpated—as I had before now done at the instance of Ambassadors from foreign Powers.

Regarding Bucher, I added that I really could not conceal my surprise that the Papal Government should allow a decoration to be conferred on an individual who makes it his business to pursue the Bavarian Government with common, vulgar insults, an individual whose personal character is of the worst, and whom I could only designate as a *chenapan* (a scamp). To confer Orders of Merit under suchlike circumstances cannot surely ameliorate the relations between friendly Governments.

The Nuncio was a good deal impressed by this somewhat outspoken expression of opinion; he declared he knew nothing of the circumstances, but appealed to the fact that Bucher was represented at Rome as a devoted servant of the Church, and hinted that the matter had been brought to the front by Cardinal Reisach. I accepted this as true, but nevertheless, remarked in conclusion that the Church was no gainer if its head championed a common journalist as against the Bishop, on whose piety and zeal nobody could cast a doubt.

The efforts of the Prince in Baden had led to the result that the Baden Government took its part in the negotiations concerning the formation of a South German Fortress Commission. The decisive factor in bringing about this result was the opinion expressed by the Prussian Government.\* On July 31, the Minister for Baden at Munich, Robert von Mohl, announced the consent of his Government to the

\* The Baden War Minister, General von Beyer, had consulted, on July 19 and 20 at Berlin, with Roon, Moltke, and Thile, and on the 21st and 22nd conferred with the King at Ems. The latter was well pleased with the report of the Prussian Minister on the Baden negotiations.

meeting of a commission on September 21 "for preliminary consultation as to the formation of a Fortress Commission." On August 24 the invitation to Munich was accepted by decision of the Grand Duke. The Baden delegates were instructed to further in every way possible the union of South Germany with the North German Confederation, and to oppose everything which might be prejudicial to such union. As the most direct means of securing this object was indicated the maintenance of the common ownership of the fortress equipments. On September 21 the commission assembled at Munich. Bavaria was represented by Prince Hohenlohe and the War Minister, von Pranckh; Würtemberg by the War Minister, Freiherr von Wagner, State Councillor, von Scheuerlen, and Colonel von Suckow; Baden by the War Minister, General von Beyer, and Robert von Mohl. Prussia had instructed her Minister at Munich to the following effect: that Prussia claimed no full and formal participation in the commission to be formed, that she would be satisfied with the power to give assistance in definite cases and under definite circumstances, and that the miscarriage of the negotiations on the question of the participation of Prussia was to be deprecated. After a great deal of discussion at the earlier sittings, Bavaria, at the sitting of September 25, made a proposal to meet the views of Baden, viz. that the Prussian military delegate at the sitting of the Military Commission should be kept informed of all proceedings, that on subjects of importance an expression of his opinion should be invited beforehand, and respected so far as might be feasible, and that Prussia be invited to take part in all inspections of fortresses. On September 27, the Prussian Ambassador at Karlsruhe for the second time expressed the view of his Government, to wit, that Prussia laid no claim to participate in the Military Commission, but did wish to see an agreement arrived at. After a preliminary adjournment of the proceedings of the commission, on September 26 a pause was agreed to for the purpose of recording the results arrived at, and the next sitting fixed for October 5. At this stage the success of the work was questioned by Würtemberg. Baden had, with her consent, made the stipulation that the Fortress Commission should only come into existence after the commencement of the sittings of the Liquidation Commission, and after the assent of Prussia to the understanding with regard to the participation of the North German Confederation. Referring to this, Würtemberg now declared that there was no point in concluding the agreement before the beginning of the Liquidation Commission. Moreover, it would be convenient to fix the concessions in favour of Prussia and the North German Confederation before constituting the Fortress Commission in negotiation with the said North German Confederation. Objection was raised to the Bavarian presidency of the



Fortress Commission, on the ground that a Bavarian hegemony in Southern Germany would thereby be suggested. Finally, an arrangement was arrived at on the basis that the concessions embodied in Article VII. of the agreement in favour of Prussia were struck out, whereupon Baden included this clause in the proviso, on condition of which she assented to the agreement.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, *October 4, 1868.*

Yesterday Herr von Baur, the Würtemberg Secretary of Legation, came to me and brought me a despatch of his Minister, of which he left a copy with me; this was so conceived as to force me to the conclusion that Würtemberg wished to break off altogether the negotiations regarding the Fortress Commission. I could not make head or tail of it, as it was a direct contradiction with earlier expressions of opinion on the part of Varnbüler, and communicated its contents to Völderndorff, who at once advised extreme measures. Meantime I laid it quietly on one side and awaited the advent of the Würtemberg delegate, who put in an appearance to-day. In the course of the conversation with him it became clear that since the sending of the despatch in question another reversal of policy has occurred, and Würtemberg now declares herself ready to agree to the conclusions of the agreement, if it is modified as regards the status of Prussia in such a way that the particular determination of the relation of the South German fortresses to the North German Confederation remain in abeyance until the meeting of the Liquidation Commission. I deplore this, because at the Commission Prussia will bring pressure to bear; however Scheuerlen explained that at Stuttgart no apprehension was felt of such pressure, and indeed they would rather leave the first move to the other side than have to make the first bid themselves. We risk little in the long run, and as this is the only means of bringing about the Commission, I intend to accept the modification.

Before half-past one I drove out to the reception on the occasion of the October festival. I took Oettingen with me, as he had no carriage. We got away about half-past one. There we found the Diplomatic Corps and sundry other uniformed gentlemen in the pavilion. The King came at two o'clock and was greeted with cheers. First he conversed with the diplomats, and afterwards with us. He made a point of talking a very long time with me about the Empress (the Czarina), about political matters, about the intrigues that had been directed against me, saying he meant to take no kind of notice of them, and was especially and particularly amiable. The circle lasted a very long while, then he visited the animals, the distribution of prizes for these was made, and to wind up the horrible horse-races came off — a positive scandal, but one which cannot be abolished.

MUNICH, *October 6, 1868.*

To-day the preacher of the "Free Congregation" at Nuremberg, a regular clod, came to see me, to bring me a memorial from his congregation to the Minister of Public Worship. Complaint is made in it that while their pastor can perform all other duties connected with public worship, he cannot speak at the graveside, because he is not a native-born Bavarian. I cannot quite see why a man must hold a certificate of Bavarian birth to deliver a funeral address!

The fellow looked a German all over, tall, hair just turning grey, moustaches and a small imperial, dressed in black, monstrously fat, with a fanatical look. The Germans are fanatical even in unbelief! He told me they held no dogma, their creed was to propagate humanitarian ideas, virtuous living, and so on. After he had explained his business to me, I asked him the political tendencies of the congregation. He said a section belonged to the democratic wing of the Greater Germany group, the other and larger section National-Liberal. The former had no connection with the Ultramontanes. Their conjunction at the elections of the Tariff Parliament, he declared, was purely accidental and temporary.

After him came Chief Superintendent of Works Ritgen von Giessen, who spoke to me of the Germanic National Museum. He told me he was at work on the history of the dwelling-house, and proceeded to make some interesting historical observations on the development of human habitations, which originated, he said, in Central Asia and had all developed on the same lines. Originally men lived in promiscuity with the cattle, then came a segregation, and later again a further segregation of the several branches of the family by division of the rooms. He means to publish his results.

MUNICH, *October 10, 1868.*

Having at last come to an understanding with Würtemberg, I thought the conference must now come to an early conclusion. But unfortunately General Beyer failed to get from Karlsruhe the authorisation to sign, and therefore resolved to return yesterday evening in person to Karlsruhe, there to get instructions for the Minister, who remains behind here.

Both the Würtemberg delegates came to see me yesterday at five o'clock, and as they had been waiting all day long for a sitting, they had occupied themselves in drinking by way of passing the time. Councillor of State Scheuerlen was very red about the gills and smelt like an old wine-cask. He invited me to dine with him at Marschal's, a restaurant in the Dultplatz. I accepted, and found awaiting me there Völderndorff as well as Baur, and a Würtemberg Finance Councillor, Knapp by name. There was much eating and still more drinking. Presently Scheuerlen

delivered a long speech upon me, in which he extolled my "German heart" and "my gaze fixed always on high aims"; to which I replied that if ever I had been praised for a conciliatory disposition, I thought I might claim to have proved the truth of such commendation to-day, as I had succeeded in making friends with the Swabian quidnuncs. I finished up with a toast to the noble Swabian stock and its representatives then present. At eight o'clock the company dispersed in high good humour. I accompanied Suckow to the play, where I took leave of General Beyer.

October 11, 1868.

At noon yesterday I received the news that the Baden delegates had got their instructions. I made instant haste to send out the invitation to the conference for three o'clock. By that time all was ready. Only the Minister of War, Prankh, was missing. We sent after him, but he was nowhere to be found. So I opened the sitting without him, we assembled quickly, and at five o'clock we were in a good state of forwardness. About six I went to the Minister of War to communicate the results to him and invite him to come and sign at half-past seven. I found he had just got back to his office, where he had only that minute opened my midday letter. From twelve o'clock till six it seems he had been out walking. To cap the climax, he asked if it was really necessary for him to come at half-past seven, as he had a card-party at his house at eight o'clock! However, he saw he had said a silly thing in asking the question, and immediately promised that he would come. I had been all day long at the Ministry, and had only managed to snatch half an hour to take a snack at the Quatrefous.\* Thus the War Minister, though the matter concerned him in the highest degree, gives six hours of the day to going walking and the evening to his card-party, and that on a day when in deed and in truth the honour of Bavaria was at stake, for had we failed to reach a settlement, we should have been supremely ridiculous!

That evening the signatures were appended. I made a farewell speech. I was thanked for the excellent way the proceedings had been conducted, and everybody separated at nine o'clock.

The agreement "relating to the formation of a Fortress Commission" of October 10, 1868, † lays down that the meeting-place of the commission is to be in yearly rotation at Munich, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe, and that Bavaria is to exercise the presidency provisionally for the first three years. Each State may appoint several representatives, but they only exercise one vote altogether. Instructions to the commission are: to superintend the administration of the three fortresses of Ulm, Rastatt, and Landau, their defensibility from military and technical

\* A restaurant and wine-bar.

† Printed in Hirth's *Annalen des Deutschen Reichs*, 1872, p. 1579.

points of view, their strategical relation to each other as well as to the other German fortresses and defensive positions, as also to consider the construction, maintenance, and provision for military use of strategic railways and roads. The Commission is to inspect the fortresses. The relation to the Governments is that of an advisory board whose duty is to make suggestions. Any Government failing to respect a vote of the commission is held bound to communicate its reasons to the remaining Governments. Article VII. of the Agreement lays down: "The three Governments recognise the necessity of the co-ordination of the defensive system of North and South Germany, and bind themselves to regulate accordingly, on the occasion of the next assembling of the Liquidation Commission, the main principles for the preservation of this co-ordination as well as for the administration of the *matériel* heretofore held in joint ownership by the Confederation." Article VIII. declares that the compacts of alliance concluded with Prussia are not affected prejudicially by the formation of the commission. In case of war the powers of the commission are suspended. Simultaneously with the "agreement" three "protocols" were signed. One of these protocols explains the understanding of the three Governments with regard to the position to be taken up in the coming discussions and negotiations of the Liquidation Commission. All three Governments declare any division of the former movable property of the league, whether a division of the property itself or by sharing the proceeds of an auction-sale, to be inadmissible. Bavaria would raise no objection, from her side, to a redemption by the territorial States of the *méteriel* lying in the several fortresses. But inasmuch as Baden and Würtemberg oppose, it has been decided not to make any proposal of the sort, and when the time comes to vote against it. Baden considers the most important object to be the administration of the common property by a united German commission under the presidency of Prussia. But as Bavaria opposes this, "Würtemberg and Baden pledge themselves to vote in the first instance neither for the making of such a proposal nor for this mode of procedure." Bavaria and Würtemberg desire the control of the *matériel* to be in the hands of the Fortress Commission. However, as Baden is unwilling to commit such far-reaching powers to the Fortress Commission, the control is to be vested in the territorial Governments, and merely to be under the supervision of the Fortress Commission. A "distinct and separate protocol" of October 10 lays down in the first place that both the protocol just mentioned and the agreement are to be communicated to the Prussian Government before the assembling of the Liquidation Commission. Baden further declares that "the Fortress Commission can come definitely into existence only after the completion of the proceedings of the Liquidation Commission and after the acquiescence of Prussia in the decision regarding the participation

of the North German Confederation," and that its approval of the agreement is to be looked upon as given only with this proviso.

Further, the Baden Government declares with regard to Article VII. of the Agreement that in the common interest of Germany it is bound to try to secure the co-operation of the North German League in the activity of the Fortress Commission, at any rate under such a form that the commission shall communicate the result of all its deliberations to the Prussian delegate attending their sitting and shall take his opinion on more important questions; also that the North German League shall be permitted to be represented by a Deputy at the periodical inspections of the fortresses.

*Extract from a communication to the Bavarian Minister.*

FREIHERR VON PERGLAS, at Berlin.

MUNICH, November 8, 1868.

. . . The question of the relations between Prussia and Austria has again been the subject of much anxious thought to me. I must begin by saying that I agree with you that neither to ourselves nor to Europe, that is to the cause of European peace, is a mere alliance of the German greater Powers of any advantage. To say nothing of the stipulations which such an alliance may involve, and which might specially affect us to our prejudice, alliances are always easy to dissolve and offer nobody a guarantee when once the purpose is attained for which they were formed. The only thing that can save us, and the only thing that can ensure a lasting European peace, is a confederation of States that should unite together Austria, Prussia (in other words, the North German League), and Bavaria. I say Bavaria, understanding thereby the South German group of States which Bavaria would be called upon to represent.

In this way we should secure the formation of a great central defensive Power in Europe, "without whose leave not a cannon-shot would be fired."

It is self-evident in that case that Prussia would have to concede the admission of Austria as a whole together with Hungary, and make Austria's interests in the Lower Danube her own; in short, she must rise to the occasion and adopt a very sublime and imposing policy. I know perfectly well what Bismarck would say to this: "I cannot give up the Russian Alliance in exchange for a confederate of whom I can never be sure."

But here again comes in the difference between an alliance and a confederation of States, and Bismarck's doubts would sink into the background if the attempt succeeded to settle the inter-relations of the German States on a lasting and definite footing.

Here we have a problem which I have not yet been able to

solve, but the solution of which I look upon as a necessity, as something that must be faced.

The only question is: Does Prussia prefer the inevitable war with France, with all its risks, to the incorporation of South Germany with the Northern League? In other words: Does Prussia forego crossing the Main to secure the counter-balancing advantage of the permanent consolidation of her present power? If so, the question is merely one of the formulation of a draft project of confederation. If, on the other hand, Prussia will not, or cannot, go back on her present policy, she will not consent to a step which makes that act of self-denial a *sine qua non*.

Still, in these matters Count Bismarck is a less trustworthy guide than public opinion, and especially opinion in the camp of the National Liberal party. I would therefore beg you to follow attentively the utterances of these circles before you engage in any conversation, no matter how general, with Bismarck or other official personages.

So long as the Prussian people, and the National Liberal party that leads it, is ready to stake anything and everything rather than stop short on its way to the lordship "of the eagle from crag to sea,"\* so long will Bismarck embark on nothing fresh, so long is no change of policy to be counted on.

In the meantime I mean to work out the matter theoretically, so as to be secured against all eventualities. Consul Schwab writes that war in France is a certainty, and that it will break out in January. I do not share this apprehension, but I do fear that the war is inevitable — if only on the occurrence of some opportunity favourable to the French — unless this establishment of a defensive Power in the heart of Europe should be successfully accomplished. . . .

MUNICH, *end of November, 1868.*

Yesterday was the baptism of the newly born Princess.† At noon I proceeded to the Palace in my dress-coat and white tie; uniform was barred, because the ceremony was to be *en famille* on account of the Princess Alexandra.

There I found the Queen and the Royal Princes Otto, Ludwig, and Leopold, the Princess Ludwig, Count and Countess Trani.

\* Emanuel Geibel had about this time been deprived of the pension which he drew from the Royal privy purse, as well as his honorary professorship at Munich, because he had greeted King Wilhelm of Prussia on the occasion of a visit paid by that monarch to Lübeck with a poem which concluded with the words:

And may we hope, a last fond wish,  
That yet some day thine eye may note  
O'er all this Realm, at last made one,  
From crag to sea thine Eagle float.

† The Princess Elvira, daughter of Prince Adalbert and Princess Amalie, Infanta of Spain, born November 22, 1868.

Both Princesses were in blue satin, trimmed with white fur. The Princess Alexandra wore a lilac jacket and hat. The baptism took place in the White Hall, which is before you come to Prince Adalbert's apartments; its arrangement as a chapel was in excellent taste.

The Princesses stood on the left hand, the Princes on the right, the Princess Alexandra with Prince Adalbert before the altars, which were covered with red cushions. The little Princess Isabella carried the taper. She looked very pretty with her red curly hair, and was evidently very proud of her office. Both of the Prince's sons wore Spanish Orders in miniature — the elder the Golden Fleece, the younger the order of Charles III. It was shewn to me after the ceremony, when I was introduced to the children. Princess Alexandra replied to all the baptismal questions very fluently. Reindl, Dean of the Cathedral, gave a tactful address. The names of the little Princess are Elvira Alexandra Clara Cecilia Eugénie. Princess Adalbert does not like the name of Elvira, very rightly deeming it too theatrical, but Prince Adalbert thinks it very pretty. He said to me: "The mother is a Spaniard, so it is quite the proper thing, one daughter Isabella and the other Elvira."

Chocolate was served after the baptism, and after a long circle, we were dismissed at two o'clock.

At four o'clock was the funeral of Councillor of State Hermann.\* His death is a loss. I found him an interesting personality because of his stimulating conversation. Dean Mayer gave an extremely interesting address, though I could not make out why he kept repeating with such particular emphasis the phrase: "The Lord of Sabaoth hath willed it, who will prevent Him!" Nobody thinks of doing such a thing, I presume. My idea is, it was because of the fine sound that he took the Lord of Sabaoth so often into his big mouth.

At six o'clock there was a Council of Ministers, which lasted till eleven. Besides the question of the Catholic University, the reorganisation of the Upper House was minutely discussed. Schlör made a remarkable speech against its enlargement by the addition of elected members. The other Ministers voted for such election, but were for modifying my proposal to this extent, that only two members should be taken in each district from the three hundred most heavily rated householders. These were to be supplemented by the representatives of the Universities and the Academy, as also of the Polytechnic. In this shape the motion will most likely go through the Chamber. Minister Hörmann will now lay the proposal before the King. The Senators are by way of introducing a motion of their own, but it will be better if we forestall them.

By half-past eleven I was done with things at last. Anyway, yesterday was one of the most fatiguing for a poor Minister.

\* Political Economist and Statistician, died November 23, 1868.

MUNICH, December 6, 1868.

Yesterday Count Usedom came to see me on occasion of his return to Florence, and utilised his visit to make me a report on his proceedings at Florence during the year 1866.

He began by assuring me that as early as 1865 efforts had been made from Florence to induce the Austrians to sell Venice. The Envoy, a certain Landau, had, according to him, met with much sympathy at Vienna — in fact, even Count Mensdorff had shown himself not ill disposed; yet the affair had miscarried owing to the opposition of the Emperor and the military party, who held it incompatible with military honour to surrender Venice without fighting. Usedom then used this to force the Italians into the alliance with Prussia, so as on the other hand to give effect to the Prussian plans in Germany with the assistance of Italy. Govone was sent to Berlin. Lamarmora, who was of the opinion that they might very well wait till the ripe fruit fell into the lap of the Italians, was against it. Usedom, however, urged that if Prussia went to war without Italy the result would be doubtful, and that, if Austria won, Italy could not then hope for the cession of Venice. This line of argument seems to have carried the day. So the alliance with Italy came to pass. Thus, while England and France were aiming at localising the war, Prussia, it appeared, was aiming at the invasion of Hungary by the Italians. Hence Bismarck's instructions and the famous Note Usedom drew up on them. Then it would seem he was disavowed by Bismarck, who could not endure him, Usedom, and who appears not to have had the official papers at Varzin from which he might have convinced himself that Usedom had acted in accordance with his instructions.

On my asking what then had led Lamarmora to make the Note public, Usedom replied that it was a *coup monté* from France, to cause a split between Prussia and Italy and to make him impossible at Florence. But the Frenchmen's scheme had not succeeded, as the famous Note had only proved Prussia's straightforward intentions to the Italians. Consequently he had even received the most friendly communications from Italians of all sorts and conditions, and Lamarmora's *coup* had failed. He declares Italian unity to be popular throughout Italy, says that nobody would wish to go back to the old conditions, and that the assertions at Rome to the effect that Italy will very soon fall to pieces, and so on, are lies. The French, he went on to add, made a great many mistakes: they treated the Italian Government as vassals, and distinguished themselves by their imperiousness and insolence, and thus they made enemies of the Italians. The Emperor depended upon the Clerical party in France, and for that reason is driven to adopt this policy towards Italy. Lamarmora was on the French side, because he wanted nothing more than the preponderance of



Piedmont in Italy, the predominance of the Piedmontese party in Italy, but not the merging of Piedmont in Italy; it was the *Kreuzzeitung* party, he said, of Italy. The King of Prussia had been hard put to it by the alliance with Italy, as also by the war with Austria. His old legitimist proclivities had made it very hard for him to decide. But when he had once made a decision, he held to it hard and fast.

On the German question, and regarding the relations of Prussia to Austria, Usedom expressed himself very circumspectly. He listened very attentively to my exposition of our efforts in the year 1867 towards a more comprehensive confederation of South Germany, in conjunction with the North German Confederation, and seemed to agree with me in thinking that Prussia made a mistake in thwarting this plan by the conclusion of the Zollverein agreements. Now he supposed we must bide our time; you could not plough a field as long as the ground was frozen.

His views on the North German question interested me. He said we are all agreed that a slice of territory in the north must be ceded, but to yield the claim to the military positions of Düppel and Alsen is out of the question; however, the King is self-willed and makes difficulties.

Of Bismarck he says that he is a fanatic for peace, and is by way of using all circumspection to give France and Austria no pretext for war.

On my making some laudatory remarks on Hompesch, Usedom stated that in June 1866 Bismarck pressed Italy hard to declare war on Bavaria. But he (Usedom) had prevented it.

MUNICH, December 6, 1868.

As Usedom wished for information on the question of the Anglo-Indian overland mail service, I went to see him to-day and gave him the particulars as laid down in the official documents. This led to our having another longish conversation. He showed me a letter from a Würtemberg National-Liberal, pointing out that the National-Liberal party there ran the risk of losing ground hopelessly with the people if a reactionary domestic policy is pursued in Prussia. I answered that the injudicious language of the Minister of Justice Leonhardt,\* and the pietistical tendencies of Mühler particularly caused offence here — which he readily admitted. He thought, however, that the King would find it hard to make up his mind to dismiss these men. The

\* The Minister of Justice Leonhardt had, on November 30, on discussion of the draft of the proposed amendments of the Prussian Law of Mortgage, expressed the hope that the new law would shortly become applicable to all the rest of Germany. If the law proved efficacious, it would be adopted for the North German Confederation, and from that moment to its introduction into South Germany a space of time would intervene which would be counted only by months.

Minister of Public Worship was under the influence of his pious wife, and for that reason the Ministry over which he presided was nicknamed "the Adelaide Ministry." The woman was a regular busybody, and put her finger in every pie. Then we got to talking of the Ultramontane party, in which subject we were entirely agreed in thinking that its intrigues constitute a serious danger for the whole progress and development of the human race, and that the generality of people make too light of this risk. About Gustav and the intrigues directed against him he spoke with much special knowledge.

Usedom had previously made the remark in the course of our yesterday's conversation that there was no little confusion prevalent at Berlin on the precise discrimination of the powers of the Prussian as conflicting with those of the North German Confederation. He returned to the subject to-day. According to him the North German Confederation was positively ridiculous. You could not expect a Prussian to let himself be merged in the North German Confederation; in Germany you could, but that was another matter altogether. When I told him there was still, as always, the old idea of an Emperor of Germany to fall back upon, he said yes, that was better; in that way the King of Prussia might be raised higher without the other Sovereigns having to be set lower. A proposition rather difficult of demonstration! *A propos*, as we were on Bismarck, Usedom stated, as an example of how men could alter their opinions, that it was Bismarck who drove Manteuffel to Olmütz. At that time Bismarck looked upon the Austrian alliance as the sole and only means of salvation, and continued of that opinion till, as Envoy of the Federal Diet, he convinced himself that this was impracticable.

MUNICH, December 21, 1868.

To-day Fröbel was with me, having just returned from Berlin and Vienna. He told me he had found opinion in Vienna completely changed. Whereas only last year everybody believed in the disruption of Austria, now self-confidence was again rife, and people again went so far as to demand specifically and definitely that South Germany must unite with Austria to prevent Austria being completely "Magyarised." No consideration need be shown, such is the general opinion there, to the minor German dynasties, as these had proved themselves hostile or useless. This is the feeling in German parliamentary circles. Ministers express themselves more circumspectly. Fröbel had a conversation of some length with Beust, in the course of which he reproached him with the attitude of the *Süddeutsche Presse* but calmed down after a while. Beust declares he does not wish to be mixed up with German affairs. But his manner made it evident that he did not honestly mean what he said. Speaking generally, Fröbel says that opinion at Vienna

comes to this — that a peaceable solution of the German question is considered impossible.

With Bismarck, Fröbel had an interview lasting an hour. Bismarck said he meant to maintain a passive attitude towards South Germany. The development of Germany might take another thirty years, and it would do no harm. It was a great development, and needed time. The Customs Parliament Bismarck hopes will lead to the further development of German relations. He spoke, also, of the year 1866, and thought that, even if he had been able at that date to unite all South Germany and German Austria with Prussia, he would not have done so, because in that case too many heterogeneous elements would have been thrown together, and no permanent arrangement would have resulted. He had nothing to say against the South German Confederation, albeit he allowed that by its means the renewed participation of Austria in German affairs was rendered possible, and from this difficulties might arise. As to any menace against South German independence on the part of North Germany, Fröbel had noticed no symptoms of such a thing at Berlin. Our independence was threatened, he held, from the direction of Austria. A letter from a person at Vienna, who holds no political post, but is in relations with Beust, which Fröbel has received here, shows that an understanding is projected at Vienna to our prejudice.

MUNICH, *December 31, 1868.*

The Austrian Minister, Count Ingelheim,\* turned the conversation to-day at the Thursday diplomatic reception upon the speech of Minister von Varnbüler,† and observed that it made an end of every hope of a Southern Confederation. I replied that I

\* Successor to Count Trauttmansdorff, who on November 14 had been received in farewell audience of the King. On December 12 Prince Hohenlohe had received his credentials.

† In the debate on the address in the Second Chamber on December 18 and 19, Varnbüler had said: "The union of the South German States which is demanded of the Government is nothing more nor less than the Southern Confederation. . . . It is therefore not merely an understanding with the neighbouring States, but a definite political structure. I ask then: Is such a thing possible? . . . You will agree with me that a political organisation to be at all effective must have certain powers. How, pray, will you determine these for your central authority, for your Parliament? Such powers cannot, at any rate, be inferior to those of the South German Federal Council, and it follows that the South German States must hand over to the Confederate body all those matters which are enumerated in the fifteen sections of Article IV. of the Constitution of the North German Confederation. In this connection you must bear in mind that Würtemberg and Baden must always be in a minority in the Confederate bodies as against Bavaria. . . . The whole population of Würtemberg would rise *en masse* against such an experiment. . . . When you take into consideration all the matters that must come to be dealt with by the Confederation, I feel sure that you would very soon come to the conclusion that, if ever we are to have such a condition of things, we would rather have it in common with Germany as a whole than with Bavaria.

had read this without any sort of surprise, because I was familiar with Varnbüler's views, and I equally well knew the tendencies of the people of Würtemberg, whose idea was to maintain their autonomy at any cost. Without surrender of a part of this independence, however, the Southern Confederation was inconceivable. For this reason the scheme had little prospect of success in Würtemberg—unless the plan were adopted of forming a South German Confederation of Republics, which was neither in the interest nor in accordance with the plans of the South German Governments.\* Ingelheim now advised an understanding between the South German States, with the object of their mutually pledging themselves to take no further steps towards a *rapprochement* with Prussia. Only by such means could the danger of absorption by Prussia be warded off. I objected that such an understanding could only have a negative object, and ought to be made deliberately and after full consideration. The Peace of Prague stipulated the national union of the South German States with the Northern Confederation; this Ingelheim wanted to deny at first, but I was able to prove it him by reading out Article IV. of the Peace of Prague.

Next I showed him that Austria had herself recognised in Article IV. the necessity of a new political organisation; consequently, that this was bound to be formed, and that we could not confine ourselves to a merely negative attitude without acting in contravention of the Peace of Prague. The union of the South German States in the form of a federation of States and its union with North Germany was not unfeasible, and therefore no agreement ought to be entered into which might by any possibility bar such an object. In any case, I should like to think over his advice.

The Bavarian Minister at Karlsruhe, Freiherr von Riederer, had reported on January 15 that the Grand Duke Friedrich of Baden had on more than one occasion expressed the wish to enter into a personal exchange of ideas with King Ludwig as to the political situation of Germany. To this the following report of the Prince, dated January 22, 1869, refers:

"Your Majesty has been pleased by a communication from your Majesty's secretary, to entrust to your most faithful servant, the undersigned, the duty of expressing his opinion regarding the wish referred to in the despatch of your Majesty's Minister at Karlsruhe, on the part of the Grand Duke of Baden to meet your Majesty.

\* The Würtemberg Popular Party had included the Confederation of the South as part of their programme. Their representative, Karl Meyer, said in the debate on the address of December 18 and 19: "I believe, for my part, that by establishing the Southern Confederation we shall be putting no drag on the Republican development of Europe."

"Your most obedient servant feels the more bound to describe such a meeting as favourable to your Majesty's interests, inasmuch as the establishment of personal and friendly relations between your Majesty and the Grand Duke of Baden will assist not a little in furthering the efforts of your most obedient servant to restrain Baden from a one-sided policy, and to lead her to assume a position more in harmony with the politics of the other South German States. The great change which is preparing in the opinions of the Baden population on this point seems likely to promote such an alteration in the policy of the country, and a meeting with your Majesty will give the Grand Duke of Baden confidence and courage to come into closer touch with that section of his subjects which looks upon the surrender of the national independence as a calamity. Your Majesty is aware that there are situations when it is not sufficient for a Minister only to move. The personal activity of your Majesty and your Majesty's meeting with the rest of the German Monarchs may well *at this present crisis* exert an important influence on the position of affairs in Germany, and enable Bavaria to take the place which the kingdom has a right to claim in virtue of its past history and its inherent strength. I pray your Majesty may not let the opportunity slip without taking advantage of it.

"The undersigned would regard the meeting of your Royal Highness with the Archduke of Baden as an event fruitful in results, and would welcome it with delight. Since the Archduke has already paid a visit to your Majesty on the occasion of your assuming the Government, no obstacle on the ground of etiquette should stand in the way of a visit by your Royal Highness to Karlsruhe, indeed, for this very reason it is to be preferred to a meeting at some third place."

*Extract from a communication to PROFESSOR AEGIDI at Bonn.\**

MUNICH, *February 28, 1869.*

. . . I will not enter in the idle discussion whether the Peace of Prague and the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg leave the association of South German States as the only available means of coming into closer union with the North or not. I look at the matter only from the practical point of view.

Any one who considers with attention the situation in South Germany will readily recognise the fact that the danger for Germany lies in the ever-growing estrangement between

\* Aegidi, whom the Prince had met in the Tariff Parliament, had sent the latter on February 7 a project for a South German Federation of States, the contents of which were in the main limited to the matter of defensive and offensive alliances, and sought to promote the question of the South German organisation merely by the formation of the "association" apart from any other considerations.

South and North. The tighter the bond is drawn which unites together the States of the North German League, the harder does it become for the native of South Germany to reconcile himself to the thought of a union with the North. The national antipathy of the South German races to the North German is a fact not to be denied. This antipathy, coupled with the dread of absorption in the Prusso-German unified State, has notably increased since the year 1866, while all the enemies of Prussia and Germany utilise this feeling to widen the breach day by day. So the South German States drift imperceptibly into a hostile attitude towards the North, and suppose any one of the catastrophes desired and furthered by the opponents of Prussia to occur, the risk grows imminent that Southern and Northern Germany will be permanently severed. To obviate this danger, it is necessary as soon as possible to have done with all provisional arrangements, and to set to work seriously to bring about the new organisation of Germany.

But as things are now, this new organisation cannot be effected by the mere entrance of the South German States into the North German League. Whoever makes this his aim and object is only prolonging indefinitely the provisional condition of affairs, and thereby the present precarious position. But if such a provisional condition is admittedly fraught with danger, we must arrive as soon as may be at some form of arrangement which guarantees the South Germans the maintenance of their autonomy, their individuality, their *kindly, cosy* national life, if I may be allowed the expression, and at the same time makes their union with the North possible.

Give the South Germans this guarantee, and they will gradually become part and parcel of the great German body politic; without it, never!

A South German Federation of States that should be something more than a mere inter-State alliance, an association, at the head of which would be a common confederate administration — it might be without a Parliament — common regulation of military affairs and foreign policy, common management of internal communications, &c., that would possibly be the form of arrangement that would offer the South German States the guarantee just referred to, and at the same time afford Germans of the South a firm standing from which they could honestly and unreservedly extend the right hand of fellowship to their brethren of the North. Nobody likes to give his hand across a ditch, unless he has got a firm footing first on his own bank.

Prince Hohenlohe had as early as November 1868 endeavoured to persuade the Baden Government to forego their proviso, that the South German Fortress Commission should come into being only after the conclusion of the liquidation proceedings. He

was anxious to get the Fortress Commission into active operation at once, and settle by diplomatic negotiations with Prussia the question of equipments in the fortresses, so that a fresh assembling of the Liquidation Commission would have become superfluous. Baden refused to consent. In spite of this the Bavarian Government persisted in its efforts to obtain, in anticipation of the meeting of the Liquidation Commission, some guarantee at least that, when it did meet, the Prussian representatives should not demand a common control of the *matériel*.

Some insight into the nature of these negotiations is afforded by the following draft of a communication to the Bavarian Minister at Berlin, which, according to a note in the MS., was sent off "in a modified form." It dates from the end of February 1869.

"In reply to the inquiry I addressed on the 15th of the month to Count Bismarck through your Excellency as to what regulations Prussia would consider suitable as touching the erstwhile movable property of the league, and on what views the Royal Prussian Government would proceed in its instructions to its delegates at the forthcoming Liquidation Commission, Count Bismarck caused a communication to be conveyed to me on the 28th inst. through the instrumentality of Freiherr von Werthern. This declares the willingness of the Royal Prussian Government to agree to the wishes of the South German Governments to allow the common ownership to continue in such *matériel* as still remains from the days of the German Confederation in the Fortresses of Ulm, Rastatt, and Landau, but announces at the same time that the Royal Prussian Government, so long as the common ownership remains in force, considers it cannot forego a common supervision of the property. In this expression of opinion I find reasons for hoping that the compulsory redemption of the erstwhile property of the Confederation, a measure especially distasteful to the Governments of Würtemberg and Baden, may be avoided, while at the same time I fail to see anything excessive or unacceptable from our point of view in the requirement that the maintenance of the proprietary rights of North Germany shall be secured by means of mutual powers of supervision. Moreover, the minutes of the agreement of October 10 last, which we at once laid before the Royal Prussian Government \* say nothing whatever about excluding North Germany entirely from any co-operation; on the contrary, its co-operation, so long as the common ownership lasts, is expressly contemplated. Only as to the extent of this co-operation were the views of the Prussian Government so far unknown to us; and the fact that it was agreed by all parties that a Fortress Commission should be established, and should be charged not only with the supervision, but also with the actual control of the war material

\* Communicated by Prince Hohenlohe to the Prussian Minister on October 14, 1868.

existing in the South German fortresses, could not fail to impose on the King's Government the duty of declaring at once that it was not in a position to assent to any such proposal in view of the minutes of agreement between the South German States dated October 10, 1868, in which a Fortress Commission of this nature was expressly excluded.

"That the King's Government now deems itself bound to repeat this declaration is the effect of the report made by Freiherr von Freyberg, Major in the Royal Army, of a conversation which he had with Count von Bismarck, and from which it appears that his Excellency indicated as desirable a mixed commission, consisting of representatives from all States of the South that are interested parties, and such of these belonging to the Northern Confederation as are similarly situated, to be charged with the reinstatement and seasonable improvement of *matériel* in connection with fortification and artillery, and suchlike duties. I think I am justified in not regarding this in the light of an official proposal of the Prussian Government, but merely as an observation made in the course of a conversation on military matters as to what appeared desirable in the interests of military efficiency. All the same, his Excellency's words show to what sort of proposals discussions as to the management of the former property of the league may give rise, and prove the necessity of the request made to you in my despatch of the 15th inst. to learn the views of the Royal Prussian Government before the meeting of the Liquidation Commission, so as to be enabled, even at this early stage, to indicate as unacceptable proposals which would be likely to prevent a successful solution of the task which that body has to perform.

"I should mention in this connection that, when my despatch of the 15th inst. speaks of claims being avoided that might tend to loosen the tie still existing between the South German States and the North German League, I was only alluding to that particular tie which consists in the community of ownership in the erstwhile material property of the league. The defensive and offensive alliance existing between Bavaria and Prussia, and to which Count Bismarck appears to have supposed me to be referring, could not, at that time, have been in my thoughts, for the very good reason that from the point of view of the Royal Bavarian Government the compact of alliance was purely an act of foreign policy. Another proof how far from my thoughts was any notion that the regulation of common claims to the fortress *matériel* could exert any sort of influence on the compact of alliance is that in the agreement of October 10 last, which was likewise communicated to the Royal Prussian Government, it is expressly declared that the terms of the compacts of alliance should be in no way affected by the conclusion of an agreement as to the Fortress Commission.

"I am very far from admitting even the possibility that any



occasion of domestic politics could disturb or endanger the agreement which exists for the mutual safeguarding of their integrity between Bavaria and Prussia. Whether the matter of the erstwhile property of the league is settled to the general satisfaction or not, whether a common ownership between North and South Germany continues in force, or Bavaria should find herself compelled to a redemption of her share, in any case the Royal Bavarian Government will loyally maintain the defensive and offensive alliance. The national community of interests created by those alliances in defence of the German soil stands in our conception so far above all doubt that discordant opinions on mere matters of detail cannot in any way imperil this firm bond of connection.

"I am glad to learn from the communication of Freiherr von Werthern that in this respect Count Bismarck shares my view. Now, as regards the general principles on which the regulation of the common *matériel* in the fortresses might be based, Freiherr von Werthern's communication records the view that the Royal Prussian Government may be able to declare itself in agreement with the Royal Bavarian Government on this point, that the *control* of that *matériel* is not to be a control shared by the North German Confederation.

"It would be more conformable to the views of the Royal Government if the control of the *matériel* lying in South Germany were handed over, not to the South German Territorial Governments, as was agreed upon in the protocol of October 10 last, but to the Fortress Commission itself. It was only to meet the wishes of Baden that the Royal Government consented to the protocol taking that shape. However, whatever may be the final settlement of this regulation, the South German Governments were at one in admitting that the North German Confederation, as joint owner, must be allowed a share in the supervision of the common *matériel*. It should not be difficult to find a form under which this mutual inspection of the *matériel* stored in the erstwhile fortresses of the league might be conducted. I therefore indulge the hope that the differences more or less apparent in the views of the two Governments may soon be removed, and would add further, that the most expedient course would most certainly be to let the Fortress Commission come into being immediately an understanding has been arrived at between the South German States and the North German Confederation, whereby the participation of the latter, provided for in Article VII. of the Compact of October 10 last, in the supervision to be exercised over the administration of the *matériel* in the fortresses, will be duly settled.

"Meantime, I beg your Excellency to bring this despatch under the notice of Count von Bismarck. . . ."

These negotiations with Prussia led to no result. In March 1869 the Prussian Ambassador gave it to be understood that

Count Bismarck, in any case, looked forward to an early convocation of the Liquidation Commission. On March 9 Prince Hohenlohe conferred by the King's command with Varnbüler at Nördlingen, and the result of this interview was that on March 10 the Liquidation Commission was convoked for April 4.

The Prince's remains unfortunately supply but little evidence of his frequent intercourse with Ignaz von Döllinger, which exercised such an important influence on the Prince's Church policy during the period preceding the assembling of the Vatican Council. This intercourse was, of course, mainly personal, and only now and again in amplification of verbal exchanges of opinion were brief notes written.

On March 23, 1869, Döllinger transmits the Prince the draft of the following circular letter of April 9.

The circular letter, down to the concluding sentences beginning with the words "I have waited till now," was composed by Döllinger. A French translation of the letter was written by the Prince with his own hand.

*Circular letter to the BAVARIAN AMBASSADORS of April 9, 1869.*

It may now be assumed with certainty that the General Council summoned by his Holiness Pope Pius IX. \* will, if no unforeseen circumstances intervene, actually meet in December. Undoubtedly it will be attended by a very large number of Bishops from all parts of the world, and be more numerous than any previous Council, and will, therefore, make a corresponding claim upon the public opinion of the Catholic world to be accredited, both itself and its decisions, with the high significance and authority which belong to an Œcumenical Council.

That the Council will deal with simple questions of creed, with matters of pure theology, is not to be supposed, for no such questions calling for settlement by a Council are at present extant. The only matter of dogma which, as I learn from a trustworthy source, might come up for decision at Rome by the Council, and for which the Jesuits in Italy, as well as in Germany and elsewhere, are agitating, is the question of the infallibility of the Pope. But this goes far beyond the domain of purely religious questions, and has a highly political character, because the power of the Papacy over all princes and peoples, even those in schism from Rome, would thereby be defined in secular affairs, and elevated into an article of faith.

Now this question, highly important and pregnant with results as it is, is pre-eminently of a nature to draw the attention of all Governments having Catholic subjects to the Council, but their interest, or rather, perhaps, their anxiety, must needs be still further heightened, when they see the preliminaries already in preparation,

\* By the Bull dated June 29, 1868.

and the composition of the committees formed at Rome to carry out these. Among these committees is one in particular whose sole business is to concern itself with politico-ecclesiastical matters. So it is beyond a doubt the deliberate intention of the Roman Curia that the Council shall lay down, at any rate, some decisions on politico-ecclesiastic matters or questions of a mixed nature. To this may be added that the journal edited by the Roman Jesuits, the *Civiltà Cattolica*, to which Pope Pius, by a personal brief, has given the weight of a semi-official organ of the Roman Curia, has quite lately indicated as a duty assigned to the Council to transform the damnatory judgments of the Papal Syllabus of December 8, 1864, into positive decisions or decrees of the Council. Now, as these articles of the Syllabus are directed against several important axioms of State organisation as this has come to be understood among all civilised peoples, Governments are confronted with the serious question whether and in what form they would have to advise either the Bishops subject to their authority, or, at a later stage, the Council itself of the perilous consequences to which such a deliberate and fundamental disturbance of the relations of Church and State must inevitably lead. The further question arises whether it does not appear advisable that the Governments acting in common, perhaps through their representatives at Rome, should present a warning or protest against such decisions as might be taken by the Council on their sole responsibility without consultation with the representatives of the State power or any previous communication regarding politico-ecclesiastical questions or matters of a mixed nature. It seems to me absolutely necessary for the Governments interested to endeavour to arrive at some mutual understanding on this very serious matter.

I have waited till now to see if any move would be made on one side or the other, but as nothing of the sort has happened, and time presses, I find myself compelled to charge your Excellency to make this the subject of a conversation with the Government to which you are accredited, in order to elicit information as to its ideas and views on this important question.

Concurrently with this circular a request for an expression of opinion on the following questions formulated by Döllinger was addressed to the Catholic Theological and the Legal Faculties of the Bavarian Universities:

“(1) If the clauses of the Syllabus and the Papal infallibility are elevated at the next Council to articles of faith, what changes would be introduced thereby into the teaching on the relation between Church and State, as hitherto treated in Germany practically and theoretically?

“(2) In the supposed case, would the public professors of dogma and of ecclesiastical law consider themselves obliged to establish as binding on the conscience of every Christian the

doctrine of the divinely ordained authority of the Pope over Monarchs and Governments (whether as *potestas directa* or *indirecta in temporalia*)?

“(3) Would the professors of dogma and of ecclesiastical law consider themselves forthwith obliged to adopt in their instruction and their writings, the doctrine that the personal and real immunities of the clergy are *juris divini*, and so come within the range of articles of faith?

“(4) Are there any universally recognised criteria by which it may be decided with certainty if a Papal proclamation *ex cathedra*, and so in accordance with the doctrine eventually to be established by the Council, is infallible and binding on the conscience of every Christian? And if such criteria exist, what are they?

“(5) How far would the desired new dogmas and their inevitable consequences exercise a revolutionary influence on the instruction of the people in Church and school and on the popular educational books (catechisms, &c.)?”

On October 31, 1867, the Government had brought before the Chamber of Deputies the scheme of an Education Bill. The scheme of this Bill, even before the discussion in the Chamber, was the subject of intense agitation among the Ultramontane party, because it established principally the exclusive right of the State to the conduct and inspection of schools, except with regard to religious instruction, and, in place of the pastor as sole local school inspector, appointed a local board of inspection, on which the congregation, the Church, the family, and the educational authorities were equally represented. At the same time the technical control of the instruction was handed over to district school inspectors.

In these measures the Ultramontane party saw the separation of the schools from the Church and their secularisation. An address from the Bavarian episcopate to the King was referred, by a minute in the King's own hand, October 13, 1868, to the Minister of Public Worship “for careful and unbiassed consideration.” The debate in the Chamber of Deputies lasted from February 15 to 23, 1869, and ended in the adoption of the Bill by a majority of 116 to 26 votes. Prince Hohenlohe took no part in the discussion. On February 26 the scheme came before the Upper Chamber, in which the Bishop von Dinkel was Reporter, and the President of the Protestant Upper Synod, von Harless, co-Reporter. Both of them were determined adversaries of the principal motives of the scheme. A letter from Döllinger to the Prince on April 15, 1869, is very significant of the political position. He writes:

Your Highness will not accuse me of presumption if I take the liberty of supplementing my verbal remarks of this morning by a few written observations.

While, as a true servant of my King, I put myself in the position of the Royal Government and consider the present position the division of parties and the impending elections, the following considerations present themselves to me:

It is to the interest of the Government that, before the commencement of the elections, it should promulgate a conciliatory measure that would inspire confidence. Among the majority of the clergy (high and low), and principally in consequence of the Education Bill, the idea is widely spread that the Government, in the attitude it has adopted up to the present time, intends to damage and finally to ruin them. This view is greatly strengthened by the fact that no representative of the secular clergy was called in when the scheme was being discussed. If the Government were now to announce that, in consequence of the great differences of opinion which the proposed law has called into existence between the three factors of the Legislative Assembly, a fresh consideration of the scheme with the co-operation of the parties interested seems to be advisable—that is, on one hand the clergy, on the other the educational body—and that the Government reserves the introduction of the matured Bill before the two Chambers of the new Landtag, this measure would give universal satisfaction, and in particular the majority of the clergy would observe a more calm and prudent attitude than, I fear, would otherwise be the case. Only the other day I heard, from a quarter in which I did not expect it, the wish expressed that the present Ministry might be replaced by another.

If the Bill should actually come under discussion in the Senate, the inevitable consequences are:

(a) That all the passions will again be aroused.

(b) That the Minister, Herr von Gresser, will be caught between the two Chambers, as it were between the upper and the nether mill stone, since he appears to be bound by the opinions that he has already expressed and the approbation that he has given in the Chamber of Representatives. He will probably find himself in opposition to a very great majority of the Upper House without a chance of coming to an understanding.

(c) That the Government will be so unfortunate as to appear embarrassed in a question of the last importance; an appearance that will be avoided by making a voluntary concession and the announcement of a fresh revision.

I leave everything to the judgment of your Excellency, and remain,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,  
DOLLINGER.

At the sitting of the Upper House on April 19, 1869, the full discussion began. On that day Prince Hohenlohe delivered the following speech:

"I must take leave to address the House in this general discussion, because I consider it my duty not to be silent but to express my opinion openly on a question that has awakened the old opposition of parties in such a striking manner.

"There are times and questions when one cannot remain neutral. Such a time is ours, and the subject of discussion is one about which every man who is called on to take an active part in public life is bound to give his opinion. About the necessity of reform in our scholastic system, it appears that opinions are not divided, whilst the views are divergent as to the best ways and means of carrying the reform into effect. As much as twenty years ago an eloquent member of this honourable House, who is still with us, indicated to us the drastic reform of our elementary school system as an indispensable necessity. On that occasion the honourable member said: 'I hope we shall finally get rid of the idea which was rather common in former days, that the prosperity of a State depends upon keeping the lower classes ignorant. Our enlightened Government will foster the conviction that danger may arise for the State, not through the education of the people, but through the opposite — through lack of education; and that the strength of the nation and with that national prosperity reposes principally on the intelligence of the people. Starting with this conviction, the Government will not delay atoning for the sins of the past and submitting our scholastic system to the most thorough revision. By doing this it will remove a principal cause of the increasing poverty.'

"When I say that I agree most heartily with these words, I believe that I shall meet with no opposition from either side of this House. This exhortation was not the only one which was addressed to the Government through the Chamber. I will only remind you of the common decision of both Chambers in 1866, when the proposition of a School Bill on a Liberal basis was asked for.\* The Government acceded to these wishes, and brought in a measure in accordance with the demands. Since then the discussion has begun, first outside the House of Representatives and then in the Chambers. It is one of the advantages of constitutional life that questions which excite public opinion are thrashed out and made clear through the discussions of the constitutional representatives of the people, and that as a result of this tranquillity of mind is re-established. In the present question this was the case, and, if I am not entirely mistaken, the original antipathy to what people were pleased to call the 'Godless Education Bill' has given way to a less prejudiced view. The discussions of your committee also show, as far as the protocol will give information, that there is no passionate excitement among the honourable members, and the speeches of the two honourable Reporters give us a calm and unprejudiced

\* See p. 163

criticism of the scheme under discussion. That much-aired grievance that the Church is threatened in her rights by such an Education Bill as the Government projected is less heard now, at any rate outside the Chamber, for whoever criticises the Bill impartially will gradually arrive at the conviction that the difference between the present circumstances and the proposals of the Government is not so great as was originally believed. In any case, the decisions of the committee and the declarations of the Lord Archbishop von Scherr go far beyond the scheme of the Bill and the existing conditions. These decisions are based partly on the fundamental determination to claim for the Church a preponderant, if not exclusive, influence on the popular schools, a determination that was very clearly expressed in the Brief of his Holiness Pius IX. addressed to the Archbishop of Freiburg (July 14, 1864). At this point two opposite currents meet. For if the Church claims the unrestricted control of popular education, the State, on the other hand, cannot renounce its right to direct the education and training of the people. If we could indeed start from an ideal comprehension of State and Church, we should be forced to the conclusion that it could only be desirable for the State for the greatest possible influence on popular education to be left to the Church — the dispenser of salvation and consolation, the great teacher of the human race. We are not, however, at an ideal standpoint, but on the ground of positive constitutional right, and by this alone can we be guided. This constitutional right is the expression of the idea of the modern State, as it has been evolved from the political life of the nation, and to this the Bavarian people will hold fast. I am well aware that the term 'modern State' will be rejected in certain circles, but I know no other name for the State which is called upon to protect and care for our whole life as civilised beings and which has not compromised the Christian faith, but has advanced its interests, as the members of the higher clergy here present will confirm if I refer them to the tremendous manifestation of Catholic sentiments which have taken place in recent times. The difficulty of harmonious co-operation of both powers, Church and State, lies, I venture to think, in the fact that declarations have lately been made which show hostility towards the State in the party at present in the ascendant in the Church.

"I would remind you of the encyclical *Mirari vos* of Gregory XVI., which calls the legal establishment of liberty of conscience *sententia erronea et absurda*, a *deliramentum* — an erroneous and absurd idea; a piece of madness. I would remind you of the encyclical of December 8, 1864, which reckons religious toleration among the damnable heresies. Finally, I would remind you of that article in the same encyclical which refuses to allow that the Pope could ever be the friend or ally of progress, Liberalism, and with modern civilisation.

"When President von Harless spoke of *revenants* and evoked

these *revenants* from the domain of the rationalism of a hundred years ago, I leave it to your consideration whether the expressions which I have quoted to you do not also belong to the category of *revenants*, and *revenants*, too, of a long-past age, and whether one *revenant* does not call up another.

"I am, however, not at all inclined to submit these manifestations to criticism. I wish to bring them to your notice merely to show that the fact of a divergence between those expressions and modern Liberalism not only exists, but exists side by side with the Bavarian constitutional rights. I have to remind you that the principle of liberty of conscience is proclaimed and guaranteed as a fundamental right of the Bavarian people.

"The Constitution is Liberal; it is the product of modern Liberalism. It recognises expressly that 'advance towards what is better,' according to well-tried experience, shall not be excluded. These are the very words of the Constitution.

"This contradiction, this fundamental divergence of conception, disturbs that harmonious co-operation of State and Church which I ventured to point out before as ideal. Under such circumstances, when the divergences were so pronounced, nothing was left for the Government when it proposed to introduce a School Bill but a compromise, or, as we are accustomed to call it, a *modus vivendi*.

"This proposal has certainly the disadvantages of every compromise, but, as may be seen from what I have already said, a reconciliation of principles was not to be thought of. I am therefore of the opinion that we must at present content ourselves with adopting the scheme of the Bill in accordance with the proposals of the Government. The scheme contains many improvements which will benefit the congregation and the teachers, and I am convinced that it will not injure the Church.

"My lords, in all times there will be found men — yes, and they are the great majority — who in the battle and storm of life fear to suffer shipwreck or who have already suffered it; men who take refuge in the sure haven of the Church in order to find there consolation, help, and redemption. Mankind needs this helpful, consoling, and conciliatory Church at all times, and the fifty-six school inspectors will not succeed in shattering her. Whether mankind also needs a militant and condemning Church the theologians must decide."

The Education Bill was not passed by the Landtag, as an understanding between the two Chambers could not be arrived at.

The replies agreed on by the Powers in April and May, relative to the circular of April 9, were communicated to Döllinger, who transmitted to the Prince the following observations: "How great the probability is that the proclamation of the Papa



infallibility will be considered seriously by the Council the following will prove :

“(1) The scheme has already been actively prosecuted for a long time. Rome, for about seven or eight years, when provincial and diocesan Synods have been held, has emphatically urged, and has also managed to secure, that the article on the Papal infallibility should be adopted in the resolutions or acts of these Synods.

“(2) The two German Bishops, who have hitherto published their own writings about the Council, Ketteler of Mayence\* and Fessler of St. Pölten,† both declared themselves in favour of the dogma being made afresh. Fessler has already been appointed Secretary to the Council by the Pope, as though by way of reward.

“(3) The fact that the Jesuits announce simultaneously in Rome and in Germany in the *Civiltà* and in the *Laacher Stimmen* that the Council will make the new dogma, is very important, in view of the power and the organisation of the Order, and its wide knowledge of the world.

“(4) Those who know the Bishops in the Latin countries know that the great majority of them in Italy, Spain, and even in France, adhere to the theory of the infallibility. This is imparted to them even in the seminaries as a fundamental article. Even the North American Bishops have already allowed themselves to be caught by means of a paragraph inserted in their Synodical decrees. Among the Italians, one hundred and thirty of whom may be at the Council, every one will presumably vote for it. Of the far-reaching import of the matter these Bishops — I mean the Italian, Spanish, and a great proportion of the French — have no conception.

“Consequences of the new dogma of the infallibility of the Pope :

“(a) The Syllabus of 1864 will be *eo ipso* an act of faith invested with infallible authority.

“(b) The Pope is to determine by his own sovereign authority the boundary lines between Church and State. In subjects of various kinds the judgment of the Pope, which has become infallible, is alone decisive, and no successor can ever deviate from it.

“(c) Paul IV.'s Bull, which orders every heterodox Prince to be deposed, &c., becomes dogma. (The Bull is called *Cum ex apostolatus officio*.)

“(d) The same with regard to the Bull *Unam sanctam*.

“(e) As the Pope has declared the immunity of the clergy, which is now accepted everywhere as divinely ordered (*Juris divini*), this becomes dogma.

\* Ketteler, *Das allgemeine Konzil und seine Bedeutung für unsre Zeit*, 1869.

† Fessler, *Das letzte und das nächste allgemeine Konzil*, 1869. Fessler was appointed First Secretary to the Council, March 27, 1869.

“(f) In consequence of this every Bishop, and even every clergyman, will be entirely free from secular jurisdiction, or this may be allowed as in the Austrian Concordat for a certain time as a temporary need of the Pope, and the clergy and church property can only be taxed by permission of the Pope, &c.

“(g) It would be the duty of Catholics to give the preference to a Catholic monarch instead of to one who, although a direct heir, is of another religious belief. These consequences might in our days soon become very practical.

“Even this does not exhaust the probable and sure consequences.”

The attitude of the Austrian Government was decisive as regards the failure of the policy opened out by the circular telegram of April 9. It has been thought well to place here the answer of the Austrian Chancellor, which has already been published several times.

COUNT BEUST *to the Austrian Minister,*  
COUNT INGELHEIM, *at Munich.*

VIENNA, May 15, 1869.\*

The Bavarian Minister, Count von Bray, has communicated to me a despatch which has been addressed to him by his Government, in order that the question may be brought up here as to the attitude to be adopted by the European Governments with regard to the Œcumenical Council convoked in Rome. Count Bray has left this despatch in my hands, and I forward herewith to your Excellency a copy of the same for your personal information.

With reference to the information that the Royal Bavarian Government has received about the preparations for the impending Church Council, and the conjectured intentions of the Roman Court, it addresses to us — as doubtless to other Cabinets — the question whether, for the protection of modern State principles, preventive measures should not be taken into consideration; such measures, for instance, as warnings to the Bishops of the different countries or a protest at Rome; and whether it does not seem to be indicated that an understanding should be arrived at, if not jointly, at any rate as far as possible identically, by means of general deliberations — perhaps, even, by means of a conference of the representatives of all the Governments interested.

I have given my most careful attention to these communications, as the great importance of their subject demands, and I have considered myself obliged, before replying to the comprehensive questions set before me by Prince Hohenlohe, to consult, confidentially, the Imperial and Royal Austrian Ministry and the Royal Hungarian Government.

\* The despatch is also printed and defended in the *Memoirs of Count Beust: Aus drei Vierteljahrhunderten*, vol. ii. p. 278.

In complete understanding with the Ministers of both divisions of the Empire, and with the supreme authorisation of his Majesty the Emperor and King, I have now the honour, through the gracious medium of your Excellency, to impart the following observations to the Munich Cabinet, in reply to the questions addressed to me.

A Government which, like the Austro-Hungarian, has elevated to a leading principle the liberty of the various religious creeds within the freely constituted civic society, would not, in our opinion, be accepting the full consequences of its principles were it to oppose a system of preventive and restrictive measures to a precedent which is so deeply grounded in the constitution of the Catholic Church as the convocation of a General Council.

As far as we know at present, none of those Powers with whom the principle of the independence of the Church is most completely accepted, and within whose territories it is most deeply imprinted on the general conscience, have displayed any anxiety about the possible decisions of the future Council, or have occupied themselves, as yet, with the consideration of defensive measures.

If it be accepted as a universal rule that the fullest freedom must be left to recognised religious communities in the development of their inner life, as far as these do not come into conflict with the temporal standpoint, then the Imperial and Royal Government, in the present position of matters, can see no sufficient motive either of right or of advantage for following up now the very weighty suggestions of the Bavarian Government.

As to the course of the Council, only conjectures that are more or less probable can for the moment be formulated. There are no other official indications yet to hand of the programme of the matters to be submitted to discussion than the general notifications of the Papal Bull convoking the Council. No one would wish to turn the field of purely dogmatic questions into a battle-ground. But as to the interests of the State Church and those matters which touch on civic rights, no less than on doctrine, it is difficult at present to judge whether it is an imminent danger that the divergences which have already manifested themselves in this part of the question are likely to be rendered more acute by the discussions and decisions of the Council, and elevated into a still greater danger for the tranquillity of the States. We can neither affirm nor deny the imminence of such a danger. Yet, taking everything into consideration, it is scarcely to be supposed that the bishops of the Catholic world, who for the most part have to live and work in countries which possess a completely secularised code of law, will not take with them to Rome an accurate acquaintance with the practical necessities of our age. And if the expectation is justified that, for the maintenance of peace between Church and

## MEMOIRS OF PRINCE HOHENLOHE

any "system of preventive or restrictive measures." Whoever has read Prince Hohenlohe's despatch will hear with surprise that it embraces a system of preventive restrictive measures. There is no trace of such a proposal to be found in it. The Bavarian Minister asks what attitude the Governments purpose to adopt towards the Council, and proposes certain ways for securing an understanding between the Governments with the object of leaving the Roman Court in no doubt as to their views. The aim of the Bavarian Government, therefore, was no other than to urge the Governments to consider seriously their attitude towards the Council. Count Beust would certainly have been justified in doubting the seasonableness and the right of "restrictive measures" as he did in the consecutive paragraphs. As there is no question of this, his objection is as visionary as the intention attributed to the Bavarian Government of an arbitrary restrictive measure.

Count Beust further insists that only conjectures can be formed as to the course that the Council will adopt; although he must certainly have been informed by his Minister that the official organ of the Holy See and all influential personalities in Rome have made no secret of the aims of the Council. For undoubtedly the Austrian Ambassador must know as well as every one in Rome that the infallibility of the Pope is to be elevated into a dogma, and the intention is to transform the clauses of the Syllabus into resolutions of the Council. Count Beust must know, as every one in Munich knows, that the tendency of a predominant party in the Church is directed to keeping the relations between Church and State so strained that nothing is left for the State but submission or complete separation. When, notwithstanding this, Count Beust will not believe what is the fact, when he expresses the hope that, in case the assembled Council should propose to intrude on the lawful sphere of the State, there would still be time to take defensive or admonitory steps, the Austrian statesman overlooks the fact that the Council would not dare to "propose" to intrude. It would at once act and overstep the bounds, and there would be nothing left to the Governments but to protest. When Count Beust resigns himself to the hope that the Bishops would bring with them to Rome an exact knowledge of the practical needs of our age and that in the cause of the maintenance of peace between State and Church orators would not be wanting among the prelates of the Council, the Count rejoices in an enviable optimism, which stands out all the more vividly when we set it against the trial which has just been concluded before the Linz jury.\* We believe that we are not mistaken when we maintain that not one of the Austrian Bishops will attempt to oppose

\* Bishop Rudigier of Linz was condemned by the court to twelve days' imprisonment for attempting to disturb the public peace by his pastoral letter of September 12, 1868, in which he criticised the new constitution. He was pardoned the following day.

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the proclamation of the dogma of infallibility. In this dogma lies the future of Ultramontanism, in it lies the kernel of the absolutist organisation of the hierarchy. It is the crowning of the work for which the Ultramontane party has been striving for years, and no Bishop will dare to move a step in opposition to this aim. The hierarchy will come out of the Council stronger and more powerful, and begin the battle against modern civilisation with renewed strength. Whether the "freely constituted" Austria, in addition to its other difficulties, needs a deepening of the rift between State authority and Church authority the talented statesman of the Danube may decide for himself. Deplorable it must ever be that the warning voice of Prince Hohenlohe in Vienna should have been unheeded. We will not try to discover whether, as a Swiss paper maintains, the wish to increase the difficulties of the internal situation of Bavaria is the reason why the Austrian statesman did not confine himself to answering the despatch, but commissioned the Austrian Legation to counteract, as far as possible, the efforts of Prince Hohenlohe, particularly at the German Courts. We will not try to discover whether, in spite of fine-sounding phrases, the old traditional policy does not even to-day, in the Vienna Chancery of State, find it to its interest to go hand in hand with the Society of Jesus, so that it may employ it and turn it to account as usual at a propitious time in its foreign policy, either against Russia in Poland, or against Prussia in Westphalia and on the Rhine, or wherever else it may be required. It is sufficient for us for the present to have pointed out that Count Beust's despatch is, unfortunately, concerned with appearances, and passes over in silence the particular motives that prevent the Austrian Government from adopting a definite attitude towards the Council. Observant politicians will find matter for reflection in this.

*Döllinger's observations on the answers of the Powers submitted to him.*

The Italian Minister, Signor Artom, appears to look at the circumstance rather as a man of the world than as a statesman. When he holds that the Governments could escape the serious consequences of the resolutions of the Council by simply ignoring them, he overlooks the fact that when certain clauses are proclaimed by the Council as doctrines of faith (or *juris divini*, to employ the ecclesiastical term) the clergy communicate them as such to the people, and represent them as belonging from henceforth to the domain of religion and as unconditionally binding on every Christian. No Government in the world can prevent this, nor avert the consequences which will follow. In such a *jait accompli* there is no possibility of change. The Minister's reference to the Council of Trent, whose resolutions were not adopted by some States, proceeds from an entirely

erroneous premise. The *dogmatic* decrees of this Council have been received in all Catholic countries without the slightest opposition, or rather they had no need to be accepted, they were authoritative of themselves from the first. The disciplinary decrees only (such, for instance, as the immunities of the clergy, or the punishment of a duel and similar things) were rejected by a few States, by France among the number. But now in this Council new doctrines of faith, of a character calculated to arouse the greatest anxiety with regard to ecclesiastical policy, will be laid down. If this actually comes to pass, it would be perfectly futile for the Governments to follow with the announcement, "We do not accept them." They would be answered smilingly, "Your peoples, instructed by their priests, believe them already without consulting you." If the infallibility of the Pope, for instance, is elevated into a dogma, then the celebrated Bull *Unam sanctam* is, *eo ipso, regula fidei*, an inviolable charter of faith for the whole Catholic world, and therewith the complete authority of the Pope over all monarchs and governments, even in things temporal and in politics, is stamped, once for all, as a divinely communicated dogma, which must consequently be taught henceforth in the Catechism, in the confessional, and in every pulpit and chair. The Roman Jesuits in the *Civiltà* have already a few days ago (in their *brochure* of April 3, p. 21) accepted these consequences fully and with all frankness. This, therefore, is the object which they are deliberately pursuing at Rome.

According to the view of Herr von Beust it is to be feared that timely action on the part of the Governments might encourage the Ultramontane party rather than otherwise and determine them in Rome to take decided steps on the path which they have entered.

Against this it is to be remembered that the Roman Curia has for centuries allowed itself to be guided in an extraordinary degree by the motive of fear, and that it is accustomed to draw back, or to stop at once, when it encounters an energetic opposition. Much more would this be so if it had to face the combined opposition of several Powers. To this may be added that, according to a consensus of information, a moderate or anti-Jesuitical party exists in Rome and includes several cardinals. This party would be encouraged and strengthened by the eventual declarations or steps of the Governments, and would feel itself in a position to oppose with success the hitherto absolutely preponderating influence of the opposition party that is striving for the new dogma.

*Circular to the Royal Legations, May 29, 1869.\**

Now that the results of the last elections are to hand and the composition of the future Chamber † is accurately known, we see

\* Published in October 1869 by the *Donauzeitung*, 'AA-Z, 17/10/1869, No. 290.

† The election had taken place on May 20.

that in the same there will be one member of the Popular party, fifty-six members of the Progressive party, twenty members of the Centre, therefore seventy-seven Liberals and seventy-seven of the candidates put forward by the Clerical party.

This result could not come as a surprise on the Government, for it is a matter of common experience in political life that in times of excitement and when the strife of parties is stirred to passion, extreme opinions always meet with a certain apparent success, and those parties which would proceed with tranquillity and prudence remain for a time in the minority in the strife of elections.

Considering the great excitement, especially of the Clerical party, and considering the formidable weapons of agitation, of which this party disposes, the triumph of this party was always a possibility, and had been in fact expected by many. The Government can therefore declare itself all the more satisfied that, in spite of all their efforts, its adversaries have not succeeded in gaining the majority in the Chamber, and that even the present result could only be arrived at by the fact that the anti-Liberal tendency, whose success was the real object which this party had at heart, was masked by its pretended anxiety for the independence of the Crown and the country, and by the adroitly employed repugnance of the majority of the people to subservience to a Prussian supremacy. But the clearly pronounced sentiment of the majority of the people, their disinclination to enter into the North German Confederation, the Government can regard as an approbation of the policy that it has hitherto followed; though this approbation indeed did not come within the scheme of the Opposition leaders. For it was just this principle that had hitherto guided the exterior policy of Bavaria, and the Ministry would have had neither cause nor inclination to abandon it. On the other hand, the most extreme Clerical party has not ventured to come forward with a programme which would have involved the rupture of the treaties of alliance, the support of a foreign Power or even an international policy. The most openly declared enemies of the Ministry have considered it necessary rather to emphasize the fact that they too are zealous for a national confederation with our North German kinsmen. Further, it has been proved that, at any rate in the towns and in a great part of the country, the clerical tendency has generally no foundation.

Under these circumstances the course of the present Ministry is clear. So long as his Majesty the King continues to give it his gracious confidence, it has no reason to resign office, and far less still to adopt a different policy from that hitherto pursued in domestic and foreign affairs. As regards more especially legislation on domestic needs, a further advance on the path of reform is certainly not for the moment practicable in view of the probable instability of the majority; but this is



by no means necessary. For it will serve the best interests of the country if the numerous and comprehensive new laws have time to be gradually adopted in social life, if there is a pause in the recent legislative activity, and if we await the consolidation of our successes before proceeding to further innovations. The power of the Clerical party in the Chamber is not so great that the results hitherto attained can be swept away again, and that a spirit of reaction against the efforts of the last years should seize upon the legislative power; not to reckon the fact that there are already signs that a division will immediately declare itself among the seventy-seven Clerical representatives, for in the party a great number of right-minded, tranquil, and patriotic men are to be counted, who are in no way inclined to associate themselves with the purposes of the extreme party leaders.

The foreign policy of the Government has, as I have already indicated above, gained the substantial approbation of the country, and the Ministry therefore will, as hitherto, continue to endeavour to preserve the independence of the Crown in the fullest degree, without thereby losing sight of the task that the peace treaties of 1866 proclaimed with regard to the future development of Germany, the task of closing up again the division between North and South Germany by a national bond which would ensure the power and prestige of the Fatherland against foreign aggression without prejudicing the equal rights of the various States and their Princes.

I request you to express yourself in this sense to the Government to which you are accredited, and I avail myself of this opportunity, &c.

*Journal.*

BERLIN, *June 3, 1869.*

Left Munich yesterday evening at six o'clock. Found Arco-Valley and his family at the station. Arco travelled with me, and this was disagreeable in so far as he entered into conversation, which I find very uncomfortable on the railway; I very soon lay back in my corner and went to sleep; at four o'clock in the morning we arrived at Hof, where he woke me up to take coffee. There I met a number of deputies — Franckenstein, Zu Rhein, and others; and also several advanced Liberals. Arco-Valley was delayed in Altenburg and had to stay behind.

In Berlin I found Viktor, Perglas, and the staff of the Legation. I drove with Viktor to the hotel, dressed quickly, and then drove at two o'clock to the opening of the Tariff Parliament, which took place quite informally in the White Hall through Delbrück. We were in evening-dress and there was a sitting afterwards at which only formalities were settled.

*June 4, 1869.*

Yesterday at the first sitting I was greeted by many old acquaintances; among others was Benda, so celebrated for his

speech on finance at the Reichstag. He was with me twenty-five years ago in the Department at Potsdam. He has changed so much since that time that I should not have known him again. He was then a handsome young man with black locks, and he is now an old Professor with grey hair and no teeth. Others are not at all changed. It is my experience that men with passionate dispositions are those who become old the soonest, whilst calm natures use up their outer envelope the least and are therefore well preserved.

I have just come away from the sitting, at which I was again elected First Vice-President. I was uncertain up to the last moment whether I would shorten my reply by a few words or whether I would say rather more. I showed Viktor the speech, as I had written it and as I really made it, and he advised me by all means to make it as it was, for it would make the best impression on the assembly, and it would be all the same to me in the end what the Ultramontane party, with whom I was quite at feud as it was, should say to it. What Viktor had prophesied came to pass. My speech was received enthusiastically, and it has strengthened my position. Many people came to shake hands with me afterwards. In the condition of things as they are gradually evolving themselves, it is necessary always to say clearly what one thinks, and never to lay one's self open to the reproach that one has not the courage of one's convictions. Simson was again elected President, and Hugo second Vice-President.

### *Speech.*

By electing me for the second time to be your Vice-President you confer on me an honour for which I am bound to express to you my hearty thanks. This honour is so much the greater as in past years I had no opportunity of giving you any proofs of my capability for the office entrusted to me. As in spite of this you are giving me your votes to-day, I feel that I am justified in looking for the motive of your confidence in the criticism of my work outside the circle of this assembly. If this be so your voting for me has a deeper political significance. The vote of this assembly gives me courage to persevere in the way which I hold to be the right one, to persevere in endeavouring to foster and strengthen the reconciling, the understanding, and harmony of the German races.

In this spirit I accept the office conferred on me, and shall only ask you not to withdraw from me your kindly indulgence if I should be called upon to conduct the transactions of this honourable House.

BERLIN, *June 7, 1869.*

Yesterday I was invited to Potsdam to dinner. I drove at 2.45 to the station, where I found Hugo and Stillfried and got into the train with them. At Neuendorf (in my time it was Nowawes)

we found the Royal carriage which took us to Babelsberg. I had not been there for twenty-four years. The Castle has become very beautiful and the park more beautiful still. What in my time was a miserable plantation is now a beautiful English park with big trees. Everything is kept magnificently. At dinner there were the King, the Crown Prince and Princess, the Prince of Hesse, with Princess Alice and all the others. The King was as amiable as ever, he asked after the King of Bavaria and Prince Otto, but did not otherwise engage in political conversation. The Crown Princess spoke much more, asked when the King was coming and embarked on a discussion of German politics. Princess Alice reminded me of Osborne. They were all generally very pleasant to me and said very flattering things about my speech. I sat next to Prince George, with whom I talked a great deal about Wagner. After dinner a crowd of little Princes and Princesses came in, who surrounded the old King and kissed his hand. This looked quite pretty and patriarchal. At six o'clock I was back again, and then went to Perglas, with whom I was to have dined, and greeted the great people invited, who were "settling down" to their cigars in the *salon*. In the evening I walked to Kroll, where I found the South German group, Schrenck, Franckenstein, Aretin, &c., with whom I strolled home in a friendly way.

This morning was the Tariff Parliament. I had induced the National Liberal party to drop the question about the Bavarian law as to elections to the Tariff Parliament, which had given rise to disagreeable debates the previous year, which would begin again, and I had promised them to make a conciliatory speech. I did so; the speech was received with cheers, and we came out of the whole business without discussion. Then dinner at the American Minister's at six o'clock. I sat next to his wife, an old American lady, very elegant, and I spoke horrible English to her. She raves about Erckmann-Chatrian, and recommends their books to all "young ladies." After we had drunk the most various wines, Mr. Bancroft proposed the toast of the King of Bavaria. I answered that I would report this toast to the King, who had a great sympathy for the Americans, and that the words of that toast had all the more value coming from so distinguished a man as Mr. Bancroft. I spoke further of the brotherhood of the nations, and of the hope which inspired all well-minded people that the nations would attain this goal, and then, with a not too happy transition, I drank to the health of the man who shared this hope, namely, to Mr. Bancroft. The speech was not well rounded off, but it was passable.

BERLIN, *June 8, 1869.*

This morning Perglas was with me a long time, talking with me about the liquidation business. While he was there, a

Herr Sterkow, or whatever he is called, who under the symbol (—) writes the correspondence articles in the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, called. A well-informed man, but a type of the journalistic light horseman. Then I paid visits. First to Prince August of Würtemberg, who showed me his hall, richly decorated with objects of the chase, then to different princes, where I inscribed my name, and last to Moltke, with whom I had a long talk about the war, a conversation which I shall write down separately. He is a remarkable, clear-headed, decided man. At four o'clock there was a great Court dinner in honour of the Khedive of Egypt. We drove, Viktor and I together, in the State carriage. At the Palace everybody was assembled, with the exception of the King. The Khedive came somewhat before the King. He is a small man with a beard, and in spite of his gold-embroidered uniform and the Black Eagle, he reminded me of the proprietor of a French *café*. At table I sat next to Boguslaw Radziwill and Viktor. The former spoke enthusiastically of his different children, who are in the ecclesiastical profession. One daughter is a nun, and two sons are priests. It was touching, for he told me that he was so unwilling to let his daughter, who has become a real friend for him, go into the cloister, but that she is now very happy. She is a Sister of Mercy. After dinner I had a long conversation with Princess Karl, then with Princess Alice, who is very cheerful and amiable, finally, with the Crown Princess, for whom I have a quite special *tendre*, and then I had myself presented to the Khedive, who was happy to be able to speak with me about Egypt. He speaks very good French. All the lions of Berlin were present. I met Bluntschli, too, with whom I spoke of the Jesuits, the Council, and the Protestant Diet.

But now I am quite giddy with it all, more especially as they had the gruesome idea of having a military brass band playing during dinner, the effect of which was simply deafening.

*Conversation with GENERAL VON MOLTKE, June 8, 1869.*

During a visit I paid to General von Moltke the conversation turned on the conditions in South Germany. Moltke did not misconstrue what we had done, but he observed that in a foreign war we might possibly adopt the policy of arriving too late. We should not be armed, and should follow this policy without being guilty of a breach of treaty. I answered that we needed a great deal of money for the effective equipment of the Army. This, however, would depend on the Chambers. These were divided into Ultramontanes and Liberals. The latter generally were not willing to vote supplies for the Army. The former would vote more liberal supplies if they did not entertain the fear that the war would end finally with the loss of the independence of the country. If this party had the

certainly that the war did not involve as a result the loss of independence, they would be more prepared to vote the supplies. Such a security could only be offered us by a legally established federation between the Southern States. Moltke answered, without entering into the last point, that the apprehension was entirely groundless. (This was exhaustively explained to me by the General of the Artillery, Prince Hohenlohe.)

Coming to the war itself he said: France would begin no war if Austria did not go with her; the French were not so foolish. They knew too well that they were not up to the level of Prussia if they attacked alone. But Austria was not armed. If the war with France *and* Austria broke out, the Prussians would make no mistake in their plan of campaign. They would turn all their striking force on France, and the Austrians might meanwhile do what they pleased, even if they marched on Berlin.

As regarded Ulm, said Moltke, it was an Austrian fortress and had little value. But it could not be given up.

With reference to the Liquidation Commission he only mentioned that Prussia wished for nothing more than the assurance that the cannons which belonged jointly to Prussia should be so placed that they could not be taken away at once.

BERLIN, *June 10, 1869.*

Yesterday there was a short sitting of the Customs Parliament. Göler proposed to make a nationalist speech on a clause of the treaty with Japan. I explained to him the reasons against this course, and he swallowed his fine speech and was silent. An instance of rare self-control.

In the afternoon we travelled to Potsdam, where we were invited to the theatre in "undress" uniform. We arrived at six o'clock, and went on foot from the Wildpark Station to the New Palace, where we were given a room till the play began. However we spent the greater part of the time on the terrace, although the weather was not very fine. At seven o'clock the piece began. The theatre in the New Palace is new and pretty. The great personages sat in front on chairs. In the middle, the Crown Princess with Princess Alice of Hesse. On the left the Khedive, on the right the King of Prussia, then the other Princes. Behind the Crown Princess sat the Princess Charlotte and the Princess of Hesse, two little girls of six or seven years old, and between them they had the son of the Khedive. The two girls were very intimate with their playfellow with his red tarboosh and his impassive Turkish face. The little Princess of Hesse arranged the silken tassel on his tarboosh for him, and when the representation was over and she went away, she gave him a kiss, at which he was very much astonished. She asked him, too, where his mamma

was, but he could give her no information on this point. The Crown Princess told us this afterwards. The representation consisted of a French comedy, *Les souliers de bal*, and a horribly stupid ballet with the very un-French title of *La fête du jour de naissance*. Among other things a *pas styrien* was given. Two dancers in short black bathing-drawers, pink jerseys and white socks, which came just over the ankles, danced with two ladies in red stockings. The customary thumb-play with the braces was not wanting. To this a chorus of adventurous Styrians, in green hats and red waistcoats, sang the well-known so-called jodelling song, *Wenn ich nun von der Alpe weckaget*, &c., an out-and-out Berlin *Holdrio*. Viktor and I and Fritz, who sat together, were very much amused at it.

After the theatre was a supper, at which I sat between General Loë and Aristarchi Bey. Then came a reception, and at ten o'clock we were free to take the special train back to Berlin. Bismarck invited me to travel with him, and used the opportunity to talk business with me.

*June 12, 1869.*

Yesterday Simson handed over to me the Presidency of the Customs Parliament for the discussion of the New Customs Bill. I brought the 166 paragraphs through in three hours. Fortunately there was no dispute or unpleasantness. The orators all spoke to the point, and no one made a scene. My first attempt, therefore, went off well, and I am now sufficiently accustomed to it to be able to preside at less tranquil sittings. Simson was very unwell, and if he is not better by Monday, he must be seriously ill. In that case I shall have the Presidency for the rest of the session, but I hope not. At five o'clock there was a dinner given by Scheidt, Privy Councillor of the Chamber of Commerce, at the Hotel Royal. A long and noisy entertainment with much wine.

In the evening to get some exercise I played skittles at the Union Club till half-past twelve.

*Conversation with BISMARCK, June 12, 1869.*

After a dinner at Bismarck's, he invited me and Varnbüler to go with him into the garden. Bismarck turned the conversation at once on to the Council, which appears to interest him extraordinarily. He then passed to general remarks, and expressed his agreement with my views. Varnbüler, on the other hand, defended his standpoint, which is, that the extravagances contemplated at Rome are to be looked on as a nail in the coffin of the Ultramontane aims. I defended the contrary view that such a hope proves itself deceptive, and that the decisions of the Council would not only damage the Catholic Church, but would bring the State into danger.

But after Varnbüler had declared himself ready to modify his view so far as not to dissociate himself from common measures, Bismarck went on to propose that the German States should take joint and secret steps at Rome to deprecate too sweeping measures.\*

He should consider the matter in this way, said Count Bismarck. Bavaria should make the proposal in point to the German Governments, then the Prussian and the other Governments would notify each other accordingly, and then notes could serve as credentials for the plenipotentiary whom Bavaria must send to Rome in the character of a traveller of distinction. The plenipotentiary in question must have no official status, but must travel to Rome for his pleasure; when there, however, he must leave no doubt of his quality of official plenipotentiary. Who this person should be, must certainly be again considered. We went through various people, but could at the moment find no one, and determined that the question of the person of the envoy must be still left *in suspenso*.

Next day Privy Councillor Abeken, Reporter for the business of the Council in the Foreign Ministry, came to me, and we agreed on the measures embodied in the adjoined memorandum.

#### *Memorandum.*

BERLIN, June 14, 1869.

On June 13, by direction of the Minister, I called upon the Royal Bavarian Minister of State and of Foreign Affairs, his Highness Prince Hohenlohe, who is at present here. I was to lay before him, together with other documents relative to the impending Œcumenical Council, the despatches sent to the Prussian Minister at Munich on the 28th ultimo. His Highness declared that he was in complete agreement with the matter of these despatches, and he added that he agreed equally with the verbal proposal of Count Bismarck relative to the nature of the step to be taken in Rome, namely, that the confidential representations and admonitions should be made by the medium of an envoy to be sent to Rome on a confidential mission by the Bavarian Government. This envoy would be entitled to speak not only in the name of Bavaria, but of all the German Governments, whose participation in this measure was to be established by special docu-

\* Bismarck, in his despatch of May 26, 1869, to Arnim, rejecting the latter's proposal for the sending of an orator to the Council, had written to the Minister: "His Majesty the King has empowered me to enter into confidential negotiations with the Royal Bavarian Government, and eventually with the other South German Governments, and as far as possible in the name of all Germany, to bring joint pressure to bear on the Curia, which will give the Curia the certainty that in the excesses it seems to be contemplating it will meet with the most decided opposition from the German Governments." — Friedrich, *History of the Vatican Council*, vol. i. p. 785.

ments which would, at the same time, serve the envoy as the credentials of his general mission.

The Royal Bavarian Minister declared his intention of addressing to the Governments of Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, without further delay, the proposal for such a mission and for an understanding about the language that was to be employed at Rome, and on this latter point his Highness gave his assent to the principles indicated in our despatch of May 28. The personage to be selected for the mission he must leave for the moment *in suspenso*. Of the ensuing communications to the above-mentioned Courts, the Prince promised to send information here, in order that the proposal might be seconded from the side of Prussia. The question whether Saxony was to be approached from the side of Bavaria or of Prussia might be reserved for further consideration.

In the course of the conversation his Excellency Prince Hohenlohe proved himself not averse to the idea mooted on the Prussian side, that, concurrently with the action to be taken at Rome, an instruction of the German Governments, and this also of perfectly concordant tenor, should be addressed to the bishops before their departure for the Council simultaneously with the leave of absence to be granted them for the purpose. This instruction would explain the attitude which the Government was adopting towards the Council, and would warn them against supporting resolutions which encroached on State rights. In this matter the Royal Bavarian Minister was willing to await further communications, but the next steps to be taken at Rome were not to be delayed on that account.

When I made my verbal report of this conversation to the President of the Ministry, Count Bismarck, on the 12th, before his departure, he expressed himself in full accord with that conduct of the matter that the President of the Royal Bavarian Ministry intended to adopt.

ABEKEN.

*Journal.*

BERLIN, June 19, 1869.

In yesterday's sitting of the Customs Parliament Metz's proposal came under discussion, the aim of which was to request the Customs Federal Council to take measures to avoid the falling on the same days of the meetings of the various Landtags and of the Customs Parliament. Now Metz is a shameless, common bawler, and the tone of his proposal had long annoyed me. But I thought a modification would come from some side or other, and did not disturb myself about it. When, however, I came to the sitting, I heard, to my astonishment, that even the South German group meant to raise no objection. But I knew too well that Metz would give his proposal such a signifi-



cation that it would be absolutely impossible for me to accept it. As the proposal was in itself a suitable one, I made a modification of it during the sitting, and showed it to Schrenck, Varnbüler and Simson. All thought my idea in better taste. But Varnbüler, who is inspired by the greatest envy of my position in the Parliament, advised me not to bring forward the modification; it was not necessary, Delbrück would say something, &c. This was only because he knew that I should score another Parliamentary success. As I know our dear, pleasant countrymen I kept silence, but I was all the more determined to bring forward my proposal. The discussion came on. The Reporter represented the proposal in a very harmless light. A Hessian spoke against it, and it was proposed to close the discussion at once, so that Metz alone would have spoken on it. So I begged leave to speak, and explained my proposal in a few words. Metz spoke next, just as I had foreseen, with an onslaught on the South German particularism, in his usual insulting costermongerish tone. As I had said that his proposal hurt my æsthetic and diplomatic sensibilities by its form, he gave me a little knock, but praised my "national sentiment," declared himself in accord with my modification, and withdrew his motion. So my motion was adopted almost unanimously. Nearly all the Ultramontanes voted with me. I have thus made the ground in Munich smooth again for my return without having prejudiced myself here. As regards my speech, I had made the mistake of noting it down beforehand, so it was bad, as I saw afterwards from the shorthand reports. Its result remained, however.

After the sitting I drove in the Friederichshain, which I had never seen, for it lies at the end of Königstrasse, a beautiful English park.

In the evening I went with Karl and Kraft to the Wallner-theater to see *Heydemann and Son*. An extraordinarily amusing piece. The Wallnertheater is the only one I visit. I once saw the ballet *Fantaska*. It is the maddest thing, the most abandoned nonsense that has ever been put on any stage. The mounting is superb, and it is a pity that so much money has been squandered on such a nonsensical piece of workmanship. When you see how such things are admired, the melancholy feeling creeps over you that mankind is degenerating.

### *Conversation with* COUNT BISMARCK.

BERLIN, June 23, 1869.

The Prussian Minister spoke first of the close of Parliament and its results, and of the position of parties. He expressed himself as very well contented that something at least had been settled. As regards the political discussions, he had called the attention of the party leaders to the fact that in face of the feeling

in South Germany it was quite futile to touch on questions by which a South German minority would gain the victory over a South German majority only by the help of the North Germans.

Diverging from that point, he approached the question of the Liquidation Commission, expressed his concurrence with the Munich decisions, and added that he had laid the proposal before the King of Prussia to be pleased to accept these agreements; he had only one desire, which had been suggested to him by the Ministry of War, and was as follows: that Members of the sub-Commission, Bavarians and Prussians (or others as well), should travel to Landau to consult there as to whether it would not be more advisable to bring the movable material to Gernersheim, and give up Landau altogether. He asked me to moot the matter in Munich. Returning to the German question, Count Bismarck entered into a long exposition of the reasons why Prussia had not the least intention of prejudicing in any way the independence of Bavaria or the other South German States. Baden, he said, had no value for Prussia, and the advances of Baden could not be considered by Prussia. Politically speaking, Baden had officers, but no soldiers. There was nothing to be made of that.

Development in Germany would advance very slowly, and the Prussians had still too much to do in the North German Confederation to enter into the question of admitting heterogeneous elements into it, or of forming with them a confederation that would only disturb the crystallizing process of the North German Confederation.

At this I remarked that in the present position of Germany there lay a great danger for the North as well as the South. So long as peace lasted this was of no account, but, if war broke out, people in South Germany would ask, why are we making war? If we conquer, we shall afterwards enter the North German Confederation; if we are conquered, we are lost. To do away with such reflections, to bring the South to an unreserved and cheerful co-operation, it was necessary to give it the guarantee of independence after the war, and to bring this about by a further confederation between North and South on the analogy of the old German Confederation. So I asked Count Bismarck if he looked on this connection, too, as one which would disturb the development and improvement of the North German Confederation. He answered with warmth that he could not have expressed himself clearly, that this thought was far from him; that he would thankfully accept every tie which we offered him. But those fears were ungrounded; in the first place, after the war, if it had carried this through with the aid of South Germany, Prussia would not be so base as to impose on its confederates conditions which they could not accept; and secondly, the war would in any case be successful for Prussia, because France was not up to the level of Prussia. He worked this out

in great detail by a calculation of the Prussian troops, and their comparison with the French troops. Further, he pointed to the alliance with Russia, refuted my objections based on an anti-Prussian feeling in Russia by showing that this was only a Press manoeuvre of the Hietzing intriguers, who through the medium of the Grand Duke Constantine had had the same articles printed simultaneously in the *Moscow Times*, the *Observer* and the *Sächsische Zeitung*.

He did not in the least believe in the possibility of a breach of the treaty on the side of the South German States. This, too, would be much too dangerous for Bavaria, because, in spite of her German sentiment and her good will, in case of the breach of the alliance treaties a current of opinion might set in which would lead to the partition of Bavaria between North Germany and Austria. He would be against this, but in such a case he could not prevent it. The alliance of France with Italy had no value for the former; the Italians would not march, even if Victor Emmanuel, who with money and women could be made to do anything, were willing to make a treaty with France.

He then spoke of the French diplomacy, expressed his disdain of Grammont and Moustier, his appreciation of Benedetti. Then he passed to reminiscences of 1866. Here he related that the real reason why he had hastened to conclude the peace in Nikolsburg had lain in the Hungarian question. They would never have thought of letting loose the Hungarian revolution if France had not interfered. At the moment of the French interference they had been forced to fear war with France, and so he had then let loose Klapka. But now out of this arose the danger of seeing this movement extend and grow, and this would have led to European entanglements, and would have particularly disturbed Russia. The fear of seeing the war take such great dimensions, the consideration of the dangers to which the Prussian Army would be exposed through cholera and fever, had determined him to press resolutely for peace in Nikolsburg, even with the offer of his own resignation.

"People always suppose," said he, "that I swam along in triumph, but I can assure you that I have never passed a more terrible time. Everybody at headquarters looked on me as a traitor, and when I stood at a high window of the castle I often thought, 'Would it not be better in the end to jump out?' I used often to have such scenes in the Council that I sprung up, rushed out, slammed the door, threw myself on my bed, and howled like a dog."

Speaking of the constitution of the Confederation, he said that they could have made a treaty of confederation with the King of Saxony, who was a clever, conscientious man, of German sentiment. With the King of Hanover this had not been possible, and so they had been obliged to annex Hanover.

Finally, I questioned him about my project of a more widely extended confederation. He expressed himself willing to enter into negotiations, but I was to treat directly with him. (I remark here, I had particularly insisted that it was a question only of a confederation of States as in the constitution of the old Confederation, without a Parliament.) I was to write to him, too, personally, and he would answer me personally. Naturally such a correspondence would be preliminary, and in no way binding, but that would not prevent *us* from considering the correspondence as a very serious matter, and one to be handled with great caution. The result of the conversation is: Bismarck will have nothing to do with South Germany for the moment. He does not believe in the war with France, but in the case of a war he is as firmly convinced as Moltke that Prussia will conquer, and he will try to crush Bavaria if she does not hold to the alliance treaty.

BERLIN, *June 23, 1869.*

Spoke with Roggenbach of the Constitution project. He says that the National Liberal party and the Prussians generally see in such a project only the disorganisation of the hitherto existing situation. They want everything or nothing. No legislative work in common, they say here, without subordination to the authority of the Confederation.

Baden will not consent owing to her fear of being in a minority.

He advises: *no* Parliament, whether South German or North German, a return to the former project, confederation of States, joint military arrangements, analogy with the old Confederation. No further concession to the South German National Liberals.

MUNICH, *July 8, 1869.*

Yesterday at half-past twelve I received a telegram from Lipowsky informing me that the King wished to see me and Schlör at Berg between two and three. The telegram ended that the carriage would call for us at our houses. At first I thought that the last sentence must be a mistake, but a carriage really came and took us to Berg through the Fürstenrieder Park. We arrived at three. The King received me first. He gave me his hand, as he seldom does, and was very amiable. I spoke to him first of my report of the conversation with Bismarck and enlarged on the reasons why a further threatening of Bavaria through Prussia was not now to be thought of. The King is always distrustful, which is due to his extremely sceptical nature. We could give up the treaty of alliance at any moment, he maintains, as there is a passage in it which makes this possible for us. I, of course,

disputed this; but, on the other hand, I conceded that one can give notice to withdraw from any treaty, if one finds it to one's interest to do so. This, however, is not the case here. I pointed out the danger which this would bring to us. It would be better to conclude an alliance with Prussia on the lines of old German confederation. Those Ministers certainly would be against this who maintained that such an alliance would be too little for the Progressives, and too much for the Ultramontanes. The King answered very pertinently that that would be all the same, and that too much must not be left to public opinion. He could not understand what the Ministers had to do with this. "You are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the others have nothing to do with this." I replied that foreign policy had so much influence on the position of the whole Ministry that we could not take it amiss if the Ministers wanted to know what I was doing. Added to this, the King expresses his surprise to the other Ministers if they do not know what is going on in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and these gentlemen are then naturally set against me. It is in the King's nature to set people against each other. I can only counteract this by the greatest honesty and openness. With reference to the Council, I made a brief statement of the present situation. The King again thought that the germ of the matter was right, as he remarked that the right of the States towards the Church depended on the concordat, and that this would be violated by a one-sided proceeding on the part of the Church. We then came to capital punishment. The King mentioned that he had been much occupied about what I had told him during our last conversation, namely, that I was opposed to capital punishment. We discussed freely the well-known arguments for and against.\* Finally, he drew my attention to the water-colours he had in his room, and then dismissed me. Schlör was then summoned, and when he came back we lunched with Sauer and drove to Starnberg, where we took the train to Munich and reached home at 8.30.

The King was as usual very acute in his questions and answers. It is a pity that his talents are lying fallow, and that he confines himself more and more to the bad company of the horse-breaker, Hornig. Yesterday evening he intended driving to the Riss, probably to escape the arrival of the Emperor of Austria.

The Commission for the distribution of the movable property of the late Germanic Confederation met on April 4, 1869. The last valid agreements are contained in the protocol of the ninth sitting of July 6, 1869. This protocol determines:†

\* The Chamber of Deputies, on March 22, 1867, had accepted a proposal with 87 votes against 44 "that a Bill should be brought before the present assembled Diet with regard to abolition of capital punishment."

† Printed in Hirth's *Annalen des Deutschen Reiches*, 1872, p. 1579.

(1) A division of the common *matériel* of the former Confederacy fortresses, Mayence, Ulm, and Rastatt. Landau is not at present decided upon. This *matériel* remains the common property of the States represented in the conference, and will be "administered, maintained, and supplemented in the interest of the common system of German defence."

(2) The *matériel* in Ulm, Rastatt, and Landau will be administered through the territorial Governments, and that in Mayence through the North German Confederation.

(3) The cost of maintaining and supplementing this *matériel* will be borne by the States which undertake the administration.

(4) Every year in the month of September an inspection shall take place by special commissions, the composition of which is fixed for the different fortresses, and in every commission, Prussians, the North German Confederation, and the South German Fortress Commission, together with the Territorial Government, are to be represented.

(5) The extent of the inspection and the order of business for the commissions is fixed.

(6) The Prussian Military Plenipotentiary must, during the sitting of the South German Fortress Commission, be continually informed of the details of all the transactions of the latter, as regards the movable property. He is to be consulted at the deliberations of the Fortress Commission regarding essential changes in the substance of the fortress *matériel*.

(7) In such questions as concern the duration of the connection of the defence system between North and South Germany, and on such occasions as have essential influence over the whole German defence system, the South German Governments before coming to a decision must hear the views of the North German Confederation; as a general rule these are to be expressed by Military Plenipotentiary, and if the proposals of the North German Confederation are not adopted the Confederation is to be informed of the reason.

To BARON PERGLAS, *Bavarian Minister at Berlin*.

MUNICH, July 12, 1869.

In your note of the 8th inst., which I have laid before his Majesty, your Excellency has set forth your views as to the attitude of the Prussian Government towards the Council in such a way as clearly implies a criticism of the action of the Bavarian Government. I believed that throughout I had informed your Excellency, with the fullest frankness, as to the motives which have led me to take the initiative in this matter. This criticism, however, makes me see that I cannot have expressed myself with sufficient clearness, since you appear to proceed on the supposition that the Bavarian Government, without consideration of the Catholic population of Bavaria, and without being aware

of the support which this population gives to the might and independence of the Crown has thoughtlessly attacked this question and thereby forfeited the sympathy of a part of the nation. If it is admitted, and on this point no doubt can be entertained, that the temporal Governments owe it to themselves not to let the Council come upon them unawares, then it was necessary for *one* Government to take the initiative. But it needs no Machiavelian suppositions to see that the Prussian Government, as a non-Catholic one, was not in the position to take the first step. It would have rendered its position difficult as regarded its Catholic subjects, and it would have been said that Prussia had no right to interfere. The same applies to Würtemberg and Baden. Austria had its own grounds for playing a double game.

There remained of the German Governments only Bavaria. Entirely in order to avoid the conflicts which the impending Council will bring with it if it adopts the announced resolutions, and precisely in order not to endanger further the peace between the Government and the Catholic population, the Bavarian Government was compelled to consider how those extreme resolutions should be counteracted. That a single Government in Rome would accomplish nothing was clear. Only the concerted measures of all or of several Governments could make an impression there, and to introduce these measures a communication to the Governments of other interested States was necessary.

The Bavarian Government has thereby indeed forfeited the sympathy of the Society of Jesus, if indeed it ever had it, but it has won the approval of all good Catholics, who are not under the influence of that Society, and it believes that it has in no way given cause for offence. It may also hope that it has averted those religious conflicts that might be so injurious to the position of Bavaria and to the prosperity of the Church herself.

*From a report to the KING.*

*July 14, 1869.*

. . . The concerted Governments are agreed that the fullest freedom of decision must be firmly assured to the Council in the religious domain, but that on the other hand, every intrusion of this spiritual assembly on the domain of the State must equally firmly be averted, and those resolutions of the Council of the character which the undersigned foresees will bring with them the gravest danger for religious peace and for the tranquillity of social life.

On the other hand a difference arises as to whether steps to prevent resolutions of the kind shall be taken at once or whether we are to wait until resolutions of the kind are actually drawn up. If the motives on which the latter alternative would be based were the genuine ones, if, for instance, it were really incredible, as is

advanced on the side of Austria in particulars, that the majority of the bishops would let themselves be hurried into extreme decisions, then certainly not much objection could be raised to delay. But the fear that is entertained by your most obedient servant, the undersigned, is, according to all information, a well-grounded one, and he cannot banish the thought that those States which pretend not to entertain that fear are not guided by these motives but by others, especially by a jealousy of the initiative of Bavaria, and perhaps also because it appears to be in the interest of some States that Bavaria should be more deeply involved in strife with the Ultramontane party than others, and so be hampered in her political action abroad.

Your most obedient servant therefore believes that, in spite of this political diversion against his measures attempted by certain States, we must proceed on the course we have entered upon, but with yet greater foresight and delicacy. . . . It now seems desirable that by the medium of a reliable plenipotentiary of the German States, suited for this mission by his personality as well as by his social position, the necessary steps should be taken at Rome to gain a nearer view of the proposed resolutions and to draw attention once more to the dangers which would necessarily threaten religious peace and the Church herself from such resolutions of the Council as should intrude upon the sphere of State rights.

*Marginal rescript by the KING.*

The negotiations up to the present have shown the difficulty of deciding the Governments to a joint preventive action in the matter of the Council, but have served to awake a more vigilant attention, and so partly fulfilled the end in view. To despatch an agent without credentials, yet intended to speak in the name of the collective German Governments, seems to me, in view of their having hitherto declined joint action and of the varying positions of the different Governments, not quite practicable and unlikely to succeed. If, however, you consider that the Constitution and the law do not arm you with a ready means of defence, and that therefore your care for the full security of my Royal supremacy and for the interests of the State compels you to take the course, I will not prevent you from resorting to it. In that case, however, be sure to send me a report here, and be careful about the person you propose to send as envoy.

LUDWIG.

HOHENSCHWANGAU, July 31, 1869.

TO COUNT BISMARCK.

MUNICH, August 5, 1869.

Your Excellency was good enough to discuss with Baron Varnbüler and myself the further measures to be taken in the



matter of the Council, and it was decided on that occasion, as the course most likely to succeed, to send a common plenipotentiary on a confidential mission to Rome to exercise a moderating influence on the decisions which will be arrived at there. I have since become convinced that this measure will not meet with the adhesion of the collective German Governments, unless, simultaneously with its proposal, the personage can be named to whom this equally difficult and delicate mission is to be entrusted. I have not, up to the present, succeeded in finding such a personage. I wished no longer to withhold from your Excellency the reason of my not having proceeded further in the matter which we discussed; but I hope to make you a further communication so soon as I have succeeded in finding a representative who may be trusted to win acceptance from all parties.

COUNT BISMARCK *to* PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

VARZIN, August 11, 1869.

I am greatly obliged to your Highness for your courteous communication of the 5th inst., which reached me *via* Berlin after some delay. On behalf of this Government I beg to assure you in advance of its agreement with the choice of any person who may appear to the Government of the King of Bavaria to be suitable for the end in view. It will conduce to your Serene Highness's satisfaction to learn that the mutual conversations of the German Governments, taking place, as they did, at a suggestion which proceeded from Bavaria, have already had their effect at Rome in the direction of caution and peace. There is a party there which has deliberately set itself to disturb the ecclesiastical and political peace of Europe with the fanatical conviction that the general misery which results from a catastrophe will augment the consequence of the Church. They reason from the experiences of 1848, and they found themselves on the psychological fact that in this world man, when he is miserable, seeks the support of the Church more eagerly than when he is contented. The Pope, however, in view of the opposition which is declaring itself in Germany, appears to have become more cautious and less accessible to the influence of that party.

We have no doubt, in the parliamentary legislature (in North Germany, at any rate) a crushing weapon against unjust aggression on the part of the spiritual power. But of course it will be better if we are not forced to use it; and I therefore consider that it will be a benefit secured no less to the spiritual than to the temporal authority if, owing to the warnings and precautions of which we spoke, it is possible to avert a conflict between them. The Ministry of Religion has taken pains to exercise a preventive but confidential influence on our bishops.

My health slowly improves, and if I keep away as far as possible

from the sittings of the Landtag I hope to be quite ready for work for the North German Confederation in the beginning of the year.

Accept the expression of the most distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be

Your Serene Highness's

Most obedient servant,

V. BISMARCK.

*Journal.\**

WARSAW, August 10, 1869.

I travelled yesterday *via* Pilchowitz to Gleiwitz to proceed thence to Warsaw. We joined the Polish train at Kattowitz and found the conductors were already speaking Polish. The luggage was examined at Sosnowitz; but as Marshal Berg had sent orders thither, we were allowed to pass through without examination. The train was very full, yet we were left undisturbed. All the time I read *General Leberecht von Knopf*, but found it rather tedious, like all satires that are too much spun out. At Warsaw we were received by one of the Field-marshal's Aides-de-camp, who conducted me in an Imperial carriage to the Hotel Victoria, taking me, moreover, through the private waiting-room of the Imperial Family, which was lit up for the occasion and in which the Chief of Police, a general in full uniform, was presented to me. The crowd was cuffed aside for my convenience, and I was stared at like a crowned head. After a little supper I went to bed at eleven. To-day I went for an early walk in the lovely Jardin de Saxe, and after breakfast I went to pay a visit to Field-marshal Berg. He received me in a very friendly way; took me into his cabinet, which is a large pillared saloon, where he talked high politics to me for an hour and a half. He said that the peace of Europe could only be preserved, and the possibility of a disarmament brought about, if Austria, Russia, and Germany as well were in agreement. This *entente*, however, would be very hard to restore. At this point he explained to me the reasons why Austria and Russia had become unfriendly to one another. In order to do this he went back to the history of the years from 1840 to 1854. The first reason was Cracow. He told me how he carried through at Berlin the setting aside of the Republic of Cracow.† At that time, when the agreement between him, Canitz, and Ficquelmont was signed at Berlin, he suggested that there should be imposed on Austria the condition that she should deliver salt from Williczka at a fixed price to Russia, and that she should undertake not to fortify Cracow. The Emperor Nicolas would not allow this. Shortly afterwards Austria did fortify Cracow, and the Emperor Nicolas was aggrieved.

\* Of a journey to the Wittgenstein estates.

† Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte*, vol. v. p. 546.

In the year 1849, when the Hungarian War was going badly, the Emperor of Austria asked the Emperor of Russia for assistance. Berg was on that occasion sent to Vienna in order to make preparations for the war. He told me how he went to the Emperor of Austria at Brünn, to Schwarzenberg at Vienna, and how he went to Pressburg. Everything was arranged quickly and amicably. The Emperor of Russia went to Warsaw, and was there visited by the Emperor of Austria. Everything was settled except who was to have the chief command. The Emperor Nicolas wished Paskiewitsch to have it, for he knew Paskiewitsch's ambition. However, the Emperor Francis Joseph explained that he could not in honour accord this, as the war in question was against his own subjects. "*Plûtôt périr qu'agir contre mon honneur!*" said he, whereupon the Emperor Nicolas embraced him. Then, however, Paskiewitsch showed spite and malice, and did everything he could to mismanage the campaign, whereby he achieved no other result than to secure a greater pre-eminence for the Austrian general.

Then came the third reason for the schism during the Crimean War, when Austria sent an army to Galicia which did the greatest possible damage to the Russians. Then, and for that reason, hatred of Austria flared up even among the populace in Russia.

Count Berg seems to be an adherent of the old Northern alliance. He wishes to see it restored, complains that Gortschakoff has repelled the advances made by Beust at St. Petersburg, and hopes that it may yet be possible to return to a policy which will preserve the peace of Europe. Only if Russia, Austria, and Prussia joined would France keep quiet, and England attach herself to the three allied Powers. This afternoon he is going to explain to me the policy of the Russian Government with regard to the Catholic Church.

Count Berg came to me at four o'clock to continue his political conversation. He told me the whole story of the Polish insurrection of 1863. The Poles would not have begun it had they not had a promise of support from France and England. The whole rebellion was conducted on that assumption by the leaders of the movement. He then touched on the time of the Minister Wielopolski, who was betrayed by his own people, and finally came to the period of his own administration. The whole of the police arrangements were then in the hands of Poles. He therefore took sixty officers and three thousand soldiers and used them as a makeshift police for a few weeks. Three times he succeeded in uprooting and bringing to justice a secret "National Government," and three times a new one arose; until after the third attempt the Poles gave it up.

In the inquiry which followed it appeared that the clergy were seriously compromised; and it was therefore impossible to avoid getting rid of some few priests. The bishops were, generally speaking, loyal. After the death of Archbishop Fialkowski of

Warsaw, a young priest named Felinsky, then working in St. Petersburg, was made Archbishop on the recommendation of the wife of Meggendorf. This man, however, as was only discovered later, had been with Microslawski, had built barricades, and had taken orders as the result of an unhappy love-affair; and he, too, dabbled in the revolutionary game until they packed him off.

He told me that Lubienski was, to begin with, quite reasonable, but later underwent a sudden change. He was in correspondence with Ledochowski and Chigi, who egged him on. He died on a journey of a surfeit of fruit which brought on an attack of dysentery, which he tried to cure by drinking strong wine.

After he had told me this and much else, Count Berg, accompanied by Tscherkessen, took me in his landau to the Castle of Lazienki, where his sister-in-law and his niece awaited us. There were also there von Minkwitz, the Chief of the General Staff, and another general, as well as young Count Berg, the general's nephew. Dinner was served in a very fine apartment, and we had coffee afterwards in a balcony from which there is a view of the garden. Unfortunately it was a little chilly. In warm weather the castle, surrounded by its ponds and terraced gardens, must be very pleasant to live in.

To-day, August 11, we left by the ten o'clock train for Biala, where we arrived at three.

BIALA, August 13, 1869.

To-day we set apart for a visit to the estate of Olszyn. It is several miles distant from here. We left at eight o'clock. The way lies through fields where they were reaping oats and through the forest: all foreign owned. Half an hour from Olszyn we came to the wood belonging to it, about a thousand acres, consisting mostly of small oaks and beeches of no value in this part of the world. Olszyn is a dismal place, but the soil is not bad. We were received by the farmer, Herr Gerliecz, who formerly had a considerable fortune and a property of his own, but has gone through it all and is now a mere farmer. In the drawing-room hang several pictures in oil painted by himself. Remarkable among them was a Magdalen, a very *décolletée* damsel in a red apron kneeling before a table on which lies a skull, lit from within, which illumines the form of the saint. After we had viewed the buildings, listened to a deputation from the peasantry, and admired the fruit garden, we contemplated the family photographs in the drawing-room, and I conversed with Madame Gerliecz, an elegant blonde Pole, who has a great admiration for Colonel Devel, the *Landrath* of the district. He, too, was on view. Herr Gerliecz and he had had themselves photographed arm-in-arm and the picture hangs in Madame Gerliecz's own room. Thereafter we had to eat the duty dinner, and finally listen to a great

performance by madame on the pianoforte. Gerlicz observed, "*Ma femme, elle est artiste.*" It was Chopin, and she played with great fluency. When we got home, about five, both the young Counts Berg had arrived. They are nephews of the Marshal, and are to shoot with us to-morrow.

August 14.

Shooting to-day. We left Biala at half-past eight, I with one of the young Bergs. The others followed. The shooting-party was assembled on a hill on the railway. Colonel Devel in uniform, his adjutant, a major of Gendarmerie, the Commissary of Redemptions, and various other *tschinovniks*. We hoped to shoot wolves, the weather being good, and we thought that there would certainly be sport. However, we tramped the whole day without result. The various Johnny Raws, who instead of haversacks had slung old money-bags about them, were delighted with a sumptuous breakfast, and were invited to a great dinner in the evening which lasted from eight o'clock till eleven. The walk in the forest did me a lot of good. The young Counts Berg are very well-bred, nice people, and I made friends with them. One of them had been at Ischl to shoot chamois, but had of course been unsuccessful. I proposed that he should come to us next year.

August 16.

Left at eight o'clock for Domaczew to shoot. We went as far as the Bug and then forded the river to the village of Domaczew. From there to the forest the road lies through a desolate waste of sand. I have rarely seen anything more melancholy, as, besides, the sky was grey with heavy rainclouds which soon began to empty themselves. In a village in the forest were the *oblawa*, the beaters, about two hundred in number and attired in the most picturesque costumes. The women had brown dresses and curious red or white caps on their heads. The men were also in brown, and had sandals of birchbark. The shoot was not productive. One of the Counts Berg shot a wolf. We saw nothing. The rain got heavier and heavier, and we were pretty wet by the time we reached the carriage.

August 17.

Drove through the woods from Kuzawka to Januwka, where nearly four hundred peasants were collected as *oblawa*, all in their brown clothes, red scarves, and straw hats. Even the Jews had been called out. There were several Jew boys to be seen with long sticks to defend themselves from the wolves. Much excitement until the *oblawa* got under way; then we went to our stations. I got a place by a narrow glade of the forest. For a long time not a sound was heard. At last the beaters started, and suddenly several shots went off to right and left. I saw two wolves pass

far down the glade, and was beginning to think that the whole thing was over when suddenly there came a great whitish yellow wolf at full gallop through the glade just abreast of me. I fired. He staggered, heaved himself up again, and disappeared. I ran after him, saw him again, tried to shoot again, but the gun missed fire. I thought it must have been a bad shot, but he was found dead a few steps behind me after the beat. Much joy and excitement, for all the other wolves, of which there were seven, had been missed. Only two deer and a few hares had been shot. After another drive, during which I shot a fox, I forsook the chase in order to drive to Holiszow.

*August 20, 1869.*

At half-past eleven we left Biala, and arrived in Warsaw at half-past five. Both the young Bergs were waiting for me with their uncle's carriage and took me to the hotel. After dinner came Count Berg, and invited me to dine for to-morrow. He brought me a whole parcel of the newspaper reports made every day by his diplomatic chancellory, from which I was able to inform myself about the political situation. The old Marshal has a touching fondness for his nephew and adopted sons. He likes talking about them, and is pleased that I am going to give them the pleasure of an invitation to shoot chamois. Count Berg is certainly an excellent man who fills a difficult position with great tact and with as much considerateness as is possible. Every day it becomes clearer to me that no peace is possible between the Pole and the Russian. It is a racial antipathy. The Russian is energetic, thoughtless, unfeeling, and cunning to boot. The Pole is passionate, subtly sensitive, easily hurt, and without endurance — "The Frenchman of the North," in fact, as he loves to call himself. The oppression of one race by the other is seen in everything, and their mutual hatred is thus always kindled anew. You think you are in Russia when you cross the frontier at Sosnowitz, and yet you are in a thoroughly anti-Russian country, whose inhabitants will only remain Russian so long as they are kept down by Russian soldiers, officials, and priests. At present their hope is set on Austria and on a revolution which is supposed to be impending in Russia. I think they are deceiving themselves. The Russian colossus lies like an alp on Poland, and I doubt whether they will ever be able to shake him off for any length of time.

*VIENNA, August 25, 1869.*

After a two days' stay at Rauden I arrived at Vienna early to-day. Visited Count Beust at three. He was, as always, very amiable and obliging. He told me of his newspaper war with Prussia,\* and hoped that all was now over, though he urged

\* Provoked by the despatch of Herr von Thile, dated August 4, which entered a protest against certain expressions of Beust in the Delegations.

that it was very hard to avoid ruffling every one's feelings. The expressions in the Delegations had been misconstrued at Berlin. Speaking generally of the relations between Prussia and Austria, his view was — and this he had often put to Wether — that an understanding would only be possible if Austria made up her mind to leave Prussia a free hand in Germany. Prussia would profit by this from the first, but Austria would lose the friendly dispositions of France and the Franco-Russian alliance would be the consequence. This would be a most serious menace to Austrian interests in the East, and, in fine, Austria was not certain whether, as against Russia, the Prussian alliance offered suitable compensation for the friendly sentiments of France. In this way one step led to another, and it was necessary to keep the whole sequence in one's eye. I urged that I had touched upon the various projects precisely because I wished to see Austria in a permanent position within a league consisting of Austria, Prussia, and South Germany. Our own interests compelled us to that policy, and forbade us to desire an Austro-Prussian understanding at our expense.

Beust reminded me that for that very reason he regarded the South German League (without Austria) as a guarantee of peace, on which I observed that the South German League found its chief stumbling-block in the jealousy of Würtemberg, a stumbling-block which could only be removed by a method which was too adventurous for me to propose to the King, viz., the adoption of the programme of the South German Democracy.

After discussing these and similar topics, I took my leave. I must also note that there was some talk about the Council. I represented to Beust that there was no room for doubt as to what the plans at Rome were, and mentioned Manning, the *Civiltà*, &c. He admitted as much, but said we must have patience. He hoped for a split within the ranks of the Austrian clergy, but this would not come to pass unless the Government maintained a completely passive attitude. In this connection he had great hopes of the Bishop of Salzburg, as a Liberal.

*Extract from a letter from DÖLLINGER, dated HERNSHEIM, Worms. September 5, 1869.*

The letter deals with the answer which the Theological Faculty at Munich had given to the Government. The draft opinion which Döllinger had drawn up was "not materially altered by my colleagues, but additions and amplifications have been tacked to it which were inspired by 'policy,' i.e., the attempt to offend the ecclesiastical authorities as little as possible. And yet, cautious and circumspect as it may now sound, it will nevertheless arouse the deepest displeasure in Rome, in Regensburg, in Würzburg, and everywhere in the Ultramontane party. I myself was surprised, indeed, that my colleagues should have

decided to say so much — more perhaps than the great public at large will care to read when the document is published. No doubt, however, they are as strongly convinced as I am of the magnitude of the evil which threatens the Church.

"It is only a few hours since the Bishop of Orleans,\* who has been here on a visit, left me. From what he told me, I perceive that the number of Bishops who are averse from the Roman-Jesuitical plans, and who intend to oppose them, is greater than I dared to hope. He believes he can reckon on the votes of nearly fifty French bishops, but, at the same time, thinks that a very great deal will depend on the attitude of the German bishops, and, indeed, that they will be called upon to decide the issue. Even in Italy he assures me that several prelates are disposed to join with the opponents of the infallibility theory, and the view that the proclamation of this new dogma is most inopportune, and that it will only increase the difficulties of the bishops, seems, fortunately, to be very widespread there."

#### CARDINAL PRINCE HOHENLOHE *to the* PRINCE.

ROME, September 15, 1869.

. . . Perhaps the Holy Father is still deliberating, but I doubt it. With all my respect for the Supreme Head of the Church, my obedience will be put to a severe test. I trust that God will help me.

I often ask myself, what shall I do in these storms? They have isolated me as much as possible. To give but one example: Reisach and Monsignor Gassner, the Rector of the German Foundation (*Anima*) here, and others keep all the Germans from visiting me. The continual nagging at the Holy Father, so that he is in a constant state of irritation against me — all this and much else makes my position difficult. My isolation, of course, gives me the advantage of having more free hours to myself. If Döllinger were to come here, I would have him to live with me, or if you or he knew of any trustworthy theologian (lay or clerical) whom you could send to me at the time of the Council, and before then if possible, I would give him board and lodging, and it would be very nice for me to have such a man about me for as long as possible.

The Jesuits are now reviving the great comedy in which they appear before the public as divided into two parties. *Au fond* they are one, and are governed by a central control. *Before the public* then, there exist two parties among the Jesuits. One shouts joyously for the infallibility of the Pope (as, for instance, the *Civiltà* does) in order to capture Pius IX., and provokes all good Catholics who are not inclined to the Jesuits to

\* On the meeting of Bishop Dupanloup with Döllinger and Lord Acton at Hemsheim, Worms, see Friedrich, *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils*, vol. ii. p. 396.



speaking against infallibility, and so estrange them from the Pope, who is thus compelled to choose the gentlemen of the *Civiltà* to be his bodyguard. The other set, in which, as it appears, even Father Bekr the General is numbered, and to which I used to think that at bottom Döllinger, too, belonged, shake their heads gravely (though only "in the strictest confidence") with the air of old and experienced people who regard Pius IX. as a light-headed youth. These hold the door open, either for the next Pontificate, or indeed, for the Episcopate (the French Bishops, for instance). And, so soon as there comes a change of wind here, the Jesuits will be the first to be shocked at the *Civiltà* — the toy invented for Pius IX. They will make merry at his expense, and, if possible, pack off the *Civiltà* fathers to Australia, whence at a later date they may be permitted to return as repentant sinners. We have a similar case in the last century in which the Jesuits at Rome expressed detestation of the *Gallica propositio*, while simultaneously in France the General of the Jesuits, with his *bons pères*, subscribed and defended it. All this because they hoped thus to divert the Bourbons and the *Parlement* and the rest from the idea of uprooting the Order.

I believe that the question of the infallibility of the Pope is absolutely independent of the Jesuits. However the issue may be decided, it is in substance all one to them. Hereafter, as heretofore, they will pursue their false morality, their intrigues, and their Godless activities at their ease. They have raised the question of infallibility now as a standard, and have given it into the hands of the *Civiltà* in order that they may use it to impress the Pope. The Pope is charmed with the idea, without the least notion what the old Jesuit party is saying and doing. Touched by their devotion, throws himself into the arms of the *Civiltà*, and in his blindness, embraces the whole Order as the saviour of his honour in the (quite unnecessarily raised) question of his infallibility. He avoids all other counsels, makes every possible concession to the Jesuits — and *les bons pères* laugh in their sleeves. What is the meaning of Dupanloup's going round everywhere agitating against the infallibility of the Pope? He, too, is a Jesuit if he is now behaving as if he had left them only in order to compromise *une masse de monde*, and if possible upset them in the ditch at the critical moment. The decision on infallibility, for better or worse, takes us neither forward nor backward in regard to the Jesuit question. But the infallibility question has thrown Pius IX. so completely into the arms of the Jesuits, that of all his plans and ideas against them not a trace remains. The good fathers know that they can keep a firm hold on Pius IX. only if he is driven into a corner and *must* fly to them for help. Pius IX., for their purposes, must remain wholly isolated, so they are also egging him on against all the Governments in order that, embroiled everywhere, he may never more come upon a green twig.

. . . When the Council comes to pass, the matter may turn out quite otherwise than we fear. But even in the event of its happening otherwise, we must bestir ourselves. You are one of the few who understand this.

As I said, I am a little uneasy when I see Dupanloup behaving all of a sudden like a convert and going about everywhere, even to the Archbishop of Cologne before the Fulda Conference. In Paris, too, even in the *entourage* of the Archbishop, the talk is that a complete change has come over Dupanloup. He says he has quarrelled utterly with the Casa Borghese, and has thrown himself (intellectually, of course) into the arms of the Princess Rospigliosi. I only hope he will not throw his new party into the ditch at the critical moment. We must hope for the best! A very useful dependable person is Hefele, the newly appointed Bishop of Rottenburg. Here they seem to wish to postpone his consecration.

*Report to the KING.*

MUNICH, September 23, 1869.

The undersigned, your Majesty's most obedient humble servant and subject, has the honour to report that he to-day received the visit of the Austrian Minister, Count Beust, who, on his return to Vienna from Switzerland and Baden, stopped for a day in Munich.

The undersigned respectfully believes that the substance of his conversation with Count Beust cannot fail to interest your Majesty, and with his humble duty begs to submit what follows for your Majesty's information.

The visit which the Austrian Minister paid to H.M. the Queen of Prussia at Baden was a mere act of courtesy. Count Beust did not speak of politics with the Queen. This appears to be the more probable, as the fact of the visit and of his invitation to dine with the Queen was in full agreement with the object which your Majesty's most obedient servant believes to have been in view, viz. publicly to put on record the improved relations between Austria and Prussia. From Baden, Count Beust went on to Strassburg in order to pay a visit to the Pourtales family, who live in that neighbourhood. There he met the Austrian Ambassador, Prince Metternich. The mention of this visit led naturally to the situation in France. Count Beust can, as little as any one else, foresee what will happen there on the death of the Emperor Napoleon. He thinks, however, and has caused this to be communicated to the Emperor through Prince Metternich, that the dynasty can only be saved by abandoning personal rule and an unconditional inauguration of Constitutional government. Count Beust has, therefore, advised the Emperor to use all despatch in the reform of the Constitution. He has instanced the case of Austria where the consequences of constitutionalism have been the tranquillisation of the public mind, the revival of

trade, and an assured position in foreign relations. As regards the Empress's journey\* to the East, Count Beust maintains that it was undertaken to keep the Empress out of sight of the French people for a time, as her Ultramontane leanings have made her very unpopular.

The most important visit paid by the Austrian Minister was, without doubt, that to the Russian Minister, Prince Gortschakow in Switzerland. He had a conference with him which lasted several hours, in which the whole European situation was under discussion. It appears to result with fair certainty from what he told me of this conversation, that the object of Beust's journey was, above all, to bring about a better understanding with the Northern Powers in view of impending events in France. Count Beust admitted that the undersigned correctly formulated his intention in the remark that it seemed necessary that the solid Powers of Europe should, in the face of anticipated eventualities in France, come so far to an understanding as to allow their little mutual misunderstandings to rest for the time being, or, as Beust put it, "to stop the pin-pricks." They would, of course, he added, be very far from giving a definite form to these "good relations." There is no question of an alliance, and this would be avoided in order to spare the susceptibilities of France, who will always see a coalition in a northern alliance. There *is*, however, an understanding and much is thereby gained in the interests of the peace of Europe.

The fear lest an understanding between Austria and Prussia might be brought about at the expense of the South German States could not in this connection be left out of account. The undersigned, therefore, carefully sounded Count Beust, and was relieved to find that the Austrian Minister attaches the same importance for the future as he has done in the past to the maintenance of the *status quo*, for he received, with decided approval and with great interest, the assurances of your Majesty's most faithful servant as to the absurdity of the rumours which ascribe to Bavaria the intention of entering the North German Confederation. This would not have been the case had he in any respect changed his views on this point. In this connection he remarked that, theoretically, the situation in Germany was disquieting, but that in politics things depended, in the long run, not on theories, but on existing circumstances, and for South Germany these were not unfavourable.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, September 28, 1869.

This morning I received a telegram directing me to hold myself in readiness to be called for by a royal carriage at twelve o'clock, as the King wished to speak with me at two. I did so

\* To the opening of the Suez Canal.

and was called for at twelve. The Minister Hörmann drove along with me. On the way I discussed with him the Speech from the Throne, and convinced him that it could not stand in the form in which it had been proposed. We drove pretty quickly through the Fürstenrieder Park and arrived at two. Sauer received us. At the appointed hour, I was taken to the King, who shook hands with me and treated me with quite remarkable kindness. He hoped in this way to make me say what he wanted, which was that it was unnecessary for him to open the Chambers in person. This, however, I did not do, but said to him that I hated the King's Speech and the Debate on the Address, but that I could not conceal from him that he would be ill-spoken of if he did not himself come to the opening. We talked backwards and forwards about this, he always trying to get me to say that it was unnecessary, until he was at last convinced that there was no help for it. He wrinkled his forehead all over, but that availed him nothing, and finally he let it be known that "he would consider it." Then we talked about everything you can think of, and the conversation lasted more than two hours. Afterwards came Hörmann, who had to put up with the ill-humour into which the King had worked himself owing to me. Finally, Perglas was also summoned. Meanwhile, I went for a walk in the park. I had said to Sauer that I would do so, and he therefore thought it necessary first to ask the King. The King expressed himself very contemptuously to Minister Hörmann about Lipowsky. It appears that Lipowsky has ruined his position by his foolish chatter. When all the audiences were over, we, that is to say I, Hörmann, Perglas, and Sauer, had dinner in a pavilion in the garden. It was now six o'clock and after the meal was over we drove to Starnberg, and took the train back here.

This evening about ten o'clock, I dropped in at the club, where I found only one sleepy waiter. Such is the dissipation of Munich! The Chamber of Representatives has objected to several of the elections, so that nine members are not able to take part in the election of the President, one member is under arrest, and so can't appear, so that the House as it stands numbers 144 members. Of these, 72 belong to the Ultramontane and 72 to the Liberal party. To-morrow is the election of their President, and if they don't come to an understanding, no election can take place, and we shall dissolve the Chamber. I think, however, that they will agree to elect Edel. It is a pity, for we should have had four weeks' peace and quietness while they were choosing a new Chamber.

*September 29.*

The presidential election in the Chamber of Representatives has still produced no result. Seventy-one votes for Edel and 71 for Weiss. The representatives expect us to dissolve the Chamber.

Bölderndorff advises that they should be allowed to go on holding elections till some one gets ill. This, however, is hardly possible. Great excitement everywhere. This evening I was at Weiler's tragedy *Drahomira*. Horrible nonsense and verbiage. Professor Zachariä of Göttingen came to see me in my box.

# CARDINAL PRINCE HOHENLOHE to the PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

TIVOLI, October 3, 1869.

. . . As to Professor Friedrich, let him come by all means, only it would be well to keep the thing secret until he is with me. In the negotiations with him it would be well to tell him not to mention the chief object of his stay here. He should give some other reason, such as that he wants to see Rome or the like. You will understand that better than I can tell you.

As to Sigmund\* I have certainly reason to suspect that he has been coming nearer and nearer to the Ultramontane party, if not from conviction at least from self-interest, "because he doesn't wish to quarrel with these people." That being so, if he is an honourable man he had better not remain an Envoy under your administration. If, for example, Cardinal Antonelli says to him, "*Le Prince de Hohenlohe veut faire le théologien*," he could give him a conclusive answer. But not only does he not do so but he relates the incident to others with what amounts to official impropriety. His relations with the *Corps Diplomatique* are also past praying for. Seeing that he used to visit me twice a week and now never comes at all, and that he could have made himself immensely useful here by firm and dignified action, whereas he remains quite passive (and not always even that), I have reason to suspect an alteration in his attitude which he may very well have adopted with the main object of not damaging his career. However, what we have now to consider is that it is already too late to send any one here in his place before the Council. Still, a decent man who will do what you tell him, who, in weighty matters will also keep himself in touch with the representatives of like-minded Governments: a man who is safe in his views, who is not an Ultramontane, who will defend you when necessary — but where are you to find such a combination of qualities? I wished very much that Bavaria should have a dignified and trusty representative at the Council, but I fear it will be difficult to find one. If Döllinger were not a *persona minus grata* here he would be very well suited for the post. Failing that, anybody, though he were not exactly a *lumen mundi*, who was furnished with good, strong credentials, some one after the style of Professor Huber, would do.†

\* Bavarian Minister at Rome.

† V. Sigmund, the Bavarian Minister, was transferred to The Hague the same October, and Count Tauffkirchen was appointed his successor.

*Journal.*MUNICH, *October 6, 1869.*

On Saturday I heard that Haneberg\* had been endeavouring to bring the representatives to a milder frame of mind. I therefore went to him, and he told me that he *had* tried, but unsuccessfully, even though there does exist some disposition on the part of the Ultramontane party to deliver themselves from the terrorism of Herr Weiss, who is their ruler. Sunday was day. No sitting on Monday. On Tuesday the final scrutiny was to be held. There therefore remained to me two full days for negotiation. I at once sprung all my mines. Bölderndorff, Hegnenberg, Dönniges, and the others put their best foot foremost. There was a constant running backwards and forwards. The difficulty was that my colleagues were, for various reasons, intriguing against an understanding, and in favour of dissolution. At last it was found possible to persuade the Ultramontanes to send me a deputation on Monday at eleven o'clock. It came, and conferred with me. They had appointed Schüttinger, the Advocate from Bamberg, to be their spokesman, and he explained that they were in a majority, and wanted to elect both Presidents. I made it clear to this gentleman that such a claim made an understanding impossible. They should at least hold a conference with the members of the Left without previously determining on a candidate for the Presidency. This, however, they rejected, and required that the choice of Weiss as first President should remain outside the discussion. The plenipotentiaries of the party of progress came to me in the evening. They explained that they could only go to a conference on condition that all the candidates should be discussed; on the other hand, they were willing to give up their candidate (Edel). While these negotiations were pending Tuesday came, and therewith again a deadlock — 71 against 71. On that the Cabinet met. In spite of the fact that negotiations were in progress, and Hörmann knew this, he proposed an immediate dissolution. I replied that this would compromise me, and would be in the highest degree improper. Stormy scene in Cabinet. Finally they yielded. I telegraphed to the King for an adjournment, which was granted. Yesterday evening came the envoy of the Ultramontanes to say that the party could not consent to the reconsideration of Weiss's candidature. At nine the Progressives came and said that in these circumstances they refused to consent to any conference. This was the end of the negotiations. Dissolution was decided on, and a telegram sent to the King accordingly. I fear we will gain nothing by dissolution. Yet I could no longer oppose it as, if further negotiations had been effective, I should not have been spared the reproach that I was protracting the affair, and their ill-success

\* At that time Abbot of St. Boniface in Munich.

(which was by no means improbable) would have been interpreted to my disadvantage. If Ministers had been less pressing it might have been possible, with peace and quietness, to come to an understanding. In any case, the worse the result of the elections the more people will thank me hereafter for my attempt to secure agreement. A revolution of public opinion, which is at present in favour of dissolution, will take place. That, however, is small consolation. For the time being we have six weeks of peace!

MUNICH, *October 26, 1869.*

The arrival of the King of Würtemberg, which took place on Saturday the 23rd, at ten o'clock at night, did not give me so much bother and correspondence as usual, for on this occasion the King was animated by an unusual amiability, and was prepared to show every possible civility to his Royal neighbour. Unfortunately, however, the King of Würtemberg came here in the strictest *incognito*, so that the offers of quarters in the palace, and other courtesies, were not accepted. However, our King went to Augsburg to meet him, and came here with the Royal party—supper being served at the station. On Sunday at one o'clock I had an audience with the King of Würtemberg. I had caused him to be asked whether, as there was no State dinner on Monday, he would come and dine with me, but he declined. Well, when I was giving my Ministerial and Official dinner on Monday he had Schlör called away to him from table—an inconsiderate action which I took very ill from him, as he knew the hour of my dinner-party. Much more amiable was the Grand Duke of Weimar, who arrived this morning. I had left my card for him with the Aide-de-camp, on which he appeared at my house at seven o'clock. We talked for a very long time about the present situation, about the King, about the elections, about the Council, &c. Now since he, especially as to the last-named subject, asked me questions which required to be answered at some length, my explanations were sometimes rather long, and I observed that sleep was getting the better of him. As his eyes had lost the little brightness they had, I thought it wise to curtail my lecture immediately. Then he woke up again, and was altogether "most kind" and charming.

Cabinet to-morrow, in which Hörmann's circular is to be discussed. I am very curious about that.

MUNICH, *November 22, 1869.*

The elections\* seem to be going to turn out unfavourably for the Ministry. Feilitzsch told me yesterday that in that event Hörmann would resign. Lutz said to Bolderndorff

\* The elections took place on November 16 and 25.

to-day that the whole Ministry would have to resign, for that was their only course. There is no doubt, however, that Lutz is conspiring with Schlör to push me, and several other Ministers, out, and perhaps to become himself Minister for Foreign Affairs, or at least President of the Council of Ministers. In these circumstances the party appears to me to be ruined, or at least very seriously entangled.

At eleven I went to Döllinger to show him Tauffkirchen's instructions. We discussed the situation, and he told me he had just received an autograph note from the King praising his pamphlet against Infallibility, and along with it a letter from Sauer which, however, he had not yet read. We read it together, and it appeared that Sauer was asking his advice as to what he should suggest to the King in the present difficult situation; in particular, what the King should do if the Ministry were to tender its resignation after the result of the elections; whether he should advise the King to accept it or not. I arranged with Döllinger, who happened to have several people with him at the time, that he should come to me within the next few days, when we would consider and talk over what advice he had better give Sauer. We also decided that he should write to Sauer immediately, saying that he would advise him as desired. The first thing to do is to draw up a short memorandum embodying various proposals to induce the King to dismiss the Ministers, *i.e.*, accept their resignation, and to entrust me with the formation of a new Ministry — or rather, to ask me to make suggestions to him. Döllinger might tell him at the same time that, if the King did not wish to do this, he had better nominate Ministers at once in place of those to be dismissed. Völderndorff and I are agreed as to the following:

I to be Foreign Minister as heretofore; Pfretzschner, Finance; Pränkh, War; Pfeufer, Interior (Hörmann to go to the Palatinate); Schubert, Education; Lutz, Justice; Hegnenberg to take Schlör's place.

This would have to be communicated to Döllinger.

If, as it seems from Sauer's letter, the King does not wish to accept my resignation, but prefers to retain my services in a new Ministry, it would be better for him not to entrust me with the formation of this new Ministry, as such an action would be contrary to the traditions of the country; he himself should immediately replace those Ministers whose services he does not wish to retain by others. By this means the machinations of ambition which are usually set in motion during a Ministerial crisis would be nipped in the bud, and the excitement in the country would subside more quickly.

I know the Ultramontane party will expect nothing of me that I cannot do. Consequently, an agreement will be possible so long as no Ministers are nominated with whom I could not work. I would therefore suggest that the following Ministers



should be retained: Pfretzschner, Pranckh, and Lutz; whereas the resignation of Gresser, Hörmann, and Schlör should be accepted. In place of Gresser, State Councillor Schubert should be nominated: he would suffice for the present, and could be replaced by some one else later on. Gresser could take his place in the State Council. I would nominate Pfeufer in place of Hörmann, and would make Hörmann President of the Palatinate. Finally, Schlör should be replaced by Count Hegnenberg, a man whose integrity, past political career, and talent would be of immense value, and whose nomination would do much to allay popular unrest. I am confident that I can persuade Hegnenberg to accept; it would therefore be desirable to depute me to negotiate with him, unless the King prefers to nominate him immediately. In that case I ought to be informed in good time, so as to prevent him from refusing. The whole prospect of success of the combination I have proposed depends upon his nomination.

MUNICH, *November 23, 1869.*

To-day at 10.45 I went to the Chapel of the Parish Priest of the Ludwigskirche, where Tauffkirchen's marriage with Ernestine Pfeffel was celebrated. We assembled in the priest's drawing-room. The *élite* of society was present. The bride wore an elegant white satin gown with orange blossom, and Tauffkirchen a dress-coat with the black ribbon of the Swedish Order of the North Star. I was Tauffkirchen's marriage witness, and had a special red velvet stool to kneel on in the chapel. When all were assembled, we proceeded to the chapel. Father Weber of the Frauenkirche gave the address. It was full of platitudes, but gave evidence of the lively interest he took in the matter, as he had been Ernestine Pfeffel's confessor for many years. Behind me knelt the old Pocci woman, who gave expression either to a cold in her head or to her emotions by frequent and violent sneezing. After the ceremony we returned to the drawing-room, where there was much kissing. Thence we drove to Pfeffel's, where we drank champagne and where there was more kissing. In the afternoon the newly wedded couple left for Italy.

Here there is great excitement on account of the elections. Without doubt the Ultramontane party has scored a victory. As soon as the results of the elections are known, the Ministry will tender its resignation. All small ambitions are stirred, the vultures make ready for they scent carrion. The Ministry says: "The day is waning and night is falling." I long to face the enemy openly and without reserve. I cannot think of remaining in office if the majority of the Chamber is against me, and I confess that I would gladly resign. Three years in office is enough for the present.

The matter will be decided to-morrow. If the majority of

the Ultramontane party is definitely against me, I shall probably tender my resignation, together with the whole Ministry. Then we shall see what the King will do.

CARDINAL HOHENLOHE to the PRINCE.

ROME, November 26, 1869.

I wrote to you by post the other day. As you will have noticed, the letter was meant to be read in the post, that is to say, by the Secretary of State. Secramondo had circulated all sorts of *horreurs* here about his successor, consequently I have tried to counteract the mischief in every possible way. . . . It is a pity that the Bishop of Passau is not coming. There will be many a sharp tussle, and I fear the Ultramontane party will have the majority. They are impudent and reckless, and though at the present moment the Pope is somewhat out of humour, owing to various manifestations such as Dupanloup,\* North American bishops,† &c., yet I think that at the crucial moment the impudent party will endeavour to outshout all the others. Added to all this, I am still very unwell, so that I am in a somewhat melancholy mood.

Dupanloup's letter is good. It is obvious that *Janus* and other books have stuck in his gizzard.

It now appears that Haneberg will not come to the Council either, although he had every right as Konsultor (a legal functionary of the Church). Cardinal Schwarzenberg is very anxious to have Döllinger here, but does not know how to manage it. I advised him to send for him as his theologian, but he seemed to me to be undecided. Friedrich will probably come towards the end of the month. By the way, arrangements have been made so that the cardinals who do not belong to the party may have as little to do as possible. It was suggested that I should receive the German bishops at my house once a week. Owing, however, to the strained relations between the parties, I could not make up my mind to do so, all the more so as I think the Pope is somewhat suspicious of me, and might be sufficiently deluded to go the length of forbidding the bishops to assemble here. Cardinal Schwarzenberg has promised me to invite the bishops to the *Anima*.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, November 26, 1869.

The Ministers assembled at my house to-day to hear the result of the elections. I began by calling upon Hörmann to

\* Dupanloup's *Lettre au clergé de son diocèse relativement à la définition de l'infaillibilité au prochain concile*, of November 11, 1869, appeared in the *Gazette de France*. — Friedrich, *Geschichte des Vatikanischen Konzils*, vol. ii. p. 396.

† The North American bishops, on the occasion of their passing through Paris, had declared that they considered the definition of infallibility to be inopportune. — *Ibid.* p. 378.

explain the result of the elections. This was soon done, as the numbers were already known, and there was no doubt that the Ultramontanes had eighty and the Liberals only seventy-four votes. A pause ensued, and I immediately seized the opportunity to explain to the assembled gentlemen that it was against me that the general animosity of the Patriotic party was directed. I recapitulated my former programme, emphasised the change in the feeling of the country, and asked the Ministers whether they were not of the opinion that the excitement might be allayed, and a *modus vivendi* be subsequently established with the Chamber if I quitted the Ministry. I begged them to answer me quite frankly.

Hörmann immediately addressed us, declaring that he would certainly take the same course, since the country's vote of non-confidence was directed against him more than any one else. He vindicated himself in detail, pointing out that, at the present time, it is impossible for a Government not to espouse the cause of one party or another. He said it was a question of defending the modern State against the reactionary tendencies of the Ultramontanes. How, then, could a Government exist which did not take sides in this struggle?

Gresser\* assented to these sentiments with a dignified wave of his hand. He seemed to aim at the pose of a Roman Senator, and was most pathetic.

Pfretzschner, who spoke next, admitted "with the perfect frankness of a colleague" that no doubt the animosity of the parties had been directed against his three colleagues, and he "left the question undecided" as to whether a partial modification of the Ministry would not be the best solution of the difficulty.

Schlör then spoke against the idea of a general resignation of the Cabinet. He reminded us that on the occasion of the dismissal of Minister Bomhard the course of a general resignation had not been adopted; he spoke of the sad plight of the Ministry, insinuating that this was due to the fact that the solidarity of the Cabinet had been a mere fiction, and quoted various cases which, according to him, went to prove that I had involved the whole Ministry in responsibilities for actions of which the other Ministers had no knowledge. He mentioned with approval the fact that Pfordten had begun every Cabinet Council by communicating the despatches, and noted with disapproval that nominations had been made in the Diplomatic Corps without the knowledge of the Ministry, and that the liquidation proceedings had been concluded without the concurrence of the other Ministers. The obvious intention of his speech was to lay the blame of the present situation on my shoulders in order to incense the other Ministers against me. I immediately refuted the various charges; I

\* The Minister of Education, who had incurred the special hatred of the Ultramontane party by his education law.

remarked that, if Pfordten had communicated the despatches in the year 1866, it was a most natural thing for him to do, and then reminded that I had often tried to make foreign policy a subject of discussion in the Cabinet Council, but had never met with much attention; I vindicated my right of nominating members of the Diplomatic Corps on the ground that Schlör would allow no one to dispute his right to appoint railway officials; I proved that the liquidation negotiations had only been begun after the decision of the Cabinet; and I justified myself completely. Thereupon Pranckh declared, in his usual downright fashion, that any one who wished to retain the world's esteem must now tender his resignation, and what the King would then do was his business and not ours.

Hörmann then spoke at length, and very much to the point, in the same strain as before.

Lutz then spoke to the effect that he considered it most hazardous to introduce a system of parliamentaryism and party government, and that he would therefore have preferred a partial change of Ministry, but that after Pranckh's remarks he could not but acquiesce in the general resignation and would not remain alone. In any case he declared against a coalition Ministry, in which perhaps Weiss or some other patriot should hold office, saying that he would not remain in such a Ministry.

Schlör harked back to the case of Bomhard's dismissal, which he had in his eye as a precedent, and concluded by suggesting that I should go to Hohenschwangau and explain the position of affairs to the King by word of mouth.

This I at once, and very emphatically, refused to do, as I had no mind to complicate matters, but on the contrary wished to have them cleared up. The King might refuse to accept my resignation, and then I should be accused of having influenced his Majesty's decision.

Finally, I, as President, summed up, saying that it was impossible to take the vote of the majority in this matter, and that in any case I was resolved to send in my resignation to-morrow at noon. I asked them to consider the matter till then. We decided that Lutz was to draft a memorial to the King which he should bring with him next day.

*November 28, 1869.*

On the 27th Lutz brought his draft to the Cabinet Council. The statement did not please me, as it contained much superfluous matter. It was modified, but not sufficiently. In the afternoon we signed it. In the evening Holnstein came to me and told me that it was asserted that I would not resign as I could not afford to do without my salary. I pacified him by the assurance that I had already tendered my resignation. I see more and more clearly that I cannot remain. I could only

retain office if the Ultramontane party were to declare that they approved of my policy — a thing they will not do. The envy and spite of my colleagues in the Upper House would acquire weapons against which I should be defenceless, if they could reproach me with holding office from self-interest against the will and without the confidence of the country. I should soon be worsted by such attacks, and then be dismissed with scorn and shame, instead of as now, with honour. If I resign now I shall be missed, and it will always be possible for me to take office again. Moreover, I cannot remain with Schlör.

*Letter in which the PRINCE tenders his resignation.*

MUNICH, November 29, 1869.

When, three years ago, your Majesty did me the honour to entrust me with the direction of the Ministry of the Royal Household and of Foreign Affairs, and appointed me to the office of President of the Cabinet, I began my official career with a public statement in which I indicated the aims of Bavarian policy in the following terms:

“To prepare the way for a federation with the other States of Germany as soon as, and in so far as, this should be compatible with the maintenance of Bavarian rights of sovereignty and the independence of the country; until this goal should be reached, to create a power which should command respect not only by the organisation of the Army, but also by the development, on liberal lines, of our internal administrative machinery.”

Your Majesty's assent has made it possible for the Ministry, under my Presidency, to carry out these principles in their essentials during my term of office. Although the general political situation of Europe has made it impossible to form a federation, by means of which I am persuaded the existence of Bavaria would be more firmly assured than hitherto, we have nevertheless succeeded in strengthening the friendly relations between Bavaria and the allied German States in such wise as to gain that support without which a State in the position of Bavaria cannot exist. The renewal of the Zollverein has safeguarded the economic interests of Bavaria, and the result of the negotiations concerning the federal property of the sometime Germanic Confederation, has secured the necessary co-operation of German States in military matters, without exacting sacrifices from Bavaria which would not have been compatible with the independence of the kingdom. The social legislation which has been passed affords a liberal foundation for the development of the internal conditions of the country, while in the new Army organisation will be found the germ of that external force which inspires respect and which I designated at that time as the essential condition for the existence of the Bavarian State. But from the very beginning of my Administration these principles and their consequences have been attacked

by a party which at that time had but few votes in the Chamber of Deputies. This party has continued from that time onward to stigmatise the policy of the advisers of the Crown as disastrous both for your Majesty and for the country. They have succeeded in infecting others with the distrust which they themselves manifested.

Your Majesty has nevertheless honoured me during these years to such a degree with your Royal confidence as to render me deeply grateful, all the more so as I am aware what efforts were made by my opponents to undermine your Majesty's confidence in me.

Supported by this gracious kindness, I have been able hitherto to disregard the attacks of my enemies. After the result of the recent elections, it was, however, my duty to consider whether I was still in a position to devote myself successfully to your Majesty's service. I was obliged to answer the question in the negative. The humble representations of the Ministry, dated yesterday, attempted to lay before your Majesty the reasons which make it apparent that it is no longer advisable for the Government to be carried on by the present Ministry.

I subscribe to the conclusions arrived at in that document, and can only add that it would be against my conscience to hold office in view of the fact that there is a solid majority of opponents of the Government in the Chamber, and in view of the opposition in the Upper House, to which I should be exposed to a greater degree than formerly, because they could on every occasion taunt me with the country's want of confidence. For the successful fulfilment of the duties of my office, more energetic action is necessary than will be possible for me under existing conditions.

I venture, therefore, respectfully to beg your Majesty to place the conduct of affairs, hitherto entrusted to me, in other hands, at present more fitted to defend your Majesty's interests. At the same time, I lay on the steps of the throne the expression of my inextinguishable gratitude for the proofs of confidence and gracious kindness which your Majesty has lavished upon me during the last three years.

*To the KING.*

MUNICH, *December 1, 1869.*

Your Majesty has informed me, through your Secretary, that you are still graciously pleased to place confidence in me, and that I am therefore to continue in the conduct of affairs despite the result of the elections. In view of this most gracious proof of your confidence, it would not become me to emphasise my conviction that I might possibly serve your Majesty and the country more effectually at a later date if I now retired from political activity. On the contrary, it is my duty to obey your

Royal wish, and I must forthwith consider how I may best serve your Majesty while I retain my office.

In respect to this, I suppose I may consider it your Majesty's wish that my task shall not be to heighten the party struggle which, unfortunately, is raging only too fiercely in the country, nor to endeavour by means of one-sided measures to stamp out the so-called Patriotic party. I rather believe it to be your Majesty's wish that an attempt should be made to unite the moderate and loyal elements of this party with those of the others in common efforts for the good of the country, and to heal the breach among the people. Reconciliation, then, will, I believe, be the end for which I must strive, and by which the policy of your Majesty's Government must be guided.

This will entail no change in foreign policy. As your Majesty is aware, my aim in this field has always been to reconcile the conflicting interests of the great Powers of Germany, as well as to reconcile the imperative demands of national thought with the principle of equality of rights of all German peoples, with the irrefutable rights of Bavarian independence, and the unimpeachable sovereignty of your Majesty's throne. Every step is known to your Majesty, and your Majesty approved of every step I took when directing our foreign policy. Moreover, I do not believe that the majority of the so-called patriotic party desires anything different from what has been done during the last years. I am convinced that they would not, any more than your gracious Majesty's Ministry, wish for the rupture of the treaties of alliance, of the Zollverein, of the national community of law, which knit together North and South. Probably a loyal and unreserved exposition of the facts and a clear designation of the ends in view will suffice to remove the present distrust.

If, however, this should not be the case, if this distrust should attach to me personally, or if the majority of the Patriotic party should really have other aims and pursue an anti-national policy, then indeed, with the best will in the world to obey your Majesty's wishes, it would be impossible for me to continue in office. For I could never consent to relinquish the programme with which I undertook the duties of Foreign Minister; or to renounce the endeavour to remedy the sad case in which Germany found herself after the year 1866; and to try, on the foundation laid by the Peace of Prague, to weld the North and South of Germany into a higher federal unity. But I doubt, as I said, whether the patriotic party would demand such a policy.

As regards the home policy, there is no doubt that there must be a change, in so far as the Government must regain complete impartiality and must cling to it conscientiously. This impartiality must, however, make itself evident, not by weakness in the face of the excesses of all parties, but by the endeavour to obtain respect for the law regardless of parties. For this it is above all essential

that the belief in the impartiality of officials should be revived, by which alone their actions can attain respect and weight. The decisions of the State officials must on no account appear to be dictated by party spirit. The Government and its officials must act objectively, and thereby show that they are superior to the parties. On the one hand, then, we must proceed in the direction I have indicated, but on the other we must satisfy the urgent claims of all parties in so far as they are justifiable.

Among these I consider universal suffrage of the first importance. I must therefore beg your Majesty's gracious consent to make a statement on this subject in the next Speech from the Throne. The second measure to be adopted in connection with the above is the reform of the Upper House. Your Majesty is aware that I had included this in the measures I proposed in my programme, when I accepted my present office. I think it necessary to leave this question no longer undecided; but in order to meet your Majesty's wishes, I would be willing to forego the principle of suffrage, and would suggest that we adopt in its stead the principle of Nomination. Finally, as regards the concession of the right of initiative of which the last Chamber demanded so urgently, I must beg your Majesty's permission to put an end to this fruitless strife between the Crown and the representatives of the country.

It will no doubt be necessary to make some changes in the Ministry in order to carry out these measures in the spirit in which they are conceived. In particular, a man must be appointed as Minister for Home Affairs who is capable of supporting this policy with complete conviction and of defending it before the Chamber. The Minister of State, von Hörmann, by no means lacks the necessary capabilities, nor is he wanting in devotion to your Majesty or in energy; but since he regards his resignation from the Ministry as unavoidable, and since your Majesty shares his opinion, the first thing to do is to appoint the two Ministers for Home Affairs.\* Your Majesty was pleased to ask me, through your Secretary, whether it would meet with my approval to nominate State Councillor Schubert in place of the Minister of the Interior for Church and Education, and President Lerchenfeld as Minister of the Interior. As far as State Councillor Schubert is concerned, I have no objection to make. With respect to Freiherr von Lerchenfeld I venture to advance, with all respect, the following doubts as to his suitability. Freiherr von Lerchenfeld is a capable official of honourable character. But in the choice of a Minister, more especially when the Ministry which he is to join pursues a definite policy, regard must be had not only to the man's qualities, but also to his political reputation. Now Freiherr von Lerchenfeld is looked upon as an Ultramontane. He may not deserve this reputation, but as President he has certainly acted in such a manner as to give grounds for this opinion, and his nomination in Hörmann's

\* The Ministries of the Interior and of Education.



place would therefore be considered as equivalent to a change of policy. It would raise the hopes of the Opposition without satisfying them, and would at the same time completely undermine the confidence of the Liberals in the Ministry. This appointment would have the appearance of yielding to the Ultramontane party to an extent which would by no means be justified by the Ministry's policy of reconciliation and compromise. Consequently, I could not without inconsistency work together with Freiherr von Lerchenfeld in a Ministry.

However, before your Majesty comes to a decision on this point, and before I could, in fact, advise a modification of the Ministry in order to put an end to the present crisis, I think it absolutely indispensable that your Majesty should take the following steps. It would be advisable for your Majesty, in accordance with the traditions of the Constitution, to consult the leaders of the Opposition who have the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, and hear their opinions and proposals. Your Majesty would thereby put the Ministry on a firm foundation and render its existence possible. In doing so your Majesty will in no wise impair the Crown's right of an exclusive and final decision in the choice of the Ministers, and will be in a position after having heard their proposals to act according to your Majesty's own convictions. For your Majesty is King of the *whole* country and of *all* parties, and I am convinced that it will be to your Majesty's interest to hear the other side of the question too. It will be a manifestation of sovereign impartiality, and I think the many loyal adherents of your Majesty in the ranks of the so-called patriots are worthy of this gracious favour. If I may be allowed to express my humble opinion to your Majesty, I think it above all advisable for your Majesty either to command to Hohenschwangau one or two of the leaders of the Patriotic party such as Ministerial Councillor Weiss, State Councillor von Schrenck, or Freiherr von Thüngen, or else your Majesty should instruct your Secretary of State to inquire their opinions, not only on the situation in general, but in particular on the formation of a Ministry of their party and its programme. Should these proposals not meet with your Majesty's approval, your Majesty would only then be completely justified in considering my respectful suggestions set forth above. Should this be acceptable to your Majesty, I repeat the assurance of my willingness (of which I have already informed your Majesty by telegram) to retain my office in the Ministry according to your Majesty's desire. Then, and then only, will the Ministry be able to meet Parliament with confidence, and a swift return of this crisis be averted.

*Journal.*

HOHENSCHWANGAU, December 3, 1869.

Result of the conference at Hohenschwangau. Owing to the numerous letters from all sides which have been sent to them

from Munich, the King and his advisers have come to the conclusion that it will be impossible to retain Hörmann and Gresser in office, and that both these Ministers must be replaced. I opposed this, and proposed to postpone the changes in the Ministry until after the opening of the Chamber and the first debates. But the fear that this would lead to further breaches and prevent the pacification of the country outweighed my arguments, so that I did not carry my point.

The King assured me of his full confidence, and at first wished to accept the resignation of the whole Ministry and entrust me with the formation of a new one — or rather, commission me to make suggestions on the subject. I declined this, as it is not a propitious moment for such a proceeding. The formation of a new Ministry would at the outside result in the removal of Hörmann and Gresser: why, then, use such high-sounding phrases as “the formation of a new Ministry”? It would also be contrary to usage. The King then requested me to suggest other Ministers in place of Hörmann and Gresser. He dropped the idea of having Pracher and Lerchenfeld, to whom I emphatically objected; but, on the other hand, he would not hear of Feder and Pfeufer. I argued with him on the subject, and finally came to the conclusion that after consulting with the Ministers, and after detailed discussion with Hörmann himself, “who would best be able to nominate his successor,” I should write to the King within the next few days.

The King agrees to my laying a franchise measure before the Chamber. Moreover, I am to make suggestions to Eisenhart\* as regards the form which the dismissal of the Ministers is to take, and the form in which the memorial of the Ministers is to be drawn up.

The King refused to entertain the proposal for a previous conference with the Ultramontanes, for the irrefutable reason that we were not dealing with a united party, and could therefore not confer with party leaders, but only with private persons. This the King asserted had been done to a sufficient extent by Eisenhart, and he would have nothing to do with their proposals. The King assured me repeatedly of his particular confidence. He was perfectly conversant with all the stories, intrigues, gossip, &c.

*To the KING'S SECRETARY EISENHART.*

MUNICH, *December 5, 1869.*

. . . I spoke this morning at once with Lutz and Schlör; I talked over the situation with the former and informed him of

\* On September 21, 1869, the Ministerial Councillor Lipowsky was removed from his post of Secretary to the King. Eisenhart, Councillor of the Court of Appeal, took his place, and was made a Ministerial Councillor and Secretary to the King on January 5, 1870.

his Majesty's decisions. I smoothed out the little difference I have had with the latter, so that I think I shall get on with him quite well now. Then I went to Hörmann and communicated his Majesty's wishes to him, and also informed Gresser. We had a Cabinet Council at one o'clock. Herr Prankh and I reported about our journey, and I informed all the Ministers of the Cabinet that his Majesty accepted the resignation of the Ministers von Hörmann and Gresser, but declined to accept the resignation of the others. As regards the form, it was agreed upon by the two gentlemen concerned, and by the other Ministers, that it would be most suitable if you were to suggest to his Majesty that he should signify his refusal of the resignation of those Ministers he wished to retain in office, and his acceptance of the resignation of von Hörmann and Gresser, under his Royal sign manual. This might be done at the request of the whole Ministry. But it might be advisable to send each of the retiring Ministers a private note. I would also suggest that the two gentlemen be consulted as to the possibility of their further service. The administration of the two offices might be carried on by Councillors of State.

As regards the appointment of new men to these offices, all men of understanding whom I have consulted are of the opinion that Herr von Feder is the most suitable man. I really know of no one else. We have made such a concession to the Ultramontane party in removing Hörmann and Gresser that the further concession of appointing a Minister with Ultramontane tendencies is quite unnecessary. Feder is a Liberal, but has never given offence to the Ultramontane party. I should prefer Count Hegnenberg, but I have no doubt that he would refuse.

It would in any case be well for me to receive a telegraphic reply. Then I could talk to Feder at once and the matter would be settled. If it is postponed for some days the excitement among the office seekers will increase. Every man who can write his name believes at such times that he is fit to be a Minister, and is dissatisfied if he is not nominated.

*To the KING.*

MUNICH, *December 5, 1869.*

Your Majesty graciously requested me to make suggestions to your Majesty with regard to the appointment of Ministers of Education and of the Interior. As far as it was possible in this short time, I have made the most searching inquiries. I have consulted with experienced officials, and in particular, at your Majesty's special request, with the late Minister of the Interior. All are unanimously agreed that, at the present time, the most suitable man for the office of Minister of the Interior is the President of the District Government of Ansbach, Herr von Feder. In his favour it may be noted that he is a very cultured, experienced, and thoroughly loyal official, that he possesses eloquence,

and that his placability of character will be a guarantee that he will give no offence to any one in the present difficult situation.

All the other State officials who by their rank would be suitable to fill a Ministerial post, and whom I have discussed with my colleagues, are in one way or another either not acceptable to your Majesty, or useless, or impossible at the present juncture. Under these circumstances, since your Majesty wishes to put an end as soon as possible to this period of uncertainty, no course is open to me but humbly to crave your Majesty's most gracious permission to negotiate with President von Feder in your Majesty's name. As regards the office of Minister of Public Worship and Education, your Majesty has already commissioned me to approach State Councillor von Schubert on the subject, which I shall do to-morrow.

### *Notes.*

MUNICH, *December 7, 1869.*

Sunday Cabinet Council. Informed Hörmann and Gresser of his Majesty's decision to accept their resignation. Consulted Schlör and Lutz in the evening. We decided to suggest President Feder to the King. I reported to the King immediately. Went early on Monday to Hegnenberg. He is not averse to being Minister of the Interior. Wants twenty-four hours to think it over. On Tuesday, the 7th, he sent me a letter from his doctor, strongly dissuading him. I then telegraphed to Berg to ask permission to negotiate with Feder. The King would have nothing to do with Feder. I replied that I knew of no one else.

Summoned the Ministers to a Council to-morrow morning at ten. Negotiated with Schubert to-day, who makes difficulties and pleads that his health is too precarious. He will think the matter over till to-morrow.\*

MUNICH, *December 9, 1869.*

Spoke again to Hegnenberg this morning at the King's request. He proved that it is impossible, as he suffers from a heart affection which completely unfits him for any work.

Spoke to Marquard Barth. He is delighted to hear that I am not going to form a coalition Ministry: he abhors Lerchenfeld, Daxenberger, and Völderndorff. Approves of Feder and Schubert. Also recommends Hohe! Pfeufer, too, would be acceptable to the Progressive party.

Went to Schubert in the afternoon. He was out, but came to me later. He vacillates again, and wants further time for consideration.

Telegraphed to Feder, who will come here.

Afternoon reception of diplomats; evening reception of Ministers.

\* According to a telegram to Eisenhart, dated December 8, he refused on that day.

• December 10, 1869.

Spoke to Feder at twelve. A timid bureaucrat, who has not sufficient self-confidence to accept office. He went away promising an answer. I conferred with the Ministers, and wrote to Feder telling him what we offer. In the evening he and Schubert sent refusals. Wrote to Eisenhart suggesting Pfeufer as an *ultimum refugium*.

MUNICH, December 15, 1869.

Decision of Cabinet Council: Convocation of the Chambers necessary. Provisional appointment to the Ministry of the Interior not advisable.

Consequently, Minister of the Interior, Pfeufer or Braun (direct election); Church and Education, Lutz. Sent report to Hohenschwangau. Telegram with provisional announcement.

December 17.

Telegraphed to Eisenhart that Braun accepts.

In the Speech from the throne with which the Landtag was opened on January 17, 1870, King Louis said in reference to the party disputes during the elections: "The bitterness of the rivalry between opposite parties has recently become very acute. Many erroneous and disturbing notions have consequently been widely disseminated. Confident of the patriotism and good sense of you all, I indulge in the hope that the example of moderation which you set to the country will materially contribute to its pacification.

"I am aware that many minds are filled with anxiety that the just independence of Bavaria is menaced. This fear is groundless. All the treaties which I have concluded with Prussia and the North German Confederation are known to the country. In conformity with the treaty of alliance, to which I have pledged my royal word, I, together with my powerful ally, will be answerable for the honour of Bavaria, if our duty calls us.

"Much as I wish and hope for the restoration of a national federation of the German States, I will consent only to such a combination of Germany as does not jeopardise the autonomy of Bavaria.

"By upholding the independence of the Crown and the country I am fulfilling a duty not merely to Bavaria, but to Germany. The possibility of a prosperous development of a United Germany on a firm foundation of Law can only be secured if the German races do not voluntarily surrender."

A committee on January 18, 1870, was elected to draw up an address to the King in answer to the Royal Speech. This committee included, in addition to the Officers — the First President, nominated by the King, Freiherr von Stauffenberg the Second President, elected by the Chamber, Freiherr von

Thüngen; and the two Secretaries, also elected by the Chamber, Reichsrat von Niethammer and Count von Lerchenfeld — three members specially elected for this purpose, namely, the president of the Protestant Supreme Consistory, von Harless, Freiherr von Aretin and Reichsrat von Bomhard. Paragraphs 4 and 5 in the draft proposed by the committee ran as follows: "Sincere loyalty to your Majesty and unshaken fidelity to the country and its independent development have produced among the majority of the people a feeling of mistrust, to which the result of the elections has given expression — a feeling accentuated by the party spirit of the Ministry.

"The noble words of your Majesty are calculated to calm excited feelings; but thorough confidence will not be restored until your Majesty succeeds in finding as advisers of the Crown men who combine good intentions with firm action and possess alike the confidence of your Majesty and of the country."

After the Second President, Freiherr von Thüngen, in the general debate on the draft address, had supported a vote of censure on the policy of Prince Hohenlohe, the latter replied: "Since the Second President has yielded to my wish that I should be given an opportunity of meeting the charges which are contained in the address, I will avail myself of it. I cannot but feel a certain surprise that the members of the honourable committee are now for the first time filled with this distrust of His Majesty's Government, although they have been for three years in opposition to this same Ministry without having shown any sign of want of confidence. On the contrary, the most important and most momentous act of the Ministry, of which I have the honour to be head — the renewal, that is, of the Zollverein — was passed with the approval of the majority of the honourable House, in which the majority of the members of the committee were. Two years have since elapsed. During that period not a single act of my official career has been subjected to any criticism whatever; and I imagine that you would not have neglected to criticise if any reasons for so doing had existed.

"The Chambers separated for the last time in May last.

"What new events have occurred since to justify the censure which it is now proposed to pass on the Ministers?"

"The Second President says that there are no definite facts, but a succession of small facts which, combined together, justify the want of confidence.

"The Second President has called attention to my attitude in the Tariff Parliament. An opportunity is thus afforded me of throwing light on the attacks to which in this connection I have been exposed in a portion of the Press. It is a question of the speech which I made on the occasion of my election to the post of Vice-President.\* I beg my opponents to recall to their memory what I then said. I pointed out the fact that I owed my elec-

\* See page 342.

tion to that post to the confidence which the members of the Tariff Parliament reposed in me, and I inferred that this confidence was due to the work I had done outside my duties as a member of that Parliament.

"I defined my work by saying that it aimed at promoting the unity, reconciliation, and agreement of the German races. I cannot understand how such efforts can be stigmatised as crimes by the organs of the so-called patriotic party.

"However, I will now leave the small facts and proceed to the real gist of the matter.

"President Freiherr von Thüngen has publicly stated that the censure was especially intended for me, and that the want of confidence extended to my whole political attitude and views for the last twenty years.

"If then, my Lords — I am addressing the honourable members or the Committee — you had hitherto found no fault with the Ministry, I may assume that you did so because you felt you could not do so with success.

"I need not trouble to defend myself further against such charges, but I owe it to myself to cast a glance on my whole political career during the last three years. And I am the more induced to do so from the admirable and thoughtful words of his Royal Highness, Duke Karl Theodor of Bavaria.\* My Lords, I will not go back to events previous to 1866. I will not inquire whether the fate which befell Bavaria in the year 1866 might not have been avoided by a timely adoption of the proposals affecting the reform of the German Federal Constitution. These proposals were not adopted by the Government of that day with the promptitude necessary to lead to satisfactory results. The Second President was perfectly right in referring me to my former action in this honourable House. I did not fail to utter warnings, which were, however, disregarded. Bavaria was therefore taken unprepared by the events of the year 1866, and had to pay the penalty for previous political mistakes.

"The position of Bavaria at the close of the year 1866 was miserable. The bond which had hitherto united the German States was snapped, the Germanic Confederation was dissolved, Austria had withdrawn from all close connections with Germany, the Zollverein was announced, and Bavaria, accordingly, was not only menaced in her political position, but exposed to the danger of seeing her economic interests damaged. The North German States were partly incorporated into Prussia, partly on the point of entering the closer Federation. The terms of the Peace of

\* Duke Karl Theodor had emphasised "the necessity of the restoration of a national confederation embracing the whole of Germany," and had testified that the previous administration of foreign affairs had unceasingly aimed at the twofold purpose of maintaining the independence of Bavaria and of establishing a federal Constitution which should embrace the whole of Germany. On these grounds he had refused to add his name to the vote of censure contained in the proposed address.

Prague offered the South German States the consolation of being able to join a union, whose national connection with the North was preferred to a closer agreement between the two.

"In August 1866, I had called the attention of this honourable House to the dangers which would arise from such a position of affairs. I have not a word to retract from what I then said in the House. I advised it to use the opportunity, while things were not yet fixed, of promoting the union of the South German States with North Germany, before the North German Confederation was concluded.

"I said: 'If the structure of the North German Confederation is ready we shall either be excluded, or we must accept terms which may prejudice the rights of the dynasty and the country. The honourable House and the Government were not of my opinion, and when, at the end of the year 1866, I entered the Ministry, the foundations of the North German Confederation were laid, and the annexations to Prussia complete.'

"I could not advise any entrance into a Confederation so constituted.

"The explanations which I gave in January 1867 leave no doubt as to the views of the Government on the question of non-entrance into the North German Confederation. But it would have been a mistake if the aim of the Bavarian policy had consisted in mere expectancy, and I did not wait until proposals were made to me.

"I at once opened the negotiations with the South German States, which are well known to you and which were intended to organise the military forces of the South German States on an equal basis, so that they would represent a national and formidable power. This led to the Treaty of Stuttgart in February 1867.

"But my Lords, if it is incontestable that the secondary states of Germany owe their existence not so much to their power as to their historical and stipulated rights, it was my bounden duty to find once more as soon as possible a basis of stipulated rights for the position of these States. This was the reason for the negotiations with Würtemberg and Baden about a constitutional scheme, which aimed at the establishment of a further federation for the South German States with the North German Confederation.

"In the autumn of the year 1867 I gave exhaustive information on the subject, but before this treaty was concluded the Zollverein was concluded on its new basis. I could not even then conceal from myself that the development and reorganisation of the Zollverein must be awaited before it could be determined whether the constitutional scheme which lay at the root of those negotiations contained the elements of vitality. The experiences which we had within the reconstituted Zollverein showed that the constitutional scheme in its original form had no prospect of being realised.



"If the charge is brought against me that I never attempted to apply the most successful means for the maintenance of the independence of the South German States — the establishment, that is, of the South German Confederation — it will not be difficult for me to answer it. A South German Confederation is necessarily made up of the South German States which are parties to it.

"You know that Baden was unfavourably disposed to a South German Confederation. But even in Würtemberg there was no prospect of the foundation of a South German Confederation, although a large party in Würtemberg had included a South German Confederation in its programme. The Government of Würtemberg, some time before, had repeatedly expressed in the Chambers its emphatic disapproval of this measure, and you, my lords, will not in any way expect me to evade the Würtemberg Government and extend my hand to that South German party.

"But even if a Southern Confederation with a South German Parliament and a South German Executive is an impossibility, I consider even at the present day that the true goal at which a Bavarian Minister should aim is to prepare way for the closest possible union of the South German States and the combined action of them all in every political question; and in this connection I think that I may assert that I did more than any Bavarian Minister has ever accomplished.

"The founding of the South German Fortress Commission and the conclusion of the Liquidation negotiations furnish the clearest proof of my words.

"The result was the creation of the only South German institution which has appeared for fifty years. I cannot judge whether this institution meets with your approval. For my part, I believe that in thus acting I acted not only for the interests of Bavaria, but of Germany, since the execution of the treaty of alliance was facilitated by this arrangement."

At the close of the general discussion the Prince said: "My Lords, — I will plainly tell you what I regard as the ground of your vote of censure. Your speakers have joined a party which talks, indeed, of treaties of alliance, but in the bottom of its heart reproaches me with loyally carrying out the treaty with the North German Confederation. Only in this way can I explain to myself the vote of censure which you are formulating; and if I so explain it I must accept it as an honourable testimony to my political exertions."

The vote of censure and the whole address were accepted by the Chamber, with some immaterial verbal alterations. Twelve members voted against it, among them Duke Karl Theodor of Bavaria. The other Royal Princes — namely, Prince Otto, Prince Luitpold, Prince Ludwig, Prince Leopold, Prince Adalbert, and Duke Ludwig of Bavaria — voted for the address.

In consequence of a Royal message of February 1, 1870, neither the address nor the deputation elected to convey it were received. The message ran as follows:

"The address of the Upper House, by marked attacks on the general constitution of the present Ministry without any conceivable foundation either in fact or law, has failed to respond to that spirit of reconciliation which I expressed to the representatives of the country in my Royal Speech, and consequently I am precluded from accepting it. I shall not for that reason fail to restore to the country that tranquillity which the predominance of party feeling has disturbed. The first President of the Chamber of the Reichsrath is at once to be informed of my resolution."

The debate on the address in the Chamber of Deputies began on January 29, 1870. The vote of censure on Prince Hohenlohe was formulated as follows in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft address:

"Your Majesty's phrase, 'All the treaties which I have concluded with Prussia and the North German Confederation are known to the country,' offers good hope for the calming of the minds of the people which have been agitated by a hard fate. No inducement will ever tempt our nation to break a treaty.

"But we live in a time in which serious crises are impending, when there can hardly be any talk of European rights. Treaties with Prussia are usually capable of more than one interpretation, and the possible interpretations spread anxiety among the people. From these circumstances arises the involuntary wish to possess an administrator of our foreign affairs who would enjoy the confidence of the country."

Immediately after the beginning of the general debate the Prince made the following speech:

"Gentlemen, — The proposed address desires an administrator of the foreign affairs of Bavaria who would enjoy the confidence of the country. That clearly means that I do not enjoy that confidence.

"The address does not give reasons for this; it designates the wish as 'involuntary,' and refers in general terms to imminent crises, and to the possible interpretations of which the treaties concluded with Prussia are usually capable.

"I cannot proceed into this field of subjective, involuntary feelings of antipathy and sympathy. If the honourable reporter\* and his partisans, and with them the majority of the Committee, do not consider me competent to interpret, and perhaps misinterpret, the treaties with Prussia in a way which meets the ideas of his political friends, I will not dispute on the point.

"But I would wish to give some solid basis to the debate, and, therefore, I beg permission to lay before you in brief words my political work during my three years' tenure of office. But in doing so I must call your attention to the principles with which I

\* Edmund Jörg, editor of the *Historischpolitische Blätter*.

entered the Ministry, and demonstrate that I remained true to these principles.

"The principles, then, which I declared when His Majesty the King placed me three years ago at the head of the Government are those which the latest Royal Speech firmly and distinctly declares. I do not require to defend them; the draft address agrees so emphatically with these principles that nothing is left to be desired.

"Gentlemen, the keynote of my policy may be expressed in two sentences — the connection of the South German States with the North, and the maintenance of the independence of Bavaria.

"If you examine the proceedings of the Bavarian Chambers since the year 1848, you will hardly find a debate of general political import in which the national idea did not find expression. This thought of the connection of the German peoples, the restoration of the national union, lost none of its importance through the events of the year 1866. The very danger of the position into which the Secondary States were brought by those events — the destruction of the Germanic Confederation — strengthened the demand that this position should be made secure. Starting from the principle that the Secondary States owed their position, not to their power, but to their stipulated and historical rights, the Government was compelled to take into consideration the necessity of restoring to them as soon as possible that basis of stipulated rights. We were then the weaker party in Germany, and history teaches us that the weaker party, when in an unfavourable position, gains nothing by waiting, but only loses. For this reason I have always endeavoured to carry out the provisions of the Preliminary Convention of Nikolsburg, which formed at the time the foundation of the German policy; and whoever is called upon to administer foreign affairs in Bavaria will learn by experience that the later the national union between the North and the South of Germany is settled by convention the greater will be the sacrifices which Bavaria will be forced to make.

The practical application of my principles which I have just explained was at once apparent on the renewal of the Zollverein. If we had then abandoned any economic union with the North, if we consequently had taken up a separate position, which not only in reference to economic interest, but also in reference to our whole political position, would have become an isolated position, there is no possible doubt that we should have been forced to surrender this position in a short time, and with far greater sacrifices of our independence.

"Gentlemen, I am proud of having, then, brought these negotiations to a successful conclusion, and of having been able to obtain the consent of the two Chambers to the Zollverein Treaty, and of having hindered that severance of the South — or, to express myself more accurately, since Würtemberg and Baden had agreed to the renewal of the Zollverein Treaty, that severance of Bavaria — from the rest of Germany.

"A further question to which those principles applied was the uniform organisation of the German military system.

"I lament with you the burdens which are imposed upon the nation for military purposes; but, gentlemen, little welcome as the assertion may sound to your ears, these burdens are necessary in order to save Bavaria from the fate of finding herself defenceless in the hour of danger, and of then being forced to make sacrifices in comparison with which the outlay which we now require for the Army would be a mere trifle. Moreover these burdens cannot be diminished, for the reason that we wish to fulfil the obligations which are imposed on us by the national interests of Germany. The treaties which South Germany had concluded with Prussia to maintain the integrity of German territory were in existence when I took office, and I do not wish to let this opportunity pass without meeting a charge which had been made against me in the Press. I take occasion to state emphatically that I never denied these treaties. If in my speech of January 19, 1867, when I was still bound to keep the secret, I represented the contents of those treaties to be that to which Bavaria had to aspire from general political grounds, no blame can possibly attach to me for so doing. The proposed address so distinctly asserts that a breach of treaty is impossible in Bavaria that I will not waste another word on this point.

"But, gentlemen, there are two ways of breaking a treaty — an open way and an underhand way. If the treaty of alliance is not to be illusory, the military strength of the South must be brought to the level of that of the North, not because the text of the treaty of alliance lays this obligation on us, but from an independent resolution, and because Bavaria owes it to her position and her own worth to be a valuable ally. But because I always attached especial importance to the common action of the South, in order to arrange such an organisation as uniformly as possible for South Germany, the Convention of Stuttgart in February, 1867, was concluded, which was followed by the treaty of October 10, 1868, and by the negotiations of the Liquidation Committee in this summer, the results of which are well known. If it appears from this that the Government has done anything to secure Germany from further disintegration — and its action, I may safely boast, has indisputably contributed to the maintenance of the peace of Europe — no one, certainly, will be in a position to find anything in all these transactions which encroaches on the independence of Bavaria and prejudices the rights of the Crown or the country. My further efforts to bring the German question to some definite solution are well known to you. I have given a full statement of them on previous occasions. Whatever opinions may be held on the matter, the future will teach this one lesson — that no Bavarian Minister will succeed in finding any way to fulfil the duty which is imposed on him by the contents of the Nikolsburg Preliminaries and to harmonise national union with

the independence to which Bavaria is entitled except that which I have followed.

Gentlemen, the practical politicians of this House will admit that it cannot be the duty of the Government of a State placed in the position of Bavaria to devote itself to the barren task of obtaining recognition for theoretical essays whose acceptance depends not on the intrinsic value of the composition, but on the political situation in Europe. The scheme of the so-called South German Confederation falls within this theoretical category. When the Nikolsburg Preliminaries laid down the point that the German States lying to the south of the course of the Main should form a union, &c., the thought — and, indeed, the wish — to change in this way the existing temporary measure into a definitive enactment was amply justified. If you consider the Southern Confederation more closely — you may call it a South German National Union or what you will, so long as you do not understand by it a mere chimera, but a living constitutionally constructed organism — you will admit that it cannot be realised unless the separate States which compose it renounce some portion of their sovereign rights. Both the legislative and the executive power of the individual States would have to be restricted in favour of the collective power of the Confederation. To give but one instance: Bavaria, Würtemberg, or Baden would not have a foreign representative, but there would necessarily be a representative of the South German Confederation. This would be no disadvantage for Bavaria, which assumes a dominant position in the South German Confederation by the number of her inhabitants. But the question is whether our neighbours would be willing to consent to the limitation of their autonomy in favour of a Southern Confederation. This question, so far as Würtemberg is concerned, was answered by the speech of the Würtemberg Foreign Minister in the sitting of the Chamber on December 19, 1868. He said: ‘I ask you, gentlemen, do you wish on behalf of Würtemberg to entrust these matters to the hands of a Confederation in which you are in a dwindling minority? Do you wish that Bavaria shall prescribe to you the management of your railways and postal system. Do you wish orders to be given you by Bavaria in these matters? Is that the opinion of this honourable House? I shall never believe that, and the whole Würtemberg nation would rise against such an experiment, if it had ever to bear the consequences.’

“If it is retorted that this was only the view of the Würtemberg Minister, I would remind you that Würtemberg is not an absolute monarchy governed by Freiherr von Varnbüler, but a constitutional State in which Freiherr von Varnbüler had then the majority of the popular representation with him — and still has, so far as I know. I will also quote the statement of another Würtemberg Minister on the same subject. It is the speech of Minister von Mittnacht. He said: ‘A Southern Confederation

such as the other side of the House would institute, a Southern Confederation in which a Parliament divided against itself and torn by factions would govern, would prove the most effective propaganda for our rapid absorption into the Northern Confederation, a contingency which would hardly be averted by the imaginary citizen army of several millions of combatants.'

"These are the authoritative views as to the Southern Confederation in Württemberg, and I do not believe that a change of Ministry in Württemberg would effect any alteration in them. The Württemberger will reluctantly renounce the independence and autonomy of his country in favour, perhaps, of a German republic, or, possibly, of a combined German monarchy, but never in favour of a Southern Confederation consisting of Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden, such as the supporters of that scheme fondly imagine. But if the Southern Confederation meets with insuperable difficulties in Württemberg, you will admit that, in Baden, impossibility stares it in the face.

"I have now stated to you the policy that I have hitherto followed, and shown how I could not follow any other. I have always explained that the constitution of the North German Confederation is organised in a way that precludes Bavaria from accepting it. I have held this standpoint in all my political actions. But, gentlemen, though I admit that the national idea may be entertained to a degree which is incompatible with the duty of a Bavarian Minister, you will not forget that the idea of the independence of Bavaria may be considered to a degree incompatible with the duties which are incumbent on us all from the fact that Bavaria forms a part of our great German Fatherland. The boundary is here accurately fixed, and you need not expect that I shall ever step over it; I shall never ally myself with the centrifugal elements which are now making themselves felt in South Germany.

"The proposed address admits that no other policy was possible for Bavaria than that which has been followed by the present Government. The address professes agreement with all the principles which the royal speech announced — principles which we have carried out for three years at the command of his Majesty the King. But in this connection the address states that the views of the present Foreign Minister inspire no confidence in the country. I do not believe that any one would ever succeed in proving to me by facts that I have merited this personal want of confidence in my loyalty towards the dynasty or the country. If, however, this want of confidence consists in the idea that I am incapable of playing a double game, that I am incapable of pretending for years to entertain friendly feelings towards North Germany and of changing these into hostility on a suitable occasion, then this want of confidence has some basis. Of such a policy I am not capable; but I can ask that my opponents declare openly, distinctly, and categorically that *this* is the reason why I do not possess the confidence of the patriotic party."

Prince Hohenlohe replied on February 4 to various remarks of "patriotic" speakers with reference to the circular of April 9, 1869, as follows: ". . . I must ask you to regard my behaviour with reference to the Council merely from the point of view of the simple execution of my duty. When in the year 1868 I first was informed that the Council was summoned, it was my necessary duty to define the attitude which the Government would have to adopt towards the Council. I consulted history on the point, and discovered that at the last Council, the Council of Trent, the Governments had taken part in the deliberations. I refer you to the action of the Bavarian Minister, Paumgartner, who, as is well known, took a prominent part in the deliberations of the Council, and made himself conspicuous by proposing the abolition of celibacy. It is obvious that in our day there can be no question of such action. But, according to the reports which I received from Rome, the question of this participation of the Governments in the Council would seem by no means settled.

"The reports in the summer of 1868 all showed that Cardinal Antonelli was then in doubt whether an invitation would be accorded to the Governments to take part in the Council. We were compelled, therefore, to contemplate our being invited to the Council. This was therefore a distinct reason why the Government was pledged to go more closely into the matter and to confer with the other European Governments in order that a uniform attitude towards the Council might be adopted. A second reason why the Government should give its attention to the Council was the subject of the impending discussion. On this point semi-official communications from Rome were volunteered to us, in which the views held by a very powerful party in Rome were laid down. These were the *Civiltà Cattolica* and the *Laacher Blätter*. The statements in those journals as to the intentions ascribed to the Council could not but fill the Government with some anxiety. This was the reason why I turned to the other Governments and called attention to the dangers which might proceed from such resolutions; and at the same time I proposed that a general discussion should be held as to the method on which such resolutions, which were calculated to separate Church and State, might best be opposed. There was absolutely no purpose hostile to the Church in all this. In order to stand on firm ground, the theological as well as the legal faculties were invited to express their opinions. These were published by the Press, and showed that the apprehensions of the Government were well founded. Herr Westermayer, a deputy, has asked what happened in the interval to justify the action of the Government. I will not weary you with details, but will only ask you, when the sitting is over, to read the *Allgemeine Zeitung* of to-day, in which you will find the *Schema de Ecclesia Christi*.\*

\* The *Schema de Ecclesia*, composed by the Jesuit Perrone, revived the claims of the Popes to the supremacy over princes and nations (Friedrich, *Das Vatikanische Konzil*, vol. iii. p. 542).

I think that whoever carefully peruses this *Schema*, which is to be submitted to the deliberations of the Council, will have no doubt that the germ of a conflict between State and Church may well exist in it."

The Prince replied to the confirmation of the vote of censure by Herr Jörg on February 5 as follows:

"... The honourable member said at the beginning of the debate on the address that the eyes of Europe are fixed on this House. He is right, gentlemen. The decision which you will to-day make will be of far-reaching importance — not because the events of this Kingdom are of such great weight for the world, but because the struggle which has been fought here for the last week forms a part of the great struggle which is at the present time convulsing the world. It is the contest between the two ideas, one of which sees something permanent and profitable in the modern constitutional State and in the completely free development of the existing conditions, while the other abhors this modern State and the whole modern development, and looks for the salvation of mankind in the reconstruction of the State on other foundations, in a reconstruction which will be completed and supported by the Church, reorganised in an absolutist spirit. In such a struggle it would be the most useless of all efforts to try to alter firm convictions by words. My judgment is not affected by the assurances of those who disavow any such intentions as I have described, nor by the brilliant speech of a most worthy member, who makes the reconciliation of Liberalism with the Church his life's work, but who will certainly meet with the same fate as all those have met who have made the same efforts. Then, gentlemen, I cannot divest myself of the thought that some part of the Opposition make common cause with the enemies of the modern State only because they have succeeded in using for their objects that excitement which filled men's minds through the events of the year 1866. This excitement, however, depends partially on the anxiety induced by the present condition of Germany, now that the bond is snapped which held the German nations together, down to the year 1866. It depends, further, on the fear of the efforts of those persons who try to give definite expression to the national idea without taking into account the given facts and feelings of the people.

"I have honestly tried for three years to lift Bavaria out of this condition of uncertainty. I have tried now, and actually before the time when an announcement of the Zollverein can be made, to return to a state of affairs defined by treaty. Various speakers have thought that any union of the South German States with the North on a treaty basis is an evil. But I cannot assume this to be the conviction of the whole party. Otherwise your assurances in the fourth clause of the draft address would not deserve that degree of credence which I would gladly extend to you as due to a loyal antagonist.

"You profess that you wish and demand a national union of



the German nations, and I may assume that it is not your desire to banish this wish and hope into a shadowy remoteness and an age in which, through unsuspected events, impossible to foresee, not merely the basis of the treaties for peace in 1866 would be put aside, but the whole course of the development of the German States for centuries would be reversed. But if, gentlemen, you do not wish to wait for this, there is only one means of attaining this national union, and that is the means which the Bavarian Government has attempted. It is the method of preparing a constitutional union of the South with the North by treaties — by acts, that is, of sovereigns possessing equal rights. . . . I must once more emphasise the fact, in answer to the assertions of the honourable Reporter, that I never, even in August 1866,\* pronounced in favour of admission into the North German Confederation. The North German Confederation was not then concluded, and the honourable gentleman would have found in the course of my remarks on that occasion that I spoke in favour of closer relations with the North of Germany just because at that time it was not yet impossible to obtain terms which might have been compatible with the independence of Bavaria. You will perhaps consider such an assumption foolish; but I must beg you not to forget that I was not yet Minister, and as a private member could not possess complete knowledge of all actual conditions. Further I do not hold that admission into the North German Confederation is merely a question of time, as the honourable member, Herr Pfahler, imputes to me. I have so often and so carefully balanced the arguments — and they are not merely financial arguments, as the same speaker thought, which prevent me from regarding the constitution of the North German Confederation as the appropriate form of a national union for us South Germans — that I need say no more. But, gentlemen, it is absolutely impossible to create a national league at all if no rights, no objects, no legislation, if nothing, in fact, which the individual State looked after for itself, is to be looked after for the future by the whole body of States; and I do not consider the independence of Bavaria endangered if she submits certain affairs to a common administration, in which administration, however — and this is the crucial point — Bavaria has as many rights and can cast as decisive a vote as any other State. I agree with the honourable chairman that we should not entrust the superintendence of these affairs and the incidental legislation to Federal officials such as stand at the head of the North German Confederation, and amongst whom Bavaria would have no other powers except that only some six or eight votes could support her in the Federal Council or accept a situation which would mean that in the Reichstag, the minority of fifty Bavarian representatives would be lost in the bulk of the North Germans. In my speech of October 8, 1867, I did not say, as the honourable Reporter thinks,

\* See p. 161.

that I was endeavouring to transfer these rights and powers to the North German Parliament; indeed, I consider the organisation of the North German Confederation and the resulting method of dealing with the Federal affairs not calculated to bring under her influence affairs which had been planned in common. I endeavoured to obtain in these negotiations, and to define by treaty a joint control of all affairs in the management of which the individual South German States had been recognised as equal factors. That was what the negotiations which I conducted with the South German States had in view — for absolutely no negotiations had taken place with the North German Confederation — with reference to a further federation between South and North Germany. For this reason the speech I then made expressly called the league at which we aimed a National Confederation. You know on what rock these negotiations were wrecked. The attempt to found a South German National Union, under which hypothesis the resolutions of the Nikolsburg Preliminaries with respect to a national alliance with the North of Germany were alone to be carried out, has not hitherto been successful. There are political situations in which the will of the individual — indeed, the will of a State — shows itself inadequate. The difficulties which beset a satisfactory reorganisation of Germany have to some extent been increased by the course which the renewal of the Zollverein has taken. I endeavoured then to effect a reconstruction of the Zollverein on a different and more federal basis. But my proposals remained isolated at Berlin, and if we did not wish to abandon the Zollverein we were compelled to assent to its new form. The way then lay open to leave the German Union and to take up an isolated position both in economic and political affairs. The way lay open for us to become self-absorbed. I should not have been able to assent to such a policy, and I was prepared, in the summer of 1867, when I came back from Berlin, and before the Tariff Treaty was concluded, to resign my office. I left the decision to his Majesty the King and to the country. His Majesty the King and the country pronounced emphatically in favour of receiving the Zollverein on the basis proposed by Prussia. In this way the position of Germany as regards federation was rendered appreciably more difficult, and you will understand that the idea of the Southern Confederation was not advanced thereby.

“I am pleased to take this opportunity of stating that the honourable Reporter has expressed his view that no one except myself would have brought about the Southern Confederation. But if the honourable member, Herr Greil, understood that I did not consider the Southern Confederation advisable because the independence of the individual States was thereby menaced, the honourable member has misunderstood me. I have only pointed out the difficulties which face the construction of the Southern Confederation from the fact that it cannot be formed unless each

of the South German States renounces some part of its independence, some part of its autonomy. I added that Bavaria could make this sacrifice, since we were the strongest Power within the Southern League, and the sacrifices thus made would be balanced by the position which Bavaria would assume in the Southern League. I further added that Würtemberg and Baden had little reason to make such a renunciation.

"Herr Greil wishes neither for the Federal State nor the National Federation, nor even that 'we should lean against the palace of the North German Confederation.' Thus the further league at which I aimed was condemned, and a waiting policy was proclaimed as the true Bavarian policy. It is possible that we shall be temporarily driven to adopt that policy. But, gentlemen, there are for us two kinds of waiting. The one consists in our frankly accepting the given conditions, and in our not regarding them as things which are once more to be destroyed, in our carefully observing whether and when the moment will come at which we can co-operate in the great national task while safeguarding the rights and interests of our own smaller Fatherland. There is another kind of waiting, which consists in impatiently searching for the moment when what has been done may be undone, when events may be put back and vengeance taken for past sufferings. You will understand, gentlemen, that I do not sympathize with this kind of waiting; if I did I should contradict my whole political past.

"I cannot conclude without meeting one more charge which has been brought against me by the honourable Reporter; that is, my much-discussed speech in the Tariff Parliament. I believe that the honourable Reporter has not read out the whole speech; I believe the conclusion was forgotten. The last sentence begins: 'The confidence reposed in me by this honourable Assembly will give me the strength to persevere ——' This opening sentence was read by the honourable Reporter, but not the conclusion, which ran: 'in the effort to work with all my strength for the amity, reconciliation, and unity of the German peoples.'

"Gentlemen, I did not make this declaration at a meeting in a foreign country; I made it at a meeting which was held in Berlin to discuss the treaty of July 7, 1867; I made it in a *German* parliament. I did not speak in the spirit of the National Liberal party, but I characterised my course of action when I said I should continue to work for the reconciliation, union, and amity of the German peoples, and so far I could refer to my policy as *Bavarian Foreign Minister*. Surely, gentlemen, things have come to a sad pass if a man cannot speak of the reconciliation and unity of German peoples without exposing himself to the reproaches of a section of his German fellow-citizens. I am convinced that no Minister could have spoken otherwise. But I will tell you how some Minister, after the heart of the honourable

Reporter, would have been compelled to speak. He must have said, or at least have thought: 'Thanks to my efforts, thanks to the efforts of the Press and my party, it is not possible to speak in this room of the reconciliation, amity, and unity of the German peoples.' Gentlemen, I am proud that I could not speak, and never have spoken, in this strain."

KING LUDWIG *to the* PRINCE, *February 6, 1870.*

I have just read with great interest the masterly and really unanswerable speech which you delivered yesterday in the Second Chamber, and while still under the spell of it, I feel compelled to express to you my pleasure and my fullest and most cordial approval.

May your emphatic and eloquent words succeed in dispersing the last clouds of the distrust which has unfortunately not yet been entirely banished.

May you persevere in your honourable office, supported by the consciousness of my unshaken confidence, and not plunge me by your resignation into the dangers of some change of system, with its inevitable disastrous consequences. With my most friendly greetings to you and the Princess, I remain, with all sympathy,

Your devoted King,

LUDWIG.

The section of the address containing the vote of censure was adopted on February 10 by 77 votes against 62.

PRINCE HOHENLOHE *to* PRINCE OTTO OF BAVARIA.

MUNICH, *February 12, 1870.*

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS, — SIR, — Your Royal Highness will graciously allow me in the following letter to discuss a matter of which only your Royal Highness can give the necessary explanation.

In a number of the *Donauzeitung* of the 9th I find the following passage: "The *Kölnische Volkszeitung* reports: The story is told of Prince Otto that he came into the Chamber prepared to vote against the address, but that before the beginning of the sitting another prince of the Royal House requested him to examine in an adjoining room documents which were intended to prove that Prince Hohenlohe, Premier, had pledged himself to Count Bismarck to act in a way which entailed danger to the independence of Bavaria."

Your Royal Highness will agree with me that this article contains the gravest charges which could be brought against a Bavarian Minister, and that I am bound to meet such reports. I take the liberty, therefore, respectfully to beg your Royal Highness to tell me

whether any occurrence could give colour to the above report, or whether the whole matter is a mere invention.

PRINCE OTTO OF BAVARIA *to* PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

MUNICH, *February* 13, 1870.

YOUR HIGHNESS, — In answer to your letter of the 12th, I am glad to be able to assure your Highness that there is no truth whatever in the statement made in that article, and I authorise your Highness to make use of this declaration in case you contradict the above false report. At the same time I add the expression of my sincere esteem, and remain,

Your Excellency's friend,  
OTTO.

*Journal.*

*Council of Ministers on February* 13, 1870.

The Ministers met to-day at eleven o'clock to discuss the situation. I opened the sitting with the remark that all the members would agree with me that I could not remain in office. I should not, however, have wished to proceed without informing my colleagues.

Pfretzschner agreed to this, and in his vote called attention to the fact that the Chamber of Deputies had not passed a vote of censure on the other Ministers.

Schlör began by saying that he would not, in my place, remain a day longer in the Ministry. As regards the other Ministers, he had carefully considered the case. They should not, on their side, prefer their resignation; that was a stale method of procedure. He advised on the contrary that the remaining Ministers should hand in to the King concurrently with my resignation a memorandum, in which they should declare their views on the state of things.

Pranckh did not consider this method correct. The position of the remaining Ministers would be untenable after my withdrawal. They must all simultaneously send in their resignation, and wait to see whether, on a new Ministry being formed, one or the other would again find a place. He supported his view by pointing to the attitude of the Upper House.

Lutz says: "As regards the determination of Prince Hohenlohe, I must leave it entirely to him. If the Prince wishes to remain in office, I will remain with him. To hand in a resignation and then remain in office is mere farce."

After a long discussion of the pros and cons there was a change of opinion, and it was admitted that they could not remain in without me.

Finally it was resolved once more to consider the matter in all its aspects. I declared also that I could not remain in office, that I was in a different position, that no Minister could remain after two votes of censure, and so on.

PRINCE HOHENLOHE *to all the MINISTERS*  
*with exception of the WAR MINISTER*

MUNICH, February 14, 1870.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES, — I have the honour to inform you respectfully that after a conference with the War Minister, and after he had abandoned the scruples which he expressed in the Ministerial Council of yesterday against my isolated procedure, I have resolved to hand in my resignation this very day to his Majesty. I find myself forced to this step from the reason that I shall be received this evening by his Majesty, and it seems to me essential that his Majesty should first have before him the reasons which lead me to make this doubtful request.

*To KING LUDWIG.*

The hope which your Majesty was kind enough to express to me in your Majesty's letter of the 6th instant, that it would be possible to remove the existing mistrust of me, has unfortunately not been realised. The party which after the result of the elections composes the majority in the Chamber of Representatives is not, in spite of every exertion, to be persuaded that this mistrust is unfounded. The constitutional representatives of the country have spoken against me in their majority, and I am faced by two resolutions of the two Chambers of the Landtag which announce the fixed purpose of making it impossible for me to carry on the administration. This mistrust may depend on previously conceived erroneous ideas or on outside influences; the fact remains that both the bodies with which the Government has to discuss the welfare of the country have assumed a hostile attitude towards me. I am most deeply grateful to your Majesty for the steadfastness with which your Majesty has been gracious enough to support me hitherto. But this very gratitude and true devotion to your Majesty impose on me the duty of reflecting whether I can venture to make any further claim on the support of your Majesty without exposing your Majesty to the gravest dangers. The monarchs of Bavaria, so long as the Bavarian Constitution has existed, have never swerved from the constitutional path. Even after the stormy events of the year 1848, when dictatorships or *coups d'état* had to be resorted to in almost all the States of Europe for the restoration of law and order, Bavaria did not allow herself to be forced into this path. The sincere confidence which the Bavarian people reposes in the dynasty is at the base of this fact, together with the innate national loyalty. I cannot advise your Majesty to take another road, which might lessen the confidence of the people in your Majesty, and might lead your Majesty possibly, if not necessarily, to violent measures.

Your Majesty would thus be faced by the greater danger since at no very distant period great revolutions are probable in France, and perhaps in other European States. If such a period coincided with a disturbance in the realm, which would be fostered by the circumstance that the constitutional rights had been opposed, the movement would no longer be directed against the Ministry, but against your Majesty's person. Your Majesty ought not to be exposed to such a contingency. I venture to give the respectful advice that your Majesty may be pleased to keep an ever vigilant control of the resources of the Constitution so that it may always be possible to pacify the country in one way or another. Bearing this in mind, and actuated wholly by the interest of your Majesty, I venture to proffer the humble request to be relieved of the office which your Majesty conferred on me. I am prepared to carry on the business of the Ministry until your Majesty has succeeded in finding a suitable successor.

*Journal.*

MUNICH, February 14, 1870.

I sent in my resignation to the King at three o'clock. At 6.30 I went to the palace. The King received me most cordially. He regretted the position of affairs, and that it had come to this, but he seemed to understand quite well that I could not have acted otherwise. He had been thoroughly posted as to the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies, quoted passages from my speech, and expressed his indignation at the "Patriots." He thought it was a weak move to give way, and contested my view. I tried to prove to him that I was acting only in his interests, since I did not place him in a position where he must either give way or effect a *coup d'état*. I said he was quite within his rights in expressing his dissatisfaction to the Upper House, but that the resolution of the elected representatives of the country signified something else, and the continuance in office of a Minister to whom the Chamber showed such hostility might lead to evil consequences. He protested that he wished to act constitutionally, but recurred to the point that my resignation was a weak surrender. He asked me whom he should send for, and I named Bray. He will not hear of Ultramontane Ministers, and especially not of Thüngen. There was much discussion about constitutionalism, absolute monarchy, &c. He asked me, finally, whether I would not temporarily conduct the business, and I assented. On my way home I met Hörman, who assured me that I had acted quite rightly, and that for the time being there could be no idea of any reconciliation between the Patriotic party and myself.

MUNICH, February 17, 1870.

Werthern was commissioned by Count Bismarck to tell me the following: Up to the last moment it had seemed to him de-

sirable that I should retire. He thought that I should only waste my time in petty disputes, and should then be unable to co-operate in great affairs.

But since the King had come forward so decisively, there was no need of the experiment which would follow my resignation to convince the King that he could not rule with an Ultramontane party. The King was convinced of that. Though, said Werthern, he did not know to what extent and in what measures the King would support me, that only rested with me. The field was open; I had only to begin. Bismarck mentioned, as means of fighting, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and a creation of peers.

Werthern further communicated to me a long *exposé* of the Hospice dell' Anima in Rome. According to a brief of 1859, which has been issued in consequence of an enquiry, Austria retained the protectorate of that institution. Prussia finds this quite unwarrantable "after Königgrätz and Prague," and wishes to dispute this Austrian protectorate. He asks whether I have any knowledge of the matter, how I regard it, and whether Bavaria is disposed to join the measures which Prussia proposes to take in the common interests of Germany. I answered that affairs of the Anima were not unknown to me, but that I considered the matter serious, since Austria and the Jesuits would both be injured, and that I must first consult Tauffkirchen, &c., before expressing myself further.

*Extract from a letter of DÖLLINGER to the PRINCE.*

MUNICH, February 21, 1870.

The situation becomes more and more grave and threatening. The *Donauzeitung* has just announced that, together with Ketteler and Melchers, our Lord Archbishop wishes to go over to the Infallibilists. It is very possible that he is under the influence of his secretary, Kagerer, whose views are well known.

The saving remedy would be common action on the part of the Powers, France first and foremost, Austria, Bavaria. But I fear there is no prospect of this.

As regards the *Schema de Ecclesia*, the initiative taken by your Highness in the summer seems completely justified.

A few months ago I should not have considered any such events as possible.

KING LUDWIG to PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

MUNICH, March 7, 1870.

MY DEAR PRINCE, — You have repeatedly petitioned me to relieve you of your duties as Minister of the Royal House and of Foreign Affairs. After a careful investigation of the circumstances, I have assented to your request to-day in consequence of the *personal* motives you have adduced. In making this explanation to



you I feel myself bound to express to you from the bottom of my heart my appreciation of the self-sacrificing devotion and unfailing loyalty which have marked your tenure of office. To give tangible expression to this appreciation I have included you, my dear Prince, in the roll of the Capitularies of my knightly order of St. Hubertus.

In the renewed assurance of my good wishes,

I remain ever

Your devoted King,

LUDWIG.



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